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ABSTRACT
Two main questions are addressed in this work. First, the evolution of public debt ideas over 
the last six decades. We argue that public debt is an area of academic work in which new 
developments and controversies have been highly influenced by changes in the economic 
context. Second, the public debt experience of a developing economy, Colombia. We show 
how the access of the country to external financing has largely depended on activity in 
international capital markets, and how a long-term relationship between the country and her 
creditors has bœn forged through historical sequences of loans, defaults, and renegotiations. 
Regarding the internal public debt, we argue that it has played the role of shock absorber, and 
the formdization and empirical scrutiny of this idea is central to the econometric sections.
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Essays on public debt in historical perspective. The Colombian experience.
General introduction
The public debt has been a controversial topic which has attracted the attention of politicians 
and social scientists since at least the 18th century. Only this century the debate has reached 
high points during extraordinary economic and political events. Some of these episodes have 
not been limited to national boundaries but have had worldwide repercussions. The interwar 
period is full of examples: the large public debts accumulated by major European economies 
during the 1920s, the outbreak of sovereign default which spread from Latin America to East 
Europe and Germany in the early 1930s, and the default by the allies on World-War-I debts 
with the government of the United States. Large national debts were again a subject of 
contention during World War II, particularly in the United States. Finally, the developing- 
country debt crisis and the likely unsustainable debt paths of some OECD economies 
revived the controversy during the 1980s.
Economists have been largely involved in these debates. Admittedly, the profession has been 
bound to offer explanations of the causes and effects of enlarged public debts and related 
problems, and to recommend possible policy measures.
In this context of historical facts concerning public debt in both industrialized and 
developing economies, and controversies in which economists have played a role, the origin 
of this study was two questions. First, what have been the contributions of economists to the 
public debt debate since the worldwide economic crisis of the early 1930s to the late 1980s? 
Certainly, most of these contributions have been formulated in advanced economies, and to a 
great extent in connection with economic circumstances of those economies. The second 
question is concerned not with the theory of public debt, but with public debt as an historical 
fact in developing economies. The record of sovereign debt since the 19th century has
widely involved developing economies, and attention has been mainly focused on the 
relationship of these economies with international capital markets. No great attention is 
dedicated to the internal debt, nor to the relative function of the internal and external debts in 
developing economies. The second question thus bears on the historical experience with 
public debt of a developing economy -Colombia in our case-, and particularly, on the inter­
relationships between the external and the internal public debt.
Let us first discuss the two questions in turn, and later explain how we plan to integrate them 
into the study. Regarding the contributions to the theory of public debt, the aim is to 
examine them in historical perspective. Our hypothesis is that public debt is an area of 
economic research in which the influence of changing events during the last six decades has 
been apparent. We do not suggest a mechanical causality running from episodes to theories, 
but highlight a strong correlation between facts and the emergence or revival of theoretical 
issues. The historical perspective is also akin to recognize possible links between theories, 
however divergent they are, as well as similarities and disagreements.
As for the public debt experience of a developing economy, the choice of Colombia offers 
some interesting features. As international debtor, the country was one of the major 
borrowers during the first modem cycle of British capital exports in the 1820s. A century 
afterwards, Colombia was a notable borrower during the U.S. lending boom of long-term 
private funds. Recently, in the 1980s, Colombia appeared again in the list of highly-indebted 
countries, and importantly, as the only commercial borrower in Latin America which did not 
share in rescheduling programs during the decade. Its record as sovereign debtor does not 
exhaust the richness of the Colombian experience, however. Colombia's experience with 
public debt, we argue in this study, cannot be properly understood without a simultaneous 
consideration of the internal and the external debt. In this work we show that for economic 
and institutional reasons the external debt and the internal debt have played different 
functions. This diversity of roles is crucial for the definition of our underlying model, as we 
explain below.
How do we plan to integrate our two original questions in the thesis? So far the common 
factor between these two questions is the historical perspective. Economists work with 
models, and so our aim is to find the elements of a model which captures salient features of 
the Colombian experience with public debt. There is a wealth of aspects in that experience 
which a researcher well aware of the theoretical debates would be tempted to consider. We 
propose to examine the following aspects which can be treated as a whole unit. First, the 
share of the country in the boom-and-bust cycles of foreign lending, which make the 
external credit to be largely exogenous. Second, the long-term relationship between creditors 
(British and U.S. investors, developmental organizations, international commercial banks) , 
and debtors (national government, other government entities and corporations) which takes 
the form of an implicit contract which survives possible breakups of formal debt contracts. 
Third, the role of the internal public debt as a shock absorber regarding shocks on the 
availability of external financing to the country, other external shocks (on exports and 
imports), and government expenditure shocks.
The three aspects just mentioned form the basis of our underlying model throughout most of 
the thesis (Parts II, III, and IV). We do not pretend to formalize all of them, however. For the 
purpose of formal empirical analysis we will only concentrate on the third one. In order to 
define a theoretical model, we look for guidance in the theoretical contributions that have 
recognized a shock absorber function to the public debt. We also examine historical 
evidence regarding the Colombian experience; this step is not only important but crucial, 
since the different roles of both external and internal debts mentioned above is revealed by 
historical documentation concerning the country, and not by theoretical priors. Additional 
pertinent statistical information (e.g. trends and cycles of relevant variables) is obtained 
from available sample information. In the final step we integrate all sources of information 
to derive empirical econometric models.
How do we organize this thesis? We have written four parts as follows:
Part I. Contributions to the theory of public debt, 1930-90.
This part is formed by six sections which discuss the theoretical debates on public debt since 
the world crisis of the 1930s. As a whole, these sections attempt to answer our first original 
question.
Part II. Stylized facts on public debt in Colombia and related issues.
This part can be seen as a preamble for our econometric and historical discussions in Part HI 
and Part IV. In this part the reader will be informed about "broad characteristics" of the 
economy during the period of study, and will receive general statistical information about 
the series used in our econometric analysis.
Part in. The behaviour of the internal public debt in Colombia. Econometric analysis.
In this part we formally test the hypothesis of the shock absorber role of the internal public 
debt. Two different models, each one in a different section, are discussed and estimated.
Part IV. The public debt in Colombia. From the Pax Britannica to the interwar period.
Three sections form this part, each one dedicated to illustrate in historical terms each one of 
the three aspects which define the underlying model.
A final point about periods of research and sources of information. The empirical analysis 
covers the period 1925-1985. Our historical enquiry also covered that period, but we have 
chosen to submit the results of our research regarding only the Colombian experience during 
the interwar period and some important antecedents during the Pax Britannica. The historical 
discussion of this experience allows us to examine a full cycle of external indebtedness since 
the creation of debt contracts through periods of default and renegotiation. Unlike the very 
recent experience of the 1970s and 1980s, the interwar period is old enough to have access 
to private sources of information regarding the flotation, default and renegotiation of
external loans. Section II and Section III in Part IV were made possible by the access to 
those unpublished sources of information.
PARTI
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE THEORY OF PUBLIC DEBT. 1930-1990 
INTRODUCTION
Budget deficits and the public debt have been permanent issues of controversy in the 
economics profession. Our aim is to review the developments of that debate during the 
period 1930-1990. However, we will occasionally consider contentions of earlier periods as 
long as they are important to understand recent discussions. Our guiding criterion is to 
review the literature in the context of the times and events in which contributions to the 
public debt debate were made. From this angle we observe the following characteristics in 
the historical perspective of public debt theories:
First. Lastingness appears to be a characteristic of central public debt issues. Some examples 
can be offered. For instance, crucial questions such as whether public debt is part of wealth, 
or whether public debt places a burden on future generations were topics of lively debate not 
only in the 1970s, but also in the 1960s, and during World War II. They were also present in 
Ricardian writings and even central issues in mercantilist arguments. But perhaps the most 
essential question, that of whether or not public debt "matters" has been a permanent subject 
of contention at least since Ricardo.
Second. Progress is also apparent in the approaches and methods followed by economists 
over time to tackle those permanent issues. An outstanding example is the debt neutrality 
controversy. Recent neoclassical approaches (1980s) to this controversy (Section VI below) 
have a major explanatory power than those of David Ricardo (Section II) and even than 
more modem theories such as those developed in the context of the neoclassical synthesis 
(Section I). Further illustrations are offered by other public debt topics. For instance, the 
burden-of-the-debt controversy as treated in life-cycle frameworks of the 1980s (Section IV)
is more powerful than in Hume’s times, and even than in the life-cycle models of the early 
1960s.
Third. Public debt theories appear to have been highly influenced by changes in the 
economy. In this century, the Great Depression of the 1930s, the general prosperity of the 
first twenty five years after World War U, and the slowdown with inflation which affected 
OECD economies in the 1970s, seem to have challenged existing predominant ideas about 
public debt. With changing scenarios new questions attracted the attention of economists, 
and new answers were expected from them. Some illustrations are in order. In the early 
1940s it was already clear that the consensus about continuously balanced government 
budgets had broken down, and a new consensus about cyclically balanced budgets was 
already in place; the reflection on the experiences of the Great Depression and World War II 
provided the foundation for a new view and policymaking.
The questions faced by the economists community could not be the same in the mid-1940s 
when stagnation was the general prediction for the aftermath of the war, and in the mid- 
1950s when unprecedented high growth rates, low unemployment rates and low inflation 
rates were characteristic in most OECD countries. Economists were no longer worried by the 
menace of unsustainable public debt figures which had provoked important contributions of 
Keynesian followers (Section I). By the end of the 1950s the public debt to GDP ratios were 
substantially lower than those achieved at the end of the war, and success in control of the 
business cycle in the first post-war decade stimulated academic interest in economies 
working close to full employment. The neoclassical synthesis was to flourish in this 
economic and academic milieu, and a variety of theories about the role of public debt in full 
employment economies emerged.
The life-cycle literature of the mid-1950s made explicit potential negative effects of public 
debt on capital accumulation; in this case, temporary budget deficits would only be 
acceptable if followed by immediate budget surpluses. The economic environment of the
late 1950s was also propitious for the revival of theories in favour of continuously balanced 
budgets, some of which condemned public debt for its alleged adverse effects on the 
consumption of future generations (Section II).
Optimal nonmonetary growth models à la Ramsey brought into being in the 1920s and 
forgotten for two decades after the outbreak of the Great Depression became a central 
approach to growth modelling in the 1960s; in this context, strong results characterize 
government intervention in the decentralized economy: with nondistortionary taxation and 
for a given level of government spending, neither the size of debt nor the method of finance 
affect capital accumulation.
The 1970s offer a more recent experience of how public debt theorizing is affected by 
changes in the economic environment and in the questions asked to the economics 
profession. Since the beginning of the decade, it was considered that important 
developments in industrialized economies such as the slowdown in productivity and rising 
rates in unemployment and inflation could not be explained within the context of established 
macroeconomics. Economists found themselves confronting new issues, and thought a wide 
theoretical reassessment was called for. This task was to be encouraged by developments 
internal to macroeconomics since the late 1950s. At the centre of those advances were the 
intertemporal models some of which pioneering expositions were made in the field of public 
debt (Section IV).
If it is true that a wealth of approaches in macroeconomics responded to the challenge of the 
early 1970s, it is also true that public debt literature blossomed in the 1970s and well into the 
1980s. There were lively controversies within standard aggregate macro models (Section V) 
but most contributions followed the route of intertemporal-intergenerational models. Some 
common elements shared with other areas of macroeconomics became the foundations of a 
new research program such as equilibrium instead of disequilibrium frameworks, rationality 
instead of fiscal or monetary illusion, and the explicit account of intertempord budget
constraints which restrict the behaviour of economic agents. The main beneficiary of this 
research was the debt neutrality proposition, an old subject of contention in public debt 
theorizing (Section VI).
Not only theoretical investigators but also policymakers shared in the burgeoning public debt 
literature of the 1970s and 1980s. The reappearance of high debt to GDP ratios in most 
OECD economies and the outbreak of foreign debt problems encouraged theoretical research 
and the design of policy options. Topics neglected for decades were rediscovered. The 
sustainability issue is only one example: a major concern by 1945, became obsolete by the 
mid-1950s and revived in the early 1980s. Interestingly, a great deal of recent literature on 
public debt and on sovereign debt owes a lot to fresh reflections of economists on the 
interwar experience.
Having mentioned these characteristics, how do we organize our discussion of public debt 
theories? We have tried to identify research programs in the sense that there is a set of 
assumptions which guide the research process, and also common methods to define and 
solve problems. We have written six sections as follows: In Section I the central issues are 
the Keynes-Lemer approach to budgetary policies, and public debt discussions in the context 
of the neoclassical synthesis. Section II reviews the revival of orthodox budgetary theories in 
the late 1950s and discusses the formation of debt theories according to which institutions 
and political structures should be incorporated in public debt analysis. Moving to the 
flourishing growth theory of the 1960s in Section III, we start by discussing how public debt 
affects standard results in models à la Solow, and dedicate a good deal of attention to the 
question of whether there is a role for public debt in optimal growth models.
After leaving the infinite-horizon models of Section III we explore the life-cycle models in 
Section IV for which life is very much finite. We examine the 1960s' contributions of life­
cycle theorists to the burden-of-the-debt controversy, before concentrating on overlapping 
generations models (OLG). We follow pioneering applications of OLG to public debt, as
1 0
well as more recent contributions, motivated by the question of how public debt affects 
capital accumulation. In Section V our review is absorbed by the vivid controversy of the 
1970s about the long-run effects of fiscal policies. The legacy of this controversy is that 
questions about the effects of fiscal policies should be accompanied by an explicit statement 
of the run and the method of financing. Towards the end of the section we examine how 
traditional crowding out descriptions are modified by the distinction between anticipated and 
unanticipated fiscal policies in the presence of rational expectations.
The debt neutrality proposition is the core of our discussion in Section VI. The first half of 
the section deals with central topics of controversy which followed the Barro (1974) 
statement of debt neutrality. The second half of the section is dedicated to a departure from 
debt neutrality which led to the design of the tax smoothing theory of deficits. Although tax 
smoothing has been mentioned in the public debt literature since the 1920s, its modem 
development is associated with the departure from the Barro model in the presence of 
distortionary taxation. Our emphasis on the subject of tax smoothing is due to the fact that it 
is a central reference in our econometric work in Part III.
This survey aims to place the public debt controversy of the last six decades into perspective. 
That purpose seems to be enough for a survey. In our case, however, the survey also 
provides the frameworks that guide our empirical work in Part III and our historical scrutiny 
in Part IV. At the end of every individual section we indicate in what ways the contents 
reviewed are applied in the rest of the thesis.
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SECTION I
From the Keynesians to the neoclassical synthesis.
Introduction
In this section we deal with public debt controversies between the mid-1930s and the late 
1950s, a period exceptionally affected by the great depression of the 1930s and World War 
n. These extraordinary events and the prosperity of the post-war period had a crucial 
influence on the subjects which attracted the attention of economists. The body of research 
reviewed in this section was also largely influenced by the so-called Keynesian program of 
academic work which dominated between the 1940s and the early 1970s.
In subsection A we start by following Keynes's message on budgetary policies and discuss to 
what extent his views affected actual policies. We refer to a set of statistics related to the 
U.S. experience during the great depression and World War II since it was the main case 
study of contemporary analysts. It is shown that fiscal policy was not a determined 
expansionary device during the depression, and that a resolute expansion of government 
expenditures did not take place until the war years. We also draw on the U.S. experience to 
show how policymakers' assimilation of fiscal activism was a slow process not completed 
until the late 1930s.
Functional finance is our topic of discussion in subsection B. If Keynes rejected the Treasury 
view in the late 1920s and advocated a countercyclical role for public debt in the late 1930s, 
Lemer expounded the "functional finance" criterion in the early 1940s as a sort of 'steering 
wheel' by which to moderate the fluctuations of the business cycle. The Keynes-Lemer view 
discarded the principle of continuously balanced budgets and underpinned the notion of
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cyclically balanced budgets. In subsection C we review the public debt debate in the 
aftermath of the war, in which the disagreement was not about whether the budget should be 
permanently balanced but about the role of fiscal authorities: in contrast to the discretionary 
role suggested in Keynesian spheres, new proposals were made in which rules rather than 
discretion should govern fiscal policies.
The prosperity of the post-war years saw the rebirth of full employment macroeconomic 
analysis, and this was the framework for further developments in public debt theory. 
Specifically, researchers sought to determine the conditions under which public debt changes 
could have real effects on the economy. In subsection D we illustrate these advances with 
reference to some outstanding contributions made in the context of the "neoclassical 
synthesis"; given its importance, these contributions were particular targets of attack from 
debt neutrality advocates in the 1970s. We also review early discussions of portfolio 
theorists, and finish with a brief comment on the challenge posed by the Fleming-Mundell 
model to the neoclassical synthesis regarding policy recommendations.
In the last subsection we make explicit the connections of this section with other sections of 
this work, and examine the possible relevance of the topics treated in the section for our 
historical narrative in Part IV.
A. The background. Keynesian thought and Keynesian policies.
1. Keynes's views on budgetary policies and their influence on actual policies.
Since the publication of the General Theory in 1936, Keynesian economics has emphasized 
the capability of demand management policies to maintain full employment, and in 
particular, the use of fiscal policy to curb unemployment and control inflation. Putting aside 
any difference between "Keynesian economics and the economics of Keynes", it can be 
shown that the original exposition of Keynes's ideas in the midst of the great depression and
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its translation into actual policies was not a straightforward process. We try to illustrate this 
point with particular reference to the U.S. experience. The arrival of Keynes’s ideas in the 
United States and their further development by Keynesian followers are of central 
importance for our historical perspective of public debt theories.
Recent research has emphasized the gradual evolution of Keynes^circumspect approach to 
budget deficits (Dimsdale, 1987,1990). Our reference to Keynes's thinking on budgetary 
policy during the interwar period is necessarily limited and selective. In 1929 Keynes 
questioned the validity of the Treasury view whose meaning was explained by the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, Winston Churchill: "It is the orthodox Treasury dogma, steadfastly held... 
that whatever might be the political or social advantages, very little additional employment 
and no permanent additional employment can, in fact, and as a general rule, be created by 
state borrowing and state expenditure". ^  In the pamphlet Can Lloyd George dû il 2 Keynes 
and Hubert Henderson referred to the Treasury View as follows: "In relation to the actual 
facts of today, this argument is, we believe, without foundation ... If (the argument) is valid 
at all, it must apply equally to ... any new business enterprise entailing capital expenditure 
...".2
The announcement and implementation of the New Deal gave Keynes the opportunity of a 
more direct involvement in U.S. recovery controversies. The New Deal was mainly a 
program of institutional reforms such as The National Recovery Act (NRA).
In a letter to President Roosevelt, Keynes mentioned that the U.S. administration was 
engaged on the double task of recovery and reform, and that the NRA was "essentially 
reform"; rather than reform, recovery required "quick results". Recovery meant "to increase 
the national output and put more men to work". In the depressed conditions of the time, only 
the public authority could "create additional current incomes through the expenditure of 
borrowed or printed money". As for the relative importance of fiscal and monetary measures 
given the deep recession of the U.S. economy, Keynes concluded: "I put in the forefront... a 
large volume of loan expenditure under government auspices ...I put in the second place the
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maintenance of cheap and abundant credit, in particular the reduction of the long-term rate of 
interest".^
In the General Theory. Keynes highlighted the role of public investment as "the only means 
of securing an approximation to full employment" since it was unlikely that the mere 
influence of monetary policy on the interest rate could deliver an optimum rate of 
investment.^ Keynes became sceptical of the capacity of interest rate changes to neutralize 
wide fluctuations in the marginal efficiency of capital, and thus to avert oscillations in 
investment.^ Further, it was part of the social philosophy envisaged by the General Theory 
that cooperation rather than exclusion would guide public debt and private investment in the 
pursuit of full employment.^
Towards the end of the decade, Keynes explicitly allocated fiscal policy to stabilization 
purposes over the business cycle: "Just as it was advisable for the government to incur debt 
during the slump, so for the same reasons it is now advisable that they should incline to the 
oppositepolicy. Aggregate demand is increased by loan expenditure and decreased when loans 
are discharged out of taxation".^ This statement prefigured what Abba Lemer would call 
"functional finance" in the early 1940s as we will see below.
Although it is possible to follow the evolution of Keynes's ideas on budgetary policies since 
the 1920s, actual budgetary policies of Keynesian inspiration in Britain or the United States 
did not take place until the 1940s. Britain achieved a record of continuous annual budget 
surpluses between 1922 and 1937 with the exception of a minor deficit in 1932 (Alesina, 
1988). The Treasury view of the 1920s sustained its official predominance over the 
depression years 1930-32 when the British economy grew at an annual average rate of -2.0%; 
it was not until the early years of World War II that the countercyclical role of budget 
policies was officially accepted (Pollard, 1976). Before turning to the U.S. experience it may 
be recalled that the deflationary budgetary policies applied in Britain during the 1930s
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contrasted with the more discretionary budgetary approaches followed in other major 
European countries (Alesina, 1988. Eichengreen, 1992).
The inertia of classical principles of public finance predominated in the United States over 
the 1930s. Some statistical facts about the great depression reveal the absence of an explicit 
countercyclical fiscal policy. As seen in Table 1, the recovery of GNP was not complete until 
1939. At this date the rate of unemployment was 17% after a peak of 25% in 1933. 
Additionally, a 25% fall in consumer prices between 1929 and 1933 could not be completely 
eliminated until the World War II period.
What do the statistics reveal about monetary and fiscal policies? Columns (1) and (4) suggest 
that for the period 1929-1933 the 30% decline in real GNP was accompanied by a reduction 
of 25% in the average stock of money. Further, column (5) indicates that the government 
budget was practically in equilibrium during the most critical period of falling real GNP and 
increasing unemployment rates. The recovery started with the revival of the money stock and 
a fiscal expansion materialized in an average budget deficit over 5% of GNP in the period 
1932-1936. It was during these years that the stock of nominal debt doubled (Column 6), and 
so did the debt-GNP ratio (Column 7), given the still incipient recovery of economic activity. 
In the second half of the decade the average annual deficit was not higher than 3% of GNP, 
and the stock of public debt accumulated at a lower pace.
Supplementary information about the relative importance of fiscal policy in the 1930s is 
provided by the full-employment surplus (Brown, 1956) in columns (8)-(10). It is shown that 
with only two exceptions, 1931 and 1937, Federal and State-Local governments applied 
conflicting budgetary policies. The expansionary action of the Federal government started in 
1931 -the third year of recession- and its major importance as a proportion of GNP 
materialized in the period 1934-1936; however, it was largely offset by State-Local 
contraction.^ Altogether, the figures in columns (5) to (10) lead to the conclusion that fiscal
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policy was not intended as a strong recovery device and that as a proportion of the size of the 
economy it became weaker through the decade.
In sharp contrast with the 1930s, the World War II period was the scenario for a major 
experiment in so called Keynesian- orientated policies. So as to meet the requirements of war 
production, huge Federal government deficits were required. In fact, the average ratio of 
budget deficits to GNP rose from 5% in the first three years of the war to 22% in the last 
three years and the ratio of public debt to GNP rose from 45% in 1939 to 110% in 1945. In 
the meantime, the real GNP doubled and the rate of unemployment dropped from 15% to 2% 
over the war period.
Although the 1930s were not characterized by resolute countercyclical policies, new ways of 
thinking about budgetary policies came forth since the beginning of the decade. These 
developments were channeled by the defenders of pump-priming policies. Crude versions of 
pump-priming established that a once-and-for-all increase in government expenditures 
would induce a chain of changes in consumption and investment bringing about full 
employment (Sweezy, 1972). More elaborate arguments were worked out by the so-called 
"Keynesian pioneers" at the heart of government agencies (Galbraith, 1975). It is to these 
developments I that we now turn.
2. The role of Keynesian pioneers.
Keynesian pioneers discarded the automatic full recovery and inflation carried out by a one- 
shot positive contribution of government expenditures; rather, they demanded a sequence of 
expenditures in order to stimulate the production of durable goods (Jones, 1978). It was 
shown that significant new fixed investment would not be guaranteed until the expansion in 
consumer demand had removed much of the idle productive capacity created by the slump.
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A specific result of these developments was the Currie-Krost statement according to which 
equal increments in government expenditures and in tax revenues would produce some 
positive effect on income and employment. This was the general basis for the unitary 
balanced-budget multiplier theorem derived separately by William Salant and Paul 
Samuelson in the early 1940s, and introduced in the academic literature -Econometrica,
1945- by Haavelmo (Samuelson, 1979). Further, it was stated that an active fiscal policy 
could require a money financed deficit as the only way of restoring demand and the monetary 
liabilities of the financial system destroyed in the depression -25% during 1929-33 in the 
United States as seen above (Currie, 1978). Keynesians advocated expansionary monetary 
and fiscal policies but confessed that they were not "believers in the sole efficacy of 
monetary measures" (Sweezy, 1972, p.ll7).^
Since from 1933 to 1939 the nominal GNP and M% grew at an annual rate of 9% with a timid 
response of the CPI, and this path of recovery was unable to reduce the rate of 
unemployment to the levels of the 1920s, Keynesian pioneers envisaged the role of deficits as 
a meaningful countercyclical force. Taken as a whole, monetary and fiscal policies would 
play a complementary role in terms of stabilization and growth in a mixed economy (Jones, 
1978). By the close of the 1930s Keynesian pioneers were convinced that the "fiscal policy-
employment battle" would be won The Works Financing Bill of 1939 revealed for the first
time an explicit acceptance of compensatory fiscal actions (Currie, 1972).
Keynesian pioneers played their influential role in the admission of the new ideas at decision 
levels -the White House and other official agencies.!^ In the meantime, a host of 
contributions developed the theoretical basis. Pathbreaking work by Hansen (1941) and 
Samuelson (1939) characterized the Keynesian research in its American version. This context 
was favourable to the emergence of new controversies on the role of budgetary policies. We 
concentrate our attention on the "functional finance" hypothesis.
B. Functional Finance and Public Debt
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Since the beginning of hostilities, full employment was the common goal envisaged by 
economists for the period after World War H. Two different views dominated the academic 
controversy. Hansen formulated his "secular stagnation" hypothesis as an interpretation of the 
downturn of the U.S. economy in the 1930s. It was believed that due to historical factors 
such as an exhaustion of technological opportunities for investment the economy would face 
a prospect of indefinite stagnation. A permanent policy of budget deficits would then be 
required to keep the economy close to the full employment goal. The alternative view was 
more akin to Keynes's fiscal circumspection since budgetary policies were assigned to deal 
with cyclical fluctuations, generating surpluses during booms and deficits during slumps.
Hansen's stagnation hypothesis did not gain the sympathy of the private sector. Permanent 
deficit spending was interpreted as a systematic undermining of the private enterprise system. 
The argument was simple: a permanent deficit would imply a high ratio of debt to GNP, and 
consequently higher income taxes to finance the interests on debt. These higher taxes would 
discourage alternatives of private investment with a negative impact on aggregate demand 
(Stein, 1969). A chain of higher bond-financed deficits and income taxes would provoke the 
final collapse of the private enterprise economy (Lemer, 1943). It would mean a complete 
crowding-out working through the fiscal system.
The alternative view reached a broad approval. New controversies emerged about the precise 
instruments of policy, the concept of full employment goal and the meaning of a balanced- 
budget rule in the postwar era. The striking point was the treatment of taxation as a 
stabilization instrument. The possibility of tax reductions extended the scope of expansionary 
fiscal actions and gained a greater support in the private sector (Musgrave, 1987). An 
outstanding expression of these views was the principle of "functional finance" which we 
review below.
1. Laws of Functional Finance.
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The starting point was the characterization of monetary economies as economies in 
disequilibrium. 11 The basic criterion for government action was that in "any society in which 
money is used as an important element in the economic mechanism", instruments available 
for government policy -taxes, spending, lending and borrowing- should be used according to 
their results on the economy. This principle of judging government measures according to 
their effects on the economic mechanism was called "functional finance" (Lemer, 1943).
According to "functional finance", a government has two financial responsibilities in a 
monetary disequilibrium economy: full employment of resources with price stability and 
stability in the finzincial markets. In the former case the instrument is the budgetary policy 
using taxes and government expenditure to regulate the aggregate spending according to the 
full employment target. This is the first law of "functional finance". In the latter case the 
instrument is the open-market-operations, OMO, through which private financial portfolios 
(money and securities) could be regulated. By using OMO, authorities should borrow money 
only if it was desirable for the private sector to have less money and more public debt; this 
would be the case if a "too" low interest rate was inducing a private investment rate in excess 
of full employment. On the contrary, public debt repayments should follow only if it was 
desirable to increase the proportion of money in private portfolios in order to stimulate a 
higher investment through the reduction of interest rates. This is the second law of 
"functional finance".
"Functional finance" was presented as a framework, a general guide for government financial 
policies. There was no discrimination between policies contrasting the relative efficacy of 
monetary and fiscal actions. Government policies were considered as a whole, and their 
efficacy in terms of the net result of the instruments involved (Bator, 1987). The orthodox 
principle of "sound finance" and the imperative rule of balanced budgets found no room in 
this setting. Less than a decade after The General Theory. Lemer's principle was proposed as 
a "kind of balancing wheel to dampen the amplitude of business cycles fluctuations"
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(Scitovsky, 1984). But however its aspiration of becoming a general guide for policy makers, 
"functional finance" was received in academic grounds more as an intellectual exercise rather 
than as a prescription for practical p u r p o se s . 12
2. The sustainability issue.
When "functional finance" came in, U.S. observers were concerned with the prospect of a 
large and long-term public debt at the end of the war. Large debts were opposed because of 
the possibility of government default and its consequent repudiation. Long-term debts were 
considered a risk for bond-holders because of the potential losses of capital associated with 
inflationary processes.!^ Capital levy was an issue of intensive discussion in the interwar 
period and particularly during the Second World War. It was feared that in spite of some 
failed capital levies after the First War the action could be repeated by the same countries and 
extended to others highly indebted protagonists of the Second War (Rostas, 1940). 1“^
The fears of an ever growing debt were combatted by early Keynesians. Domar (1944) 
considered the case of a policy of permanent deficit financing when interest payments are 
raised by taxation and discussed the Hansen's hypothesis that the debt burden is a problem of 
expanding national income. It is shown that when national income increases at a constant 
rate, the ratio of debt to national income is given by the ratio of the proportion of national 
income borrowed by the government (a) and the rate of growth of national income (n): D/Y 
= o/n. The burden of the debt is given by [a/n]r, where r is the interest rate. Putting it the 
simplest way, given a  and r, the debt burden is a problem of rising national income as 
stressed by Hansen. Also, this simple relationship establishes that if the rate of interest 
exceeds the rate of economic growth any primary fiscal deficit will lead to an explosive debt 
burden. The only way out perceived by Domar is an increase in taxation.
"Functional finance" offered a different vision of the debt problem. First, it stressed that the 
absolute size of internal public debt "does not matter at all" and that interest payments "do
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not constitute any burden upon society as a whole" (Lemer, 1943, p.47). However large the 
interest payments on the debt were, they could be met by new borrowing or by issuing 
money, and not necessarily by taxation. But even in the case in which interest payments were 
financed by current taxes, they would not constitute a social loss but merely a transfer from 
taxpayers to bondholders.
Second, it was postulated that public debt is part of private wealth. In particular, the 
Keynesian saving function was transformed to include private wealth. The consideration of 
wealth effects on private savings offered a further explanation of the way in which bond and 
money financed deficits could make up a gap in total spending. Firstly, there would be a flow 
effect on spending brought about by the budget deficit. Secondly, there would also be long- 
run impacts on private spending due to wealth effects derived from changes in the stocks of 
public bonds and outside money. As private spending increases there is less need for deficit 
financing, and a higher collection of taxes guarantees a tendency toward budget equilibrium. 
Therefore, in the long run the budget would be balanced and investment would coincide with 
intended private saving at full employment.
Two main conclusions can be derived from this discussion of "functional finance". First, 
there is a self-equilibrating mechanism in the dynamics of internal public debt. Accordingly, 
the fears of a never-ending internal public indebtedness expressed in the early 1940s 
appeared to be unjustified. Second, "functional finance" anticipated the wealth effects 
discussions of the early 1970s. Although there is not an explicit formulation of a 
macroeconomic model à la Blinder and Solow (1974) -with its dynamic and stability 
characteristics (Section V below)-, there is a clear distinction between short-run and long-run 
effects of budget deficits. An important difference, however, is that in Lemer's exposition 
changes in wealth do not affect the money market equilibrium.
Finally, a point which is not clear in Lemer's discussion of short-run versus long-run effects 
of budgetary policies is the impact of debt accumulation on capital accumulation. It is
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apparent that while private savings are involved in the financing of budget deficits, Lemer 
does not mention any effects of debt accumulation on the long-run capital stock (Tobin and 
Buiter, 1979). This would be a central question in both the neoclassical money-capital-bonds 
growth models and the lif e-cycle models of the 1960s. (Section III and Section IV below).
By the end of the war, Lemer restated the "functional finance" hypothesis in a broader 
framework for a capitalist economy with government intervention in The Economics gf 
Control (1944). However, it was not a dominant paradigm in the aftermath of the war, since 
the role of budgetary policies became the subject of new views and policy programs as we 
will see next.
C. Rules versus discretion. Variations at the end of the war.
Fears of an explosive government indebtedness in the early 1940s were replaced by proposals 
of a new framework for monetary and fiscal policies after World War II. The sequence of 
budget deficits in the United States was followed by a period of surpluses and budget 
balances. The ratio of public debt to GNP fell from the peatk of 114.0% in 1946 to 76.0% in 
1950 (Table 1). This striking reduction continued along the peacetime period, and ten years 
after the end of the war the ratio was 56.0%. According to recent research a similar 
experience of rapid reduction of the debt burden occurred after World War I and other 
conflicts in the U.S. history (Poterba and Summers, 1987).
The academic discussion of the role of fiscal policy was animated by the appearance of new 
views in conflict with both the classical principles of public debt (continuously balanced 
budget), and the "functional finance" laws. One of these views emphasized the relationship 
between fiscal policy and stability as a framework for the private sector. The proposal ruled 
out discretionary changes of tax rates or government expenditures. Tax structures should be 
unaffected by alterations in the state of the economy, and therefore, fiscal revenues would 
adjust automatically creating deficits during recessions and surpluses during booms. Further,
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it was stressed that tax rates should generate surpluses at high levels of employment with the 
intention of reducing the stock of public debt.^^
A more drastic proposal was presented by Friedman (1948). The aim was a structural reform 
of fiscal and monetary policies so as to achieve the long-run objectives of political freedom, 
economic efficiency and economic equality. Discretionary actions on either fiscal or 
monetary policies are ruled out. There is no room for OMO, and public debt issues should be 
confined to extreme circumstances such as a war.l^ Both ; proposals emphasized the 
importance of rules against discretion in fiscal policy, and Friedman extended the same 
regime to monetary policy. Government is seen as having a path of projected expenditures 
and a tax structure fixed at a high employment level. Given these elements, tax revenues 
would provide an automatic stabilizing effect in response to cyclical fluctuations.
In conclusion, by the end of the 1940s there was a consensus against the classical rule which 
prescribed a continuously balanced budget. The consensus embraced the idea of cyclically 
balanced budgets according to which budget deficits in recessions would be matched by 
budget surpluses in times of prosperity. Yet, there existed different approaches to cyclically 
balanced budgets. One tendency -Keynesians or Lemerians- supported the discretionary role 
of authorities to act on spending and taxation according to deflationary or inflationary 
conditions in the economy; in this context stabilization policies were required to control the 
sources of instability in the private sector. A different tendency advocated a cyclically 
balanced budget by automatic adjustments of the budget to changes in the state of the 
economy; in this view fiscal discretion was seen as a source of instability. These conflicting 
lines of thinking of the early postwar years would reappear in future controversies about the 
role of economic policies in the 1970s and 1980s.
The performance of the U.S. economy after World War II and the extraordinary 
reconstruction of the European economies after the Marshall Plan left the conviction that the 
capitalist system had surmounted its most profound crisis. This atmosphere was favourable to
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the issue of new ways of thinking about economic policy. Economists converged to the idea 
that with an adequate stabilization policy capitalists economies should perform near full 
employment where the classical welfare properties would work again. This convergence was 
known as the neoclassical synthesis and new contributions to the theory of public debt were 
made in this framework. We next illustrate those contributions with reference to some 
specific models.
D. Public debt in Post-war macroeconomic models. 1950-1960.
1. The Neoclassical synthesis.
With the emergence of the neoclassical synthesis the opposition between Keynesians and 
classicals seemed to have come to an end. The theoretical reconciliation was summarized by 
a leading economist in the following passage:
"In recent years 90% of American economists have stopped being 'Keynesian 
economists' or 'anti-Keynesian economists'. Instead they have worked toward a synthesis 
of whatever is valuable in older economics and in modem theories of income 
determination. The result might be called neo-classical economics and is accepted in its 
broad outlines by all but about 5% of extreme left wing and right wing writers" 
(Samuelson, 1955).
The neoclassical synthesis defined the ground rules of a countercyclical fiscal policy. A 
shortfall of investment demand due to the presence of "animal spirits" would mean a wastage 
of resources, a non-optimal condition according to neoclassical welfare principles. The point 
stressed by the consensus was that optimal expansions of public and private sectors 
determined according to the rationality criterion would not prosper automatically. This was 
the challenge for fiscal policy. An expansion of the private sector would demand a tax 
reduction, and an expansion of the public sector would require the corresponding increase in 
government expenditures. The general guidance for policy-makers should be the equalization 
of the social marginal rates of return on both public and private sectors (Samuelson, 1951).
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The controversy about the real effects of changes in the stock of public debt gained a central 
position in influential literature of the 1950s and 1960s. Specific work by Metzler (1951), 
Mundell (1960), and Patinkin (1965) characterized the neoclassical-Keynesian consensus 
about the effects of government intervention through budget deficit financing and through 
OMO. Other authors such as Tobin (1952,1961,1963) extended the Keynesian analysis of 
public debt by applying a portfolio approach.
a. Metzler
Metzler (1951) distinguished two fundamentally different channels of monetary expansion: 
deficit financing through a direct change of money without affecting private holdings of 
other assets, and OMO.^^ The pivot of Metzler's argument is taken up from a prominent 
contribution of Pigou (1943): the wealth-saving relationship. A money-financed deficit 
would generate classical results: after an increase in the money supply, the nominal values of 
wages and prices would change in the same proportion as the money supply leaving the 
equilibrium interest rate unaltered. Quite different results would emerge from OMO, since 
banking authorities could alter the equilibrium interest rate because of their power to affect 
the quantity and value of privately held securities. A further implication of Metzler's analysis 
was that increases in the stock of public debt would adversely affect growth through the 
wealth-saving relationship. This result would be a focus of controversy during the 1950s and 
1960s.
In conclusion, a monetary expansion through OMO would be non- neutral in the sense of 
bringing about a permanent reduction of the equilibrium interest rate. This result would be 
subject to a strong rebutai by Barro (1974) in the discussion of his debt neutrality 
proposition. In fact, if the marginal net wealth effects of government bonds were negligible, 
Metzler's results would be invalid (Section VI below).
b. Mundell
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Mundell's (1960) contribution was motivated by the polemic according to which because of 
the wealth-saving relationship the existence of public debt would cause adverse effects on 
saving and growth. The author carries on Metzler’s analysis of nonneutrality of OMO. Yet 
there are strong divergences in their approaches. In contrast with Metzler’s framework, 
changes in the equilibrium interest rate cannot be explained by the existence of wealth saving 
effects per se. It is shown how with imperfect capital markets changes in public debt through 
OMO can lower, raise or leave unchanged the equilibrium interest rate depending on the tax 
system used to finance the interest payments on debt.20
Since wealth is the capitalized value of real income streams, an increase in public debt 
enlarges wealth only as far as the capitalized value of the future interest payments on the new 
bonds exceeds the capitalized value of the taxes required to finance them. It is shown how in 
the case of specific tax systems -such as corporation taxes- OMO will not be nonneutral. In 
this case, changes in public debt will have no effect on real wealth. In conclusion, in a 
context of capital market imperfections, increases in public debt do not necessarily harm 
saving and growth, the outcome depending on the tax systems in use.21
In a different contribution, Mundell (1971) assumes that part of the private sector has a 
higher discount rate than the government, and thus bond-financed tax cuts involve a net 
wealth effect. In this case the government becomes a financial intermediary through the issue 
of public debt by transferring resources from private agents with easy access to credit 
markets, to agents with restricted access to those markets. This argument would be one of the 
focus of attack a decade later by the defenders of the debt neutrality proposition, as we will 
see in Section VI below.
c. Patinkin.
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In Patinkin (1965) the critical question for the historical perspective of public debt 
controversies is to what extent private agents discount their future tax liabilities derived from 
the issue of public debt. For if those liabilities and the expected interest on public bonds are 
discounted in the same way, government debt does not constitute net wealth. Patinkin 
discusses alternative ways of introducing public bonds in a neoclassical model and proposes a 
synthesis in which the proportion of public bonds to be treated as net wealth can vary 
between zero and one. When this proportion (a) equals one, agents ignore future tax 
liabilities and the whole real amount of bonds is treated as net wealth. Alternatively, when _ 
is zero agents perfectly discount their future tax liabilities: the acquisition of public bonds is 
fully offset by discounted future tax liabilities. The markets and equilibrium conditions are as 
follows:
Market Equilibrium conditions
Labor services Q[W/P, Kq ] = R[W/P] (1)
Commodities F[Yq / r, aVo/rP + Mg/P] = Yq (2)
Bonds B[Yq / 1/r, aVo/rP + Mq /P] = aVo/rP (3)
Money L[Yg, r, aVg/rP + Mq /P] = Mq /P (4)
where aVg/rP is the real stock of outstanding government debt considered net wealth. This 
term appears in both sides of the equilibrium condition in the bonds market (equation 3). The 
expresion [aVg/rP + Mg/P] in equations (2), (3) and (4) is the real net wealth in money and 
bonds.
Metzler’s and Mundell’s neutrality results of a money financed deficit are reproduced in this 
model only if the outstanding government debt is indexed against changes in the price level. 
Otherwise the outcome is nonneutral: the equilibrium interest rate falls.22 Nonneutrality 
follows, too, as a result of OMO. The simplest explanation is that a repurchase of bonds is 
equivalent to a reduction in the real quantity of government debt. While in standard 
Keynesian analysis this portfolio recomposition against public debt leads to a lower
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equilibrium interest rate, in Patinkin's model nonneutrality effects arise to the extent to agents 
imperfectly discount future tax liabilities.
Which are the main legacies of these contributions -Metzler, Mundell, Patinkin- for future 
public debt controversies? The methodology applied in these works has to be understood in 
the common grounds of the Neoclassical synthesis. Metzler's essay was written at a time 
when full employment was seen as a characteristic of the industrialized world and the rebirth 
of classical ideas was a natural development. Mundell's article served to remove fears about 
the negative impacts of accumulated public debt on economic growth in a moment in which 
growth occupied an important position in the hierarchy of goals of government policies. 
Patinkin's second edition of Money. Interest and Prices coincided with successful policies of 
high employment and low inflation in industrialized economies.
The three works are general equilibrium models with full employment. The analysis 
concentrates on the temporary disequilibria and dynamic process of tâtoimement which 
follow alternative monetary policies until a new equilibrium solution is achieved. Metzler's 
and Mundell's differentiation between alternative monetary policies is an anticipation of the 
so-called pure fiscal analysis of the 1970s. More generally, the point of how money is created 
and its real implications had an important echo in the monetarist controversy of the 1970s.
Finally, Patinkin and Mundell state that monetary policies are neutral in a context of perfect 
capital markets where all income streams -including tax changes- are discounted. How 
perfect the markets are or how imperfect the discounting of future tax liabilities associated 
with public debt is, appears to be an empirical matter. The assumption of imperfect 
discounting is used by Patinkin as a crucial but "reasonable" assumption. This reasonableness 
would be directly criticized by Barro (1974) who found that assumption with no a priori 
foundation. This assessment followed Barro's conclusion that there was not theoretical case 
for considering government debt, at the margin, as a component of net wealth (Section VI 
below).
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2. The portfolio approach
The portfolio approach or Yale School of economic policy shares important theoretical 
features with the standard presentation of the neoclassical synthesis. The rationality criterion 
and the choice-theoretic methodology are common grounds of analysis. But reliance on 
rationality and individual preferences do not transform into a belief in the efficient 
functioning of markets. In both two lines of thinking there is room for stabilization policies.
Some points are particularly stressed by portfolio analysts. Money, its properties and 
functions, and the characteristics of other assets which promise to pay money in future are 
the focus of attention. Why do people hold money and other stores of value like bonds of 
public debt? Portfolio theory considered that there was not a conclusive answer to these 
questions and challenges. Even in the early 1980s one of its leading inspirers emphasized 
"the difficulty of explaining within the basic paradigms of economic theory why paper that 
makes no intrinsic contribution to utility or technology is held at all and has positive value in 
exchange for goods and services" (Tobin, 1982, p. 173) This enduring challenge has called 
the attention of portfolio writers to the public good nature of money, and to the fact that 
monetary contracts constitute institutional events and structures.
Standard Keynesian models and specially the IS-LM model have been a permanent matter of 
criticism in portfolio writings. A central issue of debate has been the aggregation procedure 
according to which all nonmonetary assets are replaced by only one a sse t . 23 Also the 
Cambridge tradition of monetary theory has been subjected to criticism. In this framework 
capital investment is considered ths. alternative to money holdings. Government debt, 
particularly short-term bonds are treated as close substitutes for money (Chick, 1977).
Between the extreme Keynesian and Cambridge substitutability hypotheses, Tobin proposed 
a synthesis in which money, government debt, and capital are imperfect substitutes (Tobin,
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1961,1969). Relative substitutabilities and relative supplies would define the structure of 
rates of return. In this context, an increase in the supply of one asset would raise its own 
return relative to other assets but less in relation to closer substitutes. Additionally, Tobin 
synthesis provided a broader perspective for stabilization policies in the sense that not only 
by changing the quantity of money but the supply of any type of public debt the government 
could affect the rate of investment.
Within this extended model the portfolio approach examines the role of public debt in 
stabilization policies. It is shown how by altering the relative supplies of money and 
government debt that compete with equities on private capital, authorities could seek a 
determined level of the supply price of capital which is compatible with the final objective of 
stabilization.
The institutional fact is that governments possess exclusive prerogatives over their own 
liabilities which cannot be reproduced by the private sector. For instance, government 
currency issues are declared to be legal tender, and government securities are seen as future 
contracts by which governments pay their own money. Governments earn seigniorage from 
the issue of these liabilities, and additions to the stocks of money and public debt are 
perceived as private wealth. However, it is also recognized that public debt issues in the 
present create a burden on future government budgets, and the increased taxes required to 
finance the debt service would reduce private wealth held in other assets. Therefore, an 
increase in public debt does not represent an equal increase in private wealth (Tobin and 
Buiter, 1980). Interestingly, the emphasis is placed on the contractionary effects of the higher 
taxation required to finance the debt service, rather than on the discounting of future tax
liabilities. 24
Further developments of the portfolio approach which are relevant for our historical review 
are presented in Section V, where the discussion mainly refers to the Keynesian responses to
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the monetarist challenge of the 1970s. For the moment we go back to the neoclassical 
synthesis, and in particular to its policy recommendations. We show how those prescriptions 
came under attack from inside the neoclassical circles, and how different policy views led to 
different implications in terms of public debt accumulation. Our specific reference is the 
Fleming-Mundell model.
3. The Fleming-Mundell model.
At its height in the mid-1950s neoclassical theorists stated what they believed was the 
appropriate policy mix to enhance growth and avoid inflation. The recipe combined a 
growth-inducing credit policy with an austere budgetary policy. A decade later, Samuelson 
explained how the neoclassical synthesis had implied the "sanguine hope that a modem 
society could increase its rate of growth at full employment by coaxing out a deepening of 
capital through expansionary monetary policy, while using an austere enough fiscal policy to 
prevent demand-pull inflation. These combined devices could, in effect, lower the share of 
full employment income going to consumption and yet not jeopardize full employment.25 
How successful was this policy advice? As for the U.S. economy, the presence of chronic 
balance-of-payments deficits constrained the implementation of any strong growth-inducing 
monetary policy. It was then felt that macroeconomic policy prescriptions could not ignore 
the balance of payments.
Fleming (1962) and Mundell (1963) showed how the relative effectiveness of monetary and 
budgetary policies is affected by the existing exchange rate regime and the degree of capital 
mobility. More importantly for our purposes, Mundell (1962) explained how monetary and 
budgetary policies exert differential effects on internal and external balance. Fiscal policy 
was found to have comparative advantages with respect to domestic demand while monetary 
policy was found to have comparative advantages regarding the exchange rate and the price 
level. From the historical perspective of public debt controversies it has to be noted that the 
policy mix favoured by the neoclassical synthesis implied fiscal austerity and therefore the
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tendency for the government to run budget surpluses. On the contrary, " Mundell's policy 
assigivment is more prone to increase the stock of public debt; bond-financed tax cuts 
destined to promote growth would result in higher levels of public debt.
E. Final reflections and links with other sections of this work.
The public debt controversies of the 1930s and 1940s illustrate the process in which events 
and new ideas struggle against established concepts and practices. The continuously balanced 
budget was one of the cornerstones of the orthodox exposition of public finance. This 
conventional wisdom was replaced by the notion of cyclically balanced budgets. The new 
vision of public debt did not constitute a unique paradigm. Two polar positions can be 
mentioned. On one side the advocates of authorities under the assumption that the private 
sector is intrinsically unstable. On the other side the defenders of an intrinsic stability of the 
private sector standing against discretionary fiscal and monetary policies. This last position 
sustains that discretionary policies are the major source of economic instability. Both two 
extreme standpoints would have important repercussions on fiscal and monetary 
controversies in the 1970s and 1980s.
The neoclassical synthesis opened an avenue for the convergence of a variety of positions, 
and enjoyed a honeymoon with the prosperous evolution of Western industrialized 
economies in the 1950s and 1960s. In the camp of public debt analysis, different 
contributions studied the conditions under which changes in the stock of government bonds 
would bring about real effects. Using a term of the 1970s the consensus established that pure 
fiscal policies would be noimeutral. Other theoretical developments which flourished during 
the apogee of the neoclassical synthesis and which are central to the historical perspective on 
public debt ideas are dealt with in Section III and Section IV dedicated to economic growth 
and life-cycle models respectively.
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Some central issues discussed in this section will be helpful in our applied work in Parts II 
and ni. The sustainability issue which goes back to Domar (1944) is explicitly applied in 
Part II. Specifically, we ask whether the Colombian government satisfied its budget 
constraint along the period 1925-1985. In Part HI, where we concentrate our main 
econometric work, the Keynesian-Lemerian notion of cyclically balanced budgets is one of 
our guiding paradigms.
Can we find any connection between the topics treated in this section and our narrative of the 
Colombia's historical experience in Part IV?
We have mentioned how important theoretical developments regarding public debt reflected 
the economic situation of industrialized economies between the late 1920s and the early 
1960s. A similar parallel cannot be made regarding Latin America. For instance, it is not 
possible to quote examples of Keynes's personal involvement in policy advice to Latin 
American countries, as we did at the beginning of the section in relation to the United States. 
However, some interesting contrasts between specific Latin American countries and the 
United States can be offered regarding the application of fiscal expansionary policies during 
the 1930s and 1940s.
It has been documented how the largest Latin American countries -Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia, Mexico- launched reflationary policies in the early 1930s to overcome the 
contractionary shock provoked by the great depression. As a result of these policies, real 
output and real industrial production grew far faster in those countries than in the United 
States during the 1929-39 period. However, due to the huge budget deficits required for a 
massive mobilization of resources toward war production, real output and real industrial 
production expanded far faster in the United States than in the four largest Latin American 
countries during 1939-1943 (Diaz-Alejandro, 1 9 8 2 ,1 9 8 3 ,1 9 8 4 ).26
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Some authors have suggested not to confuse the activist policies of specific countries with 
"Keynesianism-before-Keynes" (presumably before the publication of the General Theory in 
1936), since, it is alleged, those were not autonomous policies but reactions forced by 
unusual events such as social turmoil and wars (Diaz-Alejandro, 1982). In the particular case 
of Colombia -Part IV, Section II- an explicit policy of recovery was launched by the end of 
1931. Central to that policy was the rescue of a nearly bankrupt financial system and the 
financing of public works. Both objectives were principally achieved by a substantial 
increase in the internal public debt. This Keynesian-type policy applied to the conditions of 
Colombia was not far from the advise given to the United States in 1933 by Keynes himself. 
An unexpected war with a neighbouring country meant a further substantial increase in the 
internal government debt; although it was not an "autonomous policy", it came to supplement 
the recovery in 1932-33. Also in the United States the massive movilization of resources of 
the early 1940s -which deserved the label of Keynesian experiment-, was made possible by 
the unusual setting of a world war (Musgrave, 1987).
Finally it has to be noted that once recovery was achieved, the resort to budget deficits was 
suspended and the economy lived through a period of budget surpluses and declining public 
debt during the second half of the 1930s; this behaviour was also consistent with Keynes's 
idea of turning to the "opposite policy" once recovery was reached.
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SECTION I
NOTES
1. Keynes, J. M. The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes (hereafter Collected 
Writings). Volume XIX, p.809.
2. Keynes, J. M. Collected Writings, Volume IX, p.115. More personal reactions of Keynes 
to the Treasury view appeared in his article "A cure for unemployment": "I say that the 
Treasury dogma is fallacious. It is neither possible nor true. It is not supported by the leading 
economists of the country... Certainly this dogma is not derived from common sense". 
Volume XIX, p.809.
3. Keynes, J. M. Collected Writings, Volume XXI, p. 289-297.
4. Keynes, J. M. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (hereafter General 
Theory), p.378
5. Keynes, J. M. General Theory, p.320
6. Keynes, J. M. General Theory, p.378
7. Keynes, J. M. Collected Writings, Volume XXI, p.390
8. It must be noted that the biggest federal government deficits in 1931 and 1936 were 
originated in extraordinary payments to the veterans of World War I. These compensation 
programs were enacted over President's vetos (Stein, 1969).
9. The issues of planning and control in a mixed economy received a leading attention 
without opposing the principle of efficacy of decentralized decision making. The role 
attached to monetary and fiscal policies should be understood in this context. For example, 
the "pioneers" supported the policy of monetary ease in 1933 to restore the media of payment 
destroyed in the depression, but at the same time beared the Banking Act of 1935 whereby 
legal reserve requirements were created to reduce excessive reserves in the banking system 
(Currie. 1980)
10. "By Roosevelt's second term, the facts of life had sunk in; the NRA and fireside chats 
would not themselves restore prosperity; planning rhetoric could not provide the monetary 
demand industry needed to provide jobs for the quarter of our population who were 
involuntary unemployed. Budget deficits, far from being an unfortunate concomitant of the 
Depression, were something deliberately to be contrived if the country was to get moving 
again. It was Hansen, and his Harvard-trained economists, who gradually converted the 
President and the Congress to an understanding of these facts of economic life" Samuelson 
(1979, p.931).
11. In this respect, Lemer can be seen as a precursor of the neo-Keynesian disequilibrium 
analysis of the 1970s (Bator, 1987).
12. Keynes characterized the "functional finance" argument as "impecable" but difficult to 
assimilate at that time given the "state of evolution of our ideas" (Colander, 1984). Friedman 
(1953) appreciated Lemer's contribution as a "brilliant exercise in logic" but rejected it as a 
prescription for public policy". According to Friedman, Lemer does not explain what 
insufficient aggregate demand is and how to differentiate a temporary deficiency in process 
of correction from the beginning of a recession. Additionally there is not any guidance as to
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what correctives to apply, how long for and in what proportions. Finally, Friedman criticizes 
"functional finance" methods as a potential source of instability when authorities wrongly 
determine the direction and/or magnitudes of policies: "By the time an error is recognized 
and corrective action taken, the damage may be done, and the corrective action may itself 
turn into a further error" (p. 316). This criticism of "functional finance" was an anticipation of 
the monetarist position in the 1970s against discretionary policies.
Two decades later an outstanding figure of the neoclassical synthesis revealed the impact of 
"functional finance" on the profession: "And certainly no economist can be the same after 
reading Lemer's Functional Finance...How revealing (even if overly simple) is the notion that 
we tax only to prevent inflation" (Samuelson, 1964, p. 177).
13. Keynes (1923) analyzed the inflationary process in France through the income 
distribution conflict between wealth owners (the French rentiers) and tax payers. Clark 
(1945) follows the same analytical route by tracing out the origins of inflation in changes in 
the balance of power between groups in favour of a stable or rising value of money (fixed 
income classes and creditors) and groups in favour of a falling value of money (debtors and 
entrepreneurs).
14. A classical statement of the effects of capital levies is the Report of the British 
Committee on National Debt and Taxation (1927). The Report mentions two elements of a 
successful levy: a substantial reduction of direct income taxes and an insignificant probability 
of repetition. The former element reveals efficiency considerations, and the latter the 
recognition of what in modem economics is known as the time-consistency issue. The levy 
payer's attitude is found critical for the success of a capital levy. A capital levy would be 
resented, and only exceptional circumstances could "reconcile the owner of capital wealth to 
the levy idea" (p.296).
15. So as to prevent negative effects on incentives, Kalecki (1944) suggested a capital tax 
instead of income taxes.
16. The proposal was launched by a private organization -the Committee for Economic 
Development- in 1947. Discretionary actions were only accepted in extreme cases of 
inflation or deflation. This was a point of convergence, though in restricted cases, with the 
advocates of countercyclical changes in taxes and expenditures. Finally, the proposal called 
for a flexible monetary policy as a complement of the budgetary policy. This was an 
important point since at that time monetary policy was coiSined to sustain a low interest rate 
on public debt (Stein, 1969, p.220-232)
17. Friedman's proposal considers a progressive tax system -income taxes-, and rates should 
be set in order to balance the budget at a high employment level, or altematively, to get the 
budget deficit required to sustain the secular g ro \^  of money supply. The only way to create 
money would be the financing of the budget deficit.
18. In Friedman's proposal there is a one-for-one relationship between budget deficits 
(surpluses) and the creation (destruction) of money, and so, under normal circumstances 
there is no role for bond-financed deficits and public debt management. The necessary 
complement of Friedman's proposal is a regime of flexible exchange rates.
19. According to Metzler, neither Classicals nor Keynesians could differentiate between 
channels of monetary expansion, given their polar positions about the determinants of 
equilibrium interest rates. Metzler's sharp contraposition between classical and Keynesian 
interest theories has been subject to criticism; examples of this criticism are provided in 
Patinkin (1965, Chapter XV and Supplementary Note J), and Niehans (1978). In historical 
perspective the main Metzler's contribution appears to be the position that all that matters for 
the effects of money on interest rates is the way in which the monetary expansion is 
produced.
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20. In historical perspective this was an important observation to Metzler's analysis but left 
the theory of monetary policy without a clear-cut position about the real effects of policies 
(Niehans, 1978).
21. The Mundell (1960) model can be summarized as follows: the economy is in equilibrium 
when the capital and goods markets are in balance. The equilibrium conditions are
(1) A = B(m,r) Capital markets
(2) S(r, m. A) = I(r) Goods markets
where A is the value of assets and B the demand for assets, S is saving and I investment, m is 
the money supply and r the interest rate. The real value of assets. A, is given by
(3) A = D/r +G/r
where D and G are the real values of dividends and government interest payments. An 
expansionary OMO combined with a reduction of income taxes appears to be reducing G and 
A in (3), and then creating an excess demand in (1) and an excess supply in (2). For 
equilibrium in (1) a lower m or a lower r is required, and for equilibrium in (2) a higher m or 
a lower r is required. As a result, the equilibrium r falls.
When an expansionary OMO is combined with a reduction of corporate taxes, the reduced 
value of G is capitalized in D leaving A in (3), (1) and (2) unchanged. But given the higher 
market value of corporate securities, investment increases and the equilibrium interest rate 
rises.
22. The price-indexation of public debt implies that the term aVo/rP is substituted by aVo/r 
in equations (2), (3) and (4). In the absence of indexation, a money-financed deficit creates a 
deflationary gap in the goods market simply because the real value of government bonds 
declines. ITiis change creates an excess demand for bonds and an excess supply of money in 
their corresponding markets. As a result the interest rate falls.
23. Consider a Keynesian model with three assets: money, government bonds, and physical 
capital. In the conventional interpretation there are only two yields: the rate of return on 
money institutionally fixed at zero, and ÜÎÊ rate of interest common to the two other assets. 
Government debt and capital are treated as perfect substitutes, and the rate of interest equals 
the marginal efficiency of capital. This is the liquidity preference hypothesis according to 
which the relevant choice is between money and bonds.
24. Early in his career, Tobin left the following statement:
"How is it possible that society merely by the device of incurring a debt to itself can deceive 
itself into believing that it is wealthier? Do not the additional taxes which are necessary to 
carry the interest charges reduce the value of other components of private wealth? There 
certainly must be effects in this direction" (1952, p.91)
25. Samuelson, P. A. (1963), p.l544
26. While the percentage change of aggregate real output in the United States between 1929 
and 1939 was 6.3, the correspondiong figures for Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico 
were 16.7,51.7,44.6 and 23.0 respectively. Regarding real industrial production, while the 
relevant figure for the United States was -1.7, the percentages for Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia and Mexico were 35.2, 86.2,132.1, and 52.3 respectively. Things were different 
during the 1939-43 period. The U.S. aggregate real output increas^ by 53.3%, the 
Argentinian by 8.4%, the Brazilian by 9.7%, the Colombian by 4.5% and the Mexican by 
25.3%. As for real industrial production the relevant percentage change for the United States 
was 133.3%, while the relevant figure for Argentina was 18.0, for Brazil 19.1, for Colombia 
16.1, and for Mexico 45.9. Diaz-Alejandro (1983, p.8-9).
39
SECTION II
Public debt: the classical traditions.
Introduction
This section has three objectives. The first is to present the academic challenges faced by the 
Keynes-Lemer criterion of cyclically balanced budgets during the late 1950s and early 1960s. 
This confrontation was known as the "burden-of-the- debt" controversy, and followed the 
publication of Buchanan's Public Principles ûf Public Debt (1958). The second is to review 
classical expositions of public debt which were revived during the controversy and have 
served as a reference for debate in the last two decades. The third is to draw a general picture 
of what in recent years has been called the political economy of government debt; this new 
political economy is firmly based on classical contributions.
Buchanan's attack upon the predominant Keynesian-Lemerian thinking on public debt of the 
1940s and 1950s, and other representative contributions to the debate are discussed in 
subsection A. In subsection B we go back to classical British and Italian writings in which 
the debt neutrality proposition was first expounded and questioned. In subsection C we 
examine the criticism of the implications of Keynesianism for modem democracies as 
spearheaded by Buchanan and his associates in the context of the Public Choice School. The 
existence of a deficit bias in democracies denounced by public-choice theorists is also the 
subject of recent research in which public debt is seen as a "strategic variable" used to either 
redistribute income between generations or to influence future governments' policies. In 
subsection D we offer some final reflections and links with other sections of this work. 
Finally, the method of quoting "chapter and verse" is applied in this section more frequently 
than in any other part of the study.
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A. Reactions to the Keynesian views on budgetary policies.
The "burden of the national debt" was an issue of intensive debate in the late 1950s and early 
1960s. It was a new round of a time-honoured debate whose roots can be found in the 
classical political economy of the 1800s. The dispute surfaced as a reaction against 
interpretations of Keynesian and Lemerian writers in the 1940s. A clear-cut statement of the 
burden of debt which provoked much criticism was left by Lemer (1948):
"By far the most common concem about the national debt comes from considering it as 
exactly the same kind of thing as a private debt which one individual owes to 
others...One of the most effective ways of clearing up this most serious of all semantic 
confusions is to point out that private debt differs from national debt in being extemal. 
That is what makes it burdensome. Because it is interpersonal, the proper analogy is not 
to national debt but to intemational debt. A nation owing money to other nations...is 
impoverished or burdened in the same kind of way as a man who owes money to other 
men. But this does not hold for national debt which is owed by the nation to citizens of 
the same nation ... 'We owe it to ourselves'... A variant of the false analogy is the 
declaration that national debt puts an unfair burden on our children,... Very few 
economists need to be reminded that if our children or grandchildren repay some of the 
national debt these payments wiU be made our children or grandchildren and to 
nobody else. Taking diem altogether they will no more be impoverished by making the 
repayments than they will be enriched by receiving them" (p.255)
The central propositions are threefold: First, there is a well-defined distinction between 
internal public debt and extemal public debt. Second, private indebtedness and internal 
public indebtedness are not analogous. Third, future generations are not affected by the issue 
of internal public debt.^ Only the national extemal indebtedness transfer the burden to future 
generations. In Lemer's view the risks associated with the national debt appeared to be 
"wholly imaginary" since the sensible application of "functional finance" in the short run 
should render a moderate long run size of the national debt. 2 These ideas were not confined 
to Keynesian-Lemerian circles. Pigou (1947) stated that although "it is true that loans raised 
from foreigners entail a burden represented in interest and sinking fund on future generations 
in the borrowing country,... interest and sinking fund on intemal loans are merely transfers 
from one set of people in the country to another set, so that the two sets together -future 
generations as a whole- are not burdened at all" (p.37-38).
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The criticism of the Keynesian-Lemerian views partly emerged from their own grounds.^ 
Meade (1958,1959) observed that Keynesians having succeeded in demonstrating that public 
debt is selfliquidating (Lemer, 1943) or that the cost of servicing the debt need not be a 
problem if the rate of income growth is sufficiently high (Domar, 1944), failed in 
recognizing the adverse economic effects derived from a domestic public debt. The central 
argument is that a positive deadweight debt -the excess of public debt over public real assets- 
is a burden on the economy. The elimination of this deadweight debt -through capital levies, 
inflation or budget surpluses- would encourage savings and restablish incentives to work and 
invest.
The strongest rejection of the Keynesian view was led by Buchanan (1958), who saw in that 
view a "new orthodoxy" opposed to the classical principles of public debt. Buchanan 
concentrated on the individual roles played by bondholders and taxpayers rather than on 
macroeconomic aggregates. Accordingly, bondholders invest on public debt looking forward 
to earn a real income in a future period of time; this is seen as a voluntary transaction 
whereby current consumption is reduced in order to get a higher future consumption. 
Taxpayers become involved in a different way, since they are institutionally forced to give up 
real resources to repay the debt service. This is the burden of public debt which is borne in 
full by later generations of taxpayers; future generations will pay the cost of bond-financed 
projects even if eventually those projects yield greater benefits than currently displaced 
private investments.^
Based on a "neutral" position, Modigliani (1961) questioned the soundness of the arguments 
put forward by the contenders, and argued that the relevant question is the long-run 
implications of public debt on capital accumulation. With this idea in mind the Keynesian 
argument that public indebtedness only affect the current availability of private resources is 
not valid. An increase in the public debt stock places a burden on the economy through the 
reduction of the private capital stock. However, such a burden may be offset to the extent to
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which debt-financed public projects result in permanent additions to the capital stock and 
increased real incomes of future generations. Modigliani's contentions were also critical of 
Buchanan's positions since the latter implied that only the interests on debt constituted a 
burden on society, without any reference to the effects of taxation on incentives to work, save 
and invest. In Modigliani's opinion the burden controversy should be defined in terms of the 
effects of alternative government financial policies on capital accumulation.^ Further 
developments of this position are discussed in Section IV below.
Other aspects of the polemic were pointed out by authors like Scitovsky (1961) who 
supported the no-burden position and explained that a burden is impcrsed only when 
governments fail to satisfy the interest payments. This could happen if debt-financed projects 
did not raise the expected yields and governments had to resort to increases in taxation. 
Finally, Mishan (1963) questioned the relevance of the debate by stressing that the net costs 
or benefits for society depend on the productivity of government investments and not on 
public indebtedness per se.
In historical perspective, the controversy may be summarized as follows: First, the debate 
confronted two different approaches to fiscal policy analysis: the traditional discussion of 
macroeconomic aggregates and the analysis based on individual roles. Buchanan defended a 
vision of the political process of fiscal policies in which citizens-taxpayers vote for the 
government projects and the method of finance. They will choose debt-finance if they want 
to postpone the reduction in consumption, but they will choose tax-finance if they opt for a 
reduction of current consumption (Fergusson, 1964).
Second, the polemic was restricted to full employment. The case of unemployment 
economies was a subsidiary issue. Buchanan supported the use of budget deficits only under 
extreme circumstances of depression and war, and stressed that on efficiency grounds those 
deficits should be money financed. Keynesian steeped economists upheld the case for 
cyclically balanced budgets and stressed that the burden argument could not be a barrier
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against debt financed deficits since any burden could be eliminated by future government 
surpluses; thus, the government ability to generate surpluses was seen as the key to dispose of 
the burdens of debt financed deficits (Modigliani, 1961).
Finally, the debate was a new stage of the controversy on intergenerational effects of public 
debt. The historical links of this academic dispute with precedents in the British political 
economy of the 19th century and the contributions of Italian scholars since the 1880s was 
emphasized by Buchanan (1958,1960). The presence of this historical nexus in more recent 
discussions has also been recalled by Buchanan (1976). It is to those classical roots to which 
we now turn.
B. Classical discussions on public debt
We start with the British tradition, although limiting the discussion to David Ricardo's 
writings which have been the focus of polemic in recent decades.
1. The Ricardian Theorems.
a. The Ricardian equivalence theorem
Keynesian concepts on public debt were not the unique target of Buchanan's challenge. The 
Ricardian proposition according to which taxation and government borrowing are logically 
equivalent was censured by Buchanan as an extreme case of agents rationality, and an 
idealized situation in which the essential differences between borrowing and taxation 
evaporate. It is useful to follow the Ricardian logic by quoting the paragraph in which the 
equivalence between taxation and government borrowing was spelled out:
"When for the expenses of a year's war, twenty millions are raised by means of a loan, it 
is the twenty millions which are withdrawn from the productive capital of the nation. 
The million per annum which is raised by taxes to pay the interest of this loan, is merely 
transferred from those who pay it to those who receive it, from the contributor to the tax
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to the national creditor. The real expense is the twenty millions, and not the interest 
which must be paid for it. Whether the interest be or not be paid, the country will be 
neither richer or poorer. Government might at once have required the twenty millions in 
shape of taxes, in which case it would not have been necessary to raise annual taxes to 
the amount of a million" (Ricardo [1817], 1951, p.244-245).
In a different place Ricardo brought to light the role of intergenerational bequests:
"It would be difficult to convince a man possessed of £20000, or any other sum, that a 
perpetual payment of £50 per annum was equally burdensome with a single tax of 
£1000. He would have some vague notion that the £50 per annum would be paid by 
posterity, and would not be paid by him; but if he leaves his fortune to his son, and 
leaves it charged with this perpetual tax, where is the difference whether he leaves him 
£20000, with the tax, or £19000 without it? This argument of charging posterity with the 
interest of our debt, or of relieving them from a portion of such interest, is often used by 
otherwise well informed people, but we confess we see no weight in it" ([1820] 1951, 
p.l87)
Buchanan's interpretation of Ricardo's arguments can be summarized as follows:
Firstly, according to Buchanan, "Ricardo enunciated the proposition that the public loan and 
the extraordinary tax exert equivalent effects on the economy" (1958, p.43). This judgement 
refers particularly to the first Ricardian paragraph quoted above.
Secondly, Buchanan points out that Ricardo's implication that the burden of the debt cannot 
be shifted to future generations is only valid in a world of rational individuals who fully 
capitalize the future tax payments associated with a switch from tax financing to borrowing: 
"...Ricardo assumes that the creation of the debt, with its corresponding obligation to meet 
the service charges from future tax revenues, causes individuals to write down the present 
values of their future income streams" (1958, p.44). The author objects to the assumption that 
individuals fully discount future taxes. At least for individuals who own no assets that 
extreme rational behaviour cannot be applied. Additionally, all individuals do not act as if 
they live for ever; differences in ages and differential interests in future periods lead to the 
fact that individuals do not evaluate taxes and debt in the same way.
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Lastly, Buchanan notes the fact that in Ricardo's propositions the logical bases of borrowing 
behaviour are ommited. Persons and institutions borrow to adjust spending flows over time, 
and governments borrow for similar reasons. "There is no raison d'etre for public debt if this 
instrument is behaviourally equivalent to taxation" (Buchanan, 1987b, p.l045).
The revival of the public debt controversy in the mid-1970s refreshed some contributions of 
the late 1950s. At the center of that resurgence was the reformulation by Barro (1974) of the 
role of intergenerational bequests in offsetting the intergenerational distribution of income 
brought about by a shift from taxation to debt. In his refusal of Barro's work, Buchanan 
(1976) coined the well-known expression "the Ricardian equivalence theorem". Previously 
the same author had used the expressions "fundamental equivalence" and "equivalence 
hypothesis" (Buchanan, 1958).
b. The Ricardian Nonequivalence Theorem.
The resurgence of the public debt debate in the 1970s and the common reference to the 
Ricardian equivalence theorem stimulated a new exploration of the Ricardian remarks on 
public debt. Some authors concluded that Buchanan’s version of Ricardo was partial, and that 
Ricardo had developed a nonequivalence theorem between taxation and debt. The key idea in 
the counterargument was that Ricardo's contentions were more complex and that he had been 
aware of the problem of public debt illusion (O'Driscoll, 1977; Tobin and Buiter, 1979). 
Although Ricardo indeed stated an equivalence theorem in the first paragraph cited above, it 
is alleged that he rejected its validity in different passages of his Principles (1817) or of his 
later article Funding System (1820).
The case for public debt illusion is clearly stated in the Principles:
"It is a system (borrowing) which tends to make us less thrifty -to blind us to our real 
situation. If the expenses of a war be 40 millions per annum, and the share which a man 
would have to contribute towards that annual expense were £100, he would endeavour, 
on being at once called upon for this portion, to save speedily the £100 from his income.
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By the system of loans, he is called upon to pay only the interest of this £100, or £5 per 
annum, and considers that he does enough by saving this £5 from his expenditure, and 
then deludes himself with the belief that he is as rich as before. The whole nation, by 
reasoning and acting in this manner, save only the interest of 40 million, or two millions; 
and thus, not only lose all the interest or profit which 40 millions of capital, employed 
productively, would afford, but also 38 millions, the difference between their savings 
and expenditure" ([1817] 1951, p.247).
This paragraph illuminated a sharp contrast between taxation and the issuance of public debt. 
The latter would result in reduced saving and private investment. Taxation would be the 
preferred method of public spending financing. The point is how to reconcile this conclusion 
with the equivalence between the two methods stated in the pieces quoted before. In his 
Funding System Ricardo distinguished between what he called "in point of the economy" and 
the prevailing behaviour of economic agents. At the first instance the two methods would be 
equivalent, but the actual behaviour of individuals would lead to different results:
"In point of the economy, there is no real difference in either of the modes ...; but the 
people who pay the taxes never so estimate them, and therefore do not manage their 
private affairs accordingly" ([1820], 1951, p. 186)
Following O'Driscol (1977), Ricardo’s distinction between equivalence "in point of 
economy" and nonequivalence in reality could be stated in terms of what "a hypothetical 
transactor with perfect foresight would do, and what transactors actually do" (footnote,
p.208).
Under these considerations Buchanan’s interpretation of Ricardo's view about public debt and 
taxation appears to be partial and unfair. Buchanan concentrated exclusively on the "in point 
of economy" argument. This is the reason why in the 1950s Buchanan alluded to a Ricardian 
world of rational individuals who fully capitalize the future tax liabilities originated in a shift 
from tax financing to borrowing. And this is the reason why in the 1970s in his controversy 
with Barro, Buchanan (1976) referred to the "Ricardo-Barro model" to characterize a world 
in which taxpayers fully capitalize the future obligations embodied in public debt issues.
2. The Italian contributions
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The Italian work in fiscal theory has produced outstanding contributions to the public debt 
controversy. The so-called "La Scienza delle Finanze" was developed since the 1880s and the 
major writings covered the first half of this century. A wider consideration of this literature 
in modem public debt discussions is due to Buchanan (1958,1960) who found in the Italian 
tradition followers and critics of the "equivalence hypothesis".^
For our own purposes the Italian thought can be sketched out regarding its closeness to the 
Ricardian positions. This is the method used by Chiancone (1985) and Eusepi (1989).^ A 
first strand of literature represented by authors like Loria, Borgatta and Einaudi developed 
the no-burden, no-transfer concepts present in the Ricardian writings and later on in the 
Keynesian tradition. The emphasis on distributional consequences of public debt which is a 
characteristic of the Italian thinking appears vividly in Loria's writings during the 1880s:
"In a period in which the possibilities of employing capital are increasingly limited by 
the growth of population, public debt is in the end, a means whereby those capitals, 
which could not obtain a sufficient rate of profit in ordinary ventures, receive it at the 
expense of taxpayers and are thereby exempted from the need to look for risky 
undertakings, which could lead to inevitable disasters. In such economic conditions, 
therefore, tiie State that issues public debt renders a notably useful service to the owners 
of liquid capital" (Chiancone, 1985, p.256)
In the late 1930s Einaudi left clear statements in favour of the no-burden position and offered 
a smoothing argument in support of the issue of public debt:
"If we want to make an expenditure, we have to pay for it with present means, we must 
decrease, by an equal amount, the means available for reaching other present ends ... 
public debt is an instrument for distributing more conveniently in time, and without 
grave disturbances for the taxpayers, the burden of the extraordinary expenditure" 
(Chiancone, 1985, p.254)
Borgatta, writing at the end of World War II, applies the concept of Ricardian equivalence in 
a framework of social classes rather than in an intergenerational context. He finds how the 
Ricardian equivalence is only valid in the case in which capitalists hold liquid funds which 
could be channeled either to pay for an extraordinary tax or to acquire public bonds.
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Otherwise the monetary policy would have to provide the liquidity required by capitalists to 
pay the extraordinary tax, with implications in the social distribution of credit.
A second line of thinking evoked by authors like Puviani and Griziotti called in question 
basic Ricardian propositions. First, Puviani developed at the beginning of the century a 
"finite horizons" argument against the Ricardian equivalence by concluding that persons 
prefer public debt because the present value of future tax payments is lower than the present 
value of an extraordinary tax. Second, Griziotti writing in the late 1910s criticized the 
Ricardian assumption of intergenerational solidarity and rejected the notion of solidarity 
between social classes. Even more, public finance was put at the centre of conflicts between 
persons, groups and generations:
"In public finance the prevailing note is the triumph of individual interests, which 
succeed in prevailing on all the others by means of the conquest and exercise of political 
power: thus the necessary condition for admitting the social continuity from generation 
to generation disappears altogether" (Chiancone, 1985, p.265).
To sum up, in the Italian contributions public debt is largely associated with the way in 
which social conflicts are projected in budgetary policies. As with the British contributions, 
the Italian legacies are not confined to the past. As we report below, very recent 
developments on the political economy of government debt have followed the early 
orientation of the Italian writings. Regarding the modem debates on the Ricardian theorems. 
Section VI below is entirely dedicated to that topic.
C. The political economy of government debt.
The political economy of government debt has attracted the attention of economists 
particularly since the mid-1970s. Two main directions can be mentioned. One has been 
developed by Buchanan and his associates in the context of Public Choice and 
constitutionalist theories, where a central issue is the proclivity of democratic societies to 
create budget deficits. Two guiding principles in these frameworks are the notions of "fiscal
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illusion" and "voters irrationality". A more recent line of research seeks to create a positive 
theory of debt. It follows the Italian and Swedish traditions at the core of which was the issue 
of "how governments choose policies". An important characteristic of this research is that 
economic policy cannot be disconnected from politics.
1. The constitutionalist view
a. The bias towards deficits in democratic societies.
The public debt controversy of the 1960s was spearheaded by supporters of the "sound 
finance" principle of balanced budgets.^ What elements have extended the discussion over 
three decades after the burden versus no-burden polemic? After all, the Keynesian 
prescription of cyclically balanced budgets merely extended the time period over which the 
old wisdom would be applied. In this sense the critics accepted their closeness to the 
Keynesian tradition. Additionally, it was recognized that in the Keynesian view institutions 
matter, particularly in relation to the differential effects of taxes and debt on individual 
behaviour. As expressed by Buchanan and Wagner (1977): "In this respect, we are strictly 
Keynesian, rather than Ricardian ..." (p. 135). The assumptions about the political 
environment in which Keynesian policies were to be applied constituted the essential source 
of divergence. This point has been clarified in the related literature since the mid-1960s. 
Keynesians, it was said, concentrated on the requirements of macroeconomic engineering 
without taking in account the prevailing interests of political powers.
Buchanan and Wagner (1977,1978) explored the implications of democratic politics for the 
failure of Keynesian ideas and the upsurge of greater economic instability. The central idea is 
that once Keynesian fiscal views are accepted, a democratic society will tend to use 
excessively the expedient of fiscal deficits. The Keynesian prescription based on the 
symmetry of surpluses and deficits is not viable in the context of a democratic society. This 
society is not governed by an elite of technicians who would administer the budget
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independently of political pressures. Deficit finance is seen as generating political support on 
the side of the beneficiaries of tax-cuts, increased transfers, or increased aggregate demand.
How is it possible that voters support a system of fiscal irresponsibility? In Buchanan and 
Wagner's framework, fiscal perceptions and tax institutions play a key role. It is suggested 
that individuals "perceive" the cost of public services to be lower under indirect taxation 
rather than under direct taxation. It is also mentioned that debt financed deficits reduce the 
perceived price of government goods and services, and therefore citizens-taxpayers will 
increase their demands for them. It is then concluded that individual fiscal choices are 
expoused to illusion -the so-called fiscal illusion- which influences budgetary decisions 
through the political democratic process.
b. A constitutional framework for fiscal policies.
Fiscal illusion and voters irrationality call for a constitutional reform which restores fiscal 
responsibility. Public Choice theorists -constitutional economists in particular- insist that the 
budget balance rule should be incorporated into the constitutions of democratic states.^ From 
the scrutiny of the postwar experience it is observed that the Keynesian prescription of 
cyclically balanced budgets was issued without taking in account the institutional structure. 
Since, as it is alleged, there is a tendency in democratic governments to overspend and a 
natural resistance to adjust taxes upwards, budgetary policies in democratic structures are 
biased toward deficits.
In conclusion, macroeconomic stability is not only the result of demand-orientated policies or 
supply-orientated policies. The rules of the political game do condition the final outcomes. In 
the specific case of budgetary policies, constitutional economists evoke the classical principle 
of budget balance. In democratic societies, given their proclivity to budget deficits, that 
principle should be given the character of constitutional rule, explicitly incorporated in the 
constitutional documents of states.
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2. Towards a positive theory of public debt.
Why similar countries offer different solutions to the debt problem? Alesina (1988) shows 
how major European countries gave different individual treatments to the large public debts 
accumulated during World War I. The clue for those dissimilar treatments was the way in 
which each society solved the income redistribution problem associated with the burden of 
the debt. Regarding the experience of industrial democracies during the 1970s and 1980s, 
Roubini and Sachs (1989a, 1989b) find that different political institutions in the various 
OECD countries help to account for different debt policies. Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini 
(1991) examine differing political and monetary institutions in the OECD economies since 
world War II, and find that authorities in these countries applied different financial policies 
in response to incentives resulting from different political and monetary institutions. The 
relationship between debt policies and political and institutional contexts are sought to be 
explained by the novel literature on positive theory of government debt policy.
The new literature discards the Buchanan's guiding notions of "fiscal illusion" and "voters' 
irrationality" for not being compatible with the standard assumption of rationality. 
Interestingly, as in Buchanan's writings it is found that there exists a deficit bias in 
democracies. The explanation is different, however. While in Buchanan it is the myopic 
behaviour of citizens which results in the bias toward deficits, in the new approach it is the 
disagreement between citizens which explains the proclivity to budget deficits. Under an 
electoral system, the citizens disagreement results in different preferences about public 
expenditure (such as the level or the composition of government expenditure) between 
current and future policy makers; it is this disagreement and the uncertainty of future 
reelection which leads a policymaker to leave a greater public debt to its successor. Alesina 
and Tabellini (1990) conclude that the equilibrium value of public debt tends to be larger the 
greater is the polarization between alternating governments, and the more likely it is that the 
current government will not be reelected.
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Given the existence of different preferences about public spending between alternating 
governments, it is argued that a current government may influence policies carried out by its 
successor, provided that the former can affect a state variable which enters in a critical way 
in the latter's decision problem. In the literature under discussion the level of public debt is 
the state variable which allows a current government to influence the fiscal decisions of its 
successor; public debt appears to be strategically used to affect the choices of future 
policymakers (Person and Svenson, 1989. Alesina and Tabellini, 1990,1992. Tabellini and 
Alesina, 1990). Public debt can also be used strategically by the current generations to 
influence the intergenerational distribution of resources (Bohn, 1992. Tabellini, 1991).
An alternative line of research associates the accumulation of public debt with government 
weakness instead of the alternation of governments with different preferences. It is the 
dispersion of power across discretionary levels what leads to myopic decisions regarding 
budgetary policies. The greater the disagreement between decision-makers, the less likely the 
adoption of collective decisions favourable to government financial equilibrium (Grilli, 
Masciandaro and Tabellini, 1991). In the end, both two lines of research find that it is the 
existence of political incentive constraints (the succession of governments with different 
views about public budget policies, or weak administrations which lack strong political 
support) what creates a bias toward budget deficits.
Is it possible to derive normative conclusions from the recent political theory of debt? As in 
Buchanan's writings, the new literature call for institutional reform. However, contrary to the 
former, there is no suggestion of prescribing balanced budgets at the constitutional level. It is 
asserted that governments should not be free to choose the levels of public debt left to their 
successors. The practical suggestion points out that a cooperative behaviour of political 
parties would reduce the tendency to use public debt as a strategic variable 
to influence future governments. Political parties could agree on a series of contingencies 
(such as wars and national disasters), which would allow policy makers to depart from
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balanced budgets (Alesina and Tabellini, 1990. Tabellini and Alesina, 1990). The proposal of 
political agreement is reminiscent of the "consensual agreement" between citizens 
recommended by the Sweden economist Wicksell ([1896], 1958) in one of his classical 
contributions to the theory of public finance.
D. Concluding reflections and links with other sections of this work.
By the end of World War II the Keynesian notion of cyclically balanced budgets had left 
behind the fears associated with public debt. Abba Lemer used the expression "imaginary 
evils" to discredit those apprehensions against public debt. But in public debt as in other 
areas of academic controversy the agreement among researchers was not a convergent 
process (Aaron, 1989). The new budgetary wisdom was challenged by the iconoclastic 
contributions of James Buchanan and his associates since the late 1950s who argued that 
budget deficits created a burden on future generations. A lasting criticism which has received 
special attention in recent decades refers to the political assumptions of Keynesian budgetary 
policies. Cyclically balanced budgets, it was said, are not viable since there is a tendency 
towards fiscal deficits in democratic politics.
The advocacy of balanced budget constitutional amendments is not unique to Buchanan's 
writings. As we will see in Section VI below, Buchanan and Wagner (1977), and Lucas 
(1986) have coincided in the proposal of binding constitutional constraints on fiscal policies, 
though the frameworks are at variance. Fiscal illusion and voters’ irrationality are the reasons 
in Buchanan's framework. Things are different in the Lucas economy populated by rational 
expectations agents who live forever. The budget is intertemporally balanced, in opposition 
to the Buchanan's prescription of continuously balanced budgets. Deficits and surpluses are 
seen as optimal responses to low and high income periods, and not as Lemerian functional 
finance responses to business cycles. The constitutional constraint on budgetary policies is 
seen as a pre-commitment to avoid time-inconsistent fiscal policies; a sort of constitutional 
rule destined to assure annual balanced budgets over normal periods.
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The recent political theories of government debt also find a case for institutional reform. 
Although it is not argued in favour of balanced budget constitutional amendments, it is 
stressed that the suboptimal behaviour of governments regarding public financial policies 
could be eliminated by means of cooperative agreements between political parties.
What is the relevance of these reflections for our historical scrutiny in Part IV? We offer one 
illustration of marked importance in the Colombian experience related to the imposition of 
constitutional restrictions on the financing of government deficits.
A constitutional amendment carried out in 1910 incorporated a new clause according to 
which "Any future issue of fiat money is absolutely forbidden". This clause made part of a 
chapter on civil rights and social guarantees instead of being part of the public finance 
chapters of the constitution. Since at that time a well organized banking system was not yet 
in place, fiat money meant money issued by government decree. The constitutional 
amendment was proposed after a period of civil war accompanied by hyperinflation. The 
amendment was the result of a cooperative behaviour of political parties and was also 
thought as a first step to adopt the gold standard, a regime which would demand a high 
degree of fiscal discipline.
Although the constitutional amendment per se became dated in a few years, the cooperative 
behaviour of political parties to impose constraints on the monetary financing of budget 
deficits continued through the decades. Importantly, when the central bank was established in 
1923, it was constituted as an institution highly independent from the government, and its 
potential loans to the government were limited to a fraction of capital and reserves of the 
bank. Given a small intemal market for private investment in government bonds, authorities 
understood that the limit imposed on the bank loans to the government not only restrained the 
possibility of money financed deficits but also implied a boundary on the expansion of the 
intemal public debt. Of course, government deficits could still be financed with extemal
55
debt, but at that time it was not seen as a practical choice, given the sporadic access of the 
country to extemal capital markets during the first two decades of the century and the 
inactivity of those markets during the early 1920s.
Historically, the access of the government to central bank loans has always been limited by 
law, and during the first three decades after World War II they represented a very small 
proportion of the intemal public debt. Nowadays, after a constitutional amendment adopted 
in 1991, not even Congress is authorized to allow a limited access of the government to the 
central bank financing. If required, the government could apply for loans to the central bank 
board, and if accepted, the rate of interest would be the rate paid on bonds sold to the public 
in open market.
The important lesson that we extract from these experiences is that political and monetary 
institutions have played a role in restricting the access of the government to central bank 
loans, and therefore in controlling the expansion of the intemal public debt. However, as we 
will see in the next three parts of this study, that controlled expansion was limited to periods 
of normality when the economy was not subject to extraordinary shocks, particularly 
originated in the extemal sector.
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SECTION II
NOTES
1. That public debt is a component of wealth and that interest payments on the debt is a mere 
transfer from tax payers to bondholders was an idea already accepted by the Mercantilists. 
One of his exponents, Jean F. Melon in his Essay sur le Commerce (1736) sustained that:
"the debts of a nation are debts due from the right hand to the left, by which the body is not 
weakened". These ideas were rejected by Hume in his Of Public C r^ t .  Hume highlighted 
the costs involved in raising tax revenues to pay the interests on the debt, and discussed how 
debt increases adversely affected capital accumulation. A recent and detailed review of these 
controversies is found in Mundell (1993).
2. "We see then that the kind of evil most popularly ascribed to national debt are wholly 
imaginary ... and that the direct application of the basic principles of Functional Finance are 
an adequate general guide to fiscal policy. If the short-run equilibrium is taken care of so that 
there is ... neither inflation or depression, and a normal amount of reasonableness is applied 
in choosing between the different ways of achieving this short-run equilibrium, the long-run 
equilibrium of the size of the national debt will look after itself". Lemer (1948, p. 275)
2. The controversy was carried out under the following assumptions: full employment of 
resources, a fixed plan of government expenditures, and, taxation and debt as the only 
altematives to finance government expenditures. Money-financed deficits did not constitute 
an issue of debate. Buchanan (1958) accepted money-financed deficits on efficiency grounds, 
only under conditions of extreme depression or war.
4. In Buchanan's framework taxation and public indebtedness are operations of different 
nature. The former requires exchange between beneficiaries of the public expenditure 
and tax payers. This exchange is performed under the compulsory action of the State. The 
latter involves two exchanges: the voluntary purchases of bonds, and the compulsory 
exchange caused by taxation. Under a tax financed expenditure the government imputes the 
corresponding liabilities to a definite set of tax payers at the time of the operation. Under a 
debt financed scheme the funds are secured at the time of the operation but the liabilities are 
postponed to be paid off by future tax-payers; the burden of the debt is placed on the 
shoulders of future generations.
In a review of the debate, Tobin (1965) reemphasized Modigliani's criterion that the 
important matter was the effects of public debt on capital accumulation. Further, he criticized 
the fact that in the Modigliani's model bondholders were affected by an asymmetrical illusion 
whereby they felt wealthier without taking in account the future tax liabilities associated with 
the repayment of public debt. As seen in Section I above, Tobin considers future tax 
liabilities as far as they affect private wealth held in assets other than bonds.
"This proposition [the Ricardian Equivalence] has been discussed at such greater length in 
Italian worl6 that it may be properly said to belong to the Italian rather than to the English 
tradition" Buchanan (1958, p. 114). This comment made in the late 1950s could be valid until 
the mid-1970s when the Barro (1974) contribution opened a new strand of Anglo-Saxon 
literature on public debt.
7. The quotations are from Chiancone (1985).
5. The "sound finance" principle recommended a "moderate surplus" to reduce the possibility 
of deficits. Writing in 1903, Bastable indicated that:
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"... under normal conditions, there ought to be a balance between these two sides 
(expenditure and revenue) of financial activity ... This general principle must, however, 
admit of modifications. Temporary deficits and surpluses cannot be avoided ... The safest 
rule for practice is that which lays down the expediency of estimating for a moderate surplus, 
by which the possibility of a deficit will be reduced to a minimum" (Buchanan and Wagner, 
1977, p.lO).
2. Public Choice has evolved since the late 1960s as the application of economic methods in 
political analysis. The political process is considered similar to the market process, and as in 
the neoclassical methodology, the decision making procedure is centered on individuals. 
However, Public Choice adds new considerations to the standard efficiency results by dealing 
with the institutional context within which individuals take decisions. The subject of study is 
the choice of constraints, rather than the choice within coinstraints which is the matter in 
orthodox economics (Buchanan, 1987a).
10. The new literature is also critical of the political business cycle theory of Nordhaus 
(1975), according to which policy makers overstimulate the economy before elections in 
order to maximize their reelection probabilities, and adopt recessionary policies after the 
election. In this theory, voters "never learn", and policy makers "never loose credibility".
11. Consensual agreements have also been a constant in Buchanan's writings. In Buchanan 
(1949) two approaches to fiscal policies are differentiated: the organismic Sieory of the state, 
and the individualistic foundation. In the former, the state is the unit which decides for 
society as a whole. In the latter, decisions are taken by individuals, and the state projects 
certain collective aspirations. The existence of consensual agreements among individuals 
provides the only benchmark against which to evaluate individual decisions. These 
agreements should be ratified as constitutional rules of the game.
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SECTION III
Public debt in economic growth models
Introduction
Prosperity with relatively low inflation characterized OECD economies during the first 
quarter of a century after the end of World War H. In major European countries and Japan 
the growth rates of GDP during 1950-1973 were higher than in any previous period. 
Although this was not true for the United States (the highest recorded growth rates were 
obtained during the period 1870-1913), the same European countries, Japan and the 
United States exhibited unprecedented high growth rates of per-capita GDP. Additionally, 
unemployment was very low (excepting Germany and Italy in the 1950s) in comparison 
with the experience of the interwar years. These encouraging facts about growth and 
employment were accompanied by a rather new event, the appearance of persistent and 
increasing though still low inflation rates (Maddison, 1987; Mattews and Bowen, 1988).
Growth theory burgeoned in the propitious atmosphere of the 1950s and 1960s. Solow 
(1956) and Swan (1956) explained the basis of the neoclassical approach to economic 
growth, and Tobin (1965) applied the model to monetary economies. After a general 
background in subsection A, in subsection B we present the monetary growth model, also 
called the neoclassical theory of public debt, and discuss the implications of government 
bonds in a neoclassical growth model. It is shown how by introducing government bonds
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in the model, capital accumulation is affected and also the dynamics and stability of the 
system.
Optimal growth models are dealt with in subsection C. Although originally developed in 
the 1920s, they were left aside during the world depression of the 1930s and World War 
n. It was in the optimistic environment of the 1960s that optimum growth attracted the 
attention of economists. After discussing the basic setup, we ask what the implications are 
for private consumption of allowing government deficits. The answer is an unambiguous 
and strong result: government deficits do not affect consumption, and therefore, public 
debt does not matter. This overwhelming upshot did not refrain economists from finding a 
room for fiscal policy in mixed economies, in the context of optimal growth models. Such 
a role was found to be that of persuading the private sector to produce investment goods 
at the rate dictated by optimal growth considerations.
The literature surveyed in subsection D seeks to enrich the neoclassical theory of public 
debt by explicitly incorporating two new elements: one refers to the central role of the 
government budget constraint in the determination of capital intensity and the rate of 
inflation, and the other one recognizes the presence of institutions (such as the Central 
Bank and the Treasury) with their own objectives and strategies, behind specific financial 
policies. Finally, in subsection E we indicate how the main topics in this section are the 
basis for further sections of this work.
A. The background.
Modem growth theory was conceived in the 1930s and 1940s under the influence of the 
great depression and World War H. Pioneering works by Harrod (1939) and Domar 
(1946) examined the problem of economic growth in a Keynesian spirit. The main concern 
was the capability of capitalist economies to achieve a steady-state growth. Through 
different ways Harrod and Domar arrived at a unique condition under which a modem
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economy -capitalist or centrally planned- would reach a path of steady-state growth: the 
relation of the saving rate s to the capital-output ratio y should be equal to the rate of 
growth of labor force n.
The arguments behind the Harrod-Domar condition s/v = n reveal its Keynesian 
characteristics. For capital to be fully employed, output should grow at the rate s/v, and 
for labour to be fully employed, output should rise at the rate n. Harrod (1939) called s/v 
the warranted rate of growth, and n the natural rate of growth. 1 A steady-state growth 
might not exist, however. An excess of the warranted rate over the natural rate would 
bring about an excess of capital driving the marginal productivity of capital to zero and 
discouraging investment. If, on the other hand, the natural rate exceeded the warranted 
rate there would be increasing unemployment of labour. In both two cases a hypothetical 
economy would move away from an equilibrium growth path. An equilibrium growth, if it 
existed, would be a knife-edge equilibrium. Formed in the Keynesian mode and sharing the 
stagnation thesis which gained currency in the late 1930s (Section I, above), Harrod's 
analysis emphasized the possibility of a warranted rate secularly superior to the natural 
rate.
Neoclassical growth models criticized the knife-edge version of economic growth 
according to which a steady state equilibrium might not exist. In the economic context of 
the 1950s and 1960s with the leading Western economies working at a high level of 
demand and full employment, the Hansen's stagnation thesis was considered not just as an 
outcome of the depression of the 1930s but as an incorrect interpretation of the evolution 
of capitalist economies. In the same way, growth models brought into being during the 
depression and the War were censured as a wrong view of the capitalist development.^
On technical grounds the knife-edge characteristic of the Harrod-Domar model resulted 
from the fact that s, v and n were set up as constants. Neoclassical writers questioned the 
assumption of a capital-output ratio v derived from a fixed coefficient production function
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and introduced technological flexibility. The new models embodied a range of feasible 
steady states, and then alternative consumption paths for the society to choose. In this 
context there would exist a growth path which would guarantee a higher level of per- 
person consumption than any other growth path, namely, there would be a saving rate and 
a corresponding capital-output relation which would maximize consumption. This was the 
neoclassical golden rule of capital accumulation.
According to the golden rule the saving ratio should be chosen in order to set the capital- 
labor relation K/L at a level in which the social return on investment r was equal to the 
natural growth rate, r=n. In this sense, any growth path on which the K/L always exceeded 
its golden rule level by at least some constant amount, or any path which kept the r below 
its golden rule value by at least some constant amount would be defined as dynamically 
inefficient, because there would always exist another path which, starting from the same 
initial capital stock would generate a higher consumption (Phelps, 1965). The golden rule 
concept will be repeatedly used in this section and also in sections IV and VI below.
Neoclassical growth models captured an important part of the theoretical and empirical 
research in economics in the late 1950s and 1960s. The relationship between government 
policies and growth was a topic of debate. Could there exist a meaningful growth policy 
when exogenous factors -population growth and technological progress- were thought to 
be the determinants of the long-run rate of growth? Could government policies be neutral 
as between present and future consumption? Some writers argued that any policy mix 
affects the composition of current output and future social endowments. However, it was 
observed that the existence of imperfect capital markets would require the intervention of 
governments in the process of intertemporal social choices. In general, it was admitted 
that the relevant issue would be the consistency of current policy mixtures and the final 
objective of economic growth (Tobin, 1964).
62
Other areas of debate focused on the projections of growth theory on policy grounds. 
Various authors expressed the need for a synthesis between the long run and full 
employment theories of growth, and the short run macroeconomics applied to 
unemployment situations.^ Some approaches intended a direct application of neoclassical 
growth theory to economic policy. The so-called monetary growth models or neoclassical 
theory of public debt as outlined by Tobin ([1955], [1965a], [1968], [1971]), are 
representative of these lines of research.
Finally, other researchers paid attention to the problem of the optimal growth path. Based 
on the classical contributions of Ramsey (1928) for a planned economy, and of Solow 
(1956) for a decentralized economy, these endeavours considered the case of mixed 
economies in which governments use policy instruments -government bonds and money 
supply- to achieve the optimal growth path.
In the next two subsections -B and C- we review the last two areas of research with 
emphasis on the neoclassical theory of public debt as it was developed in the 1950s and 
1960s in the framework of monetary growth models and optimal growth models. We start 
with basic monetary growth models in which the underlying issue is how the introduction 
of public debt into the structure of a neoclassical growth model affects the standard results 
as obtained by Solow (1956) [Box III.1]. We initially review the Tobin (1965a) model 
which opened the modem literature on monetary growth models, and discuss an explicit 
illustration of how government bonds "matter" in a two-asset model. Finally, we turn to 
supemeutrality models in which public debt does not matter. An important point to note 
before we proceed is that the relevant literature generally used the concept "public debt" 
to indiscriminately refer to government liabilities such as money and interest bearing 
government bonds. When the literature reviewed here exclusively refers to either money 
or bonds, the point will be made clear in the text.
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BOX m. 1 
The Solow model
In the Solow (1956) model, the labor force L given by exogenous population growth, 
increases at a constant rate, n. Output Y is produced using capital K, and labour. The 
production function Y=F(K,L) exhibits constant returns to scale, and then the per-capita 
production function can be written as y=f(k). Saving is a constant fraction of income, 
S=sY. Net investment is the rate of increase of the capital stock, DK, where D is the time 
derivative d/dt; then, the basic macroeconomic identity is DK=sY.
The behaviour of the per-capita capital stock is given by Dk=sf(k)-nk; this is the 
fundamental equation of capital accumulation, or neoclassical differential equation of 
economic groA^. Alternatively, this equation can be written as Dk=f(k)-nk-c. The steady 
state per capita capital stock k* is given by this equation when Dk=0. In the steady state k 
is constant and then K and L grow at n, the exogenous rate of population growth. 
Therefore the Harrod-Domar consistency condition is satisfied.
In the capital accumulation equation, when k is out of the steady state (k<k* or k>k*), k 
increases (because sf(k)>nk), or decreases (because nk>sf(k)), until the long run k* is 
achieved. In conclusion, the model provides an equilibrium path for the per-capita capital 
stock and the svstem is globallv stable._________________________________________
In monetary growth models the question "Does public debt matter?" is addressed in the 
context of the supemeutrality debate of the late 1960s. Supemeutrality refers to the long- 
run neutrality of a change in the rate gf growth of money in a growing economy, rather 
than to once-and-for-all changes in the quantity of money in stationary economies. 
Specifically, supemeutrality means that a change in the growth rate of money affects no 
real variables other than real balances.
1. The Tobin monetary growth model.
Tobin (1965a) generalized to a monetary economy the Solow (1956) real growth model 
[Box ni.2]. One of the reasons for this generalization was the monetary character of 
modem economies, and therefore the analysis of the implications of this institutional fact 
on growing economies. Two strong ideas dominate the Tobin approach. The first one is 
the Keynesian thinking according to which in the short run monetary factors and portfolio 
decisions affect the process of capital accumulation; Tobin attempts to prove that "a
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similar proposition is true for the long run. The equilibrium interest rate and degree of 
capital intensity are in general affected by monetary supplies and portfolio behaviour, as 
well as by technology and thrift" (p.684). Technology and thrift represent the neoclassical 
tradition in saving-investment analysis as well as in economic growth. The novelty of the 
contribution consists in the incorporation of monetary effects on the degree of capital 
intensity. These are the so-called "Tobin effects". The second idea refers to the capital- 
money conflict which is set up as a problem of portfolio decisions: capital and money 
compete for the placement of saving based on their relative returns.
BOX m. 2
The Tobin (1965a) model
1. As in Solow (1956) [BOX in.l], S=sY, and y=f(k).
2. Wealth and portfolio behaviour.
Real wealth (A) is kept in the form of capital (K) and real money balances (M/P). In per- 
capita terms, real wealth (a) is a=k+m. Tlie desired composition of wealth is given by the 
demand for money function m(j=k<|)(r+3c), where r is the real interest rate and Jt the rate of 
inflation. Accordingly, m^ j is proportional to the per-capita capital stock and a decreasing 
function (<j)'<0) of &e nominal interest rate (r+Ji).
2. Government deficits and disposable income.
Government deficits take the form of monetary transfers (DM) to the private sector. In 
real terms these transfers are DM/P = 0M/P where 0 is the growth rate of money DM/M. 
Considering the effects of the inflation rate on real balances, the real disposable income is 
Yd=Y+(0-jt)M/P.
4. Capital accumulation, steady state and Tobin effects.
The capital accumulation equation is DK=s[Y+D(M/P)]-D(M/P) which in per capita terms 
becomes Dk=sf(k)-nk-(l-s)(0-jc)m. The growth rate of real per-capita money balances is 
Dm=(0-jt-n)m. The steady state relationship between capital and real money balances is 
obtained for Dk=Dm=0, as follows: O=[sf0c)-nk]-[(l-s)nm] which shows that to lower 
equilibrium real money balances correspond higher levels of capital accumulation._______
Three main conclusions are reached. First, supemeutrality does not obtain in Tobin's 
extension of the Solow growth model to a money economy, namely monetary factors 
affect the real characteristics of the steady states. Second, in a monetary economy savings 
finance not only the accumulation of physical capital but also of real money balances. This 
means that the equilibrium capital intensity in a monetary model is lower than in the Solow 
real model: the higher the desired real balances, the lower the equilibrium capital-labor 
ratio. Consequently the golden rule saving ratio is no longer the one that maximizes steady 
state consumption in nonmonetary models (Sidrauski, 1967b); a higher saving ratio is
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required to accomplish that target in a monetary economy. Third, a higher inflation rate 
would invariably lead to a higher degree of capital intensity.
We next describe a two-asset model which incorporates government bonds. We show how 
the new asset affects the dynamics and the long-run equilibrium of the Solow (1956) 
model, and discuss the stability issue which arises not only in this particular setting but in 
monetary growth models à la Tobin.
2. Public bonds in the Solow model. The stability issue
Shell, Sidrauski and Stiglitz (1969) introduced government bonds as a second store of 
value into the Solow model. It is shown how the presence of government bonds in the 
neoclassical growth model alters the long-run equilibrium value of the capital labour ratio, 
and also the dynamics and stability of the system. The basic insight can be described as 
follows: the equilibrium capital intensity is affected not only by the growth rate of public 
bonds, but also by the capital gains derived from changes in their market prices. The 
overall conclusion is "government debt matters". A graphical illustration of the model is 
provided in BOX HI, 3.
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Boxm.3
Government bonds "matter”. A diagrammatic example from the late 1960s.
As in Tobin (1965a), saving is a constant fraction of real income which in this model is 
defined as real output plus capital gains from changes in bond prices. Real investment is 
then the part of red savings which is not absorbed by increases in bond holdings and 
capital gains. A crucial aspect of the model is the hypothesis of expectations formation. It 
is assumed that individuals instantaneously adjust their expectations about price changes. 
In the context of the adaptive expectations theory represented by an equation like d/dt(jc 
^)=h(]t-jt^), the instantaneous adjustment is illustratW by the h coefficient tending to 
infinity. This is a case of short-run perfect foresight or "myopic foresight" in which 
individuals only know the price at die next moment.
The laws of motion for per-capita capital k and per-capita bonds b are given by
Dk = sf(k)-nk-(1-s)[a+q]b 
Db = [q+a-n]b
( 1 )
( 2 )
where a  is the rate of growth of public bonds, a=DB/B, and q stands for capital gains 
derived from changes in bond prices. The interest rate on government bonds is assumed to 
be zero. Equation (1) has the standard structure of monetary growth models: the first two 
terms on the right-hand side give the law of capital accumulation in the Solow model, and 
the third term indicates that given a saving ratio s, public bonds add to private 
balancesheets according to a  and q but displace a whole unit of real capital.^
FIGURE 1
s f  ( k i )  -  (J -  s )
Figure 1 shows the equilibrium ratio kg determined by the intersection of sf (k) with nk in 
the Solow model, and the lower equilibrium ratio k% determined by the intersection of 
sf (k)-(l-s) [a+q]b and nk when public bonds are a second asset. The figure shows that 
even when a=DB/B=0, the existence of capital gains on government bonds implies a 
lower long-run equilibrium for k than in the Solow model.
Figure 2 is the phase diagram of the system (1) and (2) drawn in the (k,b) space. From (2), 
Db=0 if and only if q=n-a. Given nx%, which means that the growth rate of the economy 
is greater than the growth rate of public debt, there is a unique value k* for which Db=0. 
To the left of the Db=0 locus, k<k* and b is increasing (Db>0); similarly, b is decreasing 
(Db<0) to the right of the locus, where k>k*. These directions of motion are shown by the 
vertical arrows. The locus Dk=0 starts from the origin and crosses the horizontal axis at 
point k** where sf(k**)=nk**. This is the Solow equilibrium of the system for Db=0. 
Above the Dk=0 locus, k is decreasing (Dk<0) simply because public bonds are above the 
level which would keep k constant, and below the Dk=0 locus, k is increasing (Dk>0).
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The horizontal arrows illustrate these directions of motion.
Two relevant points appear in Figure 2. The solution (k*,b*) which assures balanced 
growth equilibrium for an economy with capital and public bonds, and the Solow solution 
for a real growth model (k**,0).^ While the former equilibrium is a saddlepoint, the latter 
is locally stable. In Figure 2 only the trajectory AA, the saddlepoint path that converges to 
E satisfies the differential equations (1) and (2). All other paths, either tend to the Solow 
solution or imply such attractive capital gains that real investment falls to zero. If the initial 
conditions are "just right", that is, lie along AA, the system will converge to equilibrium 
with capital and bonds. Expectations are also fulfilled on paths tending to the k-axis; 
however, this latter result is specific to the model under discussion, and more general 
conclusions relevant to government debt and monetary growth models may be drawn with 
reference to the stationary solution (b*, k*).
FIGURE 2
A highly controversial result of early monetary growth models was that an economy 
would fail to reach a steady state equilibrium, except if it started from a "right position" 
(Nagatani, 1970). The instability found in these models is characteristic of competitive 
models with more than one asset and an asset market clearing equation consistent with the 
hypothesis that individuals instantaneously adjust their expectations about price changes 
(Hahn, 1966). In monetary growth models à la Tobin, the asset market clearing equation 
states that the supply and demand for real balances are always equal; additionally, it is 
assumed that the expected rate of price change is equal to the current rate of price change. 
Altogether, these assumptions are the source of instability. For instance, after a shock that 
displaces m above (below) its steady state value, in order to induce agents to increase 
(decrease) their demand for real balances the rate of inflation must fall (increase); but as a
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result of this reaction of the inflation rate, m moves further away from its original 
equilibrium.^
Early discussants of the monetary growth model indicated that a sluggish adjustment of 
expectations (a low value of the adjustment coefficient b in the expectations equation in 
Box m , 3) was necessary for stability (Sidrauski, 1967b; Stein, 1971).^ Other critics 
sustained that stability would be guaranteed by the existence of future markets for all 
periods in the future, or by investors who exercised long-run perfect foresight (Shell and 
Stiglitz, 1967). Sargent and Wallace (1973) suggested a way out of the instability problem 
by allowing prices to depend not only on their past history -as in the early monetary 
growth models- but on other relevant variables; specifically, after a change in m above 
(below) its steady state value, the price level would rise (fall) instantaneously thereby 
eliminating the change in real money balances without affecting the inflation rate. In other 
words, (saddlepoint) instability was no longer a characteristic of monetary growth and 
government debt models.^ Further discussions reached (global) stability by adding new 
elements to the original model. For instance, when a third asset such as private interest- 
yielding bonds are introduced to the usual two-asset economy (Takayama, 1994).
We now finish this subsection with a brief reference to supemeutrality models which are 
invariant to changes in public debt.
3. A case for supemeutrality. The Sidrauski model.
The nonsupemeutrality results attained in Tobin (ixs.) and Sidrauski (1967b) were called 
into question in Sidrauski (1967a). In this latter influential article an anticipated inflation 
created by money-financed government net transfer payments no longer affects the long- 
run capital intensity. The rate of monetary expansion affects no real variables such as 
consumption, capital intensity and real interest rate; only the real balances are affected by 
changes in the growth rate of money. ^  Unlike the monetary growth models where savings
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are postulated as a fixed proportion of real disposable income, in this model they are 
derived from utility maximization. The model considers a representative infinitely lived 
family which maximizes an intertemporal utility function whose arguments are 
consumption and real balances. In the context of an economy which grows at a constant 
rate with a linearly homogeneous production function, Sidrauski shows that money is 
supemeutral.l^
Supemeutrality exclusively refers to the steady state, since changes in the growth rate of 
money affect capital accumulation in the short run. Fischer (1979) corroborates that in the 
Sidrauski (1967a) maximizing model the trajectory of the economy to the steady state is 
not in general independent of the growth rate of money. The supemeutrality result has 
obvious implications for the historical perspective of public debt theories since contrary to 
models à la Tobin the steady state capital intensity is invariant to changes in public debt 
We now move to discuss optimal growth models, an area of research which stimulated 
new developments of the theory of public debt during the 1960s.
C. Public debt in optimal growth models
Two main lines of research dominated the attention of theorists of economic growth in the 
1960s. One focused on the growth possibilities of a full employment market economy, 
given technology; the Solow (1956) model was a representative contribution of this area 
of research. The other source of contributions analyzed the case of fully planned 
economies, given technology; these efforts continued the pioneering exposition due to 
Ramsey (1928).
Two sets of questions are relevant for the discussion of public debt in the context of 
optimal growth models. First, how the optimal development results for a planned economy 
are affected when allocation decisions are made in a decentralized fashion? And, what are 
the effects of government intervention on this decentralized setting through bond-financed
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deficits? Second, is there a room for discretionary fiscal and monetary policies in optimal 
growth strategies? What are the implications of this analytical perspective for the current 
"burden of the debt" debate of the 1960s?
The first set of questions is discussed along the lines of an optimal neoclassical growth 
model. The final aim is to examine the resource allocation effects of bond-financed 
deficits. The second set of questions tries to find an intermediate way between the polar 
strategies due to Ramsey (1928) and Solow (1956). The purpose is to determine how 
governments could achieve an indirect control of the capital accumulation process through 
monetary policy -by changes in the relative proportion of money and government bonds-, 
and budgetary policy -through changes in the size of government deficits (surpluses)-. The 
particular case discussed here is a Tobinesque model in which the asset and consumption 
goods markets determine the equilibrium prices of money and capital. It is shown that 
government policies can alter these equilibrium prices, and depending on the specific 
policy mix, the capital accumulation, either in the short run or in the long run. Further, the 
model is enriched by postulating a social welfare functional for the government, in order to 
provide sound foundations to policy measures in a mixed economy.
1. Common features.
Although optimal growth models bloomed in the late 1960s, the central question had been 
posed by Ramsey in 1928 on the eve of the great depression: "how much of its income 
should a nation save?" (p.543). The open discussion of this problem burgeoned in the 
sixties with their record of full employment and expansion. Some common features 
characterize optimal growth models. First, society "goes on forever" which means that 
these strategies adopt an infinite time horizon. Second, economic growth is understood in 
terms of consumption rather than in terms of capital accumulation; consumption concerns 
to the very end of growth while different levels of capital stock reveal previous decisions
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on resource allocation. Third, a social welfare function is the optimality criterion for 
choosing between alternative consumption paths.
The specification of the social welfare function reveals the consumption distribution 
scheme adopted by society. This scheme depends on the shape of the utility function as 
well as on the existence and magnitude of a social discount factor. It is assumed to 
prevail for ever leaving aside any possible change in social choices. This outcome is 
explained by the resemblance of the analytical procedure with those employed in physical 
sciences. Now we turn to essential features of the neoclassical optimal growth model.
2. A basic model
In optimal growth models the problem of society is to choose a time path for per-capita 
consumption in order to maximize a social welfare function, given an infinite time horizon 
and a positive discount rate, or rate of time preference. At successive points in time, 
allocations of income between consumption and investment are expressed in terms of the 
available capital stock. Taking the capital-labor ratio as a continuous time variable, the 
basic constraint is the fundamental equation of capital accumulation (Box III, 1 above).
An essential upshot of the maximization problem is that the solution obtained for a 
centralized economy also applies to a decentralized economy. One specific result shows 
that the growth rate of population and the rate of time preference, altogether determine 
the real interest rate, and according to the production function, the steady state capital 
intensity. Another result gives the level of consumption which is consistent with the real 
interest rate and the steady state capital intensity. Basic developments and results of 
optimal growth models are provided in Box HI, 4.
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BOX m. 4
Basic results from standard optimal growth models
Formally, at time tg society will find the solution to the following problem:
Max. W = U [c (t ) ] e “® (3)
[ c ( t ) ]
s u b j e c t  t o  Dk = f ( k ) - n k - c  
and  k ( t o )  = kg
where W is the social welfare function to be maximized, U is the utility function, c(t) is the 
time path for per capita consumption, ô is a positive social discount rate, Dk=f(k)-nk-c is 
the capital accumulation equation, and k(to)=kg is an initial condition.
From the solution to this problem (Intriligator, 1971), if the time paths of consumption 
[c^*] and capital [k^ *] are optimal, they must satisfy the differential equations:
Dk = f ( k ) - n k - c  (4)
Dc /c  = u ( c t ) [ f ' (k)-n-Ô] (5)
where pi(c^ ) is the instantaneous elasticity of substitution. For Dk=0 and Dc=0, the 
steady state equations are:
c = f  (k) -n k  (4 ' )
f  ' (k) = n + Ô ( 5 ' )
Equation (4 j  corresponds to the steady state sustainable consumption per capita. 
Investment per capita must equal nk to sustain a constant per capita capital stock in the 
steady state. Emiation (5 j  corresponds to the modified golden rule given a positive social 
discount rate.^^
What happens to these results when instead of a planning board, families and firms 
determine the resource allocation in a competitive market context? The budget constraint 
of the representative family can be written as the identity between her sources of income 
(wages, w, and interests, r) and the expenditure in consumption and investment. Then, at 
any time t,
w^+r^k^=c^+Dk^+nk^ (6)
where w  ^and r^  are déterminé in the factor markets when firms maximize profits 
according to the standard neoclassical conditions f(k^)=r^ and f(k^)-k^f(k^)=w^.
In this framework the problem of the representative family is to maximize a functional 
such as (3) subject to the budget constraint (6). The necessary condition is given by 
Dc/ c  = u ( c t ) [ r t - n - ô ]  
which is the same necessary condition obtained for the centralized economy. Therefore, 
the steady state results and the dynamic analysis obtained before for the centralized 
economy applv to the decentralized economy.___________________________________
So far we haye overlooked the role of government. One could question to what extent 
government deficits affect consumption. We answer this question in the next subsection by 
following the idea that the fully informed forward-looking representative family 
incorporate the implications of the government budget constraint into its own (Frenkel and 
Razin, 1987).
3. Government spending, government deficits and private consumption
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The starting point for analyzing the role of government is the consideration of the 
government budget identity, according to which the primary deficit and the interest 
payments on the outstanding debt are financed with public debt increases. When this 
identity is generalized to many periods, we obtain an intertemporal government budget 
identity which states that the government could incur in deficits financed with public debt 
provided it can engineer future surpluses to repay the debt service.
The availability of government bonds extends the representative family's portfolio from 
one to two assets (capital shares and bonds). When the budget constraint of the family is 
generalized to many periods, it can be shown that bonds affect the present value of 
consumption in the same way as capital does. A crucial result can be obtained when 
government budget deficits are internalized by the representative family. This result says 
that the path of consumption of the representative family is not affected by changes in the 
method of finance (e.g. a bond financed tax cut) of a given path of government spending. 
However, it also shows that government spending does affect consumption. A formal 
discussion of the government budget constraint and its internalization by the private sector 
is offered in Box III, 5.
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Box ni. 5
The influence of public finance on the consumption path
The flow government budget constraint can be written as DB^=r^Bt+G^-T|  ^where G -^T  ^is 
the primary deficit, r^ B^  the interest payments, and DB  ^the bonds issuW to finance tiie 
excess of outlays over tax revenues. In per capita terms, Dbf+nb^=r^b(^+(g -^t )^. The 
intertemporal equilibrium level of b(t) is given by b(r-n)=(t-g) which means that the 
interest bill cannot be indefinitely financed with new borrowing: at some stage primary 
surpluses are required to finance the debt service.!^ The same idea can be expressed by 
discounting the future budget surpluses:
oo oo oo
=  J ( t - g ) V t d t  =  J  t ^ V ^ d t  -  J  g ^ V ^ d t (7)
where = exp[-jJ^r-n)dt is the factor by which future primary surpluses are discounted to 
the present time, s.
Equation (7) is the government intertemporal budget constraint, according to which given 
an initial per capita debt bg, and a trajectory of government spending g ,^ it does not 
require a balanced budget (gt=tt) for all t.
The availability of public bonds extends the family's portfolio Z from one to two assets. In 
per capita terms this portfolio is z=k+b. The family budget constraint can then be 
reformulated as
wt + r t z t - t t=c t+Dz- t -+nz t  
In intertemporal terms this constraint becomes
^ c tV ^ d t  = kg + bg + J  w^V^dt -  t t V ^ d t  (8)
The present value of the consumption stream is equal to the initial value of portfolio plus 
the present value of wages after taxes.
The impact of changes in the method of finance of government spending on the 
intertemporal budget constraint of the representative family is obtained by substituting 
from (7) into (8) (Frenkel and Razin, 1987, Blanchard and Fischer, 1989):
I  c^V^dt = kg + rw^V^dt - I  g^V^dt (9)
The timing of taxes is irrelevant in the decision-making process: in present value, a current 
reduction of taxes is exactly offset by the anticipated increase in future taxes. Neither 
deficit finance ngr the size of public debt affect the present value of the consumption 
stream. However, as revealed by the last term on the right-hand side of (9), government 
spending matters. Since government activities employ resources which otherwise would 
have been available to the private sector, the path of consumption is affected by the path 
of government spending.____________________________________________________
Some critical assumptions are required to obtain the neutrality of consumption to a change 
in the timing of taxes collected to finance a given path of government expenditures. First, 
there is a forward-looking representative family which incorporates the implications of the 
government budget constraint into her own, recognizing the dependence between 
government spending, government financed deficits and the implied tax liabilities. Second,
75
capital markets are perfect, namely, private and public sectors lend and borrow freely at 
the same terms: the rental rates expected by the private sector from capital and public 
bonds are equivalent. Third, taxes are not distortionary. And finally, the government meets 
the condition (transversality condition) according to which an increasing debt cannot be 
indefinitely served with new debt issues, namely, future primary surpluses are required to 
finance the debt service.
These reflections are reminiscent of our discussion of the Ricardian equivalence 
proposition in Section II. The equivalence between borrowing and taxation stated in 
selected paragraphs of Ricardo's writings reappears here in the context of a neoclassical 
optimization framework. For the historical perspective of public debt theories the 
conclusion is clear: in an intertemporal context there is no such a thing as a government 
deficit, deficit finance is of no consequence, and public debt does not matter.
Having arrived to such strong neutrality results, is there any hope for government 
discretionary policies under the context of optimal economic growth? Can the intervention 
of governments in mixed economies be rationalized in the framework of optimal growth 
models? These are the leading questions in our last subsection on optimal growth models, 
in which we inquire whether and under which assumptions some room is left for 
government debt policies in mixed economies.
4. Public debt policies in mixed economies.
Foley, Shell and Sidrauski (1969), and Foley and Sidrauski (1971) tackled the questions 
addressed in the previous paragraph, in the framework of optimal growth models. First of 
all these authors designed a portfolio model following Tobin (1961) in which combinations 
of fiscal and monetary policies affect capital accumulation through changes in the price of 
capital. At this point, the methodology of optimal growth models is applied as "a way to
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make rigorous the prescription of government control in the mixed economy" (Foley et al. 
1969,p.699).
There is a crucial difference between the assumptions of this model and the assumptions 
underlying our previous discussions of the influence of public finance on private 
consumption. While in the last subsection there is a fully informed forward-looking 
representative family which integrates the government budget constraint into its own, in 
the model under discussion the assumption of fully informed agents is considered "very 
strong" and "unlikely to be met in reality". In the absence of this "strong" assumption, the 
argument continues, some room is left for discretionary government deficit policies. The 
position of the authors has to be seen in the context of the mid-1960s when assumptions 
about static expectations and adaptive expectations were widely used in the economic 
literature.
The economy under consideration is represented by a two sector neoclassical growth 
model with two flow variables -consumption and investment- and three stock variables - 
money, bonds and capital-. Two key assumptions are price flexibility and full employment. 
The two sector structure provides the key role in the investment process to the cost of 
capital. Two goals are ascribed to the government: the stabilization of the price level, and 
the constrained maximization of a welfare functional. The two instruments are fiscal policy 
and monetary policy, namely, some trajectory for the fiscal deficit and a certain time path 
for the debt-money ratio.
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BOX m. 6
Government intervention in a modem fixed economy
In the two-sector growth model the command optimum is based on the maximization of 
the intertemporal welfare functional
U [ q c ( t ) ] e - ^ t ^  a>0 (10)
subject to the capital accumulation equation Dk=qj(k,pi^)-nk, and k(0)=kg, where q%(*) is 
the per-capita production function of investment goo&, represents the output of 
consumption goods, and pjj^  the price of capital. The necessary condition for an optimal 
path is f  (k*,p]ç^ *) = ô+n, namely, the same condition obtained for the one-sector model. 
The government's problem is to choose the time paths for the fiscal deficit d(t), and for the 
debt money ratio x(t) so as to maximize the welfare functional. If the paths [d*(t)] and 
[x*(t)] are optimal, they must satisfy the differential equations, Dk = qj(k, p^-nk and Dg 
= d(k, pk)-ng. The latter equation relates the per capita nominal stock of government debt, 
g, to die per capita deficit, d; g includes money and bonds (g=m+b).
Given the necessary condition f  (k*, pi^*)=0+n, the long-run optimal capital-labor ratio k* 
is unique. There is only one value of k that satirfies qj(k*, p^4=nk*. TTierefore, the Dk=0 
locus is a vertical line in the (k, g) plane. As for the Dg=0 line the slope is ambiguous; 
here, it is depicted under the assumption that an increase in k creates excess supply in the 
consumption goods market, and therefore a higher deficit is required to restore 
equilibrium.^O^Figure 3 depicts the Dg=0 and Dk=0 loci. The equilibrium (k*,g*) is 
unique and globaUy stable. Global stability has an important implication in this model: a 
mixed economy with optimal fiscal and monetary policies tends to the steady state 
equilibrium (g*, k*) regardless of the initial values (kg, gg).^!
FIGURE 3
From the solution to the maximization problem it is obtained that the long-run equilibrium 
capital-labor ratio k* is only determined by the social rate of time preference and the 
growth rate of population. Then, the equilibrium price of capital pj^ *^ is uniquely 
determined by k*. Given these facts and the government goal of price stability, authorities 
have to choose a value for the debt-money ratio so as to get an equilibrium pj^  ^in the assets 
market equivalent to its optimal level p^*. Both k* and pj^ * are the signals for producers 
to determine the division of the national product between consumption goods and
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investment goods. Once again, the government has to intervene by using the fiscal deficit 
so as to assure that consumption goods demand is enough to meet the supply.
Also from the solution to the maximization problem it is concluded that a mixed economy 
with optimal fiscal and monetary policies converges to the steady state equilibrium 
regardless of the initial values of capital and debt. This result led the authors to the 
conclusion that the "burden-of-the-debt" debate of the early 1960s (Section II) had been 
ill-posed.
In conclusion, under the framework of optimal growth models monetary and fiscal policies 
are designed to persuade the private sector to produce investment goods at the optimal 
rate. This rate is not determined by policies but by social preferences, population growth, 
and technology. Additionally, the steady state value of the stock of debt is independent of 
the initial condition, which means that the initial stock of debt does jiQl matter at all for the 
steady state equilibrium and for the optimal growth paths of consumption and investment.
We now move to the next subsection in which our central interest is to make an explicit 
consideration of the government budget constraint and its implications for capital 
accumulation and inflation. In monetary models à la Tobin government deficits take the 
form of transfers to the private sector (transfer payments financed by printing money) but 
there is not a formal incorporation of the government budget constraint. Although already 
Foley and Sidrauski (1971) had formally discussed the implications of the government 
budget constraint on capital accumulation, further theoretical contributions gave 
budgetary policies a central importance in the determination of both the capital intensity 
and the rate of inflation. A characteristic of the contributions reviewed below is the 
importance of institutional factors, particularly of those institutions closely associated with 
the financing of government activities.
D. The budgetary process, capital accumulation and inflation.
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Two analytical directions can be distinguished. The first one is directly associated with the 
neoclassical growth model, including money, capital and bonds. The second direction 
posits the budgetary problem as that of optimizing the mix of taxes given a path of 
government expenditures.
To illustrate the former analytical direction, two examples may be offered. In the first 
example, Dombusch (1977) extended the Tobin (1965a) model to include the government 
budget constraint. The model is similar to that of Foley and Sidrauski (1971), but instead 
of analyzing the effects of alternative stabilization policies on capital accumulation, the 
rate of inflation itself and the capital intensity are endogenously determined by budgetary 
policies. It is shown that the effects of these policies on long-run capital accumulation and 
inflation are not unambiguous. In particular, it is illustrated how a shift from money 
financed deficits to bond financed deficits invariably lowers the long-run capital stock but 
its effects on the inflation rate are indeterminate.
The second example follows Burmeister and Phelps (1971). The immediate precedents of 
this contribution appear in the money-growth literature. In Tobin (1965a) and Sidrauski 
(1967b) an increased rate of inflation leads to a higher capital intensity, and the Treasury 
determines the inflation rate through money-financed transfers to the private sector; Tobin 
shows how a permanent inflation diverts wealth from public debt to capital stock ("Tobin 
effects"). From a different standpoint Sidrauski observes how the perverse effects of 
inflation on consumption lead to capital accumulation. Mundell (1963) arrives to similar 
conclusions in an analysis of the impacts of inflation on interest rates: an increased 
inflation derived from the Treasury's deficit spending lowers real money balances and the 
consequent decline in wealth encourages a higher saving and thus a lower real interest rate 
("Mundell effects"). Therefore, from different analytical angles, foreseable changes in the 
rate of inflation appear to affect capital accumulation.
80
Given these precedents, Burmeister and Phelps discuss whether there is an inherent 
relationship between the rate of inflation and the capital intensity of the economy. Further, 
they question whether the role of public finance is limited to the Treasury's deficit 
spending. The argument of the contribution states that the capital intensity of the economy 
is invariant to the rate of inflation if the real public debt is isolated from the rate of 
inflation; the key of this result is a coordinated compensatory action between the 
government agencies -the Treasury and the Central Bank-. In conclusion, there is no 
inherent relationship between inflation rates and capital accumulation, and the precise 
characteristics of this relationship hinge on institutional factors.
The second analytical direction proposes a public finance case for inflation (Phelps, 1973). 
Governments face the problem of how to finance public expenditures. Ordinary taxation is 
one way, the issue of bonds is an alternative route, and the inflation tax is a third way. The 
latter means that governments derive rents from the monopoly of money issue. This is an 
institutional fact of public finance with obvious implications for fiscal planning since 
governments can choose a tax mix between ordinary taxes and the inflation tax.
For given paths of government expenditures and income effects from taxation, an increase 
in the inflation tax reduces the amount of wage taxes which have to be collected. Under 
this public finance context the government's problem is the optimal choice of taxes. It is 
shown how the utility of a representative household is maximized when the marginal utility 
on consumption is equal to the marginal revenue on ordinary taxes evaluated by real wage 
incomes, and equal to the marginal revenue on inflation evaluated by the real amount of 
money holdings. In this framework, liquidity is a good, and then it is optimal to tax it as 
any other good. Further developments and criticisms of this result in a new-classical 
framework are discussed in Section VI below.
E. Extensions and links with other sections of this work.
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We find two ways to build a bridge between some of the contents of this section and our 
further empirical and historical expositions. First, we discuss an optimal monetary growth 
model some of who.se essential results were commented in the section. In the context of 
this model, it is shown how by altering the nature of taxation, changes in public debt have 
real effects. We also extend the model to examine the double constraint -internal and 
external- which gravitates on government finances, and discuss its relevance for the study 
of the Colombian experience. These topics are presented in the appendix to the section.
Second, foreign borrowing is another issue through which our review can be linked to the 
remainder of this work. Optimal growth models were applied to the problem of optimum 
foreign borrowing since the 1960s. Eaton and Taylor (1986) and Eaton (1989) summarize 
their achievements and prospects. We do not directly dwell with those models in the 
empirical sections of this work, but in the historical sections (particularly in Part IV, 
Section III) draw on recent literature on international borrowing inspired by the optimum 
foreign borrowing contributions of the 1960s and 1970s and highly influenced by the 
international debt problems of the 1980s.
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APPENDIX
FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND THE GOVERNMENT BUDGET CONSTRAINT
To start with, and to facilitate some connections with our case study, we offer a scheme of 
sample balance sheets which encapsulate the financial structure of the economy.
A. A simple sketch of financial balance sheets.
Sample balance sheets are described in Table 2.
TABLE 2
FINANCIAL MARKETS
Sample Balance Sheets
Selected Items
Rest-of the World
. Foreign Loans to Banks International Reserves. Z.
F^*- Foreign Loans to Govern­
ment
Foreign Loans to Private 
Sector
Central Bank
International Reserves Currency. Q
GL. Loans to Government Bank Reserves. EE
PrC. Credit to Private Sector 
(Rediscounts)
Commercial Banks
ER. Bank Reserves Deposits. E
Lpr. Loans to Private Sector Rediscounts. Pro
Foreign Loans to Banks .£^1
Government
Central Bank loans, GL 
(...) Internal Debt Bonds, E
External Public Debt.
Private Sector
G. Currency Bank Loans. Lpr
E. Deposits Private External Debt.
E . Bonds Wealth, ü
Ej^ K. Capital
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The monetary sector is formed by the central bank and the commercial banks. The private 
sector embraces firms and public. It is assumed that government, commercial banks and 
private sector (firms) have access to external credit. At any moment the stock of external 
debt is given by the accumulated foreign indebtedness of tiiose sectors 
(F*=Fb *+Fq *+Fs *). The overall net external indebtedness is simply the difference 
between the stock of external debt and the stock of international reserves (F*-Z).
The main assets of the central bank are the international reserves in national currency (it is 
assumed an exchange rate equal to 1), the loans extended by the central bank to the 
government, and the rediscounts granted to commercial banks. These three assets form the 
monetary base (M=Z+GL+PrC). Later we will separate out the monetary base issued in 
the form of government loans (Mg=GL) from other issues, which for simplicity we will 
ascribe to the private sector (Mp=Z+PrC). The demand for base money is divided between 
deposit reserves and cash. The government finances its primary deficit and the debt service 
by changing the stocks of external public debt, loans granted by the central bank to the 
government, and public bonds (B) sold to the domestic private sector. Wealth is the sum 
of primary assets in the system; recalling that the monetary base M is the sum of the assets 
of the central bank, wealth can be written as W=P)^K+M+B. As far as sectors engage in 
external indebtedness, a net concept of wealth (NW) seems more appropriate, namely 
NW=(PkK-F*)+M+B.
B. Individual behaviour and the government budget constraint.
We follow the framework due to Sidrauski (1967a). The model is modified in two ways, 
by introducing taxation on factor payments and also by considering government 
intervention through fiscal deficits. We explicitly introduce the government budget 
constraint since in the original framework only net lump sum government transfers are 
considered.
1. Optimization and steady-state properties,
a. A Sidrauski type model
The basic economic unit in the model is the representative family. The utility function is
oo
I  u(c^,m^)e'i^dt (11)
o
where c^  and m  ^stand for real per-capita consumption and cash balances respectively, and 
j>0 is the subjective rate of time preference. The economic unit has access to a production 
function which is linear homogeneous in its two factors, capital and labour, and therefore 
can be written as y^=f(k )^ where y^  is the real homogeneous per capita output and k^  the 
capital-labor ratio.
Two constraints affect the behaviour of the economic unit. The stock constraint requires 
that non-human wealth (A^ ) be allocated between capital and real cash balances. In per 
capita terms,
a t  = k t  + mt (12)
The flow constraint requires that disposable income be equal to real consumption plus real 
saving. Considering the existence of ngt real lump-sum transfers from the government to 
the representative family, V^ , the flow constraint can be written as follows:
[ y t + v t ] - c t  = St  = DKt/L + DMt/PL
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or alternatively as
[yt+vt]-ct = St = [Dkt+nkt] + [Dmt+mt (Jt+n) ]
where [yt+vj is the per capita disposable income and S( the per capita saving. The right- 
hand side on both equations show how the flow of real saving per capita is loca ted  
between capital accumulation and additional holdings of real money balances.^^ At this 
point we introduce our first important modification to impose taxation on factor payments 
(ty), instead of lump-sum taxation. The left-hand side of the flow constraint can then be 
written as {[yftytl+vtl-Ct, where v^  is now a gross lump-sum transfer financed with tax 
revenues. Given the definition of per capita wealth in (12), the flow constraint can be 
written as (where time indexes have been eliminated)
(y-ty)+v-c-m(3t+n)-nk = Dk+Dm= Da (13)
Under competitive equilibrium the wage rate (w) and the interest rate (r) are given by the 
profit-maximizing conditions, w=f(k)-kf'(k), and f  (k)=r. In distributional terms gross real 
income can be rewritten as f (k)=w+rk, and therefore the flow constraint can be expressed 
as
(w+rk) - T  (w+rk) +v-c-m (jt+n) -nk=Da (13')
which is conveniently rearranged as follows
[w+a (r-n) ] -t [w+rk] +v- [c+m(jt+r) ] =Da (14)
or equivalently as
{ (w-Tw) +a[r (1 -t) -n] }+v-{c+m [jt+r (1 -t) ] }=Da (14')
In (14') the first term in braces represents disposable income, and the second one full 
consumption where the concept of real consumption is augmented by the interest foregone 
by holdmg money instead of capital. | These financial losses are interpreted as the implicit 
consumption of money services (Blanchard and Fischer, 1989).
The problem of the representative family is to maximize the objective functional (11) given 
the stock constraint (12), the flow constraint (14') and an initiai condition for the per- 
capita value of wealth, a(to)=aQ. Both variables c(t) and m(t) in the objective functional 
are subject to the discretionary choice of the representative family and therefore they are 
the control variables; the variable a(t) indicates the state of the per capita stock of wealth 
at every point of time, and therefore plays the role of state variable. In order to solve this 
control problem we use the maximum principle technique, which involves the concepts of 
Hamiltonian function and costate variable. Tlie Hamiltonian function H(t,c,m,a,X) where t 
is time and k the costate variable, is defined as
H={u (c,m) +X [ (w-tw) +a [r (1 -t) -n] +v-c-m[jt+r ( 1 -t) ] }exp (-j t)
First-order conditions for maximization of H with respect to the control variables c and m 
are
Uc(c,m)=k (15)
Uni(c,m)=k[jc+r (1- t ) ] (16)
-DÀ/k=[r(1- t ) -n]—j (17)
lim a^k^exp[-jt] =0 (18)
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The optimality conditions (15) and (16) are obtained from the first order derivatives of H 
with respect to c and m respectively. Accordingly, the costate variable is the marginal 
utility of consumption, but it is also related to tiie marginal utility on real money balances. 
Altogether, they imply that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and real 
cash balances Uj /^u  ^is given by the aftertax nominal interest rate. Equation (17) is the 
equation of motion of the costate variable. As seen, as long as the aftertax return on 
capital net of population growth exceeds the rate of time preference, the marginal utility 
on per capita consumption must be falling and thus per capita consumption must be rising; 
this is a necessary condition which is satisfied on the optimal path, and known in the 
growth literature as the Keynes-Ramsey rule.^^ Finally, the transversality condition (18) 
rules out paths that satisfy (15)-(17) but which imply that for instance the representative 
family accumulates assets (a) at a rate that endangers its consumption plans. Overall, the 
representative family chooses the optimal admissible control path for c(t) and m(t) which 
along with the associated optimal admissible state path a(t) and costate path X(t) will 
optimize the objective functional over an infinite horizon satisfying the transversality 
condition.
b. Budget constraints: the government and the economy
At this point we can explicitly introduce the influence of governments through fiscal 
deficits (G-T), instead of the lump-sum transfers consider^ before. A simple formulation 
of the government budget constraint is G-T+rB=dB, where dB represents the change in 
the real stock of government bonds sold to the representative family to finance the excess 
of outlays (G+r^ over tax revenues (T). In per capita terms the budget constraint is (g-t 
)+rb=Db+nb. Money issues constitute an alternative way of government deficits financing. 
Then, a more complete expression of the government budget constraint is
g-t (w+rk) =Db- (r-n) b+Dm+m (jt+n) (19)
which means that in the steady state the excess of government outlays over tax receipts is 
financed by the real per capita stock of money growing at the rate (%+n).
The presence of government bonds modifies our initial stock constraint which now 
becomes
a=k+m+b (20)
Bonds are introduced in the portfolio of the representative family paying an interest rate 
equal to the rental rate on capital r, and since capital and bonds are perfect substitutes, 
bonds are also taxed with the tax rate on factor payments. After making these changes in 
the flow constraint (13), and including the redefined concept of (a) given in (20) and 
consequently the specification Da=Dk+Dm+Db, the family's budget constraint remains as 
in (14') (excepting the term v which is no longer in consideration). This upshot means that 
the introduction of government bonds does ngl affect the results obtained in equations 
(15) to (17) associated with the optimal control path and the optimal costate pa th .^  The 
family's budget constraint and the government's budget constraint integrate the following 
dynamic system
Da= w+a (r-n)-t (w+rk+rb)-c-m (jc+r) (21)
Db= g-t (w+rk+rb) + (r-n) b-Dm-m (jc+n) (22)
Equations (15) through (18) and equation (21) thoroughly condense the behaviour of the 
representative family given expectations about government policies as reflected in the 
taxation of factor payments and the sources of financing of fiscal deficits. Once we add 
equation (2 2 ) giving the evolution of government bonds, the whole group of equations 
determine the movement of the system.
86
The consolidated budget constraint relevant for the economy as a whole is obtained by 
combining the household budget constraint (2 1 ) with the government budget constraint 
(2 2 ), as follows:
Da=Dk+Dm+Db= w+a (r-n) -c-m (jt+r) +Db+Dm+m (jt+n) - (r-n) b-g 
and therefore,
Dk=w+k (r-n) -c-g 
which in the steady state becomes
w+k(r-n)=c+g (23)
As seen, this overall budget constraint is the per capita national income identity, f(k)=c+g. 
Because of this interdependence of the three constraints, only two are required to describe 
any equilibrium.
2. Steady state properties
Using equations (15) through (17), the profit-maximization condition f  (k)=r, the overall 
budget identity (23), and the government budget constraint (19), we now interpret 
properties of steady-states.
Uni(c,m) =Uc (c,m) [jt+r (1-x) ] 
j+n=r (1 -x)
f'(k)=r (24)
f(k)=c+g
g-x£ (k) + (r-n) b=m (jt+n)
Under the assumption that the government specifies paths for M (and then for jt), for g, 
and for x, these five relations determine the steady-state values of c, m, r, k, and b.
There is a crucial aspect in the system just exposed: the values of c, m, r, and k, are 
affected by the government's choice of (x), and since (x) and (b) are related by the last 
equation, changes in (b) wiU affect the values of c, m, r, and k. This result unambiguously 
depends on the existence of income taxation. Otherwise, £is in the case of lump-sum 
taxation, changes in (b) wül not alter other variables in the system. ^ 5
C. Application to the case study.
In the balancesheet of the central bank we distinguished changes in the monetary base due 
to loans to the government from changes due to other sources, then indicating diat the 
financing of government deficits is only a fraction of the total issue of base money. On the 
contrary, our differential equations (2 1 ) and (2 2 ) seem to imply that money creation 
exclusively hinges on the portion of budget deficits which is not financed by bonds. We 
rescue our previous definition M=Mp+Mg which in real per capita terms is m=mp+mg, 
where (mg) stands for the money creation due to government deficits and (mp) r&ers to 
the rest or money sources which can be ascribed to the private sector. Then, we 
reformulate the government budget constraint in (2 2 ) as follows:
Db=g-x (w+rk+rb) + (r-n) b-Ditig-irig (jt+n) (25)
The consolidated budget constraint which combines (21) and (25) is
w+ (k+iTip) (r-n) = [c+iHp(3t+r) ] + (Dk+Dnip)+g (26)
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The left-hand side is the per capita national income divided into wage payments and 
capital returns. The right-hand side shows full consumption in the first term, investment in 
the second pair of brackets, and finally government expenditure. Why is mp associated 
with k on the left-hand side, and Dmp associated with Dk on the right-hand side? Based 
on our simplified scheme of balancesneets, Dmp can be interpreted as changes in private 
sector working capital, part of which could be originated in bank loans rediscounted in the 
central bank, and the rest on external trade operations, as we see next.
From our simplified central bank balancesheet we know that Mp=Z+PrC, which in per 
capita terms is mp=z+prc. Then we rewrite the per capita national income identity in (26) 
as follows:
[w+(k+nip) (r-n) ]-{ [c+nip(jt+r) ] + [Dk+Dprc]+g} = Dz (27)
where income (in brackets) minus absorption (in braces) equals the accumulation of 
international reserves. Equation (27) gives the law of motion of international reserves.
At this point we can assume that only the government has access to external indebtedness, 
and try a new link between the balancesheets and the optimizing model by extending the 
government budget constraint to include external debt. The new version of equation (22) 
is:
Db= g-t (w+rk+rb) + (r-n) b-Dmg-mg(ji+n) + (r*-n)bf-Dbf (28)
where bf is the per capita external debt of the government and r* the foreign interest rate. 
For simplicity it can be assumed that r=r*, though this restriction does not distinctly alter 
the results. Tlie overall constraint which combines (2 1 ) and (28) is
{w+[ (k-bf )+nip] ( r - n )  }-{ [c+nip(jt+r) ] + [Dk+Dprc]+g}= [Dz-Dbf] (29)
which shows the accumulation of ngt international reserves as equal to income net of the 
external debt service (first pair of braces), minus absorption (second pair of braces).
The double constraint faced by government finances is revealed after rewriting (28) :
{ [t (w+rk) -g] - (r-n) b} + { [Ditig+nig (jt+n) ] +Db}= [ (r-n) bf-Dbf ] (28 ' )
The only term on the right-hand side are the net repayment to the creditors given by the 
difference between debt service payments and changes in external financing. On the left- 
hand side the sources and uses of government internal funds are brought out. The equation 
shows that the net transfer of resources abroad has its internal counterpart in a higher 
budget surplus (through increased taxation and/or reduced primary government 
expenditures), and/or an increased internal indebtedness with the public or the central 
bank.
We can now interpret (28') in the context of the steady state equations in (24) as follows:
Ui^(c,m) = Uc (c,m) [3t+r (1-t) ] 
j+n = r(1-t) 
f ' (k) = r (24')
f(k)° = c°+g 
[tf (k) -g] - (r-n) b+iUg (jt+n) = (r-n) bf
The right-hand side of the last equation of (24') shows the interest repayments to the 
creditors in the steady state, while the first pair of brackets on the left-hand side shows the 
government surplus diat ceteris paribus has to be generated to finance those repayments. 
Under the assumption that the paths of M, Mg, g,and t  are specified by the government, 
and the path of external financing is determine by external creditors, the five equations in
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(24') determine the steady state values of c, m, r, k and For a given steady-state level 
of the external debt, a change in the internal debt is transmitted to the rest of the economy 
through its link with the tax rate in the last equation.
How can we interpret these results in the light of our discussion of the Colombian 
experience with public debt in Part II and Part IV?
First, as assumed in (24'), foreign financing can be considered exogenously determined. 
The most outstanding periods of access of the country to external credit have coincided 
with lending booms in foreign capital markets.
Second, according to (28') the transfer to foreign creditors is financed by budget surpluses 
and/or increases of the internal debt. In our historical discussions we wiU mention episodes 
which illustrate the substitution of internal for external debt. However, the internal public 
debt has to be studied in a broader perspective where institutional arrangements play a key 
role, as seen next.
Third, in historical perspective the internal market for government bonds has been small, 
and therefore its capability to finance potential budget deficits has been limited. 
Additionally, the access of the government to central bank loans has historically been 
restricted, hi this context the most important changes of the internal public debt have been 
associated with severe shocks on the economy, originated most of the time on the external 
sector. In these extreme events the central bank has been authorized to offer temporary 
and extraordinary loans to the government. These extraordinary changes are then to be 
seen via (mg) raàer than through (b) in (28').
Fourth, in our case study the extraordinary increases of the internal public debt have not 
always been associated with the government budget constraint, as expected from an 
identity like (28'). As the historical documentation shows, in different occasions and after 
grave external shocks, the government accepted to finance private losses, or to acquire 
private assets, as part of rescue packages financed with increases in the internal public 
debt.
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SECTION III
NOTES
1. The warranted rate was given a crucial meaning in a private economy in which investors' 
expectations play a critical role. In a context in which Keynesian "animal spirits" affect the 
course of economic growth, the warranted rate will cause the entrepreneurial expectations to 
be fulfilled. In this sense, Harrod applied to the analysis of equilibrium growth in a 
Keynesian framework what in the 1970s would be called a rational expectations equilibrium 
by the new-classical macroeconomics (Hahn, 1987).
2. Instead of periods in which investment demand would be indefinitely large followed by 
periods in which investors would not undertake new projects, neoclassical models stressed 
the idea of sustained growth. Growth would be affected by business cycles but these 
alterations would seem to be self-bounding (Solow, 1987).
3. One example is provided by Solow (1956):
"It may take deliberate action to maintain full employment. But the multiplicity of routes to 
fuU employment, via tax, expenditure, and monetary policies, leaves the nation some leeway 
to choose whether it wants high employment with relatively heavily capital formation, low 
consumption, rapid growth or the reverse of some mixture. I do not mean to suggest that this 
kind of policy (for example: cheap money and budget surplus) can be carried on without 
serious strains. But one of the advantages of this more flexible model of growth is that it 
provides a theoretical counterpart to these practical possibilities." (p.93)
4. Solow ([1969], 1988) and Sidrauski (1967b) specify equations of capital accumulation of 
the form Dk=sf (k)-nk-(l-s) (0-jt)m where the last term gives the ngl absorption of private 
saving in the form of real balances, otherwise devoted to a higher capital accumulation.
5. The stationary solution for (1) and (2) in terms of b is given by b*=[sf (k*)-nk*]/(l-s)n.
For Db=0, it is seen that Dk=0 if sf (k)=nk. This is the Solow solution for real growth models.
6 . Hahn criticized the neoclassical process of divergence from equilibrium: "...there is no 
explanation of why the price of money is changing -it is changing because we demand asset 
equilibrium-" ([1969], 1984, p.207).
7. Based on Cagan (1956) scheme of adaptive expectations, Sidrauski (1967b) showed that 
for small enou^  values of the expectations adjustment coefficient the monetary growth 
model is globally stable. If the Cagan's stability condition is not satisfied, saddlepoint 
instability is produced: the economy would converge to equilibrium only if it started from a 
"right position", namely, if the initial position lies along stable manifolds; otherwise the 
system would produce runaway inflation or deflation.
So as to get stability, authors like Tobin (1965), Johnson (1966) and Stein (1966) considered 
a simple function of price expectations determined by the steady state rate of price change (jt 
*=0-n). Levhary and Patinkin (1968), considered a constant rate of price change maintained 
by authorities, even out of the steady state, by continuous adjustments in the rate of monetary 
expansion.
8 . Having overcome the doubts about stability of monetary growth models, the uniqueness of 
the equilibrium path has been a controversial and as yet inconclusive point. Calvo (1979), 
Orphanides and Solow (1990)
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9. It can also be said that welfare is affected since money is one of the arguments of the 
utility function used by Sidrauski (1967a).
10. The supemeutrality result heavily depends on the specification of the production and the 
utility functions. In the supemeutrality model these functions are y=f(k) and U=U(c, m), 
respectively. If m enters the production function instead of entering the utility function, 
supemeutrality no longer holds (Levhary and Patinkin, 1968). Similarly, when leisure is 
regarded as an additional argument of the utility function, changes in the inflation rate 
happen to affect the supply of labor, and then supemeutrality no longer obtains; Brock (1974) 
explains that even if the ratios K/L and Y/L are not influenced by changes in the inflation 
rate the amounts of labour per person and output per person will be affected.
11. "Had not these events [the great depression] intervened and deflected economists from 
following up Ramsey's powerful ideas, the optimal growth literature of the sixties might and 
indeed could have been written in the thirties" (Koopmans, 1967, p.3)
12. Ramsey postulated an integral over time of the social utility function depending on the 
consumption flow. By following this procedure society would maximize the a#ainable utility 
(or Bliss in Ramsey terms). Accordingly, to answer the question of how much income to 
save, society would save enough to reach the Bliss or to approach to it indefinitely.
13. An increasing and concave utility function indicates that a generation which expects a 
low consumption level will receive a greater support in his aspiration for more consumption 
than a generation with high expected levels of consumption.
14. "The formulae [Optimality criteria and assumptions about population and production 
function] by which we have been trying to capture these phenomena bear the marks of their 
intellectual parentage in the classical immutable laws of die physical sciences... they lack the 
flexibility that is an essential trait of all human response to a changing environmment". 
Koopmans (1967, p. 11)
15. The instantaneous elasticity of substitution is p,(q) = -cU'(c^)/U"(c^). For a utility function 
U=U[c(t)], where U'>0 and U"<0, (i(c) is a measure of the curvature of the utility function. 
The more linear is the utility function, the larger is the elasticity of substitution, and then, the 
larger is Dc/c for a given value of [f (k)-n-ô].
16. Equation (5') is the modified golden rule relationship; instead of the condition f  (k)=n 
which gives the capital stock that maximizes the steady state per capita consumption, (5') 
implies that a positive rate of time preference reduces the capital stock below the golden rule 
level. Through 6>0 the representative family states that she does not consider optimal the 
reduction of current consumption in order to attain the golden rule level of capital intensity.
17. The solution to the differential equation db/dt + (n-r)b =(g-t) is given by
b(t) = + j(g-t)ef(^"^)(^yt] where bg is the initial condition. The term [e"f(^"
’'l^^bg] gives the deviations from equilibrium. For b(t) to be dynamically stable this term 
must approach zero as t tends to infinity. When this happens the intertemporal equilibrium 
level is given by b=(t-g)/(r-n).
18. For the differential equation wt-Ct-Xt=dz/dt + (n-r)z the intertemporal equilibrium level is 
given by z=ct-(wftt)/(r-n). By integrating from s and using the discount factor V^ ,
JsCtVjdt =  Zq  +  JsWtVjdt -  /gTtVtdt.
19. A number of issues were reexamined with this portfolio model. For instance, during the 
"burden of the debt" controversy of the 1960s it was affirmed that the extinction of public 
debt incentives growth in the short run, and increases the long-run capital stock. In their full
91
employment model, Foley and Sidrauski (1971) showed that the net effect of a debt reduction 
leads to ambiguous results both in the short and in the long run, depending on the particular 
policies implemented by the government to offset the deflationary pressures of the reduction 
in the stock of debt.
20. This assumption implies ôd/ôk >0, and corresponds to the traditional assumption 
according to which consumption is proportional to income and not directly related to wealth. 
When these wealth effects are allowed to affect consumption, increases in k create excess 
demand, and for equilibrium the government deficit must fall. This case is described by 
ôd/ôk <0 .
21. The steady state value of debt (g*) may be positive, zero or negative. It depends on 
whether there exists excess supply or demand in the consumption goods market when the 
deficit is zero. If at the long run equilibrium with a zero deficit there is an excess demand the 
government will have to run a surplus and the economy will end up with a negative debt.
22. Sidrauski explicitly allowed for capital depreciation. This concept is not considered here 
only for simplicity.
23. The equation of motion for X is formally obtained as DX=-ÔH/Ôa. There is an additional 
maximum principle condition given by Da^H/ôk. This is, however, a restatement of the 
equation of motion of the state variable a(t) given in equation (2 1 ), in the appendix.
24. Bonds are part of wealth without any neutralizing present value of tax liabilities. 
Additionally, this model allows the debt service to be financed by either money and/or new 
bond issues, and not exclusively by taxes.
25. In the original Sidrauski model the interest rate is determined by the rate of time 
preference adjusted for population growth, r=j+n. In this model, it is the aftertax interest rate 
r(l-t) which equals j+n, and thus the steady state capital stock is lower than in the original 
model.
26. The change in the gross value of international reserves equals the trade balance plus the 
change in external financing net of debt service.
27. The fourth of equations (24') is the overall budget identity where f(k)®=w+[(k-bf)+mp](r- 
n) and c°=c+mp(3t+r).
28. In an open economy the equation j+n=r(l-t) means that consumption per capita is 
constant. If for instance, n=0 and j<r(l-t), consumption per capita and wealth per capita 
increase over time, which also requires that external debt per capita falls over time. 61 our 
case, given an initial level of per capita foreign debt, the constancy of consumption per capita 
over time maintains that level of initial debt.
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SECTION IV
Public debt and capital accumulation: the life-cycle view
Introduction
By the 1950s consumption theory was no longer limited to the Keynesian model and early 
studies of the long-run consumption function carried out during the 1940s. Based on a 
choice-theoretic framework, the conventional wisdom was challenged by both the 
permanent-income hypothesis (PIH) due to Friedman (1957), and the life-cycle hypothesis 
(LCH) originally developed by Modigliani and Brumberg in 1954 (Modigliani,1985). In PIH 
life is infinite and a crucial distinction is made between permanent income and transitory 
income. PIH is concerned about the effects of transitory incomes on saving. In LCH life is 
finite, and income and consumption are affected not only by random shocks as in PIH but by 
the life cycle. LCH is concerned with systematic life-cycle variations in consumption and 
their implications for aggregate saving and wealth. In this section the question is how private 
savings and capital accumulation are affected by the presence of public debt in the context of 
life-cycle models.
In subsection A we look back to the 1960s discussions of how private savings are affected by 
alternative government financial policies in an aggregate full employment model. Following 
Modigliani (1961) the crucial criterion to judge about financial policies is their effect on 
capital accumulation and not whether they are financed by public debt. In subsection B the 
discussion is continued by using overlapping generations models. It is shown how public debt 
-internal and external- affect capital accumulation, and how public debt issues may be 
Pareto-improving either by absorbing excessive savings over the golden rule capital
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accumulation level, or by reducing the risk associated with limited intergenerational 
insurance.
At the end of the section the simple two period OLG model is extended in two ways: first, a 
multiperiod OLG model allows the comparison of short- versus long-run effects of fiscal 
policies; second, a continuous time OLG model makes possible to confront the effects of 
bond-financed deficits obtained in an LCH framework with the corresponding effects 
obtained in the infinite horizon models discussed in Section III. The continuous time model 
preserves the notion of finite horizons which is essential in LCH; however, the constant 
instantaneous probability of death which is assumed to facilitate the aggregation over 
individuals is independent of age, and therefore the characteristic life-cycle patterns of saving 
and wealth vanish.
Finally, in section E we highlight the connections of this section with other sections of this 
work. We consider the implications of the LCH framework for policy prescription and 
discuss their relevance for our econometric estimations in Part III.
A. Basic aggregate models.
An outstanding assumption of the standard neoclassical growth model is that savings 
constitute a constant proportion of income, in contrast with the neoclassical choice-theoretic 
approach where savings are explained by optimizing choices of households. Such an 
assumption followed the pioneer studies of the long-run consumption function by Kuznets in 
the 1940s which concluded that the saving ratio had not considerably changed in the previous 
hundred years in spite of the substantial increase in incomes per capita.
In the early 1950s Modigliani and Brumberg provided the theoretical basis of the Life Cycle 
Hypothesis (LCH) of saving according to which the regularities found in the preceding 
studies could be explained within a framework of utility-maximizing consumers who
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Optimally allocate their resources to consumption along their lives. A crucial insight was that 
in allocating consumption at any age, consumers’ decisions depend on their life resources and 
not only on their current incomes. Under the basic assumption of households' finite life the 
focus of attention was the change of income over the life cycle created by the stages of 
economic activity and retirement (Modigliani, 1985).
Modigliani (1961) was the first systematic discussion of public debt in the context of life­
cycle models, where the main concern was the comparative long-run effects of debt and tax 
financing in a fully employed stationary economy. It was shown how individual 
balancesheets and the prospects of consumption and saving are affected by government 
expenditures increases depending on the method of financing. If financed by debt, 
individuals will reorganize their portfolios by substituting public bonds for equity, which 
means that public debt crowds out private investment but the aggregate worth of the private 
sector is unaffected; as a result the capital fall is permanent as long as the debt issuance 
remains outstanding. 1 If financed by taxation, the reduction of capital is a temporary 
phenomenon which depends on the precise path of reduction of consumption over the life 
time of the taxed individuals.^
A catalogue of cases is analyzed in this framework. For instance, when internal debt is used 
to augment the stock of government capital there is a recomposition of private portfolios but 
the total amount of physical capital is not affected; again public debt crowds-out private 
investment but without dismantLing capital formed in the past. If on the other hand the 
increase in the government capital formation is financed by taxation, there will be a 
temporary reduction in the private stock of capital, but in the long run the aggregate private 
net worth will be ! reestablished and the total capital stock enlarged in the magnitude of the 
government investment. These examples show how the same public investment policy will 
result in different magnitudes of the capital stock left to future generations depending on the 
method of finance.^
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Atkinson and Stiglitz (1989) explored Modigliani's contribution in the context of an explicit 
general equilibrium model using saving relationships of the Kaldorian type (where there is a 
propensity to save out of profits and another one out of wages). It was shown that 
Modigliani's conclusion that a unit of public debt crowds out in the margin a unit of private 
capital corresponds to the particular case in which the economy is on its golden rule path. But 
if the capital stock is below that level, the displacement of private capital is higher than in 
Modigliani's illustration; this is so because a marginal productivity of capital above the 
golden rule level causes interest payments (fb) to be higher than the new debt issues (nb).^
More importantly, the authors indicate that the effects of the national debt cannot be 
discussed "without specifying other accompanying adjustments in fiscal policy" (p. 253). The 
relevant point is that the tax structure matters, since the impact of public debt appears to 
depend on the nature of the taxes used to finance the debt service. This development will 
reappear later in this section.^
The LCH framework found a propitious vehicle of development in the overlapping 
generations models (OLG) since the late 1950s. These models consider economies with an 
infinite horizon but short-lived and overlapping individuals; at each date these open-ended 
future economies consist of consumers of different ages interacting with each other. Public 
finance has been a fertile camp of application of OLG models in different areas such as 
public debt, social security and optimal taxation. We now concentrate on outstanding 
applications of OLG models to the study of public debt. We start with a brief allusion to the 
Samuelson's consumption loan model, before outlining a simple OLG framework where the 
central reference is Diamond (1965). Further we discuss contributions based on multiperiod 
and continuous time OLG models.
B. Overlapping generations models.
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In a pathbreaking contribution, Samuelson (1958) offers a general equilibrium solution to the 
determination of interest rates in a dynamic economic system with no capital, and shows how 
the existence of money leads to a Pareto optimal allocation of resources across generations. 
By using a simple model of two generations -the young and the old- it is shown how in the 
absence of money there might occur the paradoxical situation in which generations do not 
cooperate: while the old would be willing to borrow from the young to increase their 
consumption, the young would not be willing to lend to the old since the latter generation 
would not be able to repay any loans. Samuelson introduces the "social contrivance" of 
money to solve the paradox of no cooperation: given the existence of money, the old could 
consume more by trading with the young, and the young would accept the money because 
they expect the next generations to replicate this behaviour in the context of an economy 
which goes on forever. As Samuelson puts it: "Everybody ends better off".^
1. A basic OLG model for public debt analysis.
Diamond (1965) discusses the effects of public debt on real economic activity in an OLG 
model. The central aim is to investigate long-run competitive equilibrium in a growth model 
and study the effects of public debt -internal and external- on that equilibrium. This pioneer 
essay was strongly influenced by current debates in the mid-1960s: the aggregate neoclassical 
growth model and the golden rule path of capital accumulation; the central planner optimal 
growth model in which resources are allocated between capital accumulation and 
consumption according to a social welfare function; the utility-maximizing approach as a 
basic foundation of macroeconomic analysis; and the burden of the debt controversy of the 
early 1960s.
The starting point is a modified version of the Samuelson (1958) consumption loans model 
which allows for the presence of capital. The outcome is an OLG model in which the 
younger generation makes a positive saving and provides for its retirement period by 
financing entrepreneurial activities. Regarding the long-run real effects of public debt the
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central reference is Modigliani (1961), although explicitly adding the effects of taxes levied 
to finance debt interest payments, a factor which is absent in Modigliani (1961). As in 
Samuelson (1958) the economy goes on forever, and generations overlap ad infinitum. 
Technology is constant and represented by a constant returns to scale aggregate production 
function, and labor is supplied exogenously at a fixed growth rate.
In a centrally planned framework authorities have command over the capital stock and 
output. The latter is divided between current consumption and the capital stock for the 
ensuing period.^ The optimal capital intensity (k*) which gives the maximum consumption 
satisfies the golden rule; if authorities choose a higher capital labor ratio (k>k*) the solution 
is inefficient, and therefore a reduction in the planned capital intensiveness (from k to k*) 
will increase the consumption levels of the overlapping generations.^
In a competitive context firms maximize profits at each point in time. The supply of capital is 
determined by the savings of the younger generation. Individual savings are given by the 
function^
st=s(wt, ) 0<s^<1 , Sr>0 or Sj^ <0
By assuming that all individuals are identical, the saving of the working generation is I^s(w^, 
r^+i), and then the capital available to society in period t+ 1  is^^ **t+l) which in
per-capita terms gives
(1 +n )k t+ ' | = s (w t ,  (1)
This is the capital accumulation equation for a competitive economy. Based on the foregoing 
framework the role of public debt may be devised by asking how the long-run equilibrium 
and welfare of an hypothetical competitive economy are affected by the existence of public 
debt. Although Diamond (1965) is still the main reference, the discussion incorporates more 
recent developments. Finally we mention a topic arisen as a criticism of Diamond's article in
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the 1960s which has received attention in recent controversies: the equivalence between 
public debt and tax-transfer schemes.
a. The efficiencv issue in the market economv
As seen before, an overaccumulation of capital in the centrally planned economy is 
inefficient. The question is whether the competitive solution is immune to that problem. By 
obtaining the possible steady-state consumption levels of a generation in her productive and 
retirement periods, and comparing them with the individual's marginal rate of substitution in 
competitive equilibrium, it is shown that the competitive solution may be dynamically 
inefficient. A formal derivation of this result is offered in Box IV, 1. Now we ask to what 
extent the competitive solution is affected by the existence of public debt both external and 
internal.
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BOX IV. 1
Can the equilibrium competitive solution be inefficient?
The working generation (period 1) consumes the difference between her wage and the 
amount lent in the capital market. In her retirement (period 2) this generation consumes her 
savings accrued by the interest rate. The per-capita equations for consumption (e^ )^ for the 
two periods are:
) ( 2 )
e  t+1 = ( 1 + r t + i ) s t ( w t ,  r t + i )
By substituting s^ (*) from the capital accumulation equation (1) into (2) the steady state 
consumption values are
=w- ( 1 +n) k (2 ' )
e^= (1 +r) (1 +n )k
By varying k it is possible to obtain the locus of stationary values of consumption. This is 
drawn for the Cobb-Douglas case (Ihori, 1978; Buiter, 1981) in Figure 4. k increases 
monotonically and r falls as one moves from 0 to M. The line PP is the central planner 
steady-state consumption possibility locus with slope -(1+n). The central planner chooses a 
capital-labor ratio such that f  (k)=n. This is the golden rule represented by point E*. In the 
competitive economy the utility maximization criterion implies that consumption be 
allocated according to Ue^=(l+r)Ue^ (note 8). Then the marginal rate of substitution is 
de^/de^ = Ue^/Ue^ = -(1+r).
Three examples of competitive equilibrium are given by drawing lines with slope -(1+r). At 
point E l  an indifference curve is tangent to the line FF for which r>n, and at point È2  the 
equilibrium corresponds to a case in which r<n; only when the marginal rate of substitution 
happens to be equal to -(1+n) the competitive solution coincides with the golden rule at E*. 
The competitive solution is dynamically inefficient at points like E2  because any lower k that 
does not lie below E* can assure a higher path of per-capita consumption. ^  In conclusion, 
the competitive solution may be dynamically inefficient.!^
FIGURE 4
b. Public debt effects on the long-run competitive solution.
The long-run effects of public debt on the competitive solution result from the taxes required 
to finance interest payments. As noted above, this "tax channel" was absent in the
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aggregate model of Modigliani (1961). Taxes do not only affect the lifetime consumption of 
taxpayers, but negatively influence saving and capital accumulation by reducing disposable 
income. An additional effect is exclusively brought about by new issues of internal debt: the 
substitution of public bonds for titles on real capital on the demand side of the capital market. 
The existence of any kind of government debt -either external (g%), internal (g2), or a 
combination of both- reduces the younger generation's net wages after taxes, and therefore 
affects the capital accumulation equation. These effects can be seen by comparing equation 
(1) with the following two equations:
k t +1 = s [ w f  ( r t -n )  g'l , r t + i ] / 1 + n  (3)
kt+i  = s{  [wt~ ( r t -n )  (g'|+g2 ) / r t + i ] / 1 + n  - g 2 > (4)
The difference (r -^n) denotes the taxes required to finance the part of the interest cost not 
covered by additional public debt issues. Equation (3) shows how the taxation required to 
finance part of the external debt service reduces disposable wages, then affecting negatively 
capital accumulation. Equation (4) which involves a mixture of internal and external debt 
shows how apart from the negative effects on saving, internal debt replaces capital stock in 
individual portfolios.
Figure 5 illustrates the effects of public debt on capital accumulation dynamics. An economy 
without public debt is represented by the saving locus A which corresponds to the capital 
accumulation equation (1). The arrows indicate the dynamics from the starting capital stock 
kg to the stationary level k* for the case in which there is a unique, stable, nonoscillatory 
equilibrium and Sf>0. The saving locus B describes the same economy when external debt is 
introduced and interests are partly financed by increased taxation. The dynamics follows 
equation (3) and the long-run capital stock is reduced to k**. Finally, the saving locus C 
corresponds to the same economy when there is a mixture of external and internal debt. The 
dynamics is given by equation (4) and the steady-state capital stock falls further to k***. The 
C locus integrates the double effect of internal debt, namely, the reduction of savings (change 
in the slope of the saving locus) and the replacement of capital by public bonds (downward 
shift of the curve).
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FIGURE 5
/K
Two strong ideas are derived from Figure 5 and equations (1) through (4): First, in the 
absence of public debt (gi+g2 =0 ), successive generations are benefited by the capital 
accumulation undertaken by their predecessors; the model indicates that as far as generations 
accumulate capital, wages increase and savings increase (s=s{w[kj,...}), leading to a higher 
steady state capital stock per capita (k* in Figure 5). Second, as far as public debt exists, 
future generations are left with a lower steady state capital stock (k** or k*** in Figure 5), 
since the taxation required to finance the debt service and also the existence of internal public 
debt reduce savings.!^
Having shown that competitive economies can be inefficient, and how public debt affects 
capital accumulation, the next question is whether and under what conditions the issue of 
public debt may be Pareto-improving.
c. Does public debt remove inefficient outcomes in capitalist economies?
What do the previous results say about public debt effects in terms of standard welfare 
criteria? The answer depends on the dynamic efficiency conditions of the economy. In the 
inefficient case (n>r), public debt contributes to remove the inefficiency and is welfare 
improving by reducing the excessive capital intensiveness. In the efficient case (n<r), public 
debt reduces the capital stock even further below its golden rule level and therefore is not
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Pareto improving. In conclusion, public debt is potentially beneficial when the economy is 
dynamically inefficient.
Gale (1990) and Blanchard (1990) have indicated that these considerations about the Pareto- 
improving role of debt issues are limited to models with certainty. For the case of a stationary 
economy (n=0), it is alleged that even in the presence of a positive expected rate of return on 
capital (r>0) there still is a Pareto-improving role for public debt under uncertainty: such an 
uncertainty stems from the fact that associated with finite lives there is a limited 
intergenerational insurance. The idea is that intergenerational risk sharing can be improved 
by the existence of non-contingent public debt assets. For instance, the availability of long­
term non-contingent government bonds would spread the risks associated with the business 
cycle over generations.
These considerations make clear that in models with certainty there is a Pareto-improving 
case for public debt when the economy is dynamically inefficient. Recent research has 
highlighted a different role for public debt related to the possibility of providing 
intergenerational insurance; in this case, issuing public debt may be Pareto-improving even 
when a static economy is dynamically efficient. Our last question asks whether public debt 
policies can replicate tax-transfer schemes.
d. Is the public debt burden a matter of policy constraints?
As commented above in relation to the criticisms of the Modigliani model by Atkinson and 
Stiglitz (1989), the steady state impacts of debt should not be examined without considering 
the effects of accompanying instruments of fiscal policy. In the same line, Bierwag, Grove 
and Khang (1969) extend the Diamond model to demonstrate that the burden of the debt 
problem can be mitigated by an appropiate tax distribution scheme; a critical step in their 
contribution is the removal of the Diamond's assumption according to which taxes to service 
public debt fall exclusively on the working generation.
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Diamond (1973) puts on view the results achieved by Bierwag et. al. in the context of a 
model of optimal growth for a decentralized economy. It is an overlapping generations model 
in which markets clear period by period; in order to clear markets in period t, public debt is 
introduced to absorb any discrepancy between desired savings and the optimal capital stock 
to transfer into period t+1. It is shown that the amount of debt needed to clear markets is 
equal to the present value of a transfer to the older generation which would be required to 
attain the optimal path in the absence of government debt. In conclusion, since the theoretical 
effects of government debt could be neutralized by an appropriate mix of lump-sum transfers 
and taxes, public debt constitutes a burden only in the sense that the government is 
constrained in the use of lump-sum taxes (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1989).
The late 1960s discussion on the equivalence between debt policies and tax-transfer schemes 
has been revived in more recent debates about external and domestic debt problems (for 
instance, Pagano, 1988). Further, the equivalence between equilibria with bonds and tax- 
transfer schemes has become part of modem textbooks (for instance, McCandless, 1991). 
Gale (1990) recognizes that in very simple models a tax-transfer scheme can be reinterpreted 
as a debt policy. However, he questions the general validity of that procedure. Why does the 
government use security markets if it can make transfers directly? Within a general class of 
models, the author shows that debt policies cannot typically replicate optimal tax-transfer 
schemes.
In summary, discussions about the equivalence between tax-transfer schemes and public debt 
inspired by the Diamond model led to the conclusion that the burden of the debt could be 
explained by institutional limitations on the government to create appropriate tax-transfer 
schemes. However, recent research has indicated that optimal tax transfers cannot in general 
be duplicated by public debt policies.
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To conclude this discussion about a basic OLG model for public debt analysis we emphasize 
two points. First, an LCH model à la Diamond highlights how public debt affects the 
dynamics of capital accumulation and makes an explicit distinction between the effects of 
internal and external debt. Second, the model shows how a competitive equilibrium is not 
necessarily efficient, and how when the economy is inefficient, issuing public debt is Pareto- 
improving. However, the division of life in two periods (working period and retirement 
period) limits the applicability of the model to actual fiscal policies. This drawback has been 
surmounted in the last decade by means of multiperiod and continuous time OLG models to 
which we now turn.
2. Multiperiod and continuous time OLG model.
Fiscal policies have real effects because they alter incentives either to save or redistribute 
across (or within) generations; this is a common message of life-cycle models. Real effects 
are mainly restricted to the implications on capital formation. Analyses based on simple two- 
period models à la Diamond have been completed by the construction of multiperiod models. 
One of the advantages of these models is that they help to understand short-run effects of 
fiscal policies. This is not a minor point when each period in the two-period model 
corresponds to about 30 years in real time. Kotlikoff (1984) and Auerbach and Kotlikoff 
(1987) are representatives of this approach.
A different method is the formulation of continuous time overlapping generations models. 
Cass and Yaary (1967) duplicate Diamond results in this kind of models. Blanchard (1985) 
uses a continuous time model to study the dynamics of different fiscal policies. This version 
enables the comparison of debt policy results in life-cycle models with those attained in 
optimal growth models; some results are applied in Blanchard (1984) to the analysis of fiscal 
policy effects on interest rates and capital accumulation. Both the multiperiod models and the 
continuous time models are reviewed next.
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In the line explored by Auerbach and Kotlikoff, the following results are underlined. First, 
the notion of crowding out in life-cyle contexts is thoroughly related to cross-generational 
income effects which play the crucial role in reducing national saving. Second, consumption 
changes induced by fiscal policies are spread over a long time by life-cycle agents. This 
behaviour characterizes crowding out as a slow and cumulative process. Third, in general, 
bond financed deficits and balanced budget increases in government consumption negatively 
affect the capital accumulation process and the welfare of future generations.
By conducting policy simulations, it is found that some policies may lead to short-run 
crowding in regardless of the long-run crowding out; this case is particularly associated with 
short-term tax cuts. It is argued that this outcome is caused by the predominance of 
substitution over income effects. Additionally, it is shown that permanent balanced budget 
increases in government consumption crowd out capital formation in the long run.
Temporary changes of this class are neutral in the long run but produce a higher crowding 
out in the short run.l^ Finally, the crowding out induced by bond financed increases in 
government consumption is more severe the longer the policy period. This is so, because the 
longer the period the major the involvement of older generations with heightened 
consumption levels.
As for the continuous time method, the OLG model developed by Blanchard (1984,1985) is 
a suitable setting for the analysis of the effects of fiscal policies in an undistorted economy. 
Consumer behaviour is based on Yaari's (1965) "uncertain lifetime" approach as applied to 
an aggregate macroeconomic model. Two assumptions are pivotal to this framework. First, 
agents face a constant instantaneous probability of death p so that their expected life is p"l. 
Second, regardless of their individual ages, all agents have the same marginal propensity to 
consume out of wealth. These assumptions allow aggregation and preserve the life-cycle 
characteristic of finite horizons. This characteristic is particularly important in public debt 
analyses. As the probability of dying falls, the life expectancy increases; in the limit, when 
p tends to zero, the horizon becomes infinite. Therefore, the Yaari-Blanchard formulation
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makes possible the comparison of public debt implications in finite horizon models (p>0) and 
infinite horizon models (p=0).
In contrast with the results obtained in Section III regarding the infinite horizon model, it is 
possible to show how in the finite horizon model a change in the timing of nondistortionary 
taxes, at given interest rates, affects consumption. The reason for this divergent result is the 
presence of short-lived individuals whose effective interest rate (the market rate plus the 
constant instantaneous probability of death) used in discounting future taxes is higher than 
the market interest rate relevant for the government. Formal details are offered in Box IV, 2.
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BOX IV. 2
Wealth effects of budget deficits in an xmdistorted
economy.
The following consumption functions are derived from explicit utility maximizing 
procedures (individual variables are given by lower case letters):
Individual c=[p+e] [w+h]; Dw=(r+p)w+y-c (5)
Aggregate C=[p+e] [W+H]; DW=rW+Y-C (6)
where e is the subjective discount rate, W and H are the nonhuman and human wealth 
correspondingly, Y is the noninterest income, and D is a time derivative. There are two basic 
differences between equation (5) and the traditional formulation: the marginal propensity to 
consume out of wealth is (p+e) rather than e, and the relevant interest rate is (r+p) rather than 
r. Additionally, there is an important difference between (5) and (6): in the individual case 
the effective rate of interest is (r+p) while for the society as a whole it is r. This is so because 
pw is extinguished with the death of wealth holders. Therefore, the discount rate for 
aggregate human wealth (r+p) is higher than the discount rate for nonhuman wealth (r). The 
aggregate human wealth is the present discounted value of noninterest income discounted at 
(r+p). For agents still alive at time s the behaviour of human wealth H(t) is given by
oo g
H(t) = YgOxp [-f (r^+p) dv] ds (7)
How does a change in the timing of taxes affect consumption? In an economy with 
nondistortionary taxes wealth e f f^ s  are the channel through which budget deficits affect the 
economy. The key assumption is that agents have finite life (p>0); otherwise the analysis is 
back to the infinite horizon models reviewed in Section HI above where government deficits 
have no real effects. Including lump-sum taxes the behaviour of H(t) and the intertemporal 
government budget constraint are as follows:
H(t) = Ygexp [- ^  (r^+p)dv]ds - TgOxp [-/(r^+p) dv] ds (8)
B(t) + ^GgOxp[-^ r^dv]ds = ^Tgoxp[-^^dv]ds (9)
Given a path of government spending, a tax cut leaves the right-hand side of (9) unchanged, 
but changes the value of the second term in (8). While the government discount rate is r, the 
private sector discounts the future tax hike at (r+p). Therefore, given interest rates, a tax cut 
will increase H(t) and C(t) provided that p>0. The finitness of the individual horizon is at the 
base of the positive wealth effect induced by the tax policy. As p"^ approaches infinity the 
positive wealth effect vanishes. If agents discount future taxes at r the timing of finance is 
irrelevant, and only the government spending path matters. This is the same conclusion 
reported by infinite horizon models, as we saw in Section HI above, and in the public debt 
controversy is known as the Ricardian equivalence proposition; the historical precedents of 
this proposition were discussed in Section n  above, and extensions and criticisms of it are 
considered in Section VI below.
In a general equilibrium perspective the path of interest rates is not invariant to the 
intertemporal allocation of taxes, as assumed in the previous paragraph (and also in Box IV, 
2). The point is critical from the viewpoint of capital accumulation since a trajectory of 
higher interest rates would discourage investment. The process can be illustrated with
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reference to a short-term tax cut policy financed by new bond issues. As long as the budget 
deficit persists, the stock of public debt increases and interest rates go up. Once the deficit 
policy comes to an end, taxes are raised to restablish budget balance, but the outstanding 
stock of public debt and the interest rate levels are higher than when the policy change was 
launched into. Since higher interest rates and a major share of public bonds in private 
portfolios displace capital, future generations will find themselves with a lower capital stock.
In conclusion, multiperiod versions of OLG models shed some light on the short- and long­
term effects of alternative fiscal policies. The continuous time version makes possible to 
compare the implications of bond financed tax cuts on consumption and capital accumulation 
derived from life-cycle models and from optimal growth models. Since in LCH frameworks 
life is finite, generations are affected by changes in the intertemporal allocation of taxes; this 
is the critical contrast with optimal growth models in which life is infinite and the timing of 
taxes is irrelevant. Specifically, a bond financed tax cut increases consumption in a LCH 
setting (given interest rates), while consumption remains invariant in an optimal growth 
model; as for capital accumulation, while life-cycle models report that investors substitute 
government bonds for equity shares in response to a bond financed tax cut, optimal growth 
models indicate that economic agents will increase saving in the magnitude of the tax cut to 
absorb the increased bond issues leaving equity shares unaltered in savers' portfolios. ^ 0
C. Final comments and links with other sections of this work.
Since the early expositions of the LCH in the 1950s it has been clear that life-cycle analyses 
of budget deficits depart from traditional Keynesian formulations and also from the neutrality 
propositions of infinite horizon models. In Keynesian expositions consumption is a function 
of disposable income and therefore current tax cuts are expected to stimulate consumption. 
Since in the LCH framework rational agents base their consumption on life resources, a 
current tax cut is seen as a change of taxes in the present for taxes in the future. If life is 
infinitely lasting as in the optimal growth models reviewed in Section HI, this change in the
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timing of taxes is of no consequence for consumption. If life is finite, as it is in LCH 
frameworks, the change in the timing of taxes will encourage current consumption since the 
current generation will pay the future taxes only as it lives and pays taxes. Modigliani (1993) 
has quoted estimations according to which the average fraction of current deficits paid by 
current generations is of about 30%; this fraction is shown to depend on variables such as life 
expectancy, income growth rate and interest rate.
The life-cycle and the debt neutrality paradigms differ from traditional Keynesian 
expositions in that they are both derived from explicit optimization procedures, and market 
clearing is a basic assumption. In spite of this common ground there are also sharp contrasts. 
Since Barro (1974) it has been clear that while intergenerational selfishness is crucial for life­
cycle results, intergenerational altruism is the central feature of modem expositions of debt 
neutrality. Rationality is far greater in debt neutrality analyses since agents foresee the 
precise implications of budget deficits (Modigliani, 1987).
The structure of capital markets has also been a source of discrepancy between life-cycle 
theorists and other schools. In life-cycle models agents enjoy free access to lending and 
borrowing operations in perfect capital markets; there are not liquidity constraints as they 
exist in the Keynesian framework. However, it has been the consideration of capital market 
imperfections what has led recent life-cycle theorists to accept the existence of 
intergenerational transfers, though not for altruistic reasons as in debt neutrality frameworks. 
It has been argued that intergenerational transfers may result from the absence of fairly 
developed annuity markets (Kotlikoff, 1988,1989).
What are the implications of the life-cycle framework for policy prescription? The crucial 
tenet is that fiscal policies redistribute welfare among generations and thus actual policies 
should be chosen in a way that each generation pays for itself (Modigliani, 1961,1986,
1987). In this context the practical aim of fiscal policy which does not create conflict 
between generations appears to be the stabilization of income over the business cycle. So as
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to achieve that aim, fiscal deficits during recessions should be followed by surpluses during 
booms. An important consideration is that this sequence of deficits and surpluses is not 
limited to the operation of automatic stabilizers but involve procyclical tax rates, namely, 
lower tax rates during recessions and higher ones during booms. This discretionary use of tax 
rate changes is however to be restricted by an intertemporally balanced budget.
The strong case for cyclically balanced budgets has been a constant in life-cycle fiscal policy 
discussions. In the early 1960s it was defended as a matter of intergeneration equity and the 
combination of discretionary policies and intertemporal budget balance was seen as a 
compromise between the Lemer's "functional finance" and the Buchanan’s "classical 
principles of public debt" (Modigliani, 1961). In the mid-1980s the same strong case has 
been reiterated by Modigliani (1986) in a comparison of the life-cycle model and the Barro 
(1979,1986) tax smoothing theory of deficits which we discuss in Section VI below. 
Modigliani observes that although the Barro’s model also implies cyclically balanced 
budgets, it prescribes constant tax rates, while the life cycle model includes the possibility of 
discretionary tax rate changes.
The life cycle model also deals with the financing of major transitory government 
expenditures which are thought to affect future generations. If future generations are to be 
benefited from current expenditures, it is a matter of intergeneration equity that the costs be 
spread across generations. Examples of this sort of government expenditures range from 
projects which are expected to produce future net yields, to the extreme event of war. So as 
to spread the cost between generations, the current generation should pay a fraction of it 
through increased taxation. In conclusion, major temporary government expenditures should 
only partially be financed by an increased public debt.
To what extent are these discussions helpful for our study of the Colombian experience in 
parts III and IV?
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The strong case for cyclically balanced budgets put forward by the life cycle model is one of 
the references for our econometric work and historical accounts. In our first model in Part HI 
we discuss our estimations following the guidance of alternative paradigms, the life-cycle 
model being one of them. Our main reference is the tax smoothing theory since it offers 
precise predictions for coefficients such as output and government expenditures. Specifically, 
in a model in which the dependent variable is the change in the stock of debt, tax smoothing 
predicts unitary coefficients (in absolute value) for the independent variables output and 
government expenditures while the life cycle model predicts a coefficient greater than one 
for output, and a coefficient lower than one for government expenditures. These predictions 
are considered in the interpretation of our own results.
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SECTION IV
NOTES
1. The social cost of this fiscal policy is borne by the individuals living after the 
recomposition of portfolios and is given by the reduction in the stock of private capital and 
by the taxes collected to pay public debt interests. In this particular point this analysis 
coincides with Buchanan's positions (Section II above).
2. The impact effect of this policy on private balancesheets is determined by the magnitude 
of the tax change multiplied by the marginal propensity to save. Private capital stock falls in 
such magnitude. What is the long run effect? The reduction of consumption is spread by 
individu^s over their lifetime. Tken, as time passes savings increase until the initial private 
capital stock is restored.
3. Another example is given by a tax-financed debt retirement, in which case there will be a 
higher proportion of capital in long run private portfolios according to the magnitude of debt 
reduction. Similarly, a "gratuitous" retirement of debt through total or partial repudiation, 
capital levy, or unanticipated inflation will also increase the capital stock; the critical point is 
that the forced reduction of the real value of the principal causes consumption to fall and 
therefore a higher rate of saving. This is the issue previously advanced by Meade (1958) - 
Section II above-.
4. The point is illustrated by the following steady state condition: 
nk = [s^«+Sr(l-a)]f-[sr-Sw][Tc-rb]-nb[l-Sw]
where s, Sf and s^  are the propensity to save, the propensity to save out of profits, and the 
propensity to save out of wages, respectively; a  is the share of labour on output; Tc is the 
per-capita capital tax created to finance a transfer to workers (T) and also the debt service 
(Tc=T+(r-n)b); b is the per-capita stock of public debt; and f is the per-capita production 
function, y=f(k).
In the proportional savings case s^^f= s, a positive value of the per-capita public debt b>0 
implies a lower capital intensiveness K/L than when b=0; this is the standard neoclassical 
result which we reviewed in Section HI. Modigliani's proposition can be analyzed by 
differentiating the steady-state condition given above:
( s f ' - n ) d k / d b  = n ( 1 - s )
As seen, only with f=n the Modigliani's case is satisfied. For f  >n and sf <n, the reduction in 
the capital stock is proportionately greater than an increase in public debt.
5. With reference to the steady-state condition in note 4 it is possible to show that in the 
classical savings case (where Sr>s^), particularly when Sç is close to 1, and in the absence of 
taxes levied on capital (Tq=0), the direction of the debt effects on capital accumulation might 
be reversed. In fact, by making Tc=0, the steady state condition becomes
nk = [S w # + S r(1 -a ) ] f  -  (l-Sj^)nb + (Sj--s^) ( r - n ) b  
where for s  ^close to 1 or a large r relative to n, an increase in b may lead to an increase (not 
decrease) in the capital intensity. The clue of this result is the elimination of the tax on 
capital which previously financed the debt service.
6. Samuelson (1958) p.480
7. If consumption is divided between the younger generation e^L^ and the older generation 
e^Lt_l, the every-period distribution of resources is as follows:
Kt+Yt = Kt+1+Ct = K t+i+elt^t+eZ^Lt- l  or  
Yt-(%t+l-Kt) = Ct = + e tH-1
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Assuming that authorities decide to keep a constant capital-labor ratio, the periodical capital 
accumulation is given by = (l+n)K^. Then, the last equation becomes Y^ -nK^  ^= =
ei^Lt + ® t^-1» which in per-capita terms gives, y -^nk  ^= Ct = el^4-e^y(l+n)
8. If generations are allowed to distribute their consumption over time the optimization 
problem consists in maximizing the utility function U(e^, e^) subject to e \  + e^x/{l+n) = y^ - 
nkt (see previous note). The consumption distribution which maximizes utility r^uires that
= (l+n)Ue2. Then, the optimal rate of interest is determined by the rate of population 
growth.
9. The sign of s^  is ambiguous depending on the relative importance of income and 
substitution effects. When the latter are dominant, savings increase in response to increases in 
interest rates.
10. The capital stock in t+1 is equal to savings in t. These are the gross savings of the 
younger at t, which are partially offsetted by the dissavings of the older, k^ :
%t+1 -  k t  = r t + l )  -  k t  o r
kt+1 = L t s ( w t ,  r t + i )
11. E l is not inefficient in the sense that temporary sacrifices in consumption are required to 
reach a higher capital intensiveness.
12. Except at E* the consumption possibilities in the market economy are more restricted 
than in the central planning framework. The additional constraint is die capital market in 
which savings of the younger (l+n)k provide the capital for the older period, (l4-r)(l+n)k. In 
general, the competitive solution does not coincide with E*.
13. Given full employment and a government expenditure path the question is about the 
effects of a substitution of debt for tax finance. It is assumed a one-period maturity of public 
bonds, and interests are paid off according to the equilibrium interest rate in the capital 
market. Interests are financed by new debt or by lump-sum taxes on the younger generation. 
The debt per-capita ratio is assumed to be constant, that is, the debt grows at die same rate of 
the economy, n.
14. As for stability, the system reaches a stationary state at k***, at the growth rate n, if the 
following condition is satisfied:
0 < d k t + i / d k t  = " (k*) [k^+g-i+g2l } / [ 1 +n-S2-f " (k*) ] <1
For Sr>0, the ratio dk+^i/dk^ is positive. Further, nonoscillating convergence requires that
(the absolute value of; dk^^_i/dk  ^be between 0 and 1.
15. Simulations are conducted to compare the reactions of agents to short-term tax cuts -for 1 
or 5 years- and to long-term tax cuts -for 20 years-. In the former situation, younger 
generations foresee higher tax payments for a long time with obvious negative effects on 
dieir budget constraints. In anticipation, they substitute future for current consumption. In the 
latter situation income effects are dominant because the long period tax cut favours a wide 
range of younger generations: national saving decreases and crowding out occurs since the 
policy implementation.
16. This is another case of predominant substitution effects. Agents reduce saving when 
facing a temporary increase in taxes, then reinforcing the crowding out effect of die increased 
government consumption. This behaviour is reversed once taxes are back to their precedent 
levels.
17. Aggregation has been a traditional problem of life-cycle analysis. Agents differ in ages 
and so in wealth levels, and in life time horizons and so in marginal propensities to consume 
out of wealth. As noted by Blanchard, his formulation is of little insight when differences in 
marginal propensities to consume are important.
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18. With distortionary taxes budget deficits affect the economy by means of temporal and 
intertemporal substitution effects created by distortions.
19. Government spending is financed by taxes or by debt issues, DB. Accordingly, the 
government budget constraint is DB = G-T+rB. It is assumed that DB reaches some steady 
state level, that is, the government satisfies the transversality condition
s
lim B(s)exp[-Jrydv) = 0
S_>oo t
20. LCH models coincide with optimal growth models in reporting reductions in 
consumption in response to tax- financed increases of government expenditures. They differ, 
however, in the implications of such increases of government expenditures on the steady- 
state capital stock: while LCH models document a reduction of capital, optimal growth 
models show that capital is invariant to changes in G (Blanchard and Fischer, 1989).
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SECTION V
Neo-Keynesian controversies on public debt.
Introduction
"We are all Keynesians now and nobody is any longer a Keynesian" was the way by which 
M. Friedman described the consensus achieved by economists during the first half of the 
1960s (Stein, 1969, p.382). It was a time of rapid growth and stability of the U.S. economy 
when tax cuts were being advised to avoid the negative effects of a fiscal drag. The concord, 
however, was not to last for long. Economists denounced a set of circumstances which led to 
the breakdown of the consensus, namely, the budgetary pressures originated in the Vietnam 
war and the Great Society programs of the time, as well as the delay to adopt fiscal 
correctives (Friedman, 1972; Okun, 1972). By the end of the decade, Friedman himself made 
explicit the existence of contrasting viewpoints regarding economic policy, particularly 
monetary policy (Friedman, 1968). Academics concentrated on the relative efficacy of 
monetary and fiscal policy within the IS-LM framework, captured by the issue of the relative 
slopes and stability of the IS and LM functions (Laidler, 1971).
Further developments led to the formal recognition of links between fiscal and monetary 
policy by means of the government budget constraint. This is our starting topic in this 
section, since among the literature of the late 1960s and early 1970s, here the macroeconomic 
effects of public debt issues are explicitly and formally examined. We will briefly refer to the 
Keynesian-monetarist controversy as long as it is helpful for our central discussion, before 
moving to the late 1970s portfolio contributions. Altogether, the government budget 
constraint writings and the portfolio discussions made part of the pre-rational expectations 
literature, since further public debt analyses were enriched by the consideration of how
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forward- looking fiscal expectations affect financial markets and eventually private 
investment.
Our central concerns in this section are then twofold. First, the early 1970s debate about the 
connections between fiscal and monetary policies through the government budget constraint. 
The resulting literature emphasized the importance of making explicit how budget deficits 
are financed and the distinction between short- and long-run effects of policies. These are the 
topics treated in subsection A. Second, the crowding out controversy of the late 1970s and 
early 1980s with new developments in two areas: first the portfolio theory whose early 
evolution was previously discussed in Section I; and second, the more recent analyses of the 
effects of budget deficits on aggregate demand in rational expectations models. These topics 
are dealt with in subsection B. Final comments about the neo-Keynesian paradigm and links 
with other sections of this work are made in subsection C.
A. Government financing and aggregate demand.
Two convergent strands of literature contributed to the 1970s debate on the impacts of 
government financing on aggregate demand: the discussion about the role of the government 
budget constraint, and the Neokeynesian-Monetarist controversy. The IS-LM model was the 
common ground of analysis. The distinction between short- and long-run effects of 
macroeconomic policies, and the implications of bond-financed deficits were the central 
issues in question. We start by reviewing the analysis of the government budget constraint.
1. The early government budget constraint literature.
In the historical perspective of public debt controversies, the Lemer's "functional finance" 
and the Friedman (1948) proposal are significant precedents of the government financing 
discussions of the early 1970s (Section I above). Both two expositions vindicate the effect of
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government deficits on aggregate demand but neither of them explicitly use the formal 
income-multiplier analysis.
Ott and Ott (1965) call the attention to "the endogenous impacts upon income of the 
government's budget balance". The technical reference is a fixed price, unemployment, 
closed economy version of the IS-LM model considering wealth effects in both goods and 
money markets. Starting from an equilibrium position, an increased government expenditure 
brings about a higher level of income; this is an impact effect. The deficit financing causes a 
further income expansion through wealth effects on demand, and given proportional tax rates 
the increased fiscal revenues lead to a new budget balance; this point determines the new 
long-run income equilibrium. The message is that fiscal policies render a more expansionary 
effect in the long run than in the short run described by the standard fiscal multiplier. The 
new expenditure multiplier is the reciprocal of the marginal tax rate. The surprising aspect of 
this result is that it holds independently of the method of financing government deficits and 
regardless of the behaviour parameters of the economy.
Christ (1968) highlights the role of the government budget constraint. The idea is that policy 
makers cannot define arbitrary trajectories for all of the macroeconomic policy variables at 
the same time. The trajectory of at least one of these variables must be jointly determined by 
the government budget constraint and the structure of the economy. Christ discusses a fixed 
price static macroeconomic model of aggregate demand without wealth effects. The model 
becomes dynamic after the inclusion of the government budget constraint. The multiplier 
effect of a change in exhaustive government expenditures is analyzed when the endogenous 
variable is high powered money: the reduction of the equilibrium interest rate due to the 
enlarged money supply leads to higher levels of income and the economy reaches a new 
long-run equilibrium when the budget is balanced.
Silber (1970) attempts "to integrate properly the debt aspects of fiscal policy into IS-LM 
analysis". The framework is a fixed price, unemployment version of the IS-LM model. The
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system is formed by two static and one dynamic equation. The former correspond to the IS 
and LM functions, and specify short-run conditions for certain values of the stock of assets 
which make up wealth, namely, money, bonds and capital. The latter is the government 
budget constraint where taxes are of a lump-sum type. Since government bonds appear in 
both the consumption and the demand for money functions, an increase in the supply of 
bonds enlarges the stock of wealth and stimulates both consumption (rightward IS shift) and 
the demand for money (leftward LM shift).^ Therefore, the combined wealth effects on the 
goods and financial markets do not guarantee that budgetary deficits invariably bring about 
higher levels of economic activity in the long run. The final outcome depends upon the 
relative shifts and slopes of the IS and LM functions.
In Silber's model, while money-financed deficits consistently expand total output, bond- 
financed deficits open the possibility of no expansion at all, or even of reductions in total 
output (negative multipliers). In the former case the expansionary process continuous 
indefinitely unless the deficit is eliminated by curtailment of government expenditures. In the 
latter case, the fact that bond financed deficits can bring about a crowding out of more than a 
hundred per cent hinges on the Keynesian assumption according to which bonds and capital 
are closer substitutes than bonds and money (Tobin, 1961). Otherwise, an increase in the 
supply of bonds affects the LM function in a similar way as an increase in the money supply: 
this is a case of portfolio crowding in which enlarges the expansionary impact of a deficit 
policy (Friedman, B., 1978).^
The early government budget constraint literature constituted the first formal discussion of 
the implications of financing flows resulting from government deficits (surpluses) for the 
standard IS-LM analysis. In this sense, this early literature came to fill a "major lacuna" in 
standard macroeconomics (Currie, 1978. Chick, 1983).^ We continue our exposition with a 
rapid reference to the neokeynesian-monetarist controversy, concentrating our attention on 
the allusions to the effects of budgetary policies on aggregate demand.
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2. The neokeynesian-monetarist controversy.
Tobin (1972) argues that while neo-Keynesians accept that nominal income is affected by 
both monetary and fiscal policies, monetarists only recognize the effectiveness of monetary 
policies. In particular, the controversy would focus on the shape of the LM locus, with the 
monetarists defending a demand for money function completely insensitive to interest rates - 
a vertical LM curve in the (Y, r) space-. Friedman (1972) contraargues that "at any rate" the 
matter of debate cannot be the slope of the LM locus. Instead, it is alleged, the truly 
monetarist characteristic concerns "the effect of nominal magnitudes on nominal and real 
magnitudes". The point may be discussed with relation to the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policies, and the short- and long-run effects of monetary and fiscal policies.^
Monetarists denounce the tendency of neo-Keynesians to concentrate on the dynamics of 
short-run policy changes, overlooking the cumulative effects derived from changes in stocks. 
In the opposite camp, neo-Keynesians argue that the quantity-theory approach does not pay 
much attention to flows of spending in the short run. However, both groups recognize that 
the relative importance of first and second round effects is an empirical matter (Friedman, 
1972. Blinder and Solow, 1973).
Friedman (1972) illustrates the difference between money- and bond-financed deficits. The 
existence of permanent effects of monetary policies for the case of a temporary deficit is 
described in the context of the IS-LM model as follows: authorities carry out a money- 
financed deficit for a short period after which the budget is balanced again; the IS shifts to 
the right and returns to its original position; the LM also moves to the right, achieving a new 
position at a higher income level but does not move back when the deficit is eliminated. As 
far as constant prices hold, nominal and real income stay at the superior level of income in 
spite of the backward movement of the IS curve. In the case of bond-financed deficits, it is 
argued that public bonds displace private bonds from investors portfolios, then reducing the 
financing of private projects. The higher the magnitude of this displacement, the minor the
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expansionary effect of the deficit. Therefore, the likely result of bond-financed deficits is "a 
minor", if any, expansionary effect.
There is a convergence between the monetarist position and the Treasury view reviewed in 
Section I above, according to which budget deficits primarily affect the allocation of 
resources between private and public sector. This is the basis for discarding budgetary 
policies as a leading instrument of stabilization (Fand, 1970).
In a distinct side of the monetarist camp, Brunner and Meltzer (1972) discuss the role of 
budget deficits and their financing within a model proposed as an alternative to the IS-LM 
framework. Both fiscal and monetary policies are seen working through changes in the 
relative prices of assets and output. These price changes start out the adjustment until a new 
stock-flow equilibrium is achieved. In a further essay, Brunner and Meltzer (1976) find 
expansionary influences on nominal income due to either money or bond financed deficits. 
The key of these expansionary results is the recognition of wealth effects in both methods of 
financing. This conclusion is clearly at odds with the most rigid versions of monetarism 
which disavow the stabilizing possibilities of fiscal policies.
Fiscal policy "does matter" was a categoric pronouncement in the neo-Keynesian camp. A 
new agenda of research based on earlier work on the government budget constraint was 
carried out during the 1970s. The main concerns were the long-run effects of fiscal policies 
and the stability implications of alternative ways of financing government budget deficits. 
Blinder and Solow (1973) provided the formal dynamic analysis and inspired further 
questions about stability and the role of public debt on a trajectory to a long-run equilibrium. 
It is to these discussions to which we now turn.
3. Long run, dynamics and stability.
a. The Blinder-Solow model.
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Blinder and Solow (1973,1974,1976) offer a systematic discussion of the long-run effects of 
fiscal policy. It is an attempt to demonstrate that fiscal policy works, a response the the 
challenge that only "temporary" and "minor" effects can be expected from fiscal measures. 
The main contribution is the analysis of the long-run dynamics and stability of an economic 
system under alternative ways of budget deficit financing.
The characteristics of the model can be summarized as follows: First, as in Silber (1970), 
consumption and demand for money depend positively on wealth which is held in the form 
of money, bonds and equity. Money (High powered money) and government bonds are 
perceived as ngl wealth by the private sector. Following the Keynesian assumption, bonds 
and capital are perfect substitutes in portfolios. Second, unlike Silber, taxation is linked to 
income. Interest payments on outstanding government bonds are also a taxable income of the 
private sector. Third, capital accumulation is given as a function of income, the nominal rate 
of return on debt, and the stock of capital. Finally, the model considers a stationary economy, 
and the price level is fixed even in the long run. This requires budget balance as an 
equilibrium condition.
The long-run level of output is affected by the way in which deficits are financed. When 
financed by money issues the long-run multiplier is exactly the reciprocal of the marginal 
propensity to tax. When financed by bond issues the long-run multiplier is amplified by the 
effect of the net interest payments on debt. These results contrast with previous findings 
particularly by Ott and Ott (1965). As seen above, these authors found a long-run 
government multiplier independent of the method of financing. Here, it is not only dependent 
on the financing method but implies that bond financed deficits are more expansionary in the 
long run than money financed deficits. As seen, the difference stems from the explicit 
consideration of debt service payments. A more formal discussion is offered in Box V, 1.
122
BOXV.l
Dynamics and stability in the Blinder-Solow model
The four-equation dynamic system is:
Y = C[Y+B-T(Y+B), M+B/r+K] + I[Y, r, K] + G (1)
M = L[Y, r ,  M+B/r+K] (2)
DM + DB/r = G+B-T(Y+B) (3)
DK = I[Y, r, K], lY>0, I^xO, I%<0 (4)
The IS (equation 1) and LM (equation 2) functions obey the assumptions that consumption 
and demand for money depend on total wealth. Equation (3) is the government budget 
constraint and equation (4) the law of motion of capital accumulation. For long-run 
equilibrium, DM=DB=0, which means that the budget is balanced: G=T(Y+B)-B. The 
immediate consequence of this identity is the long-run government expenditure multiplier 
dY/dG = l+(l-DdB/dG/T’.
Two main results concern stability. First, a money financed deficit (dB/dG =0) consistently 
brings about a stable long-run equilibrium. Owing to wealth effects on consumption 
(equation 1) aggregate demand and real output increase. The demand for money in equation 
2 also increases, and this fact generates contractionary effects; under the assumption tiiat the 
increase in the demand for money is smaller than the increase in wealth, the rise in the 
money supply outstrips the wealth induced rise in the demand for money. Therefore the 
wealth effects on output are always expansionary. Because of the income-linked tax function, 
as output increases tax revenues rise, the budget deficit becomes smaller an a new long-run 
equilibrium is reached when eventually the increased tax revenues dt equal the initial upsurge 
in government spending dg.
Second, pure bond or mixed money-bond financing may cause instability. A crucial fact is 
the nst influence of wealth effects on consumption and money demand. If the latter is higher, 
a negative and cumulative influence lowers incomes and revenues leading to broader deficits 
and the requirement of new bond issues. In the long run the fiscal multiplier is negative 
(tending to -®°). Alternatively, when wealth effects on consumption are predominant, stability 
is not unambiguously assured since it requires that the increase in tax revenues outweigh the 
increased cost of debt service. Additionally, stability demands that increases in wealth due to 
the expansion of the capital stock -which affects consumption positively and new investment 
negatively- generate contractionary effects. If these conditions are not met, output expands 
indefinitely given the assumption of no capacity constraints. Unfortunately, the hope for 
stability under bond financing may vanish because of the repercussion of accelerator effects 
on the investment function. ) ^ e n  this influence is taken into account as it is in I(Y, r, K) in 
equation (1) the authors show how the mathematical conditions for stability are not 
necessarily satisfied.__________________________________________________________
The main results can be summarized as follows: First, money financed deficits always 
produce stable systems. The corresponding long-run fiscal multiplier is the reciprocal of the 
marginal propensity to tax. Second, a bond-financed deficit, if stable, is more expansionary 
than a money-financed deficit. The long-run multiplier incorporates the financial service of 
the public debt. Third, stability and effectiveness of fiscal policies under bond financing are 
empirical issues. In the simplest IS-LM model with fixed capital, long-run equilibrium 
requires that tax revenues cover the cost of public debt. This is a necessary stability
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condition. When capital is allowed to vary this condition is less restrictive (provided that 
another condition is met), then enhancing the case for stability. However, it is shown that 
after the introduction of income effects on the investment function the stability conditions 
invoked by Blinder and Solow no longer necessarily hold.
b. Extensions and criticisms.
1) Is instability a characteristic of the economic system?
Tobin and Buiter (1976) show that the Blinder-Solow model includes a built-in debt 
propagation mechanism which transforms an initial increase in government expenditure in an 
even more expansionary policy. The criticism is addressed to the definition of the 
government expenditure variable and can be seen with reference to the budget constraint 
G+B-T(Y+B)=DB. Blinder and Solow use the notation of exhaustive government spending G 
with the stability implications discussed above. Tobin and Buiter suggest a government 
expenditure variable G' equal to G plus interest payments net of taxes: G'=G+(1-T)B. 
Therefore, the budget constraint becomes G -TY=DB. When this equation is integrated in a 
system of four equations in capital, debt, output and interest rate, it is found that in the 
unemployment case, sufficient and necessary conditions for stability are met. These 
conditions are less stringent than in the Blinder-Solow analysis. However, for the full 
employment case the long-run equilibrium is unstable with static expectations and only likely 
stable with perfect foresight.
Christ (1979) disavowes the use of either G or G' as the policy parameter. It is alleged that in 
either case when bonds are issued to finance a deficit there is no tendency to budget balance. 
When G is the expenditure variable the budget constraint G-TY+(1-T)B=DB shows that 
whenever bonds are issued the deficit increases in (l-T)B. The system is driven farther away 
from equilibrium and the possibility of explosive debt growth is not ruled out under the 
assumption of fixed values of G and T. Alternatively, when using G' the budget constraint
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G'-TY=DB shows that bond issues do not change the deficit. Christ suggests a policy 
parameter that includes gross interests, G"=G+B. In this case, the budget constraint 
G"-TY-TB=DB shows that for B>0 the deficit decreases by TB. It is revealed how by 
introducing G" instead of G assures stability in the Blinder-Solow fixed-capital model. 
Similarly, by replacing G’ by G" in the Tobin-Buiter full employment-static expectations 
model stability is now possible.
Currie (1978) doubts that changes in the policy parameter can remove the possibility of 
instability. It is still possible that wealth contractionary effects on the demand for money 
eclipse the upsurge in the goods market. Additionally, constant fiscal policies defined 
according to either G' or G" imply a one-by-one compensation of interest payments by cuts in 
government purchases whose recessionary effects may prevent the adoption of such 
policies.^
In conclusion, the potential instability associated with bond- financed deficits which emerged 
from Blinder and Solow results does not stem from any trait of the economic system. The 
controversy about the policy parameter shows that authorities have instruments to avert a 
likely explosive debt-deficit spiral. In practice, results would be subject to institutional 
contexts and policy options chosen by authorities.
2) Are pure fiscal policy effects only transitory?
As seen above, monetarists recognized no more than minor and temporary effects from bond- 
financed deficits. The neo-Keynesian counterattack attempted to show that there were 
reasons to believe in the permanence of pure fiscal stimulus on aggregate demand. Following 
the work by Blinder and Solow, a series of studies offered a more elaborate discussion of the 
formal dynamic analysis and also empirical implications of alternative monetary and fiscal 
policies. Stein (1976) and Cook and Jackson (1979) compiled contributions to the debate on 
both sides of the Atlantic.
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Neo-Keynesians maintained over the long run the short-run analysis conclusion according to 
which pure fiscal policy will raise aggregate real demand unless the interest elasticity of 
money demand is zero. In particular, Tobin and Buiter (1976) extended the analysis of the 
cumulative effects of deficits from the underemployment case to a full-employment, flexible 
price setting. A graphical description of these cumulative effects is offered in Box V, 2.
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BOX V.2
The cumulative effects of bond-financed deficits and the achievement of long-run 
equilibrium. An example from the mid-1970s.
Apart from conventional IS and LM equations which give the momentary equilibrium, two 
long-run equations are proposed by Tobin and Buiter (1976): one is the zero government 
saving equation used by Blinder and Solow but working with G' instead of G (equation 5 
below); and the other one is a zero private sector saving equation. The latter follows life­
cycle principles in defining wealth W as a multiple of disposable income, W=aY. The long 
run LM function LLM can be expressed in terms of the ratio Y/W (equation 6)
G'-TY=DB=0 (5)
M=L(r,Y/W)W=L(r,1/a)aY (6)
The corresponding phase diagram in (Y, r) space is depicted in Figure 6a.°
FIGURE 6a FIGURE 6b
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Figure 6b shows the comparative statics when government expenditures are increased. The 
long-run equilibrium Eg is simultaneously the short-run equilibrium of the ISg-LMg system 
for given stocks of M, B, K, and its aggregate value W. A once-for-all change in government 
expenditures shifts the DB=0 locus to Sie right until the new long-run equilibrium E% is 
attained. The impact effect is represented by the movement of the IS curve to IS% and the 
short run equilibrium is given by Eg'; at the corresponding income level Ygg' (lower than 
Y ei) and at any level of income between Ygg and Ygi there is budget deficit, and public 
debt is accumulating along the dynamic path between Eg and E%. Wealth effects derived 
from the increased stocks of public debt (being M constant) shift upwards the IS-LM curves 
describing a path like the dashed line.
A new balanced budget is reached at Yg^, and for this income level the interest rate that 
keeps asset markets in equilibrium is rg%. At E% with higher Y, the desired wealth must be 
higher because of the long-run equilibrium relationship of wealth to income. Importantly, the 
higher interest rate rg% implies a different portfolio composition, with a lower demand for 
both money and capiti, than at the original rate rgg. Put it other way, the new equilibrium 
position comprises an enlarged stock of public debt, and higher ratios of public debt to 
income and wealth.^»^. As a whole, this model integrates the common IS-LM apparatus and 
long-run relationships which express that saving accumulates wealth and government budget 
deficits add to the stock of public debt. The model is explicit about the portfolio 
recomposition which takes place as a result of bond-financed budget deficits._____________
Overall, what is the abiding message of the government budget constraint literature and its 
contribution to the public debt debate? By the end of the 1970s, observers noted that
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theoretical work on the government budget constraint had entered a phase of "rapidly 
diminishing returns" (Buiter, 1978. Currie, 1978). Perhaps the most permanent message of 
the literature is the significance of making explicit how government expenditures and/or 
deficits are financed, and the importance of distinguishing between short- and long-run 
analysis of the effects of fiscal policy. Regarding practical policy relevance the literature 
does not offer prescriptions but vindicates a role for fiscal policy: although it is indicated that 
some crowding out effects of private spending go along with fiscal policy, it is firmly 
recognized that it produces lasting effects on aggregate demand regardless of the mode of 
financing.
B. Neo-Keynesian advances of the crowding out controversv.
In the last two decades the crowding-out debate along neo-Keynesian lines has gone beyond 
the fixed-price IS-LM framework. One approach -the portfolio model- follows the ideas 
cultivated by Tobin since the early 1950s (Section I above). The research focuses on the 
bases of crowding ûut and crowding ia in unemployment and full employment models. A 
second and more recent approach enriches the Keynesian tradition by employing the rational 
expectations hypothesis. The specification of forward-looking endogenous variables and the 
distinction between anticipated and unanticipated exogenous variables comes to modify the 
traditional method of analyzing fiscal policy effects. We review these lines of research in 
order to highlight their contribution to recent discussions on the role of public debt.
1. Crowding out in portfolio models.
Textbook expositions of crowding out generally refer to the case of transactions crowding 
out set up in a fixed-price IS-LM model.^ The neo-Keynesian account of crowding out along 
the lines developed by Tobin and his associates results from the dissatisfaction with the 
standard IS-LM model and the conception of an alternative approach. The traditional 
aggregation of nonmonetary assets -equities and public debt- into a single one, with a
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common interest rate, interest rate, is criticized as opposed to actual institutional 
structures and policies. The perfect substitutability assumption between equities and public 
bonds is dropped and replaced by the principle of gross substitutability between assets. The 
new approach develops a concept of short run which allows asset accumulation: investment 
enlarges the capital stock, savings augment wealth, and government deficits amplify the stock 
of public debt. Current savings and financial flows are allowed to affect supplies and 
demands in asset markets. This is the proposed integration of saving and portfolio decisions 
(Tobin, 1979,1982. Tobin and Buiter, 1980).
The portfolio approach develops a general equilibrium system of interdependence. The 
system is designed to analyze the stock and flow effects of government fiscal and financial 
policies. Accordingly the endogenous variables are the real rates of return on capital and 
bonds, and the real output, (in the unemployment case), or the price level, (in the full 
employment case). The exogenous variables are given by the parameters of fiscal and 
monetary policies.
The short-run analysis focuses on the government spending multipliers for the unemployment 
and full employment cases. The main findings are as follows: First, whenever output 
increases in the unemployment model, the price level rises in the full employment case. 
Second, private investment is not only a negative function of the cost of capital, but a 
positive function of profits per unit of capital; the point is that the enlarged government 
spending stimulates sales and profits in the private sector, and the increased profitability 
prompts new investment. This fact proves to be crucial for the sign of the multipliers. When 
the increased government expenditure is fully financed by monetary expansion, crowding in 
results not only from a falling cost of capital but from a raising profit-capital ratio. Equally, 
when deficits are partially or completely financed by public bond issues, a likely increase in 
the cost of capital could be counteracted by positive effects of enlarged profits, thus 
rendering crowding in effects.
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Third, in the full employment economy private spending is crowded out by government 
expenditure, one by one. When public bonds and equity are close substitutes, a bond- 
financed deficit increases the cost of capital and crowds out private investment; however, a 
money-financed deficit lowers the capital cost and promotes private investment at the 
expense of private consumption.
In the long run, crowding out and crowding in refer to the effects of changes in fiscal 
parameters on capital intensity. Crowding out occurs when after an increase in government 
expenditure, an economy moves from a steady-state equilibrium path to another one with a 
lower capital intensity. Two central results are offered. A deficit policy which leads to a 
higher inflation rate in the long run, crowds in capital; real interest rates are depressed and 
investors find attractive a major proportion of equities in portfolios, instead of money and 
bonds whose real return has been lowered. Alternatively, when a deficit policy leads to a 
lower long-run inflation rate capital intensity is crowded out by an accumulating public debt. 
As Tobin puts it: "In the background is the competition between capital and public debt for 
allocation of limited wealth" (1982, p.lOO).ll
What is the position of the portfolio's literature regarding the overall contribution of neo- 
Keynesian analyses to public debt theories? If the government budget constraint literature 
discussed both short- and long-run effects of fiscal policies, and addressed the question of the 
method of financing of government deficits, the portfolio literature made explicit how flows 
(private saving, government borrowing) bring about changes in stocks (capital, government 
debt) and alter the portfolio composition. A crucial insight for interpreting the effects of 
changes in the stock of public debt on investment is the relative substitutability between 
assets; in this context, the same increase in government bonds could lead to crowding out or 
crowding in depending on the relative substitutability between bonds and capital as compared 
with the relative substitutability between bonds and money. Both the government budget 
constraint and the portfolio contributions preceded more recent expositions of the effects of 
fiscal policy on aggregate demand in models which incorporate the rational expectations
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hypothesis: further insights in the neo-Keynesian discussion of crowding out and government 
deficits were possible in these models. We deal with these developments next.
2. Consequences on aggregate demand of anticipated future deficits.
We now address the crowding out discussion in a Keynesian framework with rational 
expectations. The reference is a standard IS-LM model with two important variations 
(Blanchard, 1981, Blanchard and Fischer, 1989): First, the interest rate is a dynamic 
endogenous forward-looking variable which can react freely at any moment in time. Its 
behaviour is explained through the expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest 
rates, according to which the current long rate is a forward- looking average of current and 
future expected short rates. Output is also a dynamic endogenous variable but its values at 
any time are predetermined. Second, the exogenous variables -monetary or fiscal parameters- 
are specified as either anticipated or unanticipated. The announcement and the length of the 
period until the implementation of an anticipated fiscal policy may prompt (recessionary) 
changes in aggregate demand.
In this modified IS-LM setting consider the case of an exogenous fiscal disturbance which 
takes the form of an anticipated budget balance increase in government expenditures. Agents 
know that an expanding output positively affect both profits and interest rates. Say that the 
"bad news" case applies in this example, namely, when interest effects overcome profit 
effects. The immediate reaction in the bonds market at the announcement of the policy is an 
upward "jump" of the long-term interest rate. Output starts reacting sluggishly and negatively 
to the increased long rate. As output declines short-term rates fall but long-term rates 
continue increasing in anticipation of higher future short term rates. When the policy is 
actually implemented, both output and interest rates raise until a new long-run equilibrium is 
reached, as expected in the standard fiscal analysis of the IS-LM model.
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Now, what can be expected from anticipated bond financed deficits? The intertemporal 
arbitrage of interest rates works as in the previous illustration. The main difference with the 
former example is that the recessionary impact via interest rates is magnified by an 
accumulating public debt. In the balanced budget case the perverse effects on output are 
confined to the period between the dates of announcement and implementation of policies. In 
the bond financed deficit case the negative multiplier could also be transitory and disappear 
with the implementation of the expansionary fiscal policy. However, more extreme outcomes 
could follow as a result of expectations of high interest rates (Buiter, 1985).
Consider, for instance, the case of a permanent tax cut. Even if the policy is quickly 
implemented (or unanticipated), expectations of higher interest rates could prevent output to 
expand. This would be the case if the contractionary effect of the raised long rates on 
investment was strong enough to neutralize the expansionary effects of the actual tax cut. 
Thus, a full crowding out cannot be ruled out in this context, and it is also possible to expect 
a super crowding out if the recessionary effects of higher long interest rates more than offset 
the expansionary effects of fiscal policy. As far as capacity is endogenous, the contractionary 
effects could adversely affect not only investment in the short run but the capital stock in the 
long run.
What is the general message of these developments for the historical perspective of public 
debt theories? First, in the context of the IS-LM model it is shown how anticipated 
government deficits may result in a recession in the present. The clue of this process is the 
intertemporal arbitrage between short- and long-term interest rates. The higher is the 
proportion of interest-bearing bonds in the financing of the anticipated deficits, the more 
likely is that the interest rate effects on investment bring about negative multipliers. Second, 
it is revealed how potential contractionary effects of budget deficits depend on how 
information about the timing (anticipated or unanticipated) and lastingness (temporary or 
permanent) of deficit policies are perceived by the private sector.
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In conclusion, the incorporation of forward-looking endogenous variables (the interest rate) 
in the closed-economy short-run IS-LM model shows how fiscal policies can affect aggregate 
demand even before their implementation. The crowding out discussion in models à la 
Blinder-Solow of the 1970s is enriched by indicating how private sector anticipation of 
higher interest rates discourages current investment.
C. Final comments and links with other sections of this work
In the early 1970s neo-Keynesian paradigms and policies were at the cross-roads. In the 
monetarist camp fiscal policies were dismissed for their destabilizing effect on private 
businesses, and in the emergent new classical school fiscal policies were classified as 
harmless and ineffectual. "Fiscal policy matters" was the common label of rejoinders over the 
decade.
One line of Keynesian counterattack discussed the long-term effects of budget deficits; this 
stream of literature enriched the earlier government budget constraint contributions. The 
common finding of these efforts was that economic effects of budget deficits depend on the 
run and method of financing. Another strand of literature extended the portfolio analysis of 
the late 1950s (Section I above). In this view financial markets are imperfect coordinators of 
the real processes of saving and investment, and government stabilization policies are called 
for to harmonize individual aspirations with collective objectives.
Neo-Keynesian views gained strength with the adoption of theoretical developments of the 
late 1970s and 1980s. The distinction between anticipated and unanticipated budgetary 
policies widened the understanding of the effects of budgetary changes on aggregate demand. 
Agents' expectations play a role in the design of fiscal policies. Credibility is an unavoidable 
component in this design. Anticipations of runaway deficits or debt repudiations threaten 
public confidence and may invalidate an expansionary policy.
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Keynesians were quick to dismiss the unsustainability risk of accumulating public debt in the 
1940s. Fifty years later there are reasons of credibility to oppose steady increases of the 
public debt to GDP ratio when economies are close to full employment. But, neo-Keynesians 
allege, even at the risk of some degree of crowding out, discretionary budgetary policies are a 
valid instrument of recovery in unemployment situations.
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SECTION V
NOTES
1. A common assumption is that for a change in wealth -induced either by a bond expansion 
or a monetary expansion-, the change in the demand for money is proportionately less than 
the change in wealth.
2. As shown by B. Friedman (1978) it is crucial to distinguish between "transactions 
crowding out" and "portfolio crowding effects". The latter depends on whether bonds are 
closer portfolio substitutes for money or for capital. If bonds are more substitutable for 
capital than for money, the LM curve shifts leAward and portfolio crowding out adds to the 
transactions crowding out. On the contrary, if bonds are relatively more substitutable for 
money than for capital, the LM curve shifts rightward, and portfolio crowding in adds to the 
impact effect of fiscal policy. Finally, when the substitutability of bonds for capital and for 
money exactly offset one another, there are no portfolio crowding effects, and therefore the 
LM curve does not shift.
3. Tobin (1982) and Haliassos and Tobin (1990) question the accuracy of the claim according 
to which the absence of the government budget identity in the standard IS-LM apparatus 
constitute a "fatal flow". IS-LM analysis ignores stock-flow identities, it is alleged, given its 
"short-run" character. Regardless of the magnitude of the government deficit (a flow) it 
cannot change the stock of public debt. The approach follows Keynes's method according to 
which he was concerned with so short a pericxl of time that changes in investment have 
negligible effects on the capital stock.
4. Neo-Keynesians advocate an indirect effect of changes in the quantity of money on 
spending through alterations of the cost of capital. So long as expansive monetary policies 
reduce die rate of return required by equity holders, investment is encouraged and spending 
eventually increased throu^ the multiplier (Tobin, 1978). Monetarists describe a direct 
effect of monetary changes on spending. Individuals will transform in higher expenditure any 
excess of money balances caused by expansionary monetary policies. It is argued that neo- 
Keynesians restrict the transmission mechanism to a limited range of assets and rates. 
Monetarists emphasize that changes in interest rates after changes in the quantity of money 
affect a spectrum of spending far broader than the investment decisions of business firms 
(Friedman, 1987).
5. Currie notes that under G' (or G") open market operations should be followed by 
compensatory changes in G to offset the effects on debt interest payments.
6. Equilibrium in asset markets and government budget is given by E q  at the interest rate r g g  
and output Yeq- This equilibrium is unique. Dynamic stability requires that a small 
perturbation from Ep will result in a return to equilibrium. The directions of motion of DB 
and r (indicated by me arrows) are towards Eg: the system is stable.
7. The long-run multiplier obtained by diferencing (5) is dY/dG' = 1/T . This outcome means 
that the method of budget deficit financing does not count for the size of the long-run 
multiplier. It is the same result obtained by Ott and Ott (1965) and Christ (1968) according to 
which the multiplier is independent of the behavioural parameters of the economy. Christ 
(1979) criticizes this result, however, by arguing that it is obtained simply because the policy 
parameter is G'. Otherwise, with G or G" that result is not achieved.
8. The model is also extended to conditions of full employment and flexible prices. The short 
run can be described by adding a fixed-output supply into the standard IS-LM model. The
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prospects for stability after a bond-financed deficit are gloomy simply because given a fixed 
productive capacity the tax base cannot react to compensate for the higher public debt service 
costs. Stability is possible only if the price level increase is enough to reduce the real value of 
those costs by the amount of the deficit. In the long run, output is endogenously determined 
through capital deepening; in this context, the restitution of budget balance after a bond- 
financed permanent increase in G' requires the expansion of the capital stock, and therefore a 
reduction of real interes rates. Investors will react by demanding a larger amount of real 
balances, but given the constancy of the money supply, prices will fall. Then, in opposition to 
the short-run description, interest rates and prices fall in the long run.
9. In a simple model in which consumption depends on disposable income and investment on 
interest rates, an income tax cut encourages consumption demand and stimulates a higher 
output. Interest rates increase to keep money demand in balance with an unchanged money 
supply, and private investment is crowded out. A second case is illustrated by a fiscal 
expansion which is transmitted through an investment subsidy. This time, both consumption 
and private investment are encouraged, and output increases. However, given an unchanged 
money supply interest rates will also be higher. The first case illustrates how crowding out of 
private investment develops within a restrictive monetary policy. The second one shows how 
in an unemployment economy investment- oriented fiscal policies yield a higher private 
investment even at higher interest rates (Dombusch, 1987).
10. Three relationships give the essence of the model. These are the market equations for 
money, bonds and equity. In the open economy case there is a fourth equation, this time for 
foreign exchange. Wealth accumulation and portfolio management define the specification of 
the asset demand functions. Two economic environments are considered: an unemployment 
economy and a full employment economy. While the former implies an economic slack 
which is responsive to aggregate demand, the second describes a state of market clearing 
equilibria. Two horizons are discussed: the long run in which the system completely adapts to 
current policies and stocks grow at the same rate of the economy, and the short run in which 
markets do not fully adapt to existing policies, with asset supplies not completely adjusted to 
long-run demands.
11. Whether a deficit policy leads in the long run to crowding out or crowding in depends on 
the system as a whole. The gross substitutability principle is insufficient to guarantee 
unequivocal results and predictions are subject to the empirical knowledge of assets supply 
and demand equations.
12. Blanchard (1981) uses the market valuation of assets, q (the Tobin's q) as the endogenous 
'free' variable. Fair (1979) uses the long-term bond rate R and applies the expectations theory 
of the term structure. According to this theory the yield obtained from an n-period bond 
equals the expected yield from holding a series of one- period bonds over the n-periods. If 
expected future short-term rates are given by E r^{+;, the bond market is in equilibrium when
(1+Rt)^ = (l+rt)(l+E^r^+i) +...
Because the Et**t+j ^  unobserved values, an assumption about the way expectations are 
formed is required to apply the theory. At this point the rational expectations assumption is 
introduced.
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SECTION VI
New-classical contributions to the theory of public debt.
Introduction
The economic prosperity of the mid-1950s to mid-1960s which served as a background to 
neoclassical economic growth theorizing (Section III above) was no longer in place as of the 
mid-1970s. OECD countries were already experiencing much lower GDP growth rates than 
during the first twenty five years after World War II, a trend which would continue through 
the 1980s. A steep rise in unemployment rates affected major European economies and the 
United States since the first half of the 1970s, and particularly European countries in the first 
half of the 1980s. As for inflation rates, they accelerated since the early 1970s with 
outstanding peaks in the mid-1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, before declining through 
this last decade (Matthews and Bowen, 1988).
What was the reaction of the economics profession to these events? Economists felt that 
structural Keynesian models constructed during the 1950s and 1960s performed poorly when 
trying to explain the new economic trends in OECD economies. Further, the Keynesian 
program which had prevailed for three decades became the subject of a strong criticism 
spearheaded by leading exponents of the rising new-classical macroeconomics. A central 
component of that criticism was the "policy ineffectiveness" proposition according to which 
provided that expectations are rational and money illusion is absent, demand management 
policies will be ineffectual in affecting output growth rates (Lucas, 1973; Sargent, 1973). 
Altogether, the unprecedented conditions of the 1970s and the challenges to the Keynesian 
research program left the idea that a reappraisal was required.
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The policy ineffectiveness proposition resulted from the new-classical criticism of standard 
aggregate macromodels. But it is at the heart of new classicism that sound economic 
conclusions should be derived from explicit microfoundations. This section is about a new- 
classical micromodel which develops the notion of policy ineffectiveness in government 
finance. The central reference is the Barro (1974) statement of the debt neutrality 
proposition.
As seen before, particularly in sections II and HI, debt neutrality is an issue of long tradition 
in economic analysis. Nonetheless, for a variety of reasons the Barro (1974) contribution is 
an outstanding landmark in the historical perspective of public debt theories. The author 
attacked the crucial assumption of the neoclassical synthesis according to which an increase 
in government debt leads, at least in part, to an increase in the perceived household wealth. 
Since this assumption is vital in the neoclassical synthesis for demonstrating a positive effect 
on aggregate demand of bond financed deficits for a given amount of government 
expenditure, Barro thought to have demolished the theoretical basis for the textbook effects 
of bond financed fiscal policies on output, interest rates and investment. As for the 
framework applied, Barro constructed the first fully developed microeconomic model for the 
discussion of debt neutrality within the basic tenets of new classicism, namely, consumers are 
always in equilibrium, hold rational expectations, and make decisions according to real 
variables. Further, a wealth of contributions followed Barro's seminal and controversial 
essay. Although generally offering alternative and conflicting results regarding debt 
neutrality, they share common elements in the design of a modem neoclassical theory of 
public debt.
The basic debt neutrality model and important extensions and criticisms of it are discussed in 
subsection A. One important departure from debt neutrality which is relevant for the 
econometric sections of this work is the tax smoothing theory. We dedicate subsection B and 
a great deal of subsection C to examine this theory. Finally in subsection D we show how the
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contents of this section are useful for our empirical and historical reflections in parts HI and 
IV.
A. The debt neutrality proposition.
Our first concern in this section is the controversy about the debt neutrality proposition. We 
start by presenting a brief review of this proposition as expounded by Barro (1974) and 
discuss how it relates to other theoretical developments on public debt. Next, various issues 
which are thought to affect debt neutrality are considered. These issues summarize the main 
debates on the subject during the last two decades.
1. The basic model
Barro (1974) essay covers different angles of the controversy about real effects of shifts in 
the stock of public debt. The basic contribution is an OLG model where individuals have 
finite lives and capital markets are perfect. Its characteristics can be summarized as follows:
First, each generation lives two periods: the productive years and the retirement period. The 
model is static with the same number of individuals in each generation, homogeneous tastes 
and productivity. This is a departure from Samuelson (1958) and Diamond (1965) who built 
up dynamic models.
Second, as in Diamond (1965) a neoclassical production function with constant returns to 
scale is postulated. Firms maximize profits when the marginal productivity of capital and 
labor are equal to the rental rate on capital and the real wage, respectively. As we saw in 
Section IV, the optimization problem of individuals in the Diamond model consists in 
maximizing the utility derived from consumption in the two periods of life; it is assumed that 
individuals consume all their wealth -principal and interests- in their retirement period: there
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are no bequests. By contrast with this model, the key element in Barro's contribution is the 
existence of a chain of operative intergenerational transfers.
There exists intergenerational concern. In the simple case of two generations, the 
consumption of the old is determined not only by assets accumulated during the productive 
period, but by assets inherited from the previous generation, and also by returns obtained 
from the provision of a bequest in favour of the young generation. The concern about future 
generations is modeled by considering that a member of the old generation includes the 
attainable utility of a member of the young generation as an argument of his own utility 
function. At this point a crucial restriction rules out the existence of negative bequests.
Third, government debt is introduced in the model under the assumption that bonds and 
capital are perfect substitutes in households portfolios. Government bonds are sold in a 
perfect capital market, and the proceeds finance a lump-sum transfer to the old generation. It 
is assumed that government levies two lump-sum taxes on the young generation; one during 
her productive period to finance the current interests, and another one during her retirement 
to finance the principal. Since the transfer to the old is exclusively financed by the young, the 
net value of a bequest in favour of the latter depends on the size of the debt. In these 
conditions, the problem of a member of the old generation is the optimal choice of the net 
bequest. A marginal change in government bonds will be offset by a change in the bequest 
provision, preserving the original value of the net bequest, and therefore insulating 
consumption from changes in public debt.
In brief, the novelty of the model and the source of its crucial results is the consideration of 
operative intergenerational transfers. So long as this link between generations exists, finite- 
lived individuals act as if life was infinitely lasting. Any marginal change in public debt is 
exactly compensated by a change in bequest provisions so as to keep the value of the net 
bequest inaltered. The existence of marginal net wealth effects of government bonds on 
aggregate demand and interest rates is absolutely ruled out.
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So far, how does this model fit in our historical perspective of public debt theories? First, the 
model is developed in the wake of the neoclassical tradition inspired by Samuelson (1958) 
and Diamond (1965) who discussed the behaviour of life-cycle savers in the context of 
simple OLG models. The new model, however, offers important contrasts with established 
LCH models. Instead of intergenerational selfishness the new model postulates 
intergenerational concern through operative intergenerational transfers; it is these latter 
which makes it possible that finite-lived agents behave like if they were infinite-lived. This 
upshot not only differs from the distinguishing finitness of life of LCH models (Section IV 
above) but coincides with characteristic results obtained from infinite-horizon models 
(Section III above). As in the latter models, the new model concludes that budget deficits 
simply defer taxes and therefore there is no role for public debt.
Second, the rejection of wealth effects of changes in government debt on aggregate demand 
contradicts the vision common to both the neoclassical synthesis (Section I) and neo- 
Keynesian thinkers (Section V). These lines of thought accepted that future taxes required to 
finance the debt service of current budget deficits would only partially offset the positive 
wealth effects of an increased stock of debt.
Third, the neutrality of changes in public debt formally derived in the model under discussion 
has conspicuous precedents in the Ricardo’s writings of the early 19th century and the 
Buchanan's criticisms of the public debt literature in the late 1950s (Section II above). 
Buchanan (1976) created the expression "Ricardian equivalence theorem" to refer to the 
alleged equivalent effects on the economy of budget deficits and taxation which he found in 
Ricardo's contributions and in the Barro (1974) model.
The debt neutrality proposition has been a subject of intense controversy during two decades. 
We now trace the debate concentrating our attention on three outstanding theoretical topics: 
the concept of operative intergenerational transfers and finite horizons; capital markets and
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liquidity constraints; and, the uncertainty associated with future taxes and incomes. These 
topics are crucial because they point to the conditions under which the debt neutrality 
proposition holds. Additionally, recent debate on these matters have focused on the 
consistency of the original assumptions of the Barro model rather than to explore possible 
departures from those assumptions. Finally we present a brief review of central lines of 
empirical work on the debt neutrality proposition.
2. Intergenerational transfers and finitness of the individual horizon.
We start by reviewing recent analyses motivated by Barro's original concepts of altruism and 
dynastic families, as well as new developments on the concept of finitness of the individual 
horizon.
a. Altruism. The concept of operative intergenerational transfers.
The first point to be stressed is the notion of altruism and the conditions under which 
intergenerational transfers are operative. The original statement appears in Barro (1974): 
"...the crucial consideration for the above result [the debt neutrality proposition] is an 
operative intergenerational transfer, rather than an operative bequest motive per se. For 
example, the transfer could take the form of parental expenditure on children's education, 
etc., during the overlapping tenure of parent and child. Further, the transfer could be 
occurring in the direction opposite to that specified above (from the old to the young 
generation). In that case the same conclusions on the effect of a change in the government 
debt would be reached if a 'gift motive' were operative..."
This broadly defined altruism requires the existence of an interior solution for 
intergenerational transfers, that is, most people must be out of comer solutions of zero 
transfers. The word 'operative' denotes that equilibrium transfers are determined by tangency 
conditions instead of comer solutions where agents could opt, if allowed, for negative
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transfers. The previous quotation indicates that when either a bequest motive or a gift motive 
are operative the debt neutrality proposition holds. This is the so-called two-sided altruism.
Some authors like Weil (1987a) have studied the conditions under which bequests (one-sided 
altruism) are operative. Weil analyzes the case of an exchange economy as well as the case of 
a production economy. For both two cases the conclusion is similar: when an economy 
without bequest motive (such as the production Diamond economy) is characterized by 
dynamic inefficiency -when the rate of interest r is lower than the rate of population growth 
n- bequests cannot be operative in the same economy with a bequest motive. With r<n 
positive bequests would lead to a Pareto inferior allocation. Intergenerational transfers would 
go the other way round, from the young to the old, in order to reach a Pareto superior 
allocation. Alternatively, dynamic efficiency of the economy without bequests is a necessary 
condition for the debt neutrality proposition to be applicable to an economy with a bequest 
motive. 1
Abel (1987) and Kimball (1987) analyze the conditions under which gift and bequest motives 
are operative. As pointed out by Abel, the fact is that in steady state equilibrium either the 
bequest motive or the gift motive is operative, or neither motive is operative; in this last case, 
a change in the timing of taxes has real effects and the debt neutrality proposition fails. 
Kimball focuses on the question of whether two-sided altruism guarantees debt neutrality 
results, and from the first order conditions for the maximization of altruistic utility by an 
agent the following conclusions are obtained^: First, there is a positive interval in which the 
steady-state interest rate can fall (this interval includes the golden rule interest rate). When 
this happens, neither the bequest nor the gift motive are operative even when altruism is 
considered. It follows that the economy will react to changes in the timing of taxes and the 
debt neutrality proposition fails. Second, in a non-altruistic economy (like the Diamond 
economy) when the interest rate is outside the interval just mentioned the addition of altruism 
can lead the economy to one of the boundaries of such interval: in the efficient case (r>n)
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bequests will be operative, and in the inefficient case (r<n) gifts will be operative. In either 
case, the debt neutrality proposition holds.
Analyses like these ones due to Weil and Kimball have the merit of establishing the cases in 
which the debt neutrality proposition fails without adding any of the issues that bring about 
non-neutrality such as distortionary taxes. Particularly, Weil showed how in a Diamond 
economy with dynamic inefficiency the bequest motive is "too weak" and public debt non­
neutral (as we saw in Section IV, the oversaving in the economy is reduced by the issue of 
public bonds). And Kimball demonstrated that even the consideration of two-sided altruism 
does not in all cases guarantee the applicability of Barro’s debt neutrality proposition.
b. The dynastic assumption questioned
In Barro's view, "a network of intergenerational transfers makes the typical person a part of 
an extended family that goes on indefinitely" (1989a, p.40). In this context the "typical 
person" plans with an infinite horizon perspective. Some authors like Bemheim and Bagwell 
(1988) consider the notion of a dynastic family as highly unrealistic. It is argued that the 
propagation of human species creates not single but complex networks in which unrelated 
individuals share common descendants. Eventually, every person would be interconnected 
through these complex parent-child linkages. In this context, all government transfers are 
irrelevant because they simply redistribute resources between interconnected persons; only 
by changing real expenditure can the government affect the allocation of resources. In the 
end, the proliferation of linkages between families result in more severe neutrality properties 
under weaker conditions than those required by Barro. The debt neutrality proposition 
appears to be a particular case of a more implausible neutrality theorem.^
These considerations have immediate implications for the discussion of comer solutions. In 
Barro (1974) most people must be away from these solutions. Under Bemheim and Bagwell 
analysis of altruistic linkages, since individuals eventually form part of a single
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interconnected network, consumption does not depend on the distribution of resources but on 
aggregate wealth. Since any increment in wealth is divided between the entire population, an 
incremental bequest will be divided between all the individuals other than the donor; with a 
large population the effect on the recipient's consumption is negligible. Consequently, a 
potential donor will prefer to make no bequests at all, with the implication that in equilibrium 
a large number of these potential donors will end up at comer solutions.
What is the originality of these kind of analysis in terms of the controversy of the debt 
neutrality proposition? Earlier critics like Tobin and Buiter (1980) concentrated on the 
discussion of "realistic departures from Barro's assumptions" like childless households in 
each generation or people who do not care about their children's well-being. The method 
employed by authors like Bemheim and Bagwell is different. They examine the intemal 
consistency of the dynastic framework idea, and after offering the considerations presented 
before conclude that such a framework is not a "suitable abstraction" for the discussion of 
public debt and other policy issues.
c. A strategic motive for bequests?
Barro's linkage hypothesis is based on the consideration that intergenerational transfers are 
motivated by altruism. Altemative motives like tastes for generosity or intrafamily exchanges 
have been considered in the related literature; one general result of these efforts is the 
absence of neutrality effects (Bemheim, 1987). Intergenerational transfers is a complex 
phenomenon which cannot be encapsulated in a single analytic model. Bemheim, Shleifer 
and Summers (1985) develop a strategic motive for bequests as a supplement to 
intergenerational altruism. This formulation preserves Barro's idea of ancestors and 
descendants linked by voluntary utility-maximizing transfers, but challenges the concept of 
families as "perfect harmonious units". The point is that "parents would prefer to receive a 
gift to having their children receive an equal gift, even when they care about the utility of
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their children and make transfers to them" (p. 1073). The notion of conflict and exchange 
motives plays a central role.
Which are the implications of the strategic bequest motive for the debt neutrality 
controversy? In a non-strategic environment parents have no need to manipulate their child's 
decisions, and any forced transfer between generations (such a budget deficit) will not affect 
their levels of consumption. In this case the debt neutrality proposition holds."  ^In a strategic 
environment parents care about the well-being of their children but also require some specific 
behaviour from their children. In order to get more attention, parents would offer larger 
transfers to the children. Parents can take the initiative and design a credible threat in terms 
of bequests to motivate the children to perform properly. When the threat is at least enough 
to encourage the desired behaviour, the debt neutrality proposition holds: in case of a budget 
deficit the parents' transfer to the children will keep their utility level and enforce the 
required behaviour. The outcome is different when for the threat to be effective the children 
must be offered a higher utility level: parents must dedicate a larger portion of their wealth to 
capture an extra attention from children. In this case a budget deficit allows parents to reduce 
the utility level of children while enforcing the desired behaviour: the debt neutrality 
proposition does not hold.
In conclusion the strategic bequest motive challenges the notion of families as harmonious 
units. At least, it can be viewed as a supplement of the notion of intergenerational altruism.
In this context the debt neutrality proposition may or may not hold. Although Bemheim, 
Schleifer and Summers recognize that it is difficult to distinguish between different bequest 
motives they develop an a priori case for strategic motives and offer some empirical results 
that support the idea that strategic actions explain an important deal of behaviour at the 
margin. The implications of this approach for the effect of government indebtedness on 
capital accumulation are reported as similar to the standard implications of life-cycle models. 
Barro (1989) criticizes this device because it treats family relationships as equivalent to
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"purchases of services on markets", and then, opts for an approach in which altruism goes 
along with strategic actions. As seen, the debt neutrality proposition may or may not hold.
d. Finiteness of the individual horizon
The OLG model due to Samuelson (1958) and applied to public debt analysis by Diamond 
(1965) is characterized by the existence of individuals with finite horizons. There are neither 
gift nor bequest motives, and debt neutrality does not hold. In the OLG due to Barro (1974) 
finite-lived individuals behave as agents with infinite horizons because of the existence of 
operative intergenerational transfers. At the end of the 1970s the discussion about debt 
neutrality depended very much on the contraposition of these two frameworks.
In the mid-1980s, Blanchard (1984,1985) applied to fiscal policy issues the uncertain 
lifetime approach due to Yaari (1965), as we saw in Section IV. In this framework there is a 
constant instantaneous probability of death of each individual, (p), with p=0 or p>0; with p=0 
the framework reproduces the debt neutrality results of infinite-horizon models, and with p>0 
the framework conveys the debt nonneutrality characteristic of life-cycle models. Both the 
finite-horizons and uncertain-lifetimes (p>0) approaches predict nonneutral effects from 
changes in public debt. By 1985 it was understood that in order to get debt nonneutrality it 
was necessary to work with the finite horizon and the uncertain lifetimes frameworks.
A step forward due to Weil (1987b) showed that even if families have infinite horizons there 
will be no debt neutrality so long as there is a positive rate of birth of new infinite-horizon 
families, and there are no operative intergenerational transfers. It was no longer necessary to 
depend on finite horizons and uncertain lifetimes in order to produce debt nonneutrality. 
Weil's model is a hybrid of the Sidrauski (1967a) framework and the OLG model in which 
new and infinitely-lived families continuously enter the economy. An essential concept is the 
economic disconnectedness which refers to the creation of new families which are not linked 
to previous ones through operative bequests.
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Buiter (1988) showed how Blanchard's result that uncertain lifetimes generate debt 
nonneutrality, and Weil's result that the rate of arrival of new families alone also yields debt 
nonneutrality are special cases of the Yaary-Blanchard model generalized to allow for 
population growth and productivity growth. In this general framework, Buiter finds how debt 
neutrality requires a rate of arrival of new families equal to zero; furthermore, with this rate 
at zero, there will be debt neutrality even if there are uncertain lifetimes. The message is that 
governments can tax the resources of agents currently alive but also those of agents yet to be 
bom. A current deficit created by a postponement of taxes means that part of those taxes will 
be paid by new families not linked to the existing ones through bequest considerations.
The foregoing discussion shows the changing importance of the concept of finiteness of 
individual horizons for generating debt nonneutrality; contributions of the late 1980s 
concluded that it was not a necessary prerequisite. Additionally, it was found that economic 
disconnectedness, and not uncertain lifetimes, is the key factor responsible for life-cycle 
results in the Yaari-Blanchard framework.
e. Conclusions
The debate around the intergenerational transfers issue allows us to make some general 
conclusions. First, it is not necessary to seek for departures from the original assumptions to 
obtain results against the debt neutrality hypothesis. The intemal "criticism" of the original 
assumptions has the merit of challenging the robustness of those assumptions for the 
controversy of public issues. Second, even under the original Barro's framework the debt 
neutrality results are not always guaranteed. Additionally, new approaches have been 
conceived to supplement the Barro's intergenerational altruism; under these frameworks the 
debt neutrality proposition does not necessarily apply. Finally, recent research has stressed 
the crucial importance of disconnectedness to generate life-cycle results in the Yaari- 
Blanchard model.
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3. Capital markets and liquidity constraints.
Barro (1974) acknowledges -though sceptically- that when capital markets are imperfect, a 
debt financed tax cut increases net wealth provided that the government as a financial 
intermediary is more efficient than the private sector. As seen in Section I above, early 
discussions concentrated on the transactional costs associated with the collection of loans; as 
a more efficient performance of the government in this function is equivalent to a 
technological innovation in financial markets, a higher public debt will be perceived as an 
addition to net wealth (Mundell, 1971).
Keynesians challenge the notion of perfect capital markets by recalling that a significant part 
of society is liquidity constrained. This means that these sectors of society will not be 
indifferent to a change in the timing of taxes: "In effect the government lends to them at its 
borrowing rate of interest, an option not otherwise available in the credit market" (Tobin, 
1980, p.57).
How important is the argument of liquidity constraints for the validity of the debt neutrality 
proposition? Its significance has been evaluated in recent research using life-cycle simulation 
models. Hubbard and Judd (1986) compare results obtained for the simulated marginal 
propensity to consume out of a tax cut under different contexts -a perfect capital markets 
regime and a liquidity constrained regime-. While under the first context the result is not 
higher than 5%, under the second regime it reaches 24%. These results are interpreted as 
illustrative of the departure from debt neutrality due to capital market imperfections.^
Poterba and Summers (1987) go further inquiring for the quantitative importance of 
intergenerational linkages in the analysis of short-run effects of budget deficits on savings. 
The results obtained from simulations with a life-cycle model suggest that substantial 
fractions of debt constitute net wealth, and that a large burden of debt is transferred to future
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generations. However, it is shown that deficits bring about small changes in consumption; 
this result is explained as determined by a small average propensity to consume out of wealth 
(Life-cycle models predict small MPC for all but the oldest consumers). The striking point in 
terms of modelling is that the small change in consumption is not far from the results 
obtained in infinite horizon models where consumption is invariant to deficit policies. 
Poterba and Summers conclude that the differentiation of life-cycle models from infinite 
horizon models for the analysis of short-run effects of budget deficits is of no practical 
importance. However they discard the applicability of infinite horizon models to predict the 
impacts of altemative policies because of their strong and 'unrealistic' requirement that 
individuals are neither myopic nor liquidity constrained.^
Following a different line of research, liquidity constraints have been considered as an 
endogenous facet of equilibrium. It is argued that liquidity constraints change in response to 
government policies, and that these private responses could secure the validity of the debt 
neutrality proposition. Yotsuzuka (1987) discusses this matter under adverse selection 
conditions in the consumer loan market. Altemative models are developed to answer the 
question whether or not informational asymmetry offers a theoretical basis for rejection of 
debt neutrality.
It is shown how in a competitive environment in which there is no communication between 
lenders, a debt financed tax cut actually relaxes existing liquidity constraints. In this case the 
debt neutrality proposition does not hold.^ Things are different in a context where lenders 
have incentives to share or not to share information about their customers. It is shown how in 
equilibrium some lenders will offer loans which pool various risks, and how in the case of a 
tax cut those lenders will adjust the size of the pooling contracts leaving the whole market 
unchanged. In this situation the debt neutrality proposition applies in full.^ The key for debt 
neutrality to hold in these models is the degree to which customer information is shared 
between banks. In a broader sense, what is under controversy is the validity of informational 
imperfections as an argument against the debt neutrality proposition.
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To sum up, the existence of liquidity constraints has been considered an important argument 
in the discussion of the departures from debt neutrality. Additionally, the traditional 
objection according to which debt neutrality requires perfect capital markets has been 
challenged. It is argued that liquidity constraints respond endogenously to changes in fiscal 
policy, and according to the particular characterization of financial markets the neutrality of 
debt may or may not hold. But, after all, the general conclusion at the end of the 1980s 
resembles the conclusions at the end of the 1960s: debt neutrality effects do not follow when 
governments as financial intermediaries act in a different and more efficient way than the 
private sector.
4. Taxes and uncertainty.
In an early criticism, Tobin and Buiter (1979) consider the debt neutrality proposition as an 
extension of the Modigliani-Miller theorem of finance theory "from the household sector vis- 
a-vis the corporate sector to the private sector as a whole vis-a-vis the public sector" (p.40). 
In a further criticism, the same authors debate Barro's assumption according to which 
"government securities are a perfect hedge against tax liabilities, so that the introduction of 
both into a portfolio would change neither its expected return nor its risk". And then, they 
comment: "Given the uncertanties about when, how, and on whom future taxes will be 
levied, and about future issues of debt to refund maturing issues or finance new deficits, it is 
hard to see how so perfect a hedge against all contingencies could be constructed".
The same discussion in a context of uncertainty is raised by Chan (1983) who discusses three 
different scenarios, the first two related to lump-sum taxes and the third one to income 
taxation. The first one is characterized by the following assumptions: taxes are lump sum and 
their incidence is known and constant over time. Additionally, public and private bonds are 
perfect substitutes, namely, public debt does not open new trading opportunities because it is 
replicable by some combination of private bonds. Under these assumptions, it is examined
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whether the uncertainty about the aggregate level of future taxes and the real value of future 
payments on public debt upsets the debt neutrality proposition. It is shown how any 
uncertainty about future taxes is removed by the acquisition of the appropriate quantity of 
public bonds. Public debt works as a perfect hedge against uncertainty, and the debt 
neutrality proposition holds.
The second scenario is characterized by the introduction of uncertainty about the future 
incidence of taxes. This means that a household share of the current tax-cut may not match 
its share of the future tax increase. Ignoring the existence of insurance markets against 
relative tax risks, changes in individual tax shares introduce a wealth redistribution risk at the 
individual level. In these conditions a current tax cut creates uncertainty about future 
disposable income, and under conventional restrictions on individual preferences (a constant 
absolute risk aversion utility function) leads to a reduction in present consumption. ^  This 
upshot runs against the Ricardian invariance of consumption but also against the prediction 
that consumption should increase after a tax reduction.
In the third scenario taxes are allowed to vary with income. This case had been seen by Barro 
(1974) "like a public program of income insurance" (p.lll5). The basic point is that taxes 
positively correlated with income reduce the variability of disposable income, then 
stimulating current consumption. This is the so called risk-sharing effect on consumption 
because the government shares individual risks about future disposable incomes. Barsky, 
Mankiv and Zeldes (1986) go further, finding that the MFC out of a tax cut, with associated 
future income taxes is probably to be large. By using plausible estimates of the parameter 
values it is shown that the MFC is similar to the MFC of a life-cycle model which ignores 
future tax liabilities. The large MFC is explained to be due to the reduction of precautionary 
saving when the government provides an insurance -the reduced variance of future incomes- 
not available in private markets.!^ In this case the debt neutrality proposition fails.
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In the end, uncertainty effects derived from tax changes are not unequivocal: income 
insurance and income redistribution are common elements in tax systems. When the former 
dominates uncertainty dilutes and a tax cut stimulates consumption. Opposite results obtain 
when income redistribution effects are predominant. In both two cases the debt neutrality 
proposition fails. In conclusion, even if financial markets are able to reproduce the 
characteristics of public debt, factors associated with uncertainty about future incidence of 
taxation and risk-sharing create departures from the debt neutrality proposition. Budget 
deficits would lead to higher current savings if uncertainty increased, but would encourage 
consumption in the opposite case.
5. The neutrality of public debt: an empirical issue.
Contenders in the public debt neutrality debate agree that the subject is eventually an 
empirical one. Most studies have concentrated on the evidence of effects of fiscal policies on 
consumption, interest rates and the current account balance. Limiting the attention to 
empirical studies of fiscal effects on consumption, three approaches can be distinguished: the 
standard approach, the intertemporal approach, and the natural experiments approach.
In the standard approach, aggregate consumption is regressed on government expenditure, 
taxes, public debt, wealth and other variables which are specific to individual analyses. 
Different specifications which illustrate this approach are offered by Feldstein (1982), 
Kormendi (1983), Seater and Mariano (1985), Bemheim (1987) and Modigliani ( 1 9 8 7 ) . A 
characteristic outcome of these studies is the absence of a conclusive answer in favour or 
against the debt neutrality proposition. The endogeneity of taxes and other fiscal and 
macroeconomic variables is a common problem of these studies generally based on time 
series analysis.
The intertemporal approach follows the line of empirical analysis of the consumption 
function opened up by Hall (1978). Different contributions emphasize that an intertemporal
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stochastic method is the most appropriate procedure to test the validity of the debt neutrality 
proposition. General illustrations of this approach appear in Aschauer (1985), Leiderman and 
Razin (1988), Poterba and Summers (1987), and Haque ( 1 9 8 8 ) . The Euler equations 
specified in these studies are based on the fundamental assumption required by the debt 
neutrality hypothesis to hold, namely, that individuals maximize intertemporal utility and 
form expectations rationally. Some limitations have been mentioned, however. It is argued 
that the debt neutrality hypothesis may fail for reasons that do not contradict the Euler 
equation specification, for instance, when consumption plans are formed rationally but there 
is myopia about the links between current deficits and future taxes. (Bemheim, 1987)
The natural experiments approach has been favoured in recent years. After a decade and a 
half of empirical efforts, Barro (1989) has expressed his disappointment with econometric 
results that "are all over the map, with some favouring the Ricardian equivalence, and others 
not" (p.49). The simultaneity between consumption and income, and the endogeneity of 
budget deficits appear to be the reasons for these disenchanting results. Barro underlines 
the importance of episodes in testing debt neutrality: "..., I regard as more reliable some 
results that exploit situations that look more like natural experiments" (p.49). The method has 
been applied to the study of so-called "controlled experiments" historically provided by 
different countries. Examples are offered by Barro (1989), Carroll and Summers (1987) and 
Poterba and Summers (1987).!^ Although the approach cannot offer quantitative estimates of 
the effects of altemative policies, it does represent a more flexible way to explore 
institutional factors which cannot be encapsulated in representative agent models.
6. Where do we go from here?
We started this section with a bare description of the Barro (1974) model and the place of the 
debt neutrality proposition in an historical perspective of public debt theories. Then we laid 
out the issues which have conveyed the main "intemal" criticisms of the proposed debt 
neutrality, and reviewed empirical approaches. In the remainder of this section we examine
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the development of a theory of public debt commonly known as the tax-smoothing theory. 
The modem developments of this theory are related to specific departures from the Barro 
model which consider the implications of distortionary taxation. We devote a good deal of 
attention to the tax smoothing theory not only for its contribution to the public debt literature 
but because it will receive central consideration in our econometric discussions in Part III.
B. Optimal taxation and public debt: the tax smoothing theory.
A major assumption in the derivation of the debt neutrality proposition is that taxes are lump 
sum. There exists, however, a vast array of taxes which are likely to be distortionary (for 
instance, personal and corporate income taxes). In these conditions a change in the timing of 
taxes affects personal and corporate incentives to work and produce in different periods, 
namely, government deficits bring about non-neutrality effects. Recent discussion of these 
topics has extended the theory of optimal taxation from static to dynamic frameworks. The 
result for the public debt debate is that public debt becomes part of the theory of optimal 
taxation. This subsection reviews the development of these ideas which have received formal 
expression in the tax smoothing theory of deficits. We concentrate on two central issues: 
dynamic efficiency and time-consistency.
1. From static to dynamic efficiency.
The central question was posed by Ramsey (1927) in the following terms:
"The problem I propose to tackle is this: a given revenue is to be raised by proportionate 
taxes on some or all uses of income, the taxes on different uses being possibly at 
different rates; how should these rates be adjusted in order that the decrement of utility 
be a minimum?" (p.47)
Ramsey focuses on efficiency considerations abstracting from distributional questions. The 
subject of analysis is a static economy with identical consumers and many goods. The 
government intends to collect a given revenue by choosing a tax structure which maximizes
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the welfare of a "representative" consumer. From this optimization problem it is found that 
following a tax change the proportionate reduction of demand should be the same for all 
commodities.!^ Additionally, it is proved that the tax rate as a percentage of the consumer 
price can be expressed as an inverse function of the price elasticity of demand. Then, 
deviations from the rule of uniform proportional reduction must be found in unequal price 
elasticities. The efficiency criterion imposes higher tax rates on the commodities with lower 
price elasticities of demand as a way of minimizing deviations from the nondistortive 
original allocation.!^ A normative conclusion of these findings was offered by Pigou in the 
1920s:
".. the best way of raising a given revenue,..., is by a system of taxes, under which the 
rates become progressively higher as we pass from uses of very elastic demand or supply 
to uses where demand or supply are progressively less elastic" (1947, p. 105)
The extension of this analysis to the study of fiscal policy over time is due to Pigou, too:
".. the rates of taxation may be kept steady where the income of the people is steady,... 
where the income of a country fluctuates, it may similarly be legitimate to meet fixed 
running expenses by a succession of budgets with surpluses and deficits that cancel. For, 
with different incomes, to maintain the same budget revenue would necessitate tax rates 
varying inversely with prosperity." (p.36)
In the last decade and a half these concepts have evolved and being formalized in the context 
of the tax smoothing theory of deficits; in this framework the Ramsey rules for setting tax 
rates in a static economy with many goods are applied in an intertemporal context. Instead of 
having many goods being taxed at one date, there is a composite commodity being taxed at 
different dates. The formal exposition of the theory which has served as a common reference 
for recent contributions is due to Barro (1979).
How does the recent exposition of the tax smoothing theory fit into the historical perspective 
of public debt theories? The theory formalizes the departure from a world of debt neutrality 
when lump sum taxes are not available. In this second-order world, the theory aims to 
determine the optimal timing of taxes which in fact gives the optimal trajectory of budget 
deficits. Since the theory comes out from a departure from a world in which debt neutrality
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holds, there is no room for discussions such as crowding out of private investment or debt 
burden on future generations which are central to other public debt theories (Barro, 1979, 
1989a, 1989b).
The tax smoothing theory incorporates a concept of the role of tax changes which contrasts 
with earlier paradigms such as the Lemerian and traditional Keynesian expositions according 
to which tax changes affect the current flow of disposable income and therefore aggregate 
demand. In earlier frameworks, income and wealth effects play a predominant if not 
exclusive role. In the tax smoothing view tax changes affect economic activity by altering the 
incentives to involve in market activities like consumption, employment and production. 
Intertemporal substitution effects are crucial in this context. For instance, an expected 
increase in future income taxation encourages current and discourages future work, and also 
raises current and reduces future investment (Frenkel and Razin, 1987).!^
How does the modem presentation of tax smoothing solve the problem of determining the 
optimal timing of taxes? The earliest discussion (Barro, 1979) does not follow the literature 
on optimal taxation but concentrates on the costs linked with the collection of tax 
revenues.!^ The optimal timing of taxes is that which minimizes the present value of the tax 
collection costs corresponding to the present value of taxes implied by the government 
budget constraint. The solution to this optimization problem requires that the marginal 
collection costs of an increase in taxes be constant over time. Since in his original discussion 
Barro specified a first degree homogeneity between tax collection costs and real income, the 
optimal solution implies a constant planned average tax rate.!^
Further contributions explored whether labor-income taxation was likely to be uniform 
across time; general equilibrium analyses showed that this was not always the case (for 
example, Aschauer and Greenwood, 1985). This result led to the conclusion that the 
constancy of tax rates over time is not optimal in general (Barro, 1989a, 1989b). This 
conclusion however does not hazard the crucial observation of the theory that budget deficits
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may be used to smooth tax rates over time and over the business cycle: budget deficits will 
appear during recessions, to be replaced by budget surpluses during booms.
Since we dedicate a good deal of attention to tax smoothing in our econometric discussion in 
Part III, we just mention central implications of the theory for public debt analysis. Consider 
first the following equations for the change in the stock of debt and for the average tax rate 
(Barro, 1986):
d/dt(b)=Db=g+rb-ty ( 1 )
t= [g*+(r-n)b]/y* (2)
where Db is the current deficit, g is the exogenous deterministic real government 
expenditure, y is the real taxable income, t  is the stabilized average tax rate, n is the trend 
value of real GNP, and g*, y* are the current normal values of g and y.^^ Equation (2) shows 
that the average tax rate is determined by the ratio of the normal value of g to the normal 
value of y, where the former is affected by the difference (rb-nb), namely, the real interests 
on the outstanding debt excluding the amount financed with the normal increase of real debt.
Substituting from (2) into (1) and rearranging terms a new expression is obtained for the 
budget deficit:
Db=[1-y/y*][g*+(r-n)b]+(g-g*)+nb (3)
Equation (3) summarizes the implications of the theory. First, when output and government 
expenditures grow at their normal values (y*, g*), the stock of real debt grows at the rate of 
the economy n, which implies a constant debt-output ratio. The theory does not define any 
values for the level of debt or its ratio to output, but requires that in the absence of shocks on 
y and g the government runs a deficit equal to nb; otherwise, interest payments will raise or 
fall relative to output in a way that is inconsistent with a stabilized average tax rate in 
equation (2).21
Second, the real debt increases (decreases) when either output is below (above) its normal 
value, or government spending exceeds (falls short of) its long-run value. Given a
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proportional income tax and a constant tax rate, tax revenues raise (fall) in the same 
proportion as output. Thus, the theory suggests unitary values for the coefficients of the 
cyclical variable and the government expenditures variable.
Barro (1979,1986) discussed the applicability of the tax smoothing model to the U.S. 
experience. For the period 1916-1982 the estimates for the cyclical variable and for the 
temporary spending variable were 3.7 (s.e.=0.35) and 0.6 (s.e.=0.07) respectively, both 
highly significant but also clearly different from the hypothesized unitary values. The 
estimates suggest that under recessions tax rates tended to fall rather than being stabilized, 
and also that temporary increases of government expenses tended to be partially financed by 
increased taxation. More encouraging results were reported in Barro (1987) where the model 
is applied to the British experience from the early 1700 through World War I. In this case the 
estimated coefficient for the temporary spending variable was 0.96 (s.e.=0.04) without 
including WWI, and 1.03 (s.e.=0.02) including WWI.
The tax smoothing approach has been presented as a positive theory of public debt. The 
outstanding message is that real- world governments issue or retire public debt in order to 
smooth the distortions of non-lump sum taxation over time. Further research has enriched the 
approach by discussing how those distortions are distributed not only over time but over 
states of nature. The maturity structure of public debt is a central concern in the new 
developments of the theory, and it extends the controversy to time-consistency issues (Lucas 
and Stokey, 1983; Person and Svenson, 1984). Further, Fleming (1987) discusses how 
budget deficits smooth tax rates in a stochastic model in which in contrast with previous 
literature government expenditure is endogenous. We now turn to the second central topic 
around which we organized our discussion of tax smoothing, namely, the time-consistency of 
tax policies. Our main reference is Lucas and Stokey (1983).
2. Time-consistency of optimal tax policies.
159
Lucas and Stokey (1983) and Lucas (1986) emphasize two points: the contingent-claim 
character of public debt, and the time consistency of welfare-maximizing policies. The 
framework is an infinite horizon model in which the absence of non-distorting taxes 
constitute the way out from the debt neutrality proposition. Public debt is seen as the method 
by which the distortions caused by non-lump sum taxes are distributed not only over time, as 
in Barro's tax smoothing model, but over states ûf nature. This latter aspect refers to the 
contingent-claim character of public debt, a central point in the theoretical discussion of 
public debt; it stems from the Arrow-Debrew contingent-claim interpretation of a 
competitive equilibrium model (Lucas, 1980).
Lucas and Stokey discuss alternative scenarios which illustrate the role of public debt in 
dynamic efficient contexts, namely, the diffusion of tax distortions over time and under 
uncertain states of nature. Some examples are provided in Box VI, 1. A further question is 
whether dynamic efficient policies are time-consistent. Lucas and Stokey show it is true in a 
barter economy. It is possible to conceive successive governments, each one choosing the 
same tax rates, even when they find themselves free to choose their own policies, that is, the 
current tax rates, the announcement of future tax rates, and the restructuring of outstanding 
debt. Two elements are important. The first one is credibility, which can be assured if the 
restructuring of debt is consistent with the announced tax policy. The second is that the 
maturity structure of debt matters.
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BOX VI. 1
The role of public debt in dynamic efficient contexts.
The framework of these contributions is an economy without capital in which a constant 
population of identical consumers lives forever. Goods are produced under constant returns 
to scale, and consumed by private consumers and the government. Government expenditures 
are given by an exogenous and stochastic process; this is the only source of uncertainty in the 
model. There is no room for any kind of countercyclical fiscal or monetary policies. 
Consumers are assumed to be in a rational expectations equilibrium and the distribution of 
the stochastic process of government demands is assumed to be known by them.
Because money in this model is not a good but a means to taxed goods (in contrast with the 
Phelpsian view reviewed in Section III above), the optimal monetary policy is that which sets 
the rate of inflation at zero. Fiscal policy is left with the determination of the optimal path of 
income taxes, and therefore, of debt.
The workings of the model are illustrative of the role of public debt. Consider a situation in 
which the initial debt is set at zero (bo=0), the government consumption is zero in all periods 
(gt=0) except some period T, for instance a war period (gT>0, T#t), and the monetary policy 
is conducted through open-market operations. According to the tax smoothing principle the 
tax burden created in T must be spread backwards and forwards from T. How can this work? 
Before T the government forms a budget surplus by collecting taxes but these funds go back 
to the private sector as "loans", in exchange for private debts (the private sector is a debtor). 
At T these debts are cashed and public bonds are issued (the public sector is now the debtor). 
After T there is a positive public debt, but it is xiqI efficient to pay it off. It is shown that for 
t=T+l, T+2,..., the tax revenue just covers debt interests but no bond is ever redeemed. A 
different case occurs when government shocks are anticipated at regular periods (T, T+S, 
T+2S,..., S#0). When this happens the government pays interests and redeems gradually the 
outstanding bonds after every shock. These examples corroborate and extend Barro's tax 
smoothing principle operating symmetrically over time.
A new scenario arises when a positive government shock at T is anticipated with probability
a. Then, at T-1 or so, the private bonds acquired with budget surpluses become contingent on 
the occurrence of the shock at T. If this happens, the private sector is compelled to cash its 
bonds and to acquire public bonds, but if it does not happen private bonds become valueless; 
this case depicts the state-contingent aspect of public debt.____________________________
Dynamic inconsistency appears in the monetary economy, h o w e v e r .  ^ 2 Time inconsistency 
arises not only through the monetary channel by means of an inflation which erodes the real 
debt, but through tax changes which eventually affect the price level. Therefore, dynamic 
consistency could only be restored if the government committed itself to a given path of 
prices (not of the monetary aggregates).
Lucas (1986) envisages an institutional way by which the efficient Ramsey taxes can be time- 
consistent in modem societies. It is seen as a set of constitutional rules to which governments 
would be subject. The first rule would preclude capital levies in the form of taxes on past 
capital accumulation, and the second would require government's committment to follow a
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particular path of nominal prices (In relation to the first rule, Lucas [1990] shows that for a 
growing economy if the Ramsey path converges to a balanced path the tax rate on capital 
must converge to zero).
Overall, public debt is economically relevant in a world with distortionary taxation. The tax 
smoothing theory recognizes the role of public debt in spreading tax distortions over time and 
over changing states of nature. So far we have discussed tax smoothing under the assumption 
that government deficits are exclusively financed by bond issues. In our last subsection we 
review the new classical discussion on the interdependence of fiscal and monetary policies, to 
the extent that it contributes to our perspective of public debt theories, and turn back to recent 
developments of the tax smoothing theory where explicit consideration is made of deficits 
financed by both bonds and money.
C. Deficits, debt and inflation.
Fiscal policy considerations play an important role in new classical discussions of inflation. 
Two main fields can be distinguished for our own purposes. In the first one, public debt is 
seen as a result of a dynamic game in which the players are the fiscal authority, the monetary 
authority, and the private sector. The second one develops the implications of the equilibrium 
approach of public finance. These are the topics of our following discussion.
1. Policy coordination and budget stabilization.
The central point in this discussion is that fiscal and monetary policies are interdependent and 
have to be coordinated. The emphasis is not on individual policy actions but on policy 
strategies. In this context the public debt (size and composition) is closely related to the way 
in which these strategies are conducted (Sargent and Wallace, 1981,1986). The exposition of 
these ideas in the early 1980s led to confrontations with established ideas, particularly in the 
monetarist field.
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In the monetarist tradition a bond-financed deficit is not inflationary. Taxation as well as 
borrowing mean that the government spends the funds instead of the private sector. Inflation 
appears when the deficit is financed by money creation. 23 These points are investigated by 
Sargent and Wallace who state that the monetarist position ignore the full implications of 
treating the economy as a dynamic gam e.^ First, it is argued that when government deficits 
are financed only with bond issues, authorities are constrained by the existence of a 
maximum value of the government bonds desired by the public B-, and by the size of the 
expected future budget surpluses. Therefore, budget deficits must be temporary. Second, it is 
observed that when government deficits are financed by both bonds and money issues, the 
proportion of the budget deficit financed with bonds may eventually be repaid by additional 
money issues. This situation is more likely the larger the budget deficits are and the closer is 
the accumulated debt to the limit imposed by B-. Once B- is reached the resort to 
inflationaiy finance is unavoidable unless a fiscal reform (reduction of expenditures and/or 
increase of taxes) is introduced. ^ 5
Sargent and Wallace go further to show how when the real interest rate exceeds the growth 
rate of the economy (r>n), the debt-output ratio grows steadily under a tight monetary policy 
and the economy eventually ends up with inflation. McCallum (1984) intervenes to show that 
permanent deficits can be financed only with bonds and without inflation, if the definition of 
deficit includes interest payments (The Sargent-Wallace definition of deficit does not include 
the repayment of debt interests).26 A similar conclusion is reached by Liviatan (1984) who 
indicates that under a constant fiscal policy (which includes interest payments) increases in 
debt interests are compensated by adjustments in taxation and expenditures. This 
compensatory response of fiscal authorities would eliminate any threat of explosive increases 
in public debt.^^
Hoover (1989) comments a controversy between Darby (1984) and Sargent and Miller 
(1984) about the relative values of r and n. Darby considers more likely the case n>r (as
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opposed to r>n of Sargent-Wallace) in which the roll-over of public debt is viable and the 
monetarist prescription of tight monetary policies to control inflation is vindicated. Sargent 
and Miller respond that in the presence of growing budget deficits interest rates will be 
greater than the growth rate of the economy because of the financial incentives that must be 
offered to allocate the debt; however, they recognize that when their assumption of an 
exogenously fixed interest rate is abandoned the discussion about the relative values of r and 
n is insufficient to draw definitive conclusions about tight monetary policies because of the 
existence of a bond revenue Laffer curve. This issue has been extended by Weil (1987).
Weil discusses the "simple arithmetics" according to which government deficits should 
eventually be monetized in accordance with the difference (r-n). In his model the real interest 
rate is no longer fixed in the long run, but a function of fiscal deficits instead. It is shown 
how monetary authorities have to monetize a fraction of permanent deficits which is smaller 
than the fraction predicted in the Sargent and Wallace model.
In conclusion, the evolution of public debt is not independent of possible conflicts between 
monetary policy and fiscal policy. In extreme cases stabilization requires a drastic fiscal 
reform to reduce the burden of debt or abate high inflation rates. In the background of the 
literature reviewed here there is a feeling that a limit should exist for the debt-output ratio; 
conspicuous precedents of this feeling were present in the public debt debate of the 1940s as 
we saw in Section I above. We now turn our attention to a different discussion of the 
coordination issue generally associated with Phelps (1973). By following this discussion we 
go back to the tax smoothing theory where both monetary and fiscal policies are involved in 
the financing of budget deficits.
2. Is inflation an element of an optimal taxation plan?
The coordination issue was explored in a different framework by Phelps (1973). The 
government branches -the treasury, the central bank, and the expenditure branch- concert
164
their actions in terms of government objectives. Both the treasury -through income taxation- 
and the central bank -through inflation and the management of government bonds- affect the 
disposable income. Phelps applies the differential taxation approach in public finance which 
keeps constant the sum of tax revenues when one tax is substituted for another. By applying 
this methodology to the overall operations of the treasury and the central bank, the total 
income effects of these government branches on the private sector are kept constant to derive 
the substitution effects when there is a change in the tax mix. This means that a change in 
income tax rates -in the treasury- is compensated by a change in the inflation tax -in the 
central bank-. Phelps develops a model of the optimal tax mix including the inflation tax, 
following Ramsey (1927), as we saw in Section in. The result is that in this public finance 
framework it is optimal to tax liquidity as well as "other" goods and income.
In the context of the New Classical School this Phelpsian view has originated two lines of 
debate, at least. One discusses the theoretical soundness of the conclusion that an inflation tax 
should be used in a world with distortionary taxes and reintroduces the controversy about the 
role of money. The other one investigates to what extent the optimal taxation theory 
describes the behaviour of government.
As seen in Section III, in Lucas and Stokey (1983), and Lucas (1986), liquidity is not a good 
but rather the means to acquire goods. In this context the Phelpsian notion according to 
which it is optimal to tax liquidity is "simply incorrect" since, it is argued, liquidity permits 
the access to a set of goods that ordinary taxation has already affected. Kimbrough (1986) 
develops this anti-Phelpsian position in a general equilibrium framework in which the 
government maximizes private sector welfare by following the Friedman's optimum quantity 
of money rule even if distortionary taxes are needed to finance the budget.^^
Phelps (1989) replies that the public finance case for inflation continues to be valid; people 
consider liquidity as a good pgr gg, and additionally, the inflation tax is the only way to tax 
the underground economy. Further, conditions for including money in the production
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function are no less severe than for money in the utility function (Phelps, 1989, Spaventa,
1989). Moreover, Mankiv (1987), and Poterba and Rotemberg (1990) quote an essay by 
Romer (1987) in which the inflation tax is showed to be appropriate in a model of the 
transactions process.
Mankiv (1987) scrutinizes to what extent the prescriptive message of the optimal seigniorage 
theory has been followed by governments in the United States in the postwar period -1952 to 
1985-. This work stems from the differential taxation approach used by Phelps (1973), and 
the original Barro (1979) contribution to the tax smoothing theory in which the monetary 
policy is not used to finance the budget deficit. The aim is to show that if monetary and fiscal 
policies are used to finance optimally government expenditures, the inflation rate and the tax 
rates will behave like random walks, and evolve together over time. This implies that the 
level of taxation will vary together with inflation and nominal interest rates. Regressions 
report a positive, important and statistically significant impact of government revenues (as a 
proportion of GDP) on nominal interest rates and inflation.
Poterba and Rotemberg (1990) examine the correlation between inflation and tax rates for a 
sample of OECD countries. It is shown at the theoretical level that models of governments 
with and without committment imply a positive relationship between inflation and taxation 
rates. Unlike other contributors like Phelps (1973) and Lucas (1986), Poterba and Rotemberg 
consider not only the distortionary effects of inflation on the demand for money, but its 
distributional impacts. This vision of the inflationary effects is considered in the specification 
of the expected social cost of raising government r e v e n u e s .  32 At the empirical level the case 
for a positive correlation between inflation and taxation rates is confirmed by the United 
States along the period 1891-1986 and by Japan along the period 1955-1984. The experience 
of other countries like the United Kingdom 1872-1984, Germany 1954-1984, and France 
1948-1985, does not support the theoretical predictions. It is concluded that the absence of 
empirical support could reveal the fact that the government objectives function which 
inspires the choice of inflation and taxation rates changes over time.
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Roubini and Sachs (1989) explore the economic and political forces behind the budget 
deficits and postulate that differing institutional arrangements in the OECD economies 
explain the different patterns of budget deficits. The authors extend Mankiv (1987) test to a 
sample of 15 OECD countries along the period 1960-1986 and arrive to the conclusion that 
the optimal taxation theory is not supported by the e v i d e n c e . 3 3  it is emphasized that 
governments are not the "monolithic entities of economic models" and that the dispersion of 
power across branches or political forces increases the likelihood of inefficient budgetary 
policies. These conclusions come to support our discussions in Section II where we reviewed 
recent attempts to create a positive theory of public debt based on the observation that fiscal 
deficits are related to institutional and political contexts.
Regarding Mankiv (1987) and Poterba and Rotemberg (1990), Grilli (1989) comments that 
the positive correlation between inflation and tax rates does not consider the full implications 
of the theory. It is necessary to investigate about unit roots and cointegration properties.3^ 
For a sample of 10 European countries Grilli conducts different unit root tests applied to 
government expenditure, income taxes and seigniorage. The findings reveal a general support 
for non-stationarity in expenditure and taxes but only a mixed support in the case of 
s e i g n i o r a g e . 3 5  The empirical evidence is also mixed when cointegration tests are applied. It 
is found that those countries for which the cointegration properties do not apply, show 
substantial changes in velocity. This result suggests that developments in financial markets in 
the last decade could have reduced the importance of the inflation tax.
In the same line of Grilli (1989), Trehan and Walsh (1990) comment previous empirical 
literature related to seigniorage in the United States. It is alleged that under the revenue 
smoothing framework taxes and inflation must be non-stationary; however, non-stationarity 
does not prove by itself that the theory is correct. This requires that tax rates and inflation are 
cointegrated assuming that velocity and the distortionary costs of raising revenues are 
stationary. It is found some support for the non-stationary implications, but different
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statistical tests do not offer unambiguous results. Further, the statistical tests reject the 
hypothesis that tax rates and inflation are cointegrated under the assumption that velocity and 
distortionary costs of raising tax revenues are stationary.36 Additionally, none of the 
statistical tests reject the null hypothesis that velocity is non-stationary. Thus, it is concluded 
that shifts in velocity may explain the lack of cointegration between tax rates and inflation, as 
suggested by Grilli for the European countries. Unlike previous authors like Mankiv (1987), 
and Poterba and Rotemberg (1990), Trehan and Walsh conclude that the tax sm ootl^g^ 
criteria have not guided the behaviour of governments in the United States at least since 
1914.
D. Final comments and links with other sections of this work.
Interestingly, although for different reasons, contrasting ways of thinking -Keynesians and 
new classicals- appear to share the idea that government budgets should be intertemporally 
balanced rather than continuously balanced against the so-called classical principles of public 
debt -Buchanan and the public choice school-. Keynesians have traditionally defended 
discretionary budgetary actions as a stabilizing device over the business cycle. New classicals 
explain the role of government deficits (surpluses) as an optimal response of the economic 
system to low-income (high-income) periods, rather than a discretionary method of dealing 
with the business cycle.
There has been also a tacit agreement between new classicals and public choice theorists 
since both call for the existence of constitutional rules for fiscal policies, although again for 
different reasons. New classicals foresee an institutional organization in which capital levies 
are ruled out and governments are commited to sustain a determined path of the price level, 
namely, a written or unwritten constitution under which to eliminate the problem of time- 
inconsistent policies. This is one of the possible avenues by which the new classical 
contributions could influence actual policies and its supporters claim that the theory deserves
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the opportunity of being accepted in the solution of practical matters. This demand has been 
summarized by Lucas (1990) in one sentence:
"The attraction of neoclassical economics is not that it is pretty -though it can be- but that, 
given half a chance, it works" (p.315).
What is the link between the theoretical topics in this section and our empirical work in Part 
ni, as well as our historical discussion in Part IV?
We do not apply any test concerned with the validity of the debt neutrality proposition, but 
heavily draw on the tax smoothing theory as a guidance for our econometric estimations. Our 
first model has some resemblance with the Barro (1986) analysis of the behaviour of U.S. 
federal deficits. Our second model explicitly tests whether the tax smoothing theory of 
deficits explains the Colombian experience: we use a buffer-stock model in which the 
internal debt is used as a "buffer" by the government in order to smooth out shocks on a 
group of independent variables such as output, government expenditures, imports and 
external financing.
The idea that internal public debt has worked as a shock absorber is also a common thread of 
our historical endeavour in Part IV. In our historical narrative we aim to illustrate how the 
relationships hypothesized and tested in the econometric sections are brought to life and 
enriched by events and institutions. In conclusion, a good deal of theoretical review in this 
section will offer frameworks for the econometric work, and also guidance in the 
presentation of the Colombian experience.
E. What comes next?
Having finished this section, we have arrived to the end of our enquiry about the 
contributions to the theory of public debt between the world crisis of the 1930s and the late 
1980s. By studying how and why public debt controversies evolved during these six
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decades, we attempted to place them into perspective. Now, we are about to start a different 
scrutiny concerning public debt, this time regarding the actual experience of a developing 
economy, Colombia.
In Part II we describe broad characteristics of the Colombian economy (stylized facts), which 
we think help to understand the country’s experience with external and internal public debt. 
We see these descriptions as an introduction to our econometric work in Part III, and our 
historical enquiry in Part IV.
The reader may be wondering whether the theoretical controversies chronicled in Part I play 
any significant role in the remaining of this work. Already, at the end of every individual 
section in Part I we mentioned ways in which the topics under discussion could be helpful to 
study the Colombian experience. For the purpose of empirical analysis we will come back to 
the theoretical contributions which recognize a shock absorber function to the public debt.
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SECTION VI
NOTES
1. Weil demonstrates how dynamic efficiency in the no bequest exchange economy is a 
necessary condition for bequests to be operative, and how tills condition is necessary but not 
sufficient in a production economy.
2. Kimball represents the altruistic utility of an individual of generation t, v ,^ by an infinite 
series of the form v^  = ES2jUt+j, where Qj>0 means that people do not wish ill for their 
ancestors or descendants. Additionally Qj is required to tend to zero as the absolute value of j 
goes to infinity, id. est., the concern about distant relatives goes to zero in both directions.
3. It is shown how distortionary taxes end up equivalent to lump sum taxes: given that 
consumers are connected through operative transfers, the marginal revenues originated in the 
taxation of one person are, independently of the population size, finally returned to the same 
person. The case is equal to the single-consumer world in which given budget balance taxes 
do not distort behaviour because the individual knows that revenues will return to him. 
Further, Bemheim and Bagwell show how the dynastic assumption leads to the conclusion 
that prices are irrelevant in the resource allocation process.
4. This is the "rotten kid" theorem which sustains that children maximize their own welfare 
by choosing actions that maximize the family income. In a strategic environment parents 
desire more attention from their children and then try to manipulate their actions.
5. In aggregate, the MPC out of a temporary tax cut is the weighted average of the MPC 
equal to unity of constrained consumers and the very low MPC of active participants in 
capital markets. The fact that the simulated weighted average MPC with perfect capital 
markets is 5% is not an insignificant result in the recent U.S. experience.
6. Poterba and Summers describe the 1981 tax cut in the U.S. as a natural experiment for the 
debt neutrality hypothesis. Because of the notable reduction in personal taxes and because it 
was previously announced and gradually applied, consumption should not have increased, 
unless myopia or liquidity constraints had bœn present; the econometric findings support the 
idea that consumption increased abnormally after the tax reductions of 1981.
7. Banks are price takers and cannot differentiate between low-risk and high-risk consumers. 
Since high-risk consumers loan demand is greater than low-risk consumers demand the 
equilibrium interest rate, rg, is higher than if every consumer had the same loan demand. 
What is the effect of a debt financed tax cut in this context? The government knows how 
much public credit is assigned to each citizen and then it is allocated at an interest rate rp, 
which is lower than the equilibrium rate (rQ<rg). Thus, a tax cut improves the welfare o f low- 
and high-risk consumers; the debt neutrality proposition does not hold.
8. Yotsuzuka discusses the case of incentives to share information between lenders, as 
different to the cases of either no communication or full communication between them. The 
model with incentives for communication is illustrated by a sequential equilibrium in which 
the banks supplying the pooling contract share customer information. Following a tax cut, 
these banks reduce the size of tiieir loans, one-for-one, leaving consumption unchanged.
9. Chan shows that the response of current consumption to increased uncertainty about future 
taxes is ambiguous. A more precise result requires the specification of the utility function; by 
using a constant absolute risk aversion utility function, it is demonstrated that current 
consumption falls when uncertainty increases.
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10. Barsky, Mankiv and Zeldes conclude that "the consumer is Ricardian in taking into 
account the future tax liabilities implied by debt finance, and is Keynesian in increasing his 
spending in response to the tax cut" (p.685).
11. Feldstein (1982) specifies estimating equations in levels; OLS estimations offer mixed 
results with some parameter estimates supporting debt neutrality and the rest rejecting it. 
More conclusive support of debt non-neutrality is reported by IV estimations. Kormendi 
(1983) specifies estimating equations in first cUfferences and the results decisively support 
Barro's propositions. Seater and Mariano (1985) draw on Barro's distinction between 
permanent and transitory government spending and their effects on consumption, and report 
results which are consistent with the debt neutrality proposition. Bemheim (1987) proposes 
an estimation equation for international comparisons (23 countries over the period 1972-83) 
and concludes that cross-country data analysis stren^ens the proposition that government 
deficits stimulate private consumption. Modigliani (1987) reports tests based on a cross 
section of a different sample of countries and concludes that the empirical evidence supports 
his original ideas (Modigliani, 1961) about the long-run effects of public debt (Section IV 
above).
12. Aschauer (1989) proposes an empirical test of debt neutrality (for the United States, 
period 1948-81) in which the estimated relations are obtained from explicit intertemporal 
optimization methods. The consumption function is derived from a quadratic utility function 
and assuming that households maximize the present value of utility from consumption in 
current and future periods. The results are supportive of the debt neutrality proposition. 
Leiderman and Razin (1988) use an intertemporal stochastic model to test the validity of debt 
neutrality in recent Israel experience (1980-85). Instead of the infinite-horizon representative 
consumer considered by Aschauer, Leiderman and Razin specify a model which allows for 
deviations from debt neutrality in two ways: finite horizons, as in Blanchard (1985), and 
liquidity constraints. Various tests reiterate that the debt neutrality proposition is not rejected 
by the data.
The intertemporal approach is applied by Poterba and Summers (1987) to the analysis of the 
main tax-cut episodes in the United States in recent history. According to debt neutrality, 
their implementation should not have affected consumption, but the results obtained by the 
authors reject that proposition. The results of an application of the intertemporal approach to 
a sample of 16 developing countries are reported in Haque (1988). The hypothesis under 
discussion is the existence of different planning horizons for the private and public sectors as 
argued by Blanchard (1985). The empirical evidence gives little support to this hypothesis; 
additionally, the findings appear to be in favor of the martingale specification of 
consumption suggested by Hall (1978). As a whole, this research endorses the idea that for a 
sample of developing countries the debt neutrality proposition holds, as far as the Blanchard's 
argument is not backed up by the data. This is a limited conclusion, however; as in 
Leiderman and Razin (1988), a more ample research should consider other possible sources 
of debt nonneutrality. Additionally, literature on developing countries consider liquidity 
constraints to be a crucial cause of deviation from debt neutrality (Buiter, 1989; Rossi, 1988).
13. "Because the deficit is countercyclical and consumption smoother than GNP, 
consumption is high relative to GNP when the deficit is large. This means that the deficit will 
have a positive sign in the keynesian-type consumption regression even when Ricardian 
equivalence holds" (Comment by Barro in Discussion to Bemheim 1987, p. 313).
14. Barro quotes the Israel experience during the period 1983-1987 in which private savings 
offset one-to-one substantial changes (positive and negative) in public savings. This analysis 
relies upon information taken directly from national accounts. Carroll and Summers (1987) 
and Poterba and Summers (1987) offer additional illustrations. The first article studies the 
controlled experiment historically provided by Canada and the United States about the 
determinants of private savings from the mid-fifties to the mid-eighties. It is shown that after 
almost 25 years of moving in tandem the private savings rates of both two economies
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diverged substantially since the early seventies. In fact, for the United States, while the 
fraction of private savings to GNP was around 8.3% in the second half of the sixties, it was 
around 6.2% in the first half of the eighties. Conversely, the Canadian experience was 
sharply different; from 7.5% in the late sixties to 11.9% in the first half of the eighties. It is 
also shown how in the Canadian experience the increasing ratio of private savings to GNP 
was accompanied by a falling ratio of government savings to GNP: while the former 
increased in 5% between 1971 and 1981, the latter declined in 7% during the same period. 
This natural experiment in favor of the debt neutrality proposition does not apply in the US 
economy where the declining government savings ratio over the period is apparently 
accompanied by a declining private savings ratio (Poterba and Summers, 1987).
15. Atkinson and Stiglitz (1989) obtain the formulation,
=-8xk f o r  k = 1, . . . , n  
where tj are the tax rates, sjq are derivatives of compensated demand curves, xj^  ^are 
purchases of good k, and 0 is a coefficient which measures benefits expressed in terms of 
government revenue. The left-hand side is the change in the demand for good k when 
consumers are compensated to stay on the same indifference curve. Attention is focused on 
the substitution effect which is the origin of the distortions.
16. This conclusion is derived under the assumption that all cross derivatives of the demand 
functions of the taxed goods are zero (Sandmo, 1976).
17. The example given in the text applies to the case of tax changes on labor income. Tax 
changes on consumption bring about different results: a temporary reduction in the current 
tax induces a substitution toward current consumption. A full description of effects 
associated with changes in different taxes is offered by Frenkel and Razin (1987).
18. Uniform labor-income taxation across time is not a general result unless some restrictions 
are placed on preferences and technology. As shown by Kimbrough (1986) and also by Razin 
and Svenson (1983), if preferences are separable in consumption and leisure, and technology 
is linear, labor-income tax rates will be constant over time. Barro (1979) eluded the 
discussion of the government's optimal income tax program, and preferred to apply the 
method explained in the text and also in the next note. It was a "shortcut" to use an 
expression due to Blanchard and Fischer (1989, p.587).
19. In Barro (1979) the tax smoothing result is derived from the minimization of the costs 
involved in raising tax revenues (deadweight losses or excess burdens). Formally, the tax 
collection costs are expressed as a positive function of the real revenues R and a negative 
function of the real income, Y^ . Considering a first degree homogeneity between Z^  and Y^ , 
the present value of collection costs is given by,
oo
Z t = 2  R t f
Similarly, the present value of the government budget constraint is given by,
2[Gt/(1+r)t] + bo = 2[Rt/(1+r)t]
where G^  is the exogenous government spending, r is the real rate of return on private and 
public debt, bg is the initial real stock of public debt, and R  ^is the real tax revenue in each 
period. The government optimization problem consists in choosing R%, R2 , ..., so as to 
minimize the present value of collection costs given the intertemporal budget constraint. The 
resulting first order conditions require ÔZ^ /ÔR %he marginal collection costs of an increase in 
taxes) to be constant over time. This means that given tiie homogeneous specification of 
costs, the ratio R/Y will be constant in all periods.
20. In the derivation of the average tax rate t, it is assumed that both g and y grow at the rate 
n, so that the ratio g/y does not change over time.
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21. Equations (2) and (3) have been written under the assumption of constant real interest 
rates. This specification does not consider shocks on interest rates.
22. In a Ramsey context capital levies and default on government debt increase the efficiency 
of the economy because they reduce the excess burden of taxation. Once the time consistency 
issue is taken in account, efficient taxation presumes that governments honor debt (Lucas,
1990).
23. A recent reference is Friedman, M. (1989, p.32)
24. A simple description of the economy as a dynamic game considers three players -the 
fiscal authority, the monetary authority, and the private sector-. Each player has a strategy to 
achieve its own objectives. A crucial point is that players' strategies are interdependent. The 
fiscal authority decides about expenditures, taxes, and then, about deficits and the size of 
public debt. Tlie monetary authority is concerned with the composition of public debt 
(money and bonds). The private sector decides about consumption and investment, and about 
the accumulation of public debt in either form.
25. The weakness of the monetarist prescription of a tight monetary policy appears to have a 
double angle: not only the future rates of inflation will be higher because of the incapability 
of the government to allocate new issues of bonds, but the present inflation will be Wgher via 
the expectation of wider issues of money in the future.
26. Sargent and Wallace (1981) use an overlapping generations model. McCallum (1984) 
uses a modified version of the Sidrauski (1967a) mWel in which infinitely lived agents take 
account of the government budget constraint.
27. In his controversy with Feldstein, Barro (1976) states that public debt cannot grow 
indefinitely faster than the economy because being taxes the collateral for interest payments, 
the present value of future taxing capacity imposes a limit on the value of outstanding debt. 
McCallum (1984) indicates that this discussion is irrelevant in the context of the debt 
neutrality proposition simply because bonds are not regarded as net wealth.
28. As seen in a previous subsection, the Weil (1987) model combine characteristics of the 
Sidrauski (1967a) model and the overlapping generations framework used by Sargent and 
Wallace. Weil analizes the case of a dominant fiscal authority in two different frameworks.
In the first one characterized by the absence of intergenerational effects, the results are 
similar to those obtained in the Sidrauski model, namely, the steady state interest rate is equal 
to the rate of social discount, and invariant to fiscal and monetary policies. In the second one, 
intergenerational effects are allowed through the continuous entrance of new infinitely lived 
families. It is shown that the real interest rate is invariant to the growth rate of the money 
supply but not to fiscal policies; some illustrations are provided of the way in which fiscal 
deficits affect interest rates. Finally, because part of the bond issues associated with the 
financing of permanent deficits are sold to future new families, the monetization does not 
need to be as large as predicted in the Sargent-Wallace model.
29. The authors embrace the Friedmanian views on monetary policy in a double sense: on 
efficiency grounds to eliminate positive inflation premia, and on stability grounds under the 
consideration that an important source of business cycles is an unstable monetary policy.
30. The central point in Kimbrough's argument, as in Lucas, is that money is an intermediate 
good, in contrast with Phelps who includes money in the utility function. Additionally, 
Kimbrough recalls that in Ae public finance literature given a production technology, 
optimal taxation does not lead to the taxation of intermediate goods. It is shown that budget 
revenues are raised with lower tax rates when the inflation tax is disposed of. The reason is 
the elimination of transaction costs associated with inflationary finance.
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31. The real interest rate is assumed constant. Mankiv uses a classical model in which real 
variables are invariant to monetary policy, and government expenditures are an exogenous 
and stochastic variable. The first-order conditions for an optimal fiscal policy and also for an 
optimal monetary policy give important conclusions: tax rates, inflation rates, and nominal 
interest rates are martingales.
32. Poterba and Rotemberg depart from the conclusion achieved by Kimbrough (1986) that 
the optimal tax rate on money is given by the Friedman rule. Their argument is that they 
consider many effects on inflation and then money services are not viewed as perfect 
substitutes for other variables in the utility function.
33. The first test is applied to the question of whether tax rates follow a pure random walk 
against the alternative hypothesis which includes a constant non-zero drift. The null 
hypothesis is rejected at tiie 5% level for 7 of 12 countries considered for the period 1960- 
1973, and for 12 of 15 countries for the period 1960-1985. The only exceptions are the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and Finland. The second test extends to 15 countries the 
tests applied by Mankiv (1987) and Poterba and Rotemberg (1989) to study the correlation 
between tax rates and inflation rates. Once more this correlation is supported for the United 
States but rejected as a general case.
34. Grilli criticizes the procedures of previous works which apply standard regression 
techniques when precisely the variables under analysis may be non-stationary.
35. Three tests are reported: one for a pure autoregressive process, a second one for an 
autoregressive process with a drift, and a final test for an autoregressive process with a drift 
and time trend. The non-stationarity of income taxes obtained by Grilli is in conflict with the 
evidence presented by Roubini and Sachs (1989) who use standard t-statistics.
36. The theory requires non-stationarity of inflation and tax rates; but as long as these 
variables respond to shifts in permanent government spending the theory additionally 
requires a common stochastic trend for both variables. The statistical tests reject the existence 
of this common trend.
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PART II
STYLIZED FACTS ON PUBLIC DEBT IN COLOMBIA AND RELATED ISSUES 
INTRODUCTION
This part surveys key facts relevant for the understanding of the Colombian experience 
with external and internal debt. The stylized facts are classified in three groups as 
follows: first, facts associated with the dependence of the economy on the external 
sector; second, facts which reveal empirical regularities in the evolution of the fiscal 
sector; and third, facts which illustrate the close association between the development of 
the financial sector and the cycles of external and internal debt.
In the first group we consider the following stylized facts:
Fact 1. The reliance of the economy on a major staple (coffee exports) whose price has 
depended on notable fluctuations in world markets. The terms of trade have heavily 
depended on the fate of coffee international quotations.
Fact 2. The outstanding importance of import tariffs in the composition of tax revenues. 
A downturn of imports imply negative effects on government receipts. Given restrictions 
on the availability of foreign exchange, an adverse shock on the terms of trade will be 
detrimental to imports and therefore to expected fiscal revenues.
Fact 3. The major experiences of access of the economy to external financing have 
coincided with the booms of foreign private lending in the late 1920s and late 1970s. In 
the interim, such access has mainly depended on funds made available by developmental 
organizations.
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In the second group we refer to the following stylized facts:
Fact 4. The procyclical behaviour of the average tax rate. The government revenue 
percent of GDP appears to fall during recessionary periods and to increase during periods 
of prosperity.
Fact 5. The public sector was the predominant borrower of external funds during the 
period of study. The burden of the debt largely depended on the performance of exports: 
periods of high indebtedness and rapidly increasing exports showed low debt-to-export 
ratios, and periods of stagnated indebtedness and collapsing exports produced a high debt 
burden. Adverse shocks on export markets meant deterioration of creditworthiness.
Fact 6. The behaviour of the internal public debt is dominated by marked upswings after 
adverse shocks arising in the external sector. In historical perspective, the internal public 
debt appears to have played a function of "shock absorber" when the economy underwent 
the negative shocks. As for the sources of financing of those temporary increases of the 
internal debt, the central bank was of leading importance.
Fact 7. Authorities have followed sustainable financial policies over time. This means 
that there has existed a long-run relationship between government expenditures inclusive 
of interest payments and tax revenues.
Fact 8. The time paths of the average tax rate and the rate of inflation suggest that the 
inflation rate was not chosen by governments as a public finance issue.
In the third group we classify the following stylized facts:
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Fact 9. The two great lending booms of this century had a marked influence in the 
development of the financial sector. This effect was particularly crucial in the 1920s. 
When the booms came to an end, the financial system faced solvency difficulties.
Fact 10. The internal public debt played a significant role in the rescue of the financial 
system and other sectors affected by the external crises of the 1930s and 1980s.
These facts are intended to offer broad characteristics of the economy we want to study 
in so far as they highlight its experience with public debt. They are the basis for the 
selection of the relevant variables for our econometric work in Part XU, and the 
background for our historical inquiry in Part IV.
The reader will find three kinds of information in this part. First, some subsections are 
designed with the idea of introducing the reader to the evolution of the Colombian 
economy during the period of study. This is the case of the first subsection where we 
discuss the experience of an economy largely affected by the fate of its external sector. 
Apart from offering a general overview of the economy, this subsection also describes the 
historical phases of output (GDP), a variable of central importance in our econometric 
discussions in Part III. Second, most subsections are aimed to illustrate the stylized facts 
listed above. We heavily draw on the historical evolution of the relevant statistical series. 
In these subsections the reader is provided with historical backgroimd about the series 
which will be used in the econometric sections. Third, although most series are 
accompanied by information about their statistical characteristics, particularly 
stationarity, some subsections include additional tests when they are considered 
necessary to substantiate our stylized facts.
A. A general I  overview of the economy.
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We start by drawing a picture of the economy with a broad brush following the 
behaviour of GDP growth rates during the period of study. Three phases are highlighted: 
the interwar years (mid-1920s to early 1940s), the so-called "external strangulation" 
period (mid-1950s to mid-1960s), and a period of high growth rates (since the late 
1960s) which ended in stagnation (early 1980s). We intend this general picture to serve 
as a general background for our further discussions in this part.
We look first at the main changes in the economic structure along the period of study. 
The most notable fact is the substantial fall in the contribution of the primary production 
sector to GDP as seen in Graph 1. Agriculture represented about 50% of output at the 
time of the great depression (1929-1933) and still constituted about 40% at the end of 
World War U. In the post-War period the agricultural share in output declined 
continuously, reaching about 22% in the mid-1980s. These facts reflect a modernization 
process which involved the development of the manufacturing and services sectors.
The rapid increase in the percentage share of manufacturing in GDP during the 1940s 
and 1950s slowed down during the 1960s and 1970s before stagnating and even declining 
during the first half of the 1980s. Traditional services -commerce, construction, personal 
services and housing- represented a rather constant percentage of GDP, around 28%, 
since the end of World-War II. Other services particularly associated with the 
urbanization process -transport, communications, financial services-, increased their 
participation in GDP from about 10% in 1950 to over 18% in 1985. Finally, government 
services maintained a steady portion of about 8% of GDP in the post-War period.
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According to international standards the modernization process of the economy is less 
impressive than it appears to be in Graph 1. While the contribution of agriculture to the 
growth of GDP in the post-War period has exceeded the average for small exporters of 
primary goods (19.6% vis-à-vis 18.2% between 1945-49 and 1980-84), industry has 
notably lagged behind typical industrialization standards in those countries (22.9 vis-à- 
vis 36.5%, also between 1945-49 and 1980-84) (Ocampo, 1989, Table 6.5; Syrquin and 
Chenery, 1989).
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It has been hypothesized that agriculture has influenced not only growth but also 
financial policies. Recent literature on the international debt problem has explored the 
conjecture of a rural base of politics in Colombia as an explanation of why the country 
was the only commercial borrower in Latin America who escaped rescheduling programs 
during the 1980s (Urrutia, 1988a, 1988b; Berg and Sachs, 1988).  ^Independently of the 
validity of this hypothesis, we will see later in this section but particularly in Part IV that 
rural interests frequently appeared along the period of study when important decisions 
were to be taken on internal and external public debt, exchange rates, and credit 
policies.^
In our historical narrative in Part IV we will frequently discuss the Colombia's case with 
relation to other important debtors in Latin America. In this general outlook the question 
is how has Colombia historically fared in the context of major debtors in the region. 
Recent estimates show that the Colombia's annual average compound growth rate during 
the 1929-1987 period was 4.3%, a middle way between the higher rates of 5.4% and 
4.8% for Brazil and Mexico respectively, an the lower figures of 2.9% and 2.6% for 
Chile and Argentina respectively. The economic performance of these countries 
worsened during the 1980-87 period (the so-called "lost decade"), with Colombia 
reaching an average growth rate of 2.8%, ahead of Brazil with 2.4%, Mexico with 1%, 
Chile with 0.6% and Argentina with -0.6% (Maddison, 1992). We now turn to a 
description of aggregate output evolution during the period of study.
Three great phases may be distinguished in the evolution of output around an historical 
trend of 4.5% per year during the 1925-1985 period (Graph 2). The first extends from the 
mid-1920s through the outbreak of World War II; it can be seen how the boom of the late 
1920s exhibits the highest growth rates of the period and of the whole series. The second 
period dominates three decades in which the economy grows at less than its historical 
trend; the deepest negative outcomes coincide with the War, after which a slow recovery 
takes place until the mid-1950s when a new interval of lower rates precedes the
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expansion of the late 1960s. The third period starts in the late 1960s and extends until the 
early 1980s: along these years the economy grows above its historical trend reaching 
more enduring though lower rates than in the 1920s.^
Before moving to the description of these phases, it has to be noted that the real GDP 
series (in logs) is trend stationary, provided that a dummy variable is introduced to 
account for the strong rupture between growth rates above and below the trend during 
World War u A
GRAPH 2
E ! S T X l y I A . T E D  R E  S  X  D U A - I j  S
1 2
0 . 1
O S
0 6
0 4
0 2  - t l
O
— O . 02
—  O  -  0 4
—  O  .  0 6
—  O  -  0 8
0 . 1
2 5  3  O  3 5  4 0  4 5  5 0  5 5  6 0  6 5  V O  V  5  8 0  8 5
R E R X O D  1 9 2  5 — 1 9  8  5  
□  R E S X D X J A X j S
NOTES.
Deviations of real GDP front trend in logs. 
SOURCES. CEPAL (1957). IMF
1. The interwar years.
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We now offer a sketchy interpretation of the three periods just described. Roughly 
speaking the first period corresponds to the last stage of an unprecedented exports' 
bonanza which with some interruptions had lasted since the beginning of the century.
The boom was fuelled by extraordinary injections of external credit. The external 
upsurge peaked in 1928 before a dramatic collapse of the terms of trade and a sudden 
interruption of foreign loans.
The economy moved from an average growth rate of 8% in 1926-28 to an average of - 
1.3% in 1930-31. An immediate recovery was possible after the withdrawal of the gold 
standard and the implementation of expansionary policies. Exchange and import controls, 
and exchange rate adjustments were introduced to restore external balance. An 
extraordinary though not unprecedented decision was the official moratoria on external 
debt payments. To recover internal balance activist policies involved increased 
government expenditures, cheap bank loans and an enlarged stock of internal public debt. 
Both sets of policies revived the economy and encouraged the development of the 
manufacturing sector, particularly of consumption-goods import-competing industries. 
The intensive utilization of internal public debt was a temporary measure followed by 
fiscal reforms in 1935. A new tax regime was at the heart of the reforms. Apart from its 
pretensions of promoting a better income distribution, the new regime sought to reduce 
the dependence of budget revenues from custom duties.
2. The "external strangulation" period
During most of the 1930s the terms of trade evolved below their historical trend. The 
world quotations of coffee, the major staple, were inferior to their trend value, and the 
situation deteriorated during the international coffee crisis of 1937-40. This last episode 
opens our second period whose first phase (1939-45) dominated by World War II, 
illustrates alternative macroeconomic conditions: from recession and price deflation 
(1940-41) to recession and high inflation (1942-44). An important ingredient of the
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inflationary juncture was the collapse of imports induced by the international conflict: the 
reduction of imports precipitated a budget deficit and hastened a substantial accumulation 
of international reserves. All the time authorities sustained a fixed-nominal exchange rate 
in force since 1935. Fiscal decisions adopted to finance the budget, including 'forced' 
allocations of public bonds, made part of drastic measures of monetary sterilization.
As revealed in graph 2 the slowdown of economic activity during 1940-43 led to the 
lowest growth rates of the economy with respect to the historical trend along the period 
of study. It was during World War U that a clear break arose between previous growth 
rates above the trend and a long period of growth rates below the trend which would last 
until the beginning of the 1970s.
A new cycle of accelerated imports and falling reserves followed the end of the War. The 
burst of imports was particularly hurried by wartime-repressed imports of intermediate 
and capital goods required by the growing manufacturing sector. The sharp decline in 
international reserves led to successive devaluations of the nominal exchange rate in 
1949 and 1951. The succession of alternative and extreme economic circumstances 
during the 1940s is reflected in the ample oscillations of the growth rate of GDP as 
illustrated in Graph 3. However, as the graph suggests, quick oscillations of the growth 
rate of the economy are not an exclusive feature of the 1940s. On a more moderate scale 
the experience is reiterated in the late 1950s and during the 1970s and early 1980s.
A new phase of prosperity was fuelled by a price coffee bonanza which dominated 
during the first half of the 1950s. Booming imports of capital goods buttressed the 
industrialization process, and enlarged fiscal revenues allowed an unprecedented 
expansion of government expenditures. When the boom came to a halt the economy 
found itself dealing with a sharp fall of coffee prices, a trade balance deficit, and piling 
up import-payment arrears. ^
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The end of the external bonanza of the mid-1950s marked the beginning of a recessive 
phase which lasted until 1967. These were years of "external strangulation" dominated by 
a chronic shortage of foreign exchange. A diversity of trade and exchange rates policies 
orientated to restablish external balance were frequent in this period. Important 
developments in import-competing industries were supplemented by a resolute policy of 
export promotion. As for exchange rate changes a maxidevaluation in 1957 put the 
exchange rate back on its historical trend of real devaluation; though other nominal 
adjustments of the exchange rate were carried out in the early 1960s, they did not have a 
comparable lasting effect. Internally, an expansionary fiscal policy financed with 
increased internal and external debt took place in the early 1960s. This expansionary
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movement was stimulated by the optimistic prospects of the Alliance of Progress -a pact 
of economic cooperation signed in 1961 between the United States and its Latin 
American allies-. International creditors and observers presented Colombia as the 
"showcase of the Alliance of Progress". However, recurrent difficulties to achieve 
external balance rapidly frustrated the expansionary impetus.
i .  From rapid growth in the 1960s to stagnation and crisis in the 1980s.
Our third period starts with a phase of high rates of economic growth -1968-73- (Graph 
3), stimulated by a buoyant international economy and a set of policies orientated to 
increase external competitiveness. A crawling-peg exchange rate arrangement, foreign 
exchange controls and a regulated access to external credit constituted the framework 
enacted at that time, which practically unmodified would last until 1991. Nontraditional 
exports were stimulated, and the purchasing power of exports recovered their historical 
growth trend for the first time after the downswing of coffee prices in 1956. Yet, these 
encouraging results fell too short to overcome reiterated trade-balance deficits. It was an 
important inflow of foreign credit of official origen which financed the external 
disequilibrium, and provided part of the funds which fed one of the most notable 
expansions of public expenditure in the post-War period.
The expansionary years came to an end in the mid-1970s on the brink of an international 
recession. Additionally, the inflation rates reached heights (23.6% in 1973-75 compared 
with 7% in 1968-70) which although with ephemeral precedents in the past, for the first 
time exhibited symptoms of persistence at high levels. Policies to combat against 
inflation and to strengthen the diversification and promotion of exports were designed in 
the mid-1970s. A fiscal reform destined to eliminate subsidies and invigorate tax 
revenues, and measures of financial liberalization were introduced to restore internal 
stability. And an acceleration of the rate of the crawl was chosen to improve external 
competitiveness.
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An emphatic demonstration of the effects of coffee-price cycles on the economy was 
lived through during the years 1976-81: an unanticipated and relatively prolonged boom 
of the international quotations (1976-78) followed by a sharp decline (1979-81). The set 
of policies orientated to increase the competitiveness of the economy broke down. As the 
coffee bonanza went on, international reserves built up to unprecedented levels, the 
monetary base expanded at higher rates and the rate of inflation reached its second 
highest peak in the whole series. Authorities slowed down the devaluation rate of the 
crawling peg, then allowing the real exchange rate to appreciate with the consequent loss 
of competitiveness in the non-coffee tradables sector. In the late 1970s the economy 
found itself with a high stock of international reserves and a low stock of net external 
debt: in fact, by 1980 exports tripled net external debt. Other results were less 
satisfactory. Import-competing industries stagnated and a backward movement affected 
the process of export diversification. Additionally, the movement towards financial 
liberalization was partially reversed as authorities sought to reduce inflationary pressures 
by controlling bank lending.
The prospects of the economy worsened in the early 1980s, as seen in the downswing of 
growth rates with respect to the historical trend (Graph 2), or in the relative low growth 
rates which resembled those of the early 1940s (Graph 3). Apart from the negative 
impacts of the international economy -price shocks of 1973-74 and 1979-80 and the 
industrialized countries' policy responses- which were by their nature global, domestic 
policies could have increased the vulnerability of the economy. The following three 
phases can be observed in the first half of the 1980s:
First, the collapse of coffee prices and the outbreak of the worst recorded trade balance 
deficit. In spite of these facts the devaluation rate of the crawling peg was insufficient to 
avoid a real appreciation of the exchange rate. The eroding effect of the trade deficit on 
the stock of international reserves was disguised by a substantial increase of external 
debt, and the internal counterpart of this enlarged external debt was an increased
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government expenditure. Further, governments financed a considerable portion of the 
broadened spending with proceeds obtained from the financial investment of 
international reserves. There was also a change of attitude regarding the access of the 
private sector to foreign credit; while in the late 1970s it was controlled, in the early 
1980s private firms were allowed to obtain fresh funds in the buoyant international 
market. This change of attitude was to complicate matters in the immediate future. 
Finally, the central government and public enterprises intensively turned to the banks 
during the climax of foreign bank lending (1978-82). As a result, three quarters of the 
increased indebtedness of the economy during these years were contracted with 
commercial banks.
The second phase coincides with the aftermath of the Mexican crisis in 1982. Foreign- 
bank loans to private firms and domestic commercial banks virtually dried up. The 
external disequilibrium could no longer be veiled by borrowing and international 
reserves started falling. At the same time the negative impact of the debt crisis on 
neighboring economies -important export places- added up to the fragile trade balance 
situation.
The third phase is distinguished by drastic processes of external and internal adjustment. 
External adjustment was pursued by a combination of commercial policies and 
devaluation. A mixture of import quotas and export subsidies added to an existent and 
tight belt of exchange controls. A strong acceleration of the rate of the crawl rapidly 
rendered a real exchange rate similar to that reached in 1975 when the economy achieved 
its highest recorded level of external competitiveness. Internal adjustment was tried for 
by decreasing government expenditures, namely cutbacks in public investment and real 
reductions of wages in the public sector; additionally, ambitious tax reforms were 
implemented to broaden the tax base and increase budget revenues. While the internal 
adjustment could render the expected results, governments used massively but 
temporarily the expedient of internal public debt: bond issues were allocated in open
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market, but given the weakened financial position of the Treasury, the Central Bank 
ended up redeeming a significant amount of issues.
A crucieil difference between the financial crisis of the 1930s and its replica of the 1980s 
was the continuity of debt service payments. Despite the drying-up of foreign 
commercial bank loans the country managed to honour its external commitments along 
the decade. Important ingredients of this process were a substantial increase of loans 
from official sources and a notable contribution of foreign direct investment during the 
early 1980s. Contrasting with a common experience in the continent, debt restructurings 
were not a fact in the relationship with commercial banks. Yet, new medium- and long 
term loans approved by these banks in the second half of the 1980s were not an exercise 
of "voluntary lending"; they required prolonged negotiations frequently involving 
political pressures on the banks. As in the 1940s, the U.S. government played a 
"persuasive" role; in the recent experience, pressures from the IMF and multilateral and 
bilateral institutions influenced the outcome of negotiations.
In conclusion, we have offered the image of an economy which has been substantially 
affected by the fate of its external sector. Disturbances in the international economy have 
involved both the current and the capital account, and a good deal of policies applied 
during our period of study were conceived to face those shocks. This brings us to a 
description of shocks arising in the goods and in the capital market, as well as to a 
general perspective of policies adopted to maintain external balance.
B. External sector.
Three issues are discussed in this section. The first describes export shocks summarized 
by the cycles of the purchasing power of exports (PPE), and import shocks. The second 
shows how the access of Colombia to foreign lending has been largely determined by 
ample and sporadic waves of private funds (late 1920s and late 1970s); when private
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lenders have retreated external financing has depended on official organizations and 
scattered initiatives of foreign direct investment. The third outlines the evolution of 
exchange rate arrangements designed to cope with external instability.
1. Shocks originating in the goods market.
A description of shocks in the goods market is offered by the evolution of the terms of 
trade (TOT) or (PPE). This last measure which includes TOT and also real export effects 
is shown in Graph 4. Broadly speaking the three major positive deviations from trend in 
the late 1920s early 1950s and late 1970s correspond to price-coffee bonanzas; and the 
major negative deviations from trend coincide with World War II and the external 
strangulation period which covered part of the 1950s and 1960s.^
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Shocks are not limited to export markets. They can also appear in the import market. In 
the Colombian case import shocks have affected not only the current account, but have
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had significant fiscal effects. Although fiscal dependence on import tariffs has declined 
over time, from about 65% of fiscal revenues in 1925 to 40% in 1950, and to 25% in the 
mid-1980s, negative changes in imports have always adversely affected government 
finances. A limited availability of foreign exchange derived from adverse export shocks 
(a fall in PPE), or constraints on foreign borrowing (loss of access of the country to 
external financing including foreign bank trade credits) can be quoted between the causes 
of import downswings. Also supply shortfalls (export restrictions abroad) should be 
mentioned. The most clear, although extreme case of export rationing abroad was lived 
through during World War II, when the collapse of imports contributed to one of the 
major fiscal crises during the period of study. Finally, it has to be noted that imports are 
affected by government policies (exchange rate and/or commercial policies) concerning 
external balance.^
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Graph 5 shows the time path of import cycles which will be particularly useful in our 
empirical analysis of Part III. As for its dynamic behaviour, it can be shown that the 
series is trend stationary. ^  In conclusion, we have called the attention to two facts. First, 
the cycles of the PPE resulting from external shocks transmitted through the goods 
market. Second, the crucial importance of custom duties in government revenues, and 
therefore, the fiscal effects of import shocks.
2. Shocks arising from the capital market
The access of Colombia to international financing can be divided in three periods. First, 
the interwar period in which long-term public and private bonds were placed in financial 
centres such as New York and London. The suppliers of funds were mainly individual 
investors. This extraordinary financing was suddenly interrupted after the 1929 crash. 
Second, the postwar period up to 1970 when long term-funds were provided by official 
institutions. Third, the revival of international private financing through commercial 
bank loans (medium- and short-term) since the early 1970s up to the early 1980s, but 
heavily concentrated on the years 1979-82. During these three periods lending operations 
were supplemented by foreign direct investment and usual suppliers' credits.
Net external financing can be calculated by using the equation for changes in 
international reserves:
dIR=TB+dF'-r'F '=TB+f'
Then, f=dIR-TB, where dF is the annual flow of external financing and r' the external 
interest rate. TB is the trade balance. Note that dF includes financing to the public and 
the private sectors, and also foreign direct investment.^
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Trend and cycles of f  are depicted in Graph 6, where exports have been used as a scale 
variable. It can be statistically shown that the series follows a trend stationary process. 
Actual values give the annual ratio of the net flow of external financing to the flow of 
exports. Two main characteristics are observed. First, the extremes of the series are 
dominated by notable positive cycles which correspond to the access of the country to the 
boom of private-long-term funds in the 1920s and to the boom of commercial bank funds 
in the late 1970s. These events were followed by sharp cutbacks of external financing; 
however, the negative cycle in the 1980s was much less deep and prolonged than it was 
in the 1930s. Though in both cases foreign direct investment was a factor of recovery, 
substantial official (multilateral and bilateral) lending between 1982 and 1985 restored 
the external financing after the collapse of commercial- bank lending. The second 
characteristic of the series is the nearly year-to-year oscillations of f  around trend since 
the early 1950s to the late 1970s coinciding with the period in which official institutions 
were the dominant source of foreign credit. The series suggests a stop-go behavior of the 
net funds provided by developmental organizations and foreign investorsi combined.
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In conclusion, our stylized fact at this point is that the major experiences of access of 
Colombia to external financing during the period of study have coincided with the major 
cycles of foreign private lending this century. Once these cycles have come to an end, the 
access to external lending has been limited to concessional finance made available by 
official development institutions.
3. Exchange rate policies and other adjustment measures.
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This brief subsection offers general information about exchange rate policies during the 
period of study. Four phases dominate the evolution of the real exchange rate. Different 
arrangements appear in the background of its historical performance. The gold exchange 
standard ruled foreign exchange transactions after 1923 when important institutional 
reforms took place. This exchange rate arrangement was in force during the boom of the 
late 1920s and survived the international financial crisis of 1929-30. Colombia was one 
of the last countries who abandoned the gold standard since convertibility was suspended 
only after the devaluation of the pound sterling in late 1931.
The breakdown of the gold standard was followed by a new phase in which a managed 
float arrangement (1931-36) was replaced by a fixed exchange rate system which lasted 
until 1948. While the managed float period was characterized by a process of strong real 
depreciation of the national currency, the fixed exchange rate period was dominated by a 
tendency to overvaluation of the exchange rate particularly since the outbreak of World 
War II.
Attempts to correct for overvaluation of the exchange rate characterized a new phase 
between the late 1940s and early 1950s, but it was not until a single maxidevaluation was 
performed in 1957 that the real exchange rate reached again its historical trend. These 
adjustments happened in a context in which different exchange rates for different 
transactions were applied, and the exchange controls introduced after the collapse of the 
gold standard were preserved.
The last phase starts in 1967 with the adoption of a crawling-peg exchange rate, the 
reinforcement of controls on international capital flows, and the tendency to a unique 
exchange rate. A gradual real devaluation of the peg which clearly outstripped the 
historical trend dominated during most of the 1970s, before the coffee bonanza in the 
second half of the decade induced policy rectifications. These changes led authorities to 
slow down the rate of devaluation of the crawling peg, which eventually implied a
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substantial overvaluation of the real exchange rate (in 1981 the real exchange rate was 
25% overvalued in terms of the level of competitiveness achieved in 1975, the highest 
one achieved in our study period). Correction of misaligned exchange rates was one of 
the policy priorities after the 1982 external crisis, and that adjustment was fulfilled by 
means of a strong acceleration of the rate of the crawl.
An important observation can be added to this description. The exchange rate has been 
only one within a set of instruments designed to preserve external stability. Other 
instruments have had considerable importance in policy agendas. An outstanding 
example is given by exchange controls created for the first time in 1931 after the 
announcement of suspension of convertibility of the pound sterling. Since then, 
continuously, though with differing severity, controls were applied to the regulation of 
the capital account during the period of study. Other instruments have been closely 
related to the regulation of the current account, such as quantitative import controls. In 
practice, authorities have not relied on one single instrument but on a mixture of them. A 
publicized argument for not depending only on the exchange rate has been that the high 
instability of world coffee prices would be transmitted to the economy straightaway 
through the exchange rate (Diaz-Alejandro, 1976).
C. Fiscal Sector
Three sources of stylized facts are considered here. First, we describe the evolution of 
government expenditures, government revenues and budget deficits as a proportion of the 
size of the economy; we call the attention to the different shape of the series during the 
post-War period in comparison with 1925-45. Second, we look in turn to the evolution of 
external and internal public debt; in the former case, we describe the evolution of the 
debt-export ratio, and in the latter, the cycles of internal public debt. We finish with a 
description of the path and composition of real public debt. Third, we examine the series 
of expenditures, revenues and debt, together, to see whether the fiscal accountancy
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suggests that governments followed sustainable financial policies during the period of 
study; we close this discussion by exploring to which extent the series of government 
revenues as a proportion of GDP (the average tax rate), seems to be correlated with the 
inflation rate series as predicted by the equilibrium approach to public finance.
1. Central government expenditures.
Two main periods can be distinguished in the evolution of real government expenditures 
-Graph 7-.^^ From the mid-1920s through 1950 the importance of government spending 
declined relatively to the size of the economy. The magnitude of the fiscal adjustment 
that followed the boom in the 1920s is illustrated by a cutback of expenditures from 
8.5% to 4.5% of GDP between 1928 and 1935; there was one outstanding interruption in 
1933 when authorities deliberately increased expenditures to estimulate recovery and 
finance a temporary border conflict with Peru. The ratio went up during the first half of 
World War II to be followed by a drastic adjustment during the second half of the 
conflict. In averages, government expenditures represented 7% of GDP in the late 1920s, 
and somewhat less, 5.5% in the "optimistic" five years that followed the end of the War.
A rather different image emerges from 1950 through the end of our series. The average 
ratio of government spending to GDP grows over time, and the shape of the series 
suggests that periods of rapid increasing government spending are followed by shorter 
periods of retrenchment. There is nearly a pattern every decade with expansionary waves 
of 5-6 years followed by contractionary movements of 2-3 years.
197
GRAPH?
G O V E I ^ l S r i y i E l S r T  E X I E ^ E n s r r D I I I T T U R E S
% SH A R E  O E GE5E1 2
1  -l
1 o
9
a
V
6
5
4
2 5  3 0 3 5  4 0  4 5 5 0 5 5  6 0 6  5 7 0  7  5 a O a  5
EERXOD 1 9 2 5 —T 9 a 5
□ ANNUAL % O E ODE
NOTES
Government expenditures net of interest debt repayments.
SOURCES
Informe del Contralor
A supplementary view is offered by the cycles of government spending around their 
trend -Graph 8-. The series of real government expenditures (in logarithms) can 
statistically be described as trend stationary, and will be used in our econometric 
estimations in Part lU.l^ As seen, relative to the trend, the positive cycle of the late 20s 
has no parallel in more recent history. The four positive cycles after 1950 happened 
under different contexts: the two intermediate cycles corresponded to expansionary 
periods in which government projects were widely supported by the availability of 
concessional external funding. At the two extremes, the positive cycles emerged as a 
result of countercyclical policies implemented at the end of the coffee bonanzas of the 
early 1950s and mid-1970s.
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2. Central government revenues and primary budget deficit.
There is a similar shape between Graph 7 above and Graph 9 for the average tax rate 
below, particularly during the period before 1950.
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Discrepancies between graphs 7 and 9 are more obvious in recent decades such as in the 
early 1960s and 1980s when increasing ratios of government expenditures to GDP 
coincided with declining ratios of government revenues to GDP. These experiences differ 
from those of the 1950s and late 1960s when expenditure expansions were accompanied 
by revenue expansions, both as a proportion of GDP.
The ratio of government revenues to GDP is taken as the average tax rate. Though with 
ample oscillations, the average tax rate appears to have behaved in a procyclical way:
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going down during recessionary periods such as 1929-34,1956-66 and 1979-81; and 
going up in the first decade of the postwar period, and during the dynamic growth years 
between 1966 and 1973. A frequent reference to the trajectory of the average tax rate will 
be made in Part III, Section H.
The time paths of government revenues and expenditures are finally reflected in the 
evolution of the primary budget deficit -Graph 10-. A stop-go sequence of fiscal deficits 
characterizes the Colombian experience since 1950. Deficits in the early 1960s and 1980s 
were practically shaped by the evolution of government expenditures. The 1980s episode 
is singular since governments financed most of the increased spending with financial 
proceeds from the investment and management of international reserves accumulated 
during the coffee bonanza of the late 1970s. If these proceeds are treated as revenues in 
the same way as tax receipts the budget deficit of the early 1980s is replaced by an 
average surplus of about 1.3% of GDP between 1977 and 1985.
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a. External debt
The public debt has been predominant in the composition of the total external debt Some 
outstanding dates are illustrative. By the end of the U.S. lending boom in 1928, the 
percentage share was 71%. In 1950, when all the renegotiations of the external debt 
which had been defaulted in the 1930s were concluded, the share was 84%. These high 
figures declined during the 1960s and 1970s when the private sector gained a major 
portion of external credit. In fact, by 1970, when the access of the country to 
concessional sources of foreign lending was flourishing, the share of the public sector 
was 76%, and when the Latin American debt problem went off in 1982, the participation
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of public indebtedness had fallen to 65%. In the following years the nominal external 
debt of the private sector (in US dollars) ceased to grow, while the public debt carried on 
rising; as a result, by 1985, last year of our series, the share of the public sector in the 
total external debt was 75%. With this perspective, our descriptions will concentrate on 
the external public debt.
Graph 11 shows the path of external public debt weighted by exports, D/X. The series is 
broken down according to the two main public debtors: the central government, and the 
rest of the public sector. The rest of the public sector is formed by public administrations 
different from the central government such as provincial authorities (departments) and 
local authorities (municipalities), and also by public enterprises. The difference between 
the two lines in the graph represents the relative importance of the rest of the public 
sector indebtedness. Three peaks dominate the series in 1933,1971, and 1985 (last year 
of the series).
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The vertical upsurge of D/X during the 1925-33 period is illustrated by the fact that in 
1925 less than 5 months of exports were required to pay off the whole public debt while 
in 1933 that requirement amounted to 30 months. Two different subperiods have to be 
noted, however. Between 1925 and 1928 public debt grew much more rapidly than 
exports, and the D/X ratio increased from 0.35 to 1.21. It has to be seen that this 
subperiod coincided with the U.S. private lending boom which expired by 1928. During 
the next five years the D/X ratio continuously increased, reaching the height of 2.52 in 
spite of the paralysis of foreign lending. This evolution is explained by a 55% collapse of 
exports, which as we will see in Part IV, Section I, was precipitated by the downturn of
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commodity prices during the great depression. In conclusion, no more than 40% of the 
substantial increase of the D/X ratio during the 1925-33 period can be ascribed to actual 
indebtedness of the public sector. This upshot is important to understand how standard 
measures of creditworthiness (as D/X) were adversely affected by the international 
downfall of commodity prices.
The steep increase of the D/X ratio during 1925-33 was entirely reversed during the 
following years until the end of World War II. Some facts are to be noted. First, since the 
access to long-term lending had been suspended since 1928, the D/X fall is mainly 
explained by increased exports. Second, although an official moratoria of debt 
repayments was gradually adopted in 1932-33, the central government and other public 
entities made partial buybacks of external debt. A detailed exposition of this process is 
offered in Part IV, Section III.
The first fifteen years after the end of World War II seem to reflect a long interlude 
between episodes of accelerated external public indebtedness. But in fact, the nominal 
stocks of debt which had been declining since 1931 started growing again in 1948. Two 
phases can be distinguished in the "pause" period 1947-60. A first one between 1947 and 
1953 when a notable increase of 70% in the nominal stock of external public debt 
resulted inferior to an upturn of exports of more than 100%. This upsurge of exports 
resulted from the coffee bonanza of the early 1950s. Conversely, the second phase was 
characterized by a minimum change in the nominal debt (3%) and a slightly negative 
growth of exports. The final effect of these facts was that along the "interlude" period no 
more than 4 months of exports were required to pay off the total amount of external 
public debt.l^
Contrary to the experience of the 1920s, the sharp increase of external indebtedness 
during the 1960s was financed by official institutions, mainly the International 
Development Agency (IDA), the Interamerican Development Bank (IDB), and the World
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Bank. At its height in 1971, central government indebtedness represented one year of 
exports, a burden just inferior to that experienced in the critical years 1932-33; the total 
indebtedness of the public sector amounted to over two years of exports, a burden similar 
to that of the years 1930-33. These debt burdens fell by 50% between 1971 and 1978, 
principally due to the rapid increase of exports: while the nominal stock of public debt 
doubled during these years, the nominal flow of exports multiplied by 4. As a matter of 
fact, the nominal increase of public debt between 1971 and 1978 exceeded that of the 
period 1960-71 of "high indebtedness". Therefore, the path of exports made a crucial 
difference for the increasing external debt burden in the 1960s followed by its sharp 
decline in the 1970s.
An important change in the sources of external funds for the public sector took place 
during the 1970s. Foreign commercial banks became increasingly important while 
official credits lacked the dynamism of the 1960s. Coinciding with the international 
boom of private commercial bank loans during the years 1978-82, 68% of the new 
external public indebtedness of Colombia was disbursed by those creditors. One of the 
similarities of this process with the experience of the 1920s was the private character of 
the lenders, though in contrast with that precedent, in recent times they were typified by 
bank syndicates instead of atomized investors, and loans were extended on a medium-, 
short-term basis rather than on a long-term basis. Another contrast is that, as commented 
above, although the 1982 crisis interrupted the "voluntary" lending of commercial banks 
to the public sector, the official lending sustained the curve of increasing external 
indebtedness. As a result, in the last year of the series the ratio of external public debt to 
exports outstripped the high coefficients reached at the time of the great depression.
In conclusion, we highlight the following facts: First, the historical predominance of 
public indebtedness in the composition of the external debt of Colombia during the 
period of study. Second, the burden of the external public debt measured according to the 
D/X ratio has depended not only on the magnitude of public indebtedness (the
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numerator) but importantly on the fate of exports in commodity markets. Consequently, 
adverse shocks on exports (such as in the early 1930s and 1960s) have negatively 
affected creditworthiness.
b. Internal debt
i) Trend and cvcles
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Graph 12 displays the cycles of internal public debt between 1925 and 1985. On 
statistical grounds it can be shown that the series is stationary. The historical growth 
rate of this series is equal to 4.5% per year and coincides with that of the economy. Four
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expansionary episodes are worthnoting: the 1932-33 extraordinary increase in internal 
debt after the negative impacts of the great depression on the external sector; the 
substantial enlargement of internal debt during World War II after the collapse of import 
duties and the implementation of policies orientated to smooth out adverse effects of the 
war on the economy; the early 1960s increase in government liabilities destined to 
finance central bank losses in the foreign exchange market, and also government 
programs in connection with national priorities and international objectives of the 
Alliance of Progress; and finally, the upsurge of internal indebtedness after the external 
shocks of the early 1980s, particularly the near extinction of commercial foreign lending 
to the country. These facts suggest a connection between severe external crises and 
exceptionally large internal debt upswings.
Some important economic and institutional characteristics have affected the evolution of 
internal public debt. The internal market for government bonds has been small, and the 
access of the government to central bank loans restricted by regulations whose severity 
has varied over time. How can then internal public debt have had any meaningful role in 
the Colombia's experience? How could the positive cycles of internal debt described in 
the previous paragraph have been financed? The main sources of financing have been ad- 
hoc central bank loans to the government whose extraordinary magnitude brought about 
internal debt growth rates above the historical trend, after periods of very low growth 
rates as in the early 1930s and early 1980s (Graph 12).
The extraordinary loans of the central bank to the government are reflected in the 
composition of internal public debt. While during the 1930s those loans represented 
about 30% of the nominal stock of internal debt, in the 1983-85 period they amounted to 
70%. The rest of the time during our period of study its importance was none or 
negligible, apart from temporary increases in the mid-1950s and first half of the 1970s.
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The central bank's credit to the government is not limited to the extraordinary loans just 
mentioned. The central bank is the "bank of the government", and therefore the relevant 
account which summarizes the financial relationship between the Treasury and the bank 
is the ngt credit to the government. This account is debited whenever loans and other 
lending operations to the government are made, and is credited as a result of Treasury 
deposits in the bank. 20 The concept of net credit allows us to examine the importance of 
government financing in the balancesheet of the central bank (GL in Table 2 of Part I, 
Section in). It also allows us to describe the relative weight of central bank credit in the 
domestic sources of government financing different from open market sales of bonds. 
Regarding the importance of GL in the central bank balancesheet. Graph 13 shows the 
percentage share of GL and net international reserves (Z in Table 2 of Part I, Section in) 
in the monetary base, respectively.
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The message conveyed by these graphs is the countercyclical behaviour of the central 
bank net credit to the government. Whenever the share of international reserves in the 
monetary base increases (decreases), the share of set credit to the government falls 
(raises). The net credit to the government appears to be neutralizing -partially at least- the 
monetary effects of the balance of payments.
As for the share of central bank net credit in domestic sources of government financing 
different from bond sales to the public, we use the concept of seigniorage. We do not 
apply the conventional definition which considers the changes in the monetary base as a 
proportion of GDP, as applied, for instance, in Fischer (1982). We consider more
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appropriate for our own purposes an alternative definition according to which 
seigniorage (S) is equal to the annual changes in net credit of the central bank to the 
government. These resources can be supplemented by the proceeds obtained by the 
government, if any, from the investment of international reserves. This sort of definition 
is favoured in recent literature, particularly in Drazen (1985,1988) and Spaventa (1988). 
By considering seigniorage and tax revenues as a whole, the path of seigniorage over 
time can be depicted in relation to this total, as in Graph 14. As expected, seigniorage is 
mostly important in the 1930s, 1960s, and 1980s. Seigniorage is particularly meaningful 
in the 1980s, first due to unprecedented returns on international reserves in 1979-83, and 
second, due to substantial enlargements of nst credit of the central bank to the 
government in 1982-85.
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The central fact that we want to emphasize at this point is how the positive cycles of 
internal public debt are created in response to severely critical periods of the external 
sector and internal depression. When it has been required, the extraordinary increases of 
internal debt have been financed by ad-hoc loans of the central bank to the government.
ii) The shock absorber role of the internal public debt.
We next try to document the shock absorber role of the internal public debt in a highly 
stylized way, based on the similarities of the Colombian experience both in the 1930s and 
1980s, but minimizing references to specific details.
Consider simultaneous external shocks arising in both the goods and the capital markets. 
The severity of these shocks leads to paralysis in export sectors and deep recession in 
home markets. In the financial sector, the central bank experiences substantial losses of 
foreign reserves with the consequent drain on the money supply. As for commercial 
banks, both sides of the balancesheet are adversely affected: the suspension of foreign 
financing by international banks and the reduction of the money supply create strains on 
the liabilities' side, while because of the recession (and deflation as in the early 1930s) 
the quality of assets is critically damaged by a high proportion of bad loans. An 
economy-wide debtors' problem arises and there are symptoms that the public is losing 
confidence in the stability of the banking system.
How do authorities react to these developments? At the very beginning they express their 
conviction that the external problem is a temporary one, and therefore there is no 
justification for changes in policy. As the external position of the country deteriorates
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authorities adopt contractionary measures on public spending (a draconian adjustment in 
the 1930s) to alleviate pressures on the balance of payments; it is understood that this is 
the best contribution of the government to the stability of the exchange regime (gold 
standard in the early 1930s and a fixed real exchange rate in the early 1980s). Regarding 
the external debt, authorities consider that the reduction or suspension of foreign lending 
being a temporary phenomenon, the best way of regaining access to international credit is 
to honor thoroughly the debt service, regardless of unilateral suspensions of debt service 
adopted by other debtors. In a nutshell, authorities judge that fiscal austherity, exchange 
rate stability and full repayment of the external debt service contribute to stabilize the 
economy and guarantee the resurgence of external lending to the country.
It is the rapid depletion of international reserves, the proximity of collapse of the banking 
system and extraordinary developments in foreign capital markets (particularly in the 
1930s with the abandonment of the gold standard by Great Britain [1931], and the 
devaluation of the U.S. dollar [1933]) which lead authorities to change policies. Those 
changes initially contemplate the adoption (as in 1931) or reinforcement (as in 1983) of 
exchange controls and commercial policies to stop the drain on foreign reserves long 
before more drastic measures are imposed (in the 1930s these strong measures meant 
suspension of the gold standard and adoption of a managed-float-exchange-rate regime, 
and partial default on the external debt service. In the 1980s they only meant substantial 
acceleration of the rate of depreciation of the crawling peg to correct an overvalued 
exchange rate).
Where is internal public debt in this story? In spite of the government expenditure 
retrenchment a substantial budget deficit appears. It is the endogenous result of the 
adverse external shock originated in the export market (in particular the collapse of 
coffee prices after periods of bonanza in the late 1920s and late 1970s) and the 
subsequent slowdown of economic activity. By then, getting fresh external funds for 
fiscal purposes is a remote possibility, and the banking system finds it extremely difficult
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to finance imports, an important (crucial in the early 1930s) source of tax revenues. Up 
to this point the stock of internal public debt has been increased by selling bonds to the 
public, and also to the central bank, within strict regulations which limit the loans to the 
government to a certain proportion of the capital of the institution.
The role of internal public debt is not limited to provide automatic stabilization, 
however. Even this function is substantially constrained by a relatively small market for 
public bonds (in the early 1930s severely affected by lost of confidence in financial 
markets), and the aforementioned restricted access to central bank loans. At some point 
authorities find themselves with a badly depressed domestic economy (and substantial 
deflation in the early 1930s), international reserves nearly exhausted, vital export sectors 
going bankrupt, the banking system facing insolvency rather than illiquidity, the treasury 
accumulating a backlog of immediate obligations, and no hope of getting funding abroad. 
After adopting the new exchange and foreign debt policies mentioned above, authorities 
turn to policies of domestic recovery (reflation in the 1930s), rescue of the banking 
system and support of crucial economic sectors (coffee growers in the 1930s).
Authorities obtain from Congress the legal authorization for extraordinary loans of the 
central bank to the government, with limited amounts, temporary character and specific 
purposes (recapitalization of banks, public works and others. In the 1930s a war with a 
neighbouring country demanded additional loans). This is the extraordinary and 
temporary expedient by which internal public debt absorbs part of the negative effects of 
the external shocks on the economy.
What is coming next? Authorities embark in a process of fiscal reform substantially 
orientated to strengthen tax revenues (in the 1930s to consolidate direct taxation and 
reduce the fiscal dependence from custom duties, and in the 1980s to simplify existing 
systems and reinforce the VAT). Also authorities seek to accommodate to the new 
situation in foreign capital markets (sporadic short-term loans from subsidiaries of
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foreign companies in Colombia during the 1930s, and only refinancing loans, instead of 
fresh credits, between 1983 and 1990).
How do the extraordinary loans affect the maturity structure of the internal public debt? 
Although originally designed as short- or medium-term operations, the experience shows 
that the repayment of those loans is deferred well into the future (most of the 
extraordinary loans of 1932-34 due to be amortized by 1940 were actually redeemed in 
the early 1970s. Similarly, the extraordinary loans of 1983-1984 which were supposed to 
be repayed in the following two years were transformed into a 30-year loan). In other 
words, the tax burden of the shock absorbing increases in the internal public debt is 
largely translated to future generations of tax payers.
4. The path and composition of central government debt.
So far we have described the path of the external public debt as well as the cycles of 
internal debt, but have not reported the relative composition of total public debt of the 
central government between their external and internal components. This is what we do 
in Graph 15, where the real external debt is the area between the graphs for the real total 
debt and for the real internal debt. The series have been updated to 1993 although our 
period of study ends in 1985. Apart from reasons mentioned in the next subsection, we 
preferred to bring up to date the series not to leave the reader with the impression that the 
real debt persisted increasing without bound after 1985; as seen in the graph, a "ceiling" 
was achieved in the second half of the 1980s.
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Three main periods can be distinguished in the evolution of the real total debt. First, the 
interwar period during which three phases alternate. At the beginning of the series (1925) 
the internal debt represented 45% of the total, but due to the extraordinary access to the 
US lending during 1926-28, that figure declined to 16% by 1928. With the collapse of 
foreign lending, the share of internal debt started growing since 1930, and after the 
reflationary policies of 1932-33 (fully detailed in Part IV, Section II) reached the figure 
of 46%. Due to stabilization policies during World War II the share of internal debt rose 
to 60%, and to 72% in the late 1940s, this time due to the rapid decline of the 
outstanding external debt which followed the renegotiations carried out during the 
decade.
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The second period covers from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s. During the second half 
of the 1950s the external debt started growing continuously and the participation of the 
internal debt declined. In 1962 the internal debt "jumped" (the real stock tripled) during a 
severe external crisis, and its share was again close to 70%. Since 1962 up to 1974 the 
internal debt grew only to sustain a relatively constant real stock, but its share declined to 
35%; during the same period the real stock of external debt quadrupled.
The last period covers from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s. For some years (1975- 
1978), both the external and the internal debt declined, but the latter at a very much 
greater pace; by 1981 the external debt was growing again and the share of the internal 
debt reached its lowest figure in the series: 12%. A new phase started in 1982: the 
internal debt "jumped", again coinciding with a new external sector crisis which involved 
not only the current but the capital account. Repeating j an experience : similar to that of the 
early 1930s, the internal debt increased reaching a share of 45% by 1985. Graph 15 is 
eloquent about the rapid recovery of external debt since 1984. In fact, the real stock of 
external debt doubled between 1984 and 1990. In the meantime, the real stock of internal 
debt continuously declined since 1986, and its share was only 25% by 1990. Finally, the 
reaction of internal debt at the end of the series corresponds to a deliberate substitution of 
internal for external debt destined to reduce an unintended overaccumulation of 
international reserves.
An important factor which affects the composition of the public debt in national currency 
is the depreciation of the exchange rate, since the external debt is contracted in foreign 
currencies. Some examples can be mentioned regarding important changes in the share of 
external debt as revealed in Graph 15. As for the period 1962-1973 during which the 
share of the external debt increased from 32% to 67%, only 23% of the increment in the 
nominal stock of external debt (in Pesos) can be ascribed to changes in the stock (in US 
dollars), 18% to variations in the exchange rate, and 58% to a mixed effect of changes in 
both the dollar stock of debt and the exchange rate. Also during the 1982-1986 period.
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during which the real external debt doubled, only 11% of the change in the nominal stock 
can be explained by the increase in the stock (in US dollars), 63% by depreciations of the 
exchange rate, and 26% by a combined effect of both variables.
These descriptions corroborate our previous observations that the internal debt tended to 
move in the opposite direction of the external debt. It has also been established that 
important changes in the composition of total debt in national currency, in favour of the 
external component, are largely explained by debt-revaluation effects of exchange rate 
changes.
5. The intertemporal government budget constraint.
Having observed the evolution of government expenditures, government revenues and 
public debt, is there any way in which we can use the government accountancy to discuss 
the "internal consistency" of fiscal expenditures, revenues and indebtedness over time? 
The accounting framework suggests that such an assessment can be carried out with 
reference to the present value government budget constraint. Put in the context of the 
rational- actor framework, our question amounts to ask whether governments have 
followed sustainable financial policies in the long run.
As seen in Part I, Section I, sustainability has been a recurrent topic in public debt 
theorizing. The solvency of a nation was the focus of attention in Domar (1950) 
application of Harrod-Domar models to foreign debt issues, and the common thread in 
analyses of Latin American and other international borrowers written for the World Bank 
in the 1960s (Avramovic and Gulhati, 1958,1960; Avramovic et al. 1964). This 
literature revived during the debt crises of the 1980s (general illustrations are provided in 
Cline [1983], Kharas [1984], and Simonsen [1985]). We do not discuss here the national 
solvency, but the solvency of the central government, and apply an approach which is
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closer to the representative-agent models discussed in Part I, Sections III and VI, than to 
the Harrod-Domar models.
The budget constraint faced by the government in period t+1 can be written as follows:
®t+1 “ = rBt + Gt+1 - Tt+1
where the left-hand side shows the change in total (internal and external) real public debt 
during t+1, and the right-hand side shows the interest service (domestic and world 
interest rates are assumed equal) paid on the real stock of debt at the end of t, and the 
primary deficit incurred at t+1. The single-period budget constraint can be transformed 
into an intertemporal relationship by performing recursive substitutions for successive 
future values of the real stock of debt (B^+j, j=l,2,...). Taking expected values (E) at time 
t, the solvency constraint of the national government is:
where V = l/(l+r).
For the solvency constraint to hold, the following terminal condition has to be satisfied:
lim VÎE^B^+4 = 0 
j —>00
This terminal condition shows that the solvency constraint holds so long as B does not 
increase faster than r. An alternative reading of the solvency constraint indicates that 
provided the terminal condition is satisfied, the outstanding value of B is equal to the 
present value of future government surpluses.
The empirical implications of the solvency constraint have been examined. As indicated 
by McCallum (1984) and Hamilton and Flavin (1986) the present value budget constraint 
is compatible with a constant budget deficit inclusive of interest payments. This 
implication is developed in a stochastic context by Trehan and Walsh (1988) who
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showed that the necessary and sufficient condition for the solvency constraint to hold is 
that the first difference of the stock of debt namely, the deficit inclusive of
interest payments [(Gt+i-Tt+i)+rBj is stationary.
Since we want to know whether the terminal condition is a valid representation of the 
fiscal series previously described, we start by checking stationarity in the series of deficit 
inclusive of interest payments. We use a standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
statistics to test for the presence of unit roots; if the results of the test indicate the absence 
of unit roots, it means that the series is characterized by a stationary process, and thus we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the terminal condition is satisfied. As seen in Table 
3, column 4, the presence of unit roots is comfortably rejected. This statistical result 
supports the idea that, overall, Colombian authorities followed sustainable financial 
policies during the period of study.^l
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TABLE 3
Tests for Unit Roots and the
Government Solvency Constraint
Sample Period: 1925-1985
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gt Gt+^t^t-l Tt [Gt+^t®t
Constant -854.9 -848.4 -623.2 -839.4
(-1.12) (-1.1) (-1.07) (-1.5)
Trend 82.2 81 .6 62.9 54.2
(2.1) (2.0) (1.94) (3.0)
Lagged level -0.058 -0.053 -0.012 -0.49
No of lags of 
differenced
(-1.39) (-1.31) (-0.28) (-6.6)
variable 1 1 2 2
Notes
(1) t ratios in parentheses
n
(2) ADF test: dx^ = a + bt + (l-l)xt-i + 2_hj_dxt-i +
where dx^ = x^ - ^ t - ^  / (a) and (b) stand for constant and 
time trend respectively, and (e) is an error term. The t- 
statistic on (1-1) tests the null hypothesis that this 
coefficient is zero, namely, that 1=1 and x^ contains a unit 
root. The t-statistics has a non-standard distribution under 
the null that x^ is non-stationary. Critical values for the 
case under study (61 annual observations) are: -4.15 at the 
1% significant level, -3.5 at 5%, and -3.18 at 10% [Fuller 
(1976), Table 8.5.2. p.373]
(3) Tests for the possible existence of a second unit root 
in the processes for G^/ G^+r^Bt-i / and T-j- were also carried 
out. The t-ratios for the lagged first differences were as 
follows : -4.09, -4.07, and -6.80, for G^/ G^+r^B^_i, and T^ 
respectively. In conclusion, the processes for the variables 
on discussion are integrated of order 1, 1(1)._______________
An equivalent test of the solvency constraint relies on the cointegration of (G^+rB )^ and 
T^ . As shown in Table 3 there is one unit root in the process for (G^+rB )^ and also one 
unit root in the process for T^ . Being these two processes integrated of order 1, both are 
cointegrated, provided the residuals obtained from regressing one on the other are
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Stationary (Engle and Granger, 1987). Table 4 shows the results of regressing (G^+rB )^ 
on T  ^and the reverse, as well as the unit root (ADF) tests applied on the residuals of 
those regressions (the appropriate critical values were tabulated by Engle and Yoo 
[1987]). As seen, the two variables under comment are cointegrated with cointegrating 
vector [1-1.17]. Since both cointegrating equations exhibit heteroscedasticity (the 
reported ARCH statistics are highly significant) which would question the power of the 
previous unit root tests, based on the assumption of homoscedasticity of the errors, a 
further test which does not require such assumption is applied. This is the Z oc test 
[Phillips (1987, p.287), Phillips and Ouliaris (1990, p.l71)]. Once more, the results 
indicate the rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration.
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Table 4
Cointegration Tests 
Sample Period: 1925-1985
1. Regression of tax revenues on government expenditures 
inclusive of debt interest.
1*t ~ 0.83 [G^+r^B^_i ]
r 2 = 0.978 ARCH [F(4,52)] = 65.1
Residual regression:
Lagged level coefficient :-0.853
ADF test:-7.384
Lags of differenced variable: 3
Phillips' Z^a test : 14.001
2. Regression of government expenditures inclusive of debt 
interest on tax revenues.
[ G t + r t B t - l ]  = 1 . 1 7Tt
r 2 = 0.978 ARCH[F(4,52)] = 79.9
Residual regression:
Lagged level coefficient :-0.833
ADF test:-7.274
Lags of differenced variable: 3
Phillips' Z^a: 14.216
Notes
(1) Both residual regressions included up to 3 regressors. The critical values tabulated by 
Engle and Yoo (1987) for the ADF tests are:-3.75 at 5% and -4.46 at 1% significant level 
respectively.
(2) The critical value for ARCH[F(4,52)] at 5% significant level is 2.56
(3) Since only one explanatory variable appears in the cointegration equation, and neither 
constant term nor trend have been considered, the critical values for the test are as 
follows:-15.64 at 5% and -13.81 at 7.5% si^ificance level. Phillips and Ouliaris (1990, 
p. 189). The null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected at the 5% level if the 
computed value of the statistic is smaller than -15.64. In both cases 10 autocovariances 
were used.
223
Similar results should be expected if instead of testing for stationarity of the deficit 
inclusive of interest payments we check for stationarity in the first difference of the stock 
of debt. The stationarity of this variable is confirmed at just 10% significance level for 
the period of study 1925-1985, but at 1% for periods such as 1925-1982 (just before the 
recent Latin American debt crises started) or the whole series 1925-1993.^^ As seen in 
the previous subsection regarding Graph 15, the 1982-86 period was dominated by a 
substantial jump of the internal debt, followed by a vertical increase of the external debt 
(in Pesos) since 1984 coinciding with strong depreciations of the exchange rate. As a 
whole, the real stock of debt multiplied by 3.1 in the brief period 1982-1986, an 
experience only comparable with that of an equally long period, 1929-1933, when the 
real stock of debt multiplied by 3.7. These extraordinary circumstances represented by a 
vertical upswing in Graph 15 could have affected the behaviour of the series so as to 
yield less significant stationarity results in first differences.
To sum up, the accounting framework of present values allows us to get a further 
understanding of the consistency of long-run government financial policies in our case 
study. Our survey of fiscal facts can be enriched by this general idea that the Colombian 
government has led sustainable financial policies over time.
6. Tax rates and inflation
Graph 16 shows the rate of inflation path along the period of study. Two great phases can 
be observed. The first one -1925 through 1955- reflects the dramatic changes of the 
external sector which accompanied the boom of the late 1920s, the impacts of the great 
depression which led to an average deflation rate of 19% during 1930-32 (23% only in 
1932) and a new deflationary episode after the outbreak of World War II. A one-shot 
spectacular increase in the rate of inflation right to the peak of 39% in 1934 followed 
activist reflationary policies implemented after the suspension of the gold exchange 
standard. Inflationary waves arose under different external contexts: during the second
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half of the War when with a blocked imports trade a rapid and unprecedented 
accumulation of international reserves resulted in a huge expansion of base money; and 
in the immediate postwar years, in spite of the contractionary effects of boosting imports 
which drained the stock of foreign reserves previously accumulated. Both episodes were 
followed by deflationary policies which abated the inflationary upsurge, and even 
reached nil or negative rates in the early 1950s.
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In the second great phase two subperiods can be differentiated: an interval of mild 
inflation between 1956 and 1970 when disregarding a notable once-for-all increment in
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1963 the average inflation rate did not exceed 9%; and an interval of higher inflation 
between 1971 and 1985 when the average inflation rate was above 22%. A distinctive 
characteristic of this last subperiod was the permanence of inflation rates at high levels. 
Inflation rates crossed the threshold of 20% after the first oil-price shock and remained at 
that height revealing the presence of inertial components which tended to reproduce past 
rates of inflation.
Why are we looking at the evolution of inflation rates in the middle of our discussion of 
government expenditures, tax revenues and debt? An important approach to public 
finance analyzes inflation from a public finance viewpoint. This approach follows Phelps 
contributions (1972,1973) which we reviewed in Part I, Section VI. The optimal public 
finance model sees inflation rates as a result of an optimal choice of taxation. 
Additionally, the theory predicts a positive and proportional relationship between tax 
rates and the rate of inflation. Our previous description, however, does not seem to 
support the idea that inflation rates have resulted from a deliberate choice of taxation.
Nor it appears to exist a direct and proportional relationship between tax and inflation 
rates (graphs 9 and 16).
As reviewed in Part I, an important strand of literature follows Mankiv (1987) who 
combines Barro (1979) original modem exposition of the tax-smoothing theory and 
Phelps (1973) contribution to the theory of public finance. Mankiv aimes to show that 
if monetary and fiscal policies are used to optimally finance government expenditures, 
the inflation rate and the tax rate will behave like random walks, and evolve together 
over time. The inflation rate is taken as a proxi of the tax rate on real money balances.
A simple test of the central implication of the theory that higher inflation rates and higher 
tax rates are associated over time may be performed by examining the correlation of 
average tax rates with the inflation rate. The regression of the rate of inflation (INFL) on
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the government revenue percentage of GDP (TAX) and a time trend (TIME) for 1925 to 
1985 yields (with t-statistics in parentheses)
INFL = 16.2 + 0.59TIME - 3.35TAX 
(1.9) (5.0) (-2.1)
= 0.38 DW = 1.64 N: 61 annual observations.
This simple exercise is similar to that applied by Mankiv (1987) to the U.S. experience 
during the period 1952-85, and by Roubini and Sachs (1989) to the performance of 15 
OECD countries during the period 1960-85. Mankiv found a positive and significant 
correlation between the average tax rate and the rate of inflation, in support of the tax- 
smoothing theory. Roubini and Sachs confirmed Mankiv finding for the United States 
and found support for the underlying hypothesis in the case of two other OECD 
countries; however, no significant correlation between (INFL) and (TAX) was found for 
other 12 countries, and even for five countries the sign of the relationship between these 
two variables was negative.
In our case, there is a significantly negative correlation between the variables under 
discussion, therefore rejecting the applicability of the theory to the Colombian 
experience. The coefficient on (TAX) is notably large, suggesting that an increase in 
taxes of 1% of GDP is associated with a reduction of 3.4% in the inflation rate. The 
absence of positive correlation between (INFL) and (TAX) is not a strange result after 
our discussion of the paths followed by the average tax rate and the inflation rate (graphs 
9 and 16). While the theory implies that governments choose inflation rates as part of 
optimal tax decisions, our description of episodes did not leave that i m p r e s s i o n . 24
The testing procedure employed by Mankiv, and Roubini and Sachs, has been questioned 
for not exploring the full implications of the theory, in particular for not inquiring about 
integration and cointegration properties of the processes for inflation and tax rate. As
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seen in Part I, Section VI, authors such as Grilli (1989) and Trehan and Walsh (1990) 
show how under the tax smoothing framework, non-stationarity of the processes for 
(INFL) and (TAX) is a necessary condition. In our case, it can be shown that contrary to 
the theoretical requirement, both processes are s t a t i o n a r y .  25 These results should be 
interpreted with some caution, however, since as recalled by Grilli et al. (1991), the 
prediction that "optimal" tax rates are non-stationary is obtained from models which do 
not take into account that tax rates are bounded between zero and one.
In conclusion, our discussion of graphs 9 and 16 suggest that inflation rates have not 
been a public finance fact in the Colombian experience. Further insights indicate that the 
processes for the inflation rate and the tax rate do not match with theoretical predictions.
D. Financial intermediation and public debt.
This last section shows how financial intermediation in Colombia has been affected by 
the boom-and-bust cycles of external capital markets, and how under extreme 
circumstances the collapse of financial institutions has been prevented by the use of 
internal public debt. A description of ups and downs of the financial intermediation 
system adds new elements to our introductory picture of external and internal debt.
As a background for the reader. Graph 17 depicts the evolution of two standard 
indicators of financial deepening: one is the ratio of the money supply to output 
(Ml/GDP); and the other one the ratio of financial assets in the hands of the public which 
are liabilities of financial institutions, to output (Financial assets/GDP). Three phases are 
clearly distinguished: an extraordinary development of the financial system relative to the 
size of the economy during the booming late 1920s interrupted by a sudden collapse in 
1932; nearly four decades of stagnated financial progress until the late 1960s; and finally, 
a substantial and sustained process of financial deepening.
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Crucial institutional changes opened the first phase. A financial reform in 1923 instituted 
the system of central bank and commercial banks following the model of the U.S. 
Federal Reserve System. Commercial banks were assumed to do the job foreseen in the 
English private banks model, namely, lending operations on a short-term basis (trade and 
working capital loans). As for the long run, mortgage banks were created or reorganized 
to compete for savings, locally and abroad, and to grant loans to agriculture and housing 
sectors.
GRAPH 17
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Why the ephemeral success of financial intermediation during the first phase? External 
capital markets proved to be critical. With the apogee of private long-term funds in the
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New York financial market in the mid-1920s mortgage banks could sell an important 
proportion of their long-term issues to foreign investors. At the same time commercial 
banks enjoyed an easy access to short-term funds in U.S. commercial banks. Long-term 
funds for mortgage banks were sharply suspended after the 1929 crash, and short-term 
finance dried out in 1931. While the external expansion flourished, internal financial 
intermediation burgeoned with the general prosperity of the economy; and with the 
cessation of international lending and the negative impacts of the great depression (deep 
recession cum deflation) the process of financial deepening came to a halt.
Only a decisive government intervention in 1932-33 avoided the collapse of the banking 
system, and more generally, of the credit structure in the economy. The internal public 
debt played a vital and extraordinary role in this process. Through a variety of ways 
which are spelled out in detail in Part IV, Section U, the internal public debt helped 
restore the machinery of private credit. One outstanding measure was the creation of 
official banks destined to replace the bankrupt mortgage banks; the initial capital of the 
new institutions was largely financed by the central bank through the acquisition of 
equity shares, or through loans whose liability was assumed by the government.
A model of centralized financial decisions -in the sense of Gurley and Shaw (1955,
1956)- predominated since the early 1930s through the late 1960s. The newly organized 
official banks were destined to supply credit to agriculture, industry and construction, 
according to government policy priorities. Interest rates were subjected to regulations 
after the great depression, and demand deposits became the main source of funds of 
private commercial banks; Graph 17 shows how financial intermediation ratios hinged on 
changes in the money supply rather than on interest-bearing deposits, for over three 
decades. During this period commercial banks became regular suppliers of loans to the 
government, and important investors on bonds of the internal public debt.
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During the phase of stagnated financial deepening, which largely coincided with 
inactivity of world private capital markets (1930s to 1960s), the access of private 
commercial banks to external funds was basically limited to the financing of external 
trade operations. However, some official banks were granted loans from developmental 
institutions. The Eximbank was an important source of funds even before the end of 
World War II. Later the World Bank and other agencies continued these special 
operations. Finally, during the 1960s developmental loans were granted by international 
organizations to newly created investment banks; these banks were established to attract 
long-term domestic and international funds required by the financing of projects in 
manufacturing, import-competing, and export-promoting sectors.
A new phase of accelerated financial deepening characterized the 1970s, as a result of 
policies of financial liberalization and greater access to external private capital markets. 
The former favoured a major diversification of financial assets, and stimulated 
competition (e.g. the creation of building societies in the early 1970s which disputed the 
predominance of commercial and investment banks. Competition began eroding the 
traditional centralized-financial-decisions model, and a rapid increase in financial 
deepening indicators was lived through the mid-1970s as revealed in Graph 17). The 
latter coincided with the boom of foreign commercial bank loans in the second half of the 
1970s. Colombian banks not only trippled their external debt between 1978 and 1981 but 
some of them opened offshore branches and engaged in lending operations to foreign 
debtors.
By 1981 there were clear examples of crisis in the domestic financial system after the end 
of a coffee bonanza which dominated the second half of the 1970s. In this context, the 
aftermath of the Mexican debt crisis in 1982 had devastating effects on a system which 
was increasingly relying on external short- and medium-term funds. Domestic branches 
of Colombian banks faced a virtual paralysis of external trade financing, and some 
offshore branches practically went bankrupt. Offshore branches confronted the
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simultaneous effect of accumulating unpaid loans which immovilized their assets, and the 
suspension of external credits; headquarters had to accept the burden left by failed 
offshore expansion and consider solutions as a whole.
Repeating the experience of the 1930s authorities intervened to avoid the collapse of the 
financial system. Governments resorted to increase internal public debt to strengthen the 
capital of some banks. Additionally, an important proportion of the external debt of 
private offshore branches was nationalized; as a matter of fact, it was the pressure of 
creditors (syndicates of commercial banks) during negotiations which eventually led to 
the extreme measure of nationalization. These episodes are extreme illustrations of how 
originally private-sector debts are transformed into public-sector debts. At the end of our 
period of study the financial system was back on its path of financial deepening: in 1985 
the percentage ratio of total financial assets to GDP reached 38% compared with 23% in 
1970 when the economy just recovered the peak level of financial deepening achieved 
before the great depression.
E. Lpgking ahead
In Part II we have gathered stylized facts as an introduction to our econometric work in 
Part ni, and the historical narrative in Part IV. In Part III our main purpose will be to 
model and test our hypothesis about the shock absorber role of internal public debt. In 
the process of specification of the models and interpretation of the econometric results, 
our survey of stylized facts will prove useful. We have already introduced trends and 
cycles of GDP, imports, government expenditure and external financing, which as we 
will see in Part HI will be crucial variables for explaining the behaviour of internal public 
debt.
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PARTIT
NOTES
1. Berg and Sachs (1988) highlight "the heavy political influence of the coffee growers" in 
the adoption of exchange-rate as well as financial policies which led to a relatively low 
foreign indebtedness of the country in the Latin American context.
2. The relative weight of agriculture in the Colombian case can also be illustrated with 
reference to other major Latin American debtors. While during the U.S. lending boom of 
1925-29 the shares of agriculture and industry in GDP in Colombia were 52% and 8% 
respectively, the corresponding figures in Argentina were 26% and 20%, in Brazil 22% and 
13%, and in Mexico (a major historical debtor although not an important borrower in the late 
1920s) 22% and 21%. Later, in the 1975-79 period, coinciding with the beginning of a new 
borrowing boom, while the Colombia's shares were 26% and 22%, the relevant figures for 
Argentina were 13% and 35%, for Brazil 8% and 33%, for Chile 9% and 39%, and for 
Mexico 9% and 31%. Mitchell (1993).
3. Some caution has to be used when interpreting GDP and price series in the Colombian 
case. As with other countries in the region, national accounts for the 1920s to 1940s were 
estimated by the United Nations (Economic Commission for Latin America, ECLA) during 
the 1950s. Further, the quality of price series for the 1920s and early 1930s has been 
questioned by researchers of the period (e.g. Diaz-Alejandro, 1983; Thorp and Londono, 
1984). Some researchers have opted for excluding the 1920s from their time series based on 
national accounts. For our own purposes a full consideration of the 1920s is essential. It has 
to be noted that the first great lending boom of this century took place between 1924 and 
1928, and Colombia was an outstanchng borrower not only in the Latin American context but 
on a wider international basis.
4. The recursive least squares coefficient for the trend of real GDP changes over time, with 
the final estimate lying outside the initial confidence interval. Additionally, it is only during 
World War II that the time path of the coefficient declines. To remove the influence of the 
war (an exogenous shock!), the specification of the test for stationarity includes a dummy 
variable for the 1940-1945 period. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF) for the lagged 
dependent variable is -3.32 which is significant at the 10% level. If we excluded the 1920s 
as commented in the previous note, the series would be stationary at the 5% significance 
level (the ADF test is -3.69 which exceeds the critical value of -3.50).
5. This accumulation of short-term trade debts was refinanced by means of parallel 
arrangements with the Export-Import Bank and commercial banks (a consortium of New 
York private banks), concurrently with a stand-by arrangement with the IMF. The notable 
fact here is that for the first time since the collapse of external financing in the early 1930s a 
syndicate of private banks was offering credits to Colombia.
6. The estimated coefficient for the trend of the PPE (according to recursive least squares) 
shows a substantial fall during World War H, before recovering its previous growing path. A 
new though more moderate fdl is observed during the "strangulation period" 1955-1965. The 
series is stationary provided that dummy variables are considered to account for the two 
periods just mentioned. The ADF test for the lagged dependent variable is -4.15, which 
coincides with the critical value at the 1% level.
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7. In Colombia the share of imports in GDP has fluctuated substantially over time. High 
points were achieved during the booming late 1920s and the 1950s (around 13%), and low 
points during the great depression and World War H (around 5%). During the 1960-1985 
period the average share was 11.5%.
Even in relatively closed economies the income elasticity of imports may be high. In the U.S. 
case (where the share of exports and imports was around 4% in the 1950s and 1960s, and 
about 7% in the 1950s to mid-1980s), estimates of the income elasticity of imports up to the 
mid-1980s varied between 1.5 and 2.0 (Dombusch and Fischer, 1986). In countries were 
imports are restricted by the availability of foreign exchange, such as in our case study, the 
income elasticity of imports is expected to be low. Econometric evidence suggests that in the 
Colombia's case this elasticity is around 0.4 and a similar coefficient is found for the 
elasticity with respect to PFE.
8. The ADF test is -3.22 for the lagged level of the dependent variable, which is significant at 
the 10% level (critical value:-3.18). If a dummy variable is allowed to account for the 40% 
collapse of imports in 1942, during World War II, the ADF test is now -4.57, which is 
significant at the 1% level (critical value:-4.15).
9. As for TB, in our historical discussion (Part IV, Section H) we will indicate that for some 
exportables die annual figures of exports did not correspond to actual export revenues. For 
the moment we do not take into account that consideration.
10. The ADF test for the lagged value of the dependent variable is -4.30 which is significant 
at the 1% level (critical value:-4.15)
11. The historical trend, obtained as a semilogarithmic regression of the real exchange rate on 
a constant and time is 1.3%.
12. By comparing the deviations from trend (in logs) of the exchange rate and the 
international reserves (not shown), it can be observed that positive cycles of the real 
exchange rate arise when the stock of international reserves grows at a rate which is less than 
the historical trend. This behaviour has been discussed in the literature related to the Latin 
American experience with crawling-peg arrangements. For instance, Yuravliker (1984) finds 
that for a set of countries authorities tended to reduce the rate of devaluation of the crawling 
peg when international reserves increased above desired levels. Edwards (1984) applies a 
similar reflection to the Colombian experience in the late 1970s.
13. Government expenditures are defined as the annual flow of government expenditures 
excluding any payment for interest on internal and external debt. This definition will allow us 
to use the concept of primary budget deficit, below.
14. The ADF test for the lagged value of the dependent variable is -3.5 which coincides with 
the critical value at the 5% level.
15. At the end of Part in. Section I we will discuss a seemingly conflicting evidence reported 
by the paths of internal debt, government expenditures and government revenues. As we will 
see, the solution of the "puzzle" depends on whether the proceeds on international reserves 
are treated either as legitimate government revenues or as a source of financing "under the 
line".
16. An important episode took place in the mid-1950s. It was a substantial accumulation of 
trade debts in the Aermath of tiie coffee bonanza (1954-57) which required extraordinary 
balance-of-payments loans. These exceptional and temporary loans were granted with the 
only purpose of refinancing short-term trade debts and entirely repayed before the mid-1960s.
17. The ADF test for the lagged value of the dependent variable is -3.9 which is significant at 
the 5% level (critical value: -3.5).
234
18. The experience of the early 1940s and early 1960s was different. In the first case, there 
was a massive and to a great extent forced allocation of public bonds in the private sector as 
part of a plan of stabilization during World War H. In the second case, large losses of the 
central bank in the foreign exchange market during the "external strangulation" period were 
transformed into government liabilities.
19. At least two precisions have to be made about the importance of central bank loans in the 
1930s. First, only during the brief period 1931-33 there were significant loans to the 
government reaching a share of over 30% of internal debt; the share remained practically 
constant up to 1937 simply because in a period of stagnated internal debt there were no 
amortizations of loans up to that year. Second, there was an abrupt reduction of loans to nil 
values in the early 1940s which did not correspond to amortization in the usual way; it was a 
conversion of a government liability into a long-term investment of the central bank. 
Otherwise the loans share would have continué at its previous level.
20. Historically, other lending operations included items such as conversions of external 
obligations of the government into internal debt, and the results of specific transactions 
carried out by the central bank which were finally charged to the public debt. Examples of 
the first case can be found since the 1940s (Eximbank loans) and were common in the 1960s 
(IDA and other international agencies' loans). The best example of the second case is offered 
by the losses made by the central bank in the foreign exchange market during the 1960s (note 
18 above) which were charged to the public debt.
21. Also the primary deficit (G^ -T^ ) is stationary since based on the ADF test it is possible to 
reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in the process for (G^ -T^ ) at the 1% significance level 
(The t-ratio for the lagged level of the dependent variable is -6.47 compared with the critical 
value of -4.15). This is not a crucial result regarding the solvency constraint since as shown 
by Trehan and Walsh (1988), stationarity of (G^ -T^ ) is neither necessary nor sufficient for the 
budget to be intertemporally balanced. However, it is of interest in tax-smoothing 
discussions, where as shown by Trehan and Walsh it is expected that (G^ -T^ ) is nonstationary.
22. The relevant unit root tests are as follows (t-values in parentheses). Critical values as in 
Table 1.
Period 1925-1982 
First unit root 
dxf = 0.01938xt_i 
(1.10)
Critical value for the Dickey-Fuller test:-1.61 
Serial Correlation LM-F(4,52)=1.61, Crit 5%:2.54 
Second unit root 
ddx+= -0.654dxt.i 
(-5.10)
Critical value for the Dickey-Fuller test:-1.61
Serial Correlation LM-F(4,51)=0.07
Conclusion: The series is stationary in first differences.
Period 1925-1985 
First unit root
dxt=0.0346xf.i + 0.7233dxt_i 
(1.60) (5.81)
Critical value for the Dickey-Fuller test:-1.61 
Serial Correlation LM-F(4,53)=0.42 
Second unit root 
ddXf=-0.1746dXf. i 
(-1.61)
Critical value for the Dickey-Fuller test:-1.61 
Serial Correlation LM-F(4,54)=0.02
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Conclusion: The first differences of the series of the real total debt are just stationary at 10%.
Period 1925-1993 
First unit root
dxf = -2650 + 195.6t - 0.107x+_i + 0.026dxt_i + 0.7dxt_2 
(-1.3) (2.6) (-2.96) (0.21) (5.43)
Serial Correlation LM-F(5,56) = 2.21, Crit 5%:2.38 
Second unit root
ddxf = -2719.3 + 129.8t - 1.132dx+_i (+ 6 lags of ddx+)
(1.3) (2.3) (-4.39)
Serial Correlation LM-F(4,48) = 0.52, Crit 5%:2.56
Conclusion: The series is stationary in first differences.
23. While in Barro's contributions the revenue from money creation is disguised within the 
whole array of distortionary taxes (on personal income, etc.), Mankiv and subsequent 
contributors explicitly and formally discuss the role of the inflation tax.
24. That inflation cannot be exclusively explained from a public finance perspective is a 
position sustained by the inspirators of the theory (Phelps, 1972). The theory was formulated 
on prescriptive rather than on descriptive grounds. The transition to descriptive grounds has 
been encouraged by empirical research in the last decade, as we noted in our literature review 
in Part I, Section VI.
25. The ADF tests for unit roots in the process for INFL and the log of TAX are (t-values in 
parentheses)
INFL
dxt = -0.92 + 0.29t - 0.75xf_i 
(-0.35) (3.4) (-5.87)
Serial Correlation LM-F(4,53)=1.53, Crit 5%:2.54 
TAX (in logs)
dXf = 0.77 + 0.004t - 0.47xf i 
(4.2) (3.7) (-4.29)
Serial Correlation LM-F(4, 53)=1.35, Crit 5%:2.54
Since the critical value for the ADF test at 1% significant level is -4.15, in both cases the null 
of non-stationarity is rejected.
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PART m
The behaviour of the internal public debt in Colombia. Econometric analysis.
Introduction
In Part III we present the bulk of our quantitative work regarding the Colombian experience 
with public debt. Since we intend to estimate and test models, we apply econometric 
techniques. Our central hypothesis already introduced in Part II is the shock-absorber role of 
the internal public debt.
Two stages characterize the process of empirical research. In the first stage we test the 
hypothesis of the shock-absorber role of the internal public debt. We largely rely on historical 
documentation concerning public debt in Colombia and the behaviour of relevant economic 
time series that we described in Part n. Guidance from economic theory is assured by 
recalling paradigms which were previously reviewed in Part I. The econometric results offer 
a strong support to the hypothesized shock-absorber role of the internal public debt. At this 
point we start the second stage. In a broad sense, we follow the Lakatosian advice (Lakatos, 
1970) of pursuing a "progressive research strategy". Having successfully tested the shock 
absorber hypothesis, we go on to test whether when using internal public debt as a buffer, 
governments also introduce changes in taxation. The econometric results suggest that 
governments do not discard adjustments in taxation while using internal public debt as a 
financial buffer.
At each stage we develop and test a different model. In the first stage the model is derived 
from the government's intertemporal budget constraint. It is shown how cycles in the internal
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public debt are explained by cycles in the explanatory variables. The estimating equation is 
derived from a conventional, structurally non-invariant model. In the second stage, the 
estimation equation is derived from a new classical model which presumes a forward-looking 
behaviour of governments and the notion that the internal public debt acts as a buffer. The 
model embodies the characteristically new classical distinction between planned and 
unplanned changes in the variable under study.
Two sections integrate this part, one for each one of the stages of research just mentioned. 
The organization of the sections is similar, starting with a detailed presentation of the models. 
The methods of econometric estimation and the corresponding results are also discussed at 
length. Finally, an attempt is made to interpret the econometric results in light of the broad 
characteristics of the economy discussed in Part TL.
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SECTION I
The shock-absorber role of the internal public debt.
Introduction
This section is an attempt to model our hypothesis that the internal public debt has played 
the role of shock absorber in the Colombian economy. So far we have offered stylized 
expositions of how this role has been performed (Section II, C). Such discussions have 
been largely based on historical knowledge. We now aim to formalize them and 
characterize the available statistical information in parametric relationships which are 
interpretable in light of economic paradigms.
We build a model based on the government budget constraint in which the dependent 
variable is the deviation from trend of the internal public debt. The explanatory variables 
are shocks on the sources of tax revenues (output and imports), shocks on government 
expenditures, and shocks on external financing. These shocks are also modelled as 
deviations from the historical trends. The model shows how when output, imports, 
government expenditure and external financing grow at their historical rate, the internal 
public debt grows at the rate of the economy. The relevant statistical series are taken from 
our previous exposition of stylized facts on public debt in Colombia, in Part II.
We follow standard econometric methods for evaluating our estimated model, and present 
estimations for the whole sample period (1925-1985) and also for subsamples. It is shown 
how the sample period estimation satisfies prevailing criteria regarding statistical and 
economic interpretation of the estimated parameters. Based on the estimation results and 
our former descriptions in Part II, we describe the cycles of the internal public debt during 
the period of study.
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The section starts with a brief reference to economic paradigms which were discussed at 
length in Part I, and which guide our interpretation of the econometric estimations.
A. The paradigms.
Despite major analytical differences, three lines of thinking discussed in Part I offer a 
general guidance for the empirical work, namely, the Keynesian model of fiscal deficits 
(Sections I and IV), the life-cycle hypothesis with its implications for fiscal policy choices 
(Section V), and the tax-smoothing model of deficits (Section VI).
Regarding the Keynesian model, we refer to the Keynesian-Lemerian principle of 
"functional finance". In this framework, a balanced budget over the business cycle is the 
outcome of deficit policies during recessions and surplus policies during prosperity. The 
stabilization of the economy is the criterion invoked to assess budgetary policies, and taxes 
and government expenditures are active policy instruments.
As for life-cycle theories, a central concern is the ability of budgetary policies to 
redistribute welfare between generations. In order to preserve a balanced budget over the 
business cycle, life-cycle exponents advocate discretionary and procyclical tax rates. What 
is behind this position is a defence of the principle of intergenerational equity. It is asserted 
that generations benefited by tax reductions during depressions are the same who finance 
increased tax rates and surpluses at high activity levels.
The tax-smoothing model argues for cyclically invariant tax rates. Deficits during 
recessions and surpluses during prosperity result from automatic fiscal stabilizers. Fiscal 
deficits during depressions are interpreted as optimal responses of the economic system to 
temporary low-income periods.
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As seen, the three paradigms favour a balanced budget over the cycle as a whole, but fiscal 
activism or discretionary policies are ingredients of the Keynesian or the life-cycle 
prescriptions which do not find room in the tax-smoothing theory. These alternative 
theoretical positions determine the expected coefficients in applied work. While the tax- 
smoothing framework predicts unitary coefficients (in absolute value) for changes in 
public debt due to shocks on output and government expenditures, the other two 
frameworks predict a coefficient greater than one in the case of output, and less than one 
in the case of government expenditures (This last assertion is more explicit in an LCH 
framework where on grounds of intergenerational equity it is expected that a temporary 
increase in government expenditures should be partly financed by increased taxation. In a 
Keynesian context the expected coefficient could be less or equal to one depending on the 
mix of debt and taxes chosen by authorities).
Our empirical work is different from what is usual in the literature, since instead of 
considering the stock of total debt (or the changes in this variable) as a function of other 
economic variables, we separate out the internal debt from the external debt, and treat the 
former as the dependent variable, and the latter as one of the explanatory variables. The 
reasons for this specification were offered before in our discussion of "stylized facts" in 
Part n. Essentially, we emphasize the shock absorber role of internal public debt, and 
highlight the exogenous nature of external financing. The historical documentation of the 
Colombian experience reveals that the internal debt and the external debt are not perfect 
substitutes. While the latter is largely determined by the cycles of private foreign credit 
and the availability of developmental loans, the former is constrained by limited domestic 
financial markets and restricted access to the credit of the central bank. Only under 
exceptional circumstances (deep recessions, wars), and after ad hoc parliamentary 
legislation, would the government had access to extraordinary lending from the central 
bank. These specific aspects of our study do not invalidate the applicability of the 
'paradigms', however, but extend their application. For instance, our model below 
discusses not only the textbook countercyclical role of the internal public debt concerning
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output fluctuations, but also its countercyclical function regarding shocks on external 
financing to the economy as a whole.
B. The model.
In our discussion of "stylized facts" (Part II, C, 5) we showed how according to public 
accountancy, the Colombian government satisfied its intertemporal budget constraint 
during the period of study. We now go back to the government budget constraint as the 
starting point for our discussions on the internal public debt.
A simple expression for a government budget constraint which discriminates between 
external and internal debt is
dF + dF* = (G - T) + rF + r*F* 
where dF and dF* represent the changes in the real stocks of the internal and the external 
debts respectively, (G-T) is the real primary deficit, and r and r* are the real interest rates 
on the internal and the external debts respectively. Regarding tax revenues, T, our 
"stylized facts" (Part n, B, 1) highlight the crucial historical importance of imports in the 
tax base. Based on those facts we propose to make an explicit differentiation between 
imports and other sources of tax revenues which for simplicity we relate to the GDP. 
Bearing these considerations in mind, a simple two-period government budget constraint 
can be represented as follows:
( F ^ - F ^ _ 1 ) +  ( F * ^ - F * ^ _ i ) —
rF^_1 + rF*^_i  + -  t(Y+M)-(- (1)
where the terms in parentheses on the left-hand side are the changes in the internal and the 
external debts respectively, r is a constant real interest rate applicable to both the internal 
and the external debts, G^  is the real flow of government expenditures exclusive of interest 
payments, and t  is the tax rate equally applied on real output (Y) and real imports (M).
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Equation (1) gives the change in and F*  ^between any two equal periods of time. By 
solving this equation forward it is possible to extend the analysis to a finite period (T) or 
to the infinite horizon (T->®°). Assuming for simplicity that the government has an infinite 
time horizon, and imposing the transversality conditions
lim Ft+j_/(1+r)^ = 0
( 2 )
lim F*^+i/(1+r)^ = 0
i-^oo
the intertemporal budget constraint is
F t - 1  + F * t - i  = [T(Y+M)t+i -  G t+ i ]  ( 1 + r ) - ( i + l )  (3)i —0
The two equations in (2) state that neither the stock of internal debt nor the stock of 
external debt grow faster than the interest rate forever. Equation (3) means that the 
present value of primary fiscal surpluses to be obtained in the infinite horizon is exactly 
equal to the sum of the initial stocks of the internal and the external debts.
The discussion of the government budget constraint can be extended by considering the 
steady-state case in which the variables Y ,^ and grow all at the same rate, n. The 
actual values of these time series fluctuate around a trend which grows at the common 
rate n. The present values of these series are calculated by using the Gordon model of 
corporate finance (Copeland and Weston, 1988), according to which the present value of 
a series growing at a constant rate n (assumed to be less than r) is given by
oo
xP = (r-n)E Xt+i(l+r)-(i+'>)
1—0
Therefore, the normal or permanent values for the variables under discussion are as 
follows
“ ( r - n ) Z  (1+r)   ^ = ( r - n ) £  . (1 +r)  " )
1-0 1-0
\  -  ( r - n ) Z  (4)
1=0
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By substituting the permanent values and from (4) into (3), the
intertemporal budget constraint can be rewritten as
Ft_i + F*t-1 = [tY^t + / (r-n) (5)
Now, by substituting from (5) into (1) where we have previously added and subtracted the 
same amounts nF^ _% and nF*^ _% leads to the following expression for the two-period 
government budget constraint:
( F ^ - F ^ _ 1  ) + ( F * ^ - F * ^ _ - ]  ) =
t (YF-Y)t  + + (G-GF)t + n ( F t - 1 + F * t - 1 ) (6)
where the (X^-X) terms represent shocks on the corresponding variables. The shocks on 
Y i and appear weighted by t, thus giving the deviations of Y  ^and from their trend 
values as a proportion of the normal amount of revenues.
At this point we can introduce some rearrangements and modifications which will prove 
useful in our empirical analysis. First we can rewrite the government budget identity in 
terms of the internal public debt as follows:
[F^-(1-n)F^_i] =
t (Y^-Y) ^   ^ + (G-G^) ^  - [F*-(-- ( 1-n) F*-^ _^  ] (7)
Since n is a constant growth rate, the presence of n on the left-hand side represents a 
single increment of the internal debt at rate n. The same applies to the external debt on the 
right-hand side. Then, equation (7) shows that in the absence of shocks on output, 
imports, and government expenditures, and provided that the external debt does not grow
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at a rate different from n, the internal public debt will grow at the trend growth rate of the 
economy [F^  = (l+n)F^_%]. Second, since we are interested in the analysis of a period of 
sixty years, instead of a single increment between two periods, it is convenient to apply a 
constant rate of continuous compounding to the variables F^  and F* ;^ these constant rates 
are the corresponding trend growth rates of F^  and F* .^ Therefore, (7) may be rewritten as
(F-F~)t = T(YF-Y)t + t(MF-M)t + (G-G^)t “ (F*-F*~)t (8)
where F- and F*- stand for the trend values of F and F*. Equation (8) is the basis of our 
empirical analysis. The terms (X-X^) are equivalent to the residuals obtained from 
semilogarithmic regressions of each variable on a constant and a time trend. The same 
applies to the terms (F-F-) and (F*-F*~). The next step is to formulate an estimating 
equation for the model in (8). This is what we do in the following subsection.
C. Empirical analysis.
The empirical equation to be applied to annual observations over the period 1925-1985 is
F u t “  a g F u t- i  + a-]Yu^ + a2Mut + agGu^ + a 4 f ' u t  + (9)
(+)  ( - )  ( - )  (+)  ( - )
where the dependent variable Fu  ^represents estimated deviations from trend of the 
internal public debt. Similarly, the explanatory variables are also estimated deviations from 
trend of the corresponding variables. All the variables are in logarithms with the exception 
of f  u^  (estimated innovations for external financing scaled by exports) because this series 
is sometimes negative, e^  is an error term.
The time paths of the regressand and regressors in equation (9) were described by 
individual graphs in Part U. The evolution of Fu  ^appears in Graph 12. The original series
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corresponds to the year-end nominal stocks of the internal public debt between 1925 and 
1985. The real values of the series were obtained by using the GDP deflator. The 
evolution of Yu  ^is shown in Graph 2. The original series is the annual values of GDP in 
real terms. The time path of Mu  ^appears in Graph 5. The original series is the year-end 
values of real imports in US$. The time path of Gu  ^is depicted in Graph 8. The original 
series excludes interest repayments, and its real value was obtained by using the GDP 
deflator.
The time path of f  u^  is portrayed in Graph 6. As seen in Part II.B.2, the flow of external 
financing f  includes not only the flow of foreign lending to the national government dF* 
(which we used in our discussion of the government budget constraint, above), but also 
foreign lending to the rest of the public sector and the private sector; these concepts are 
net of interest repayments abroad. Additionally, f  includes the flow of foreign direct 
investment. In our estimating equation (9) we use this concept of f  rather than a narrower 
one which only includes the foreign lending to the national government. The reason for 
this choice was advanced in our stylized discussion of the shock absorber role of the 
internal public debt in Part II. Accordingly, it is the collapse of net foreign financing to the 
country, and not only to the national government, which encourages the reaction of the 
internal public debt.
1. Expected signs.
Consider first positive (negative) shocks on GDP which lead this variable to grow above 
(below) its trend. The internal public debt is expected to grow below (above) its trend, and 
therefore the expected sign is negative. A similar consideration can be made regarding 
shocks on imports. According to our "stylized facts" in Part II.B., custom revenues have 
been of critical importance in the composition of total tax revenues. The internal public 
debt is expected to grow below (above) its trend when imports grow above (below) their 
own trend, and thus the expected sign is negative. Regarding government expenditures, it
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is expected that temporary deviations from trend will cause the internal public debt to 
deviate from trend in the same direction, and therefore the hypothesized sign is positive.
The term agFu^.^ accounts for lagged effects of the growth rate of internal debt. We 
expect that the current deviation of internal debt from trend should be a positive function 
of its lagged value. Graph 12 in Part II brings out a notable persistence of periods in which 
internal debt grows above its trend. We explain this behaviour as a result of institutional 
factors associated with the maturity structure of the internal public debt. As mentioned in 
Part n.C.3., after episodes of extraordinary increases of the internal debt (particularly in 
the 1930s and 1980s) governments transformed their substantially enlarged short-term 
financial obligations into long-term liabilities.
Finally consider the term a^fu^. The internal public debt is expected to grow above 
(below) its trend, whenever the flow of net external financing to the country grows below 
(above) its trend. This hypothesized relationship is derived from our discussions in Part II 
according to which governments resort to internal financing to cushion the impact of 
changes in external financing on the economy. The proposed sign is negative.
2. Expected coefficients.
How can we interpret the coefficients in equation (9)? As for the coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable a^, the expected coefficient is strictly greater than zero, and strictly 
less than one. ag is expected to say what percentage of the lagged deviation from trend of 
the internal public debt in a given period persists to the next period. Regarding the 
output's innovations coefficient a%, consider the case in which tax revenues T depend on a 
proportional income tax and a constant tax rate (T=t-Y). When only built-in fiscal 
stabilizers are at work, and the deficit is only financed with internal debt, the hypothesized 
coefficient is a%=l. As seen in Part I, Section VI, this is the magnitude of a% postulated by 
the tax-smoothing theory. Alternatively, when automatic stabilization is reinforced by
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procyclical changes in tax rates the expected coefficient is ai>1.0. Finally, a coefficient 
a i< l cannot be discarded if in the event of automatic stabilization part of the deficit is 
financed with external debt; if this is the case, although tax smoothing applies, the model 
cannot be informative about that result.
The discussion of the expected magnitude of a2 is somewhat more complicated. 
Governments alter tariffs not only for fiscal purposes. There may exist protectionism 
and/or balance-of- payments reasons for changing tariffs' levels. These reasons could be 
put forward regardless of whether imports are growing at their normal rate or above or 
below that rate. In general, revisions of tariffs seek to satisfy a combination of interests; 
for instance, protectionism and fiscal revenues. Some possibilities can be described in 
order to postulate expected magnitudes of a2- The simplest case is that in which given a 
constant tariff, collected duties rise (fall) when imports grow at a higher (lower) rate than 
their normal. This is a tax-smoothing case which yields a2=l; the important assumption is 
that for instance in the case of a fall in collected duties the government does not have 
access to or does not use external credit to finance the emergent deficit.
A second possible case postulates a2<l. Two options may be considered. One is the 
illustration just given in which the tariff level is kept constant regardless of positive or 
negative cycles of imports; the difference is that in this instance governments finance part 
of the ensuing deficit (when duty revenues fall) with external credit and the remainder with 
internal debt. The final effect is tax smoothing, though the model itself cannot inform 
about that result. The model only shows the direct response of internal debt to shortfalls in 
imports. The alternative option considers a mixture of increasing internal debt and higher 
tariff levels, and possibly some external financing. To sum up, a coefficient a2<l indicates 
that a hypothetical negative fiscal effect of a downturn in imports is partly financed by an 
increase in internal financing but is inconclusive about the behaviour of tariffs.
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Under a tax-smoothing framework governments use public debt to finance temporary and 
unexpectedly high expenditures. A coefficient ag=l is expected under the assumption that 
governments avoid affecting tax rates during emergency periods and finance the upsurge 
of temporary expenses with an increased internal debt. A coefficient ag<l indicates that 
only a fraction of positive cycles in government expenses is financed by increases of 
internal debt. But once more the model is inconclusive about tax smoothing; governments 
could avoid changing tax rates by using a combination of internal and external credit.
Regarding the coefficient a^ we hypothesize a coefficient less than 1. The reasons for 
expecting a^<l are not based on theoretical considerations but on historical experience. In 
Part II.C., we emphasized the temporary and partial character of important increases in 
internal debt in response to sudden reductions in external financing. Then the proposed 
coefficient is a4 <l.
To sum up, our empirical model inquires into the causes of deviations of internal debt 
from its historical trend. Shocks on output, imports, government expenditures and external 
financing are explanatory variables. The hypothesized magnitude of the coefficients 
ai=a2 =as=l corresponds to one of our paradigms, the tax-smoothing theory. Were the 
estimated parameters (aj, a2 , ag) close to 1, the evidence would favor that approach. 
However, by specification the model fails to recognize other possibilities of tax smoothing 
since estimated parameters such as a2<l and ag<l could be consistent with the actual 
validity of that framework. Finally, the inclusion of the once-lagged dependent variable 
within the explanatory variables suggests that not only shocks on the economic variables 
(Y, M, G, f  ), but also institutional factors associated with the way governments affect the 
maturity structure of the internal public debt cause internal financing to deviate from its 
historical trend.
D. Estimation and tests.
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As seen in Table 5, the processes for all the variables in the estimating equation (9) are 
stationary.!
TABLE 5 
UNIT ROOT TESTS
Variables in the model for the shock-absorber role of the
internal public debt.
Fu  ^ Fu^_1 Yu^  Gu^  Muj. f 'u^
Lagged
level -0.18 -0.21 -0.14 -0.41 -2.8 -0.49
(-3.3) (-3.8) (-2.7) (-3.9) (-3.3) (-4.6)
Lags of differen­
ced variable 1 2  1 0  1 0
S 2 (4) 0.98 0.42 1.26 0.99 2.10 2.43
h-| (4) 0.63 0.33 0.81 0.60 0.38 1 .80
Notes
1. The critical values for the Dickey-Fuller test (60 observations) are as follows: -1.61, 
-1.95 and -2.62, at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively.
2. S2 (n) is the Lagrange Multiplier test for autocorrelation in its F-form, F(n, T-n-k) 
where n are the number of lags considered by the test, T the number of observations, and k 
the number of parameters. Relevant critical value for the above regressions at the 5% 
significance level:2.54.
3. h^ (n) is the ARCH test in its F-form, F(n, T-2n-k) , where nomenclature is as above. 
Relevant critical value for the above regressions at the 5% significance level:2.56.
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The results in Table 5 allow us to apply classical OLS as method of econometric 
estimation. Table 6 displays the estimates of equation (9) for different sample periods.
TABLE 6 
INTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT 
Estimated Cycles
Regressors
Tests
( 1 )
1925-85
( 2 )
1925-55
(3)
1956-85
(4)
1925-62
(5)
1963-85
Fut-1 0.678
(10.53)
0.728
(8.90)
0.565
(4.82)
0.771
(7.97)
0.434
(4.30)
YUi
Guh
•2.442
(-3.36)
0.386
(2.25)
-0.384
(-0.46)
-0.057
(-0.26)
■4.155
(-3.71)
0.942
(2.95)
-1.278 
(-1.36)
0.347 
(1 .30)
-5.485
(-5.79)
0.860
(3.25)
MU4
f u t
•0.308
(-2.72)
•0.381
(-2.33)
-0.308
(-3.02)
-0.307 
(-1 .78)
•0.169
(-0.54)
•0.558 
(-1.97)
-0.326
(-2.54)
-0.231 
(-1.07)
-0.325 
(-1.19)
-0.695
(3.41)
Si (3)
82(3)
hi (3) 
h2(3) 
N(2) 
Reset (3)
0.87 0.92 0.88 0.84 0.96
4.54 1 .37 6.26 0.67 1 .36
1 .42 0.33 1 .93 0.18 0.28
0.03 0.84 0.73 0.26 0.31
1 .50 1 .03 1 .72 0.66 n.a
3.29 0.52 0.29 6.87* 0.03
1 .07 0.92 0.22 0.61 1 .47
Notes.
1. Asymptotic t-statistics are shown in parentheses
2. Tests statistics denoted by (*) reject the null 
hypothesis at the 5% significance level.
3. n.a.: not applicable.
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Column 1 shows the OLS estimates for the full sample 1925-1985. The estimated shocks 
associated with output, government spending, imports and external financing exhibit the 
expected signs and are all significant at the 5% level. First of all, the estimated coefficient 
of the Yu  ^variable (-2.44, t-statistics: -3.4) reveals a strong countercyclical reaction of 
internal public debt to downswings in real GDP. Literally, a negative deviation of the 
growth rate of output of 1% relative to its historical trend, causes internal financing to 
grow at 2.4% above its normal rate. As for shocks on government expenditures, the 
estimated coefficient indicates that a deviation of the growth rate of the internal public 
debt of 0.4% above its trend corresponds to an increase of the growth rate of government 
expenditures of 1% above their trend. Regarding negative shocks on imports and external 
financing, the estimates reveal a similar counteractive response of internal debt. Finally, 
the estimated coefficient for the lagged dependent variable is highly significant and shows 
a marked sluggish adjustment of the internal debt.
What can we say about theory consistency? Two issues are to be considered: the 
economic interpretation and the statistical characteristics of the estimates in Table 6, 
column (1). As for the economic interpretation we have already observed that the 
estimated parameters of the hypothesized explanatory variables are all significant, and the 
signs are as expected. The estimated value for a% indicates that the typical countercyclical 
reaction of internal debt notably exceeds the unitary coefficient which will correspond to 
automatic stabilization; by referring to our paradigms, this result suggests the presence of 
discretionary countercyclical measures beyond the operation of automatic stabilizers. 
Additionally, the coefficients' sizes imply that internal debt is used to finance only a 
portion of deficits arising due to either negative cycles of imports or huge temporary 
government expenses, but we are unable to conclude about the possibility of tax 
smoothing in these cases. Moreover, it is shown how the estimated value for a^ supports 
the conjectured countercyclical and partial reaction of internal debt to shocks on external 
financing. Further comments regarding new estimates for different subsamples are made 
below.
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As for the statistical characteristics of the estimation, Table 6 also offers various criteria 
for evaluating our econometric model. First of all, the goodness-of-fit suggested by Graph 
18 is confirmed by a high R^. Additionally, two sets of diagnostic tests insinuate the 
absence of a systematic lack-of-fit. These tests check for the presence of serial correlation 
and heteroskedasticity. s%(n) is the Lagrange Multiplier test for autocorrelation in the 
residuals of lags up to (n), and is asymptotically distributed as a chi-squared distribution 
under the null of no autocorrelation. S2 (n) is the Lagrange Multiplier test for 
autocorrelation in its F-version.^ h%(n) is the Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroskedasticity test ARCH presented here in its F form, and h2 (n) is the test for 
heteroskedasticity due to squares of the regressors also in its F-form.^ The results under 
column (1) show that the first estimated regression passes these tests.
GRAPH 18
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Two final tests for evaluating the adequacy of our regression model are offered at the 
bottom of Table 6. The R(n) is the Reset test which evaluates possible departures from the 
linearity assumption, and N(n) is a test of the conformity of the residuals with the normal 
distribution.^ Once more the first estimated equation passes these tests.
Graph 19 shows the time path of the residuals resulting from the OLS estimation of 
equation (9).
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The graph suggests that the series is not afflicted by serial correlation or 
heteroskedasticity. A few extreme values are observed, particularly in 1942 and 1983, but
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above all in 1962. So far our tests have not been affected by these unusually large values; 
such is the case of the normality test which by construction is sensitive to outliers. Finally, 
as expected from the stationarity of the regressand and regressors the estimated residuals 
are also stationary. ^
What can we add about parameter constancy? The point is important not only because the 
lack of regression parameter constancy is a cause of misspecification of estimating 
equations, but because it has to be shown that although the economic system experienced 
changes over the period of study, the model is characterized by parameters which 
remained fairly stable. In order to check for parameter constancy we reestimate the model 
by using recursive least squares (RLS). This estimation provides us with new diagnostic 
tools, namely, the RLS coefficients, the one-step residuals, and various Chow statistics, to 
which results we now turn.
The RLS coefficients allow us to follow the time paths of the parameters of the model 
over the period of study. The coefficients for f  u^  and Fu^.i are very stable over the sample 
period. The coefficient for Gu  ^remains relatively stable over the period. Finally, the 
coefficients on Mu  ^and Yu  ^are less stable; in particular, the estimated coefficient for Yu  ^
changes as the sample increases, first from positive to negative values (during the late 
1940s), and then progressively declines with the final estimate located outside the initial 
confidence interval.
Additional information is offered by the one-step residuals.^ Two values of one-step 
residuals, one in 1962, and another one in 1983, lie outside the error bands (+/- 2o^ 
around zero). These values suggest the presence of exceptionally large deviations from 
trend of the dependent variable, or perhaps alterations in the structural parameters of the 
model. Complementary information is provided by the Chow statistics. The one-step 
Chow test shows that the null of no structural break is rejected at the 5% significance level 
in 1942 and 1983, but specially in 1962.^
255
Given the results offered by recursive estimation we apply a test for structural break in 
1962, to check whether the parameters are constant over the subsamples 1925-1962 and 
1963-1985. The corresponding Chow’s statistic yields F(5,51) = 2.19 which is less than 
the critical value (2.40) at the 5% significant level. An alternative way consists in refitting 
equation (9) to the sample 1925-1962, and predicting over the period 1963-1985. With 
the only exception of 1983 the forecasts are not statistically significant. The Chow test for 
parameter constancy yields F(23,33) = 0.74 which is less than the critical value (1.84) at 
the 5% significance level.
To sum up, the recursive estimation of (9) shows that not all the parameters are equally 
stable, and in particular the estimated parameter for Yu  ^appears to be less stable than the 
rest. Further results suggest the presence of outlier values for Fu  ^or changes in the 
structural parameters of the model. Since these results coincide in reporting 1962 as a 
possible break point, we applied Chow tests for structural break over the samples 1925- 
1962 and 1963-1985. The tests reported parameter constancy over the period of study.
At this point the reader could express some reservations about the exogeneity of one or 
more regressors. For instance, if Yu  ^was affected by feedback from Fu ,^ in a broader 
model Yui would be endogenous and possibly correlated with e^ . In general, the presence 
of endogenous regressors which correlate with the estimating equation disturbance terms 
makes the OLS estimation to yield biased and inconsistent estimates of the structural 
parameters. It is then necessary to test for independence of regressors and disturbances.^ 
By using Hausman's specification test it is possible to check whether the null hypothesis of 
exogeneity of Yu ,^ and more generally, the null hypothesis of exogeneity of Yu ,^ Mu ,^
Gu ,^ and f  u^  cannot be rejected.^ In the first case the test yields Chi^(l)=1.68 which is 
less than the 5% critical value (3.84) for a single variable under test; and in the second 
case, the test yields Chi^(4)=2.04 which is less than the 5% critical value (9.49) for four
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variables under test. In conclusion, our regressors in equation (9) pass the exogeneity test 
and therefore the OLS procedure used to estimate (9) appears to be legitimate.
New estimates for different subsamples are presented in columns (2) to (5). Our "stylized 
facts" in Part II suggest that the series evolve in a different way during the first and second 
halves of the whole sample. For instance, government expenditures grow at an average 
rate lower than their normal during the 1930s and 1940s, and at an average rate higher 
than the trend since the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s. The contrast between the two halves 
is revealed by the estimates in columns (2) and (3): shocks on output and government 
expenditures are not significantly different from zero during the first half but clearly 
significant during the second half; additionally, the estimate of the government spending 
shock for the second half is close to 1.0 which means that temporary surges in government 
spending are financed by changes in internal financing.
Another important contrast is that while shocks on imports during the first half exhibit an 
estimate similar in magnitude and significance to the estimates for the whole period in 
regression (1), the estimate for the second half is lower and insignificant. Further, the 
magnitude of the estimate of the shocks on external financing for the subsample 1956-85 
clearly exceeds the magnitudes for the first half and for the whole period. Finally, columns 
(4) and (5) show the estimates for the periods 1925-1962 and 1963-1985. This 
periodization is suggested by Graph 18 which shows a long period of internal debt growth 
rates above trend (1960s and first half of the 1970s) after the continuously declining 
growth rates of the late 1940s and the 1950s. The estimates are quite similar to those 
obtained in columns (2) and (3).^^
Three central ideas emerge from the analysis of the subsamples. First, the relative 
importance of innovations on Y, G, M and f  is unequally distributed over time. Second, 
shocks on the external sector -imports and external financing- are always important to 
explain cycles in internal public debt. Third, the contribution of shocks on output and
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government expenditures to the explanation of internal debt cycles is concentrated in the 
second half of the sample. The analysis brings out that in this period the estimated 
parameter of Gu  ^is practically equal to 1.0.
Finally, a common characteristic of all the regressions is the relatively h i^  and strong 
significance of the estimate of the lagged value of the dependent variable. It reveals that an 
important feature in this historical analysis is the tendency to a slow adjustment of internal 
debt. Putting it other way, not only cycles in economic variables but the pace at which the 
government amortizes the outstanding internal debt explain the cycles in internal financing. 
Various historical episodes endorse this statistical finding. For example, in Part n.C.3., it 
was mentioned how the extraordinary increase of internal public debt of the early 1930s, 
required four decades to be fully amortized.
Having interpreted our econometric estimations, we now turn to describe the evolution of 
the cycles of internal public debt (Graph 18) in the light of the cycles of the explanatory 
variables and the estimates reported in Table 6.
E. The behaviour of the cycles of the internal public debt. 1925-1985.
Graph 18 and Table 6 (Columns (2) to (5)) suggest that we can distinguish two main 
periods in the predicted time path of the cycles of internal public debt. These periods 
largely correspond to the first and second halves of the series.
1. Mid-1920s to mid-1950s
Three phases can be observed during the first period: the second half of the 1920s which 
mostly coincides with the boom which precedes the great depression (1929-33); from the 
depression years to WWH; and the first post-War decade.
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The first phase was dominated by a deep negative cycle of internal debt around its trend. 
The reasons for this negative cycle are to be found in the behaviour of output, imports, 
and external financing, all of which experienced growth rates notably above their trends. 
1928 is a crucial date in the evolution of the series: output and imports reach their 
maximum positive deviations from trend ever, and external financing arrives at a point 
which could only be repeated at the other extreme of the series in 1981.1928 is also the 
year in which government expenditures reach their maximum growth rate above normal 
for the whole series (1925-1985); ceteris paribus, this behaviour of government 
expenditure contradicts our expectation of a positive relationship between Fu  ^and Gu .^
After 1928 the deluge: the access to external credit is virtually closed, imports fall sharply 
after 1929 and output slows down to achieve just its historical rate in 1931. As a result of 
these events, the deep negative cycle of internal public debt is transformed into a large 
positive cycle since 1931. This cycle reaches its maximum in 1933 and also high points in 
1942-1945. What can we say about the behaviour of the individual explanatory variables 
which resulted in the positive cycle of the internal public debt? Note first the evolution of 
output. Along the 1930s output grows above its historical rate, with an average deviation 
from trend of 2%, lower than the average of 10% which predominated in the second half 
of the 1920s. In contrast, during the 1940s output grows below the historical rate, 
reaching during the War years the mayor negative deviations from trend for the whole 
period 1925-1985.
Contrasting with the evolution of output, imports grow at less than their trend since 1930 
and through the end of World War II. Two subperiods can be distinguished. The first 
starts with the great depression when the imports-growth rate collapsed from being on 
average 60% above trend in 1927-28 to being on average 65% below trend in 1931-33. 
The end of this first subperiod coincides with a gradual recovery of imports which in the 
years 1937-39 regained the normal growth rate. The second downfall of imports exactly
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corresponds with the World War II years. Once more, the average negative deviation from 
trend is 60% in the interval 1942-44.
The behaviour of external financing between 1930 and 1942 adds new elements to the 
previous description. The boom of the late 1920s is abruptly replaced by the deepest 
downturn during the whole period, between 1930 and 1934; at its bottom in 1931 the 
growth rate of external financing represents a deviation of 57% from the normal growth 
rate. The magnitude of the collapse can be illustrated by the fact that the lowest growth 
rate is achieved only two years after the second highest growth rate of the series is 
reached; at this last point the positive deviation from normal is 49%. Towards the end of 
the decade external financing grows close to, but still below its trend. A different 
experience is to come about during the last three years of the War, however. The collapse 
of imports due to the hostilities, and unexpected capital inflows result in accumulating 
international reserves, and growth rates of external financing above trend; at its summit in 
1945, these rates represent a positive deviation of 28% over the historical growth rate.
As for government expenditures, their behaviour appears to be dominated by policies of 
fiscal retrenchment since the late 1920s through the 1940s. The consequence of these 
policies is a long negative cycle of government expenditures around its trend, of which the 
following figures are illustrative. The average negative deviation from the normal growth 
rate in the years 1935-1938 is 19%. Thereafter, this restrictive behaviour reaches an 
average of 32% in 1943-1946, with a trough of 56% in 1943. Some isolated points reveal 
expansionary increases of government expenditures above normal, but there is only one 
outstanding experience, in 1933, when the "actual" growth exceeds the trend by 23%.
Finally, some institutional facts appear to be influencing the positive cycles of internal 
public debt. These facts are summarized by the behaviour of Fu^ _%. Two important 
government decisions are worth noting here. First, the suspension of amortizations on the 
internal debt bonds between 1933 and 1940; and second, the conversion of medium-term
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credits granted to the government during the fiscal crisis of the early 1930s into long-term 
internal debt (An important credit received by the government from the central bank in 
1931 was converted in 1942 into a debt which would be gradually amortized along the 
next 30 years). These facts contribute to a very slow adjustment of internal debt.
In conclusion, the individual behaviour of the explanatory variables during the second 
phase can be summarized as follows: imports consistently grow below their trend, thus 
clearly contributing to the positive cycle of the internal public debt. A less consistent 
behaviour is observed in the evolution of external financing and output. An apparent 
contrast is offered by the evolution of government expenditures which grow below their 
normal rate through the whole phase. Finally, the lagged value of the deviations from 
trend of the internal public debt seems to contribute to the permanence of the positive 
cycle of the internal public debt under discussion.
The third phase covers the first decade after World War II. During these years the growth 
rates (actual and predicted) of internal public debt continuously decline, reaching the 
historical rate in 1950, and then, lower rates than normal during the first half of the 1950s. 
Regarding the behaviour of individual explanatory variables, it appears that while output 
and external financing grow below their trends, and government expenditures grow above 
their trend (altogether suggesting that the growth rates of the internal debt could be 
increasing), imports grow well above their trend. The imports boom triggered by the 
normalization of international trade at the end of the conflict, reaches its height in the 
period 1953-56 when the average deviation of the growth rate of imports above trend 
equals 58%. As for government expenditures, it has to be noted that for the first time in 
twenty years their growth rates exceed the historical rate. In fact, the fiscal bonanza 
derived from the imports upsurge facilitates the increased government spending and allows 
internal debt to grow at a slower rate compared with the normal.
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2. Mid-1950s to mid-1980s
Two phases stand out during these years. A new positive cycle of the internal public debt 
since the early 1960s to the mid-1970s, and the period 1975-85 which largely duplicates 
the experience with internal public debt in the late 1920s and early 1930s.
The first phase is characterized by the following features: First, a negative cycle of imports 
which coincides with a negative cycle of world coffee prices. Second, a positive cycle of 
government spending particularly between 1967 and 1975, which reaches its peak in 1972 
-the second highest point in the whole series of government spending.
Third, an evolution of output which can be divided into two different subperiods. The first 
covers the years 1960-68 when output grows at a steady rate of about 3% less than the 
trend. In the second period (1968-75) output growth rates evolve consistently above 
trend, reaching levels not achieved before since the economic boom of the 1920s. Fourth, 
the external financing exhibits a series of no negligible ups and downs around the trend, 
which gives an impression of the financial instability of the period. On average, the 
external financing grows below trend. As a whole, with the only exception of output 
during 1968-75, the behaviour of the explanatory variables individually considered is 
consistent with the positive cycle of the internal public debt.
Why does the growth rate of internal public debt "jump" in 1962 as shown in Graph 18? 
1962 was already an important reference in our previous discussion of parameter 
constancy. The outstanding change in the internal debt is produced by a combination of 
economic and institutional facts at the center of which there are substantial losses made by 
the central bank in the foreign exchange market which are transformed into internal debt. 
There are also other institutional facts which contribute to the "jump" in 1962 and which 
reappear later during the 1960s and early 1970s; such is the case of substitutions of 
internal debt for part of the external debt. It is as a result of these facts and the commented
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evolution of the economic explanatory variables that the wave of increasing internal debt 
of the early 1960s prolonges its existence until the mid-1970s.
The second phase, covers the last decade of our period of study. To an important extent 
the 1975-85 period resembles the boom-and-bust cycles of the late twenties and early 
thirties. Two distinct features of the boom are the coffee bonanza of the years 1976-80, 
and the access to external financing (1979-82) on a scale not seen in the previous fifty 
years. In this context, a negative cycle of real internal public debt emerges and its deepest 
point in 1981 corresponds to the actual maximum negative deviation from trend in the 
whole period. This is only an ephemeral experience, however. The end of the temporary 
boom of the external sector, and particularly the sudden and abrupt collapse of external 
financing in 1982 brings about a new cycle of accumulating internal debt.
In the light of our explanatory variables how can we explain the negative cycle of internal 
public debt during 1975-81? First, we note that the positive cycle of government spending 
which started in the mid-1960s comes to an end after fiscal reforms implemented in 1975. 
Second, output and imports grow at rates superior to their normal ones: the average 
positive deviation of output from trend in the years 1978-80 is just somewhat inferior to 
that achieved in the boom of the late 1920s; as for imports, the new positive cycle though 
important and prolonged for six years, does not achieve the magnitudes of the twenties or 
the sixties. The scene is completed with the behaviour of external financing whose positive 
cycle echoes the experience of the late 1920s; its average positive deviation from trend in 
the years 1979-82 equals 34% compared with 40% in 1926-28. The sharp increase in 
foreign financing since 1979 reaches its summit in 1981, which is at the same time the 
maximum positive deviation from trend of the whole series. Altogether, the large positive 
cycles of external financing and output contribute to explain the deep negative cycle of 
internal public debt during 1975-1981. This contribution is supplemented by a positive 
cycle of imports and by a negative cycle of government expenditures, although in the last 
case only until 1978.
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If the interval 1975-81 parallels some episodes of the 1920s, the crisis which explodes in 
1982 reproduces experiences lived through in the early 1930s and leads to a new cycle of 
internal public debt growing above the historical trend. The economy already affected by 
the recessionary effects of the end of the coffee bonanza faces the breakdown of foreign 
lending in 1982. This crisis, however, is not as deep, prolonged and dramatic as its 
precedent of the 1930s which included an "official debt default". Following the downturn 
of external lending, a new negative cycle of foreign financing emerges: during 1983-85 its 
average negative deviation from trend reached 18% compared with the average positive 
deviation of 34% achieved during the booming period 1979-82. The lesser magnitude of 
the faUdown of external financing in 1983-85 compared with that of 1930-32 is illustrated 
by the fact that the average negative deviation from trend in the latter period was 44%, far 
greater than the 18% of the former period.
Also negative cycles of output (since 1982) and imports (since 1983) appear after the end 
of the coffee bonanza and the drying up of foreign credit. Altogether, the individual 
behaviour of f  u^ , Yu  ^and Mu  ^contribute to explain the new positive cycle of internal 
public debt. Regarding the behaviour of Gup the experience of the late 1920s and early 
1930s is repeated here. A positive cycle of government expenditures during 1979-84 
coincides with the negative cycle of internal public debt during most of that period. In the 
late 1920s the positive cycle of government expenditures was largely financed by a 
positive cycle of tax revenues derived from booming output and imports. In the early 
1980s the positive wave of government expenditures was mostly financed by financial 
proceeds obtained by the government from the investment and management of the 
unprecedented stock of international reserves left by the coffee bonanza of 1976-80.
As revealed by our descriptions, the behaviour of Yup f  u^  and Gu  ^is more consistent with 
the expected signs during the second half of the sample than during the first one. By taking 
these accounts and our estimates in Table 6, columns (3) and (5), as a whole, we observe
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how the estimated parameters of the explanatory variables just mentioned appear to be of 
greater size and more significant than during the first half of the series. Finally, it can be 
seen how Mu  ^which stood out for its consistency with the expected signs and significance 
during the first half of the sample, shows no statistical significance during the second half.
F. Conclusions
In this section we formalized our historically-based hypothesis of the shock-absorber role 
of internal public debt. By starting from the government budget constraint we derived a 
model according to which internal public debt deviates from its historical growth rate due 
to shocks on a set of hypothesized explanatory variables. In the absence of these shocks, 
the internal public debt grows at its historical rate.
According to the empirical results, shocks on the explanatory variables are significant and 
exhibit the expected signs. These results are qualified when further estimations are 
performed over subsamples, with some variables being more significant during the first 
half of the whole period of study, and other variables being more significant during the 
second half. Overall, all the estimations satisfy standard criteria for evaluation of 
econometric models.
Regarding the theoretical paradigms recalled at the beginning of the section, the estimation 
applied to the entire period of study suggests that the Colombian experience is better 
represented by paradigms which recognize the role of discretionary countercyclical 
policies over the business cycle. This finding is associated not only with the significant 
estimated parameter for the output variable which turned out to be far greater than unity, 
but also with the significant estimated parameter for the external financing variable. 
Unfortunately, the specification of the model did not allow us to derive more explicit 
conclusions about the relevance of individual paradigms for the interpretation of the 
Colombian case.
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To sum up, our statistical results offer an encouraging support to the hypothesis that 
internal public debt has performed a shock absorber role in Colombia. However, as 
expresed in the general introduction to this part of our study, the results achieved in this 
section represent not the end but rather half way of our enquiry. Our new endeavour is to 
ask whether when resorting to increase internal public debt governments exclusively rely 
on issuing additional bonds or prefer to combine both changes in public debt and changes 
in taxation. This is the subject of the next section.
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SECTION I 
NOTES
1. The intercept term did not enter significantly into any of the test regressions, so it was 
ommited from them to preserve the power of the tests. The definitions of the test for residual 
serial correlation [s2 (n)J and the ARCH test for heteroskedasticity [h%(n)] are discussed 
below regarding the estimations shown in Table 6. The fact that tiie ARCH tests are not 
significant means that the power of the unit root tests is not affected by serial correlation in 
the variance.
2. The LM test (Box and Pierce [1970] and Godfrey [1978]) is computed by regressing the 
OLS residuals e \  on all the regressors of the original model x^  and the lagged residuals for 
lags up to n ( e t^-1* —>e^ t-n)* test statistic s%(n) is T (observations) times the R^ for this 
regression. Kiviet (1986) finds that this version of the test has poor small sample properties 
and recommends the Lagrange Multiplier type F-test which seems to be invariant to sample 
size and redundant regressors.
3. Engle (1982) proposes a test for heteroskedasticity (the ARCH test) in which the e*^^ are 
regressed on their lagged values. The test checks for the significance of the estimated 
parameters. The h2 (n) test proposed by White (1980) is computed by regressing the on 
the regressors of the original model x^  and their corresponding squares The null of 
homoscedasticity is tested against the alternative that the variance of the e^  is a function of x^  
and x \  The test is also a general test for model specification. If the test is not statistically 
significant it implies that not only the variance specification of the model is correct, but Aso 
that the linear specification is correct (White [1980] p.823).
4. The Ramsey (1969) Reset test (Regression specification test) is a test for the omJLtted 
variables problem where the main assumption is that powers of the predicted value series 
(Y^t) provide a good approximation to omiJtted factors. The N(n) normality test is a 
Lagrange-Multiplier test proposed by Jarque and Bera (1980). It is a skewness-kurtosis test 
distributed as a chi-square with n degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis of normality 
in the residuals. The test reported in Table 6 is for n=2, which is the case offered by PC- 
GIVE.
5. The Dickey-Fuller test for the lagged level of the dependent variable is -4.51 which is 
significant at the 1% level (Critical value:-2.62). The regression required two lags of the 
differenced dependent variable to avoid serial correlation in the residuals. Neither a constant 
or a time trend proved to be significant.
6. The one-step residuals are obtained as follows: at each recursion an OLS residual for the 
last period in Ae sample is obtained and plotted against time. The plot includes error bands 
of +/-2o^t around zero (Charemza and Deadman, 1992). In the graphical representation of 
our case (not shown) it is visually clear that the standard error of the regression changes very 
little over the whole period.
7. The one-step scaled Chow test is obtained by dividing the Chow value by an x% critical 
value taken from the F-statistic tables. Under Ae null hypothesis, the scaled Chow test should 
be less than one. In our case, the test is 4.2 for 1962 and 2.2 for 1983.
8. Exogenous variables are those which are determined "from the outside" (Theil, 1981). 
According to Sargan (1975), it is a "pious fraud" to perform regressions under the untested 
assumption that stochastic regressors are independent of the disturbances.
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9. The Hausman specification method (Godfrey, 1988) to check for simultaneity bias 
essentially tests whether IV estimates are significantly different from OLS estimates. The 
"suspicious" regressors are regressed on a set of predetermined variables, and the predicted 
values are included in the original estimating equation. The test is distributed as a Chi-square 
with r degrees of freedom, where r is the number of independent parameter restrictions Wing 
tested.
10. The regression under column (4) does not pass the N(2) normality test. We explain this 
result as caused by the presence of an "outlier" in 1962, Ae last year of the series. It has been 
documented that the test is sensitive to unusually large deviations (Spanos, 1986).
11. The increase of government expenditures during 1933 was associated with recovery 
policies implemented after the Great Depression, and the financing of a war with a 
neighbouring country, Peru.
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SECTION II
A buffer-stock model of internal public debt
Introduction
In Section I we modelled and tested the hypothesis of the shock absorber role of internal 
public debt in Colombia. In this section we pursue our enquiry still further to check 
whether governments exclusively resort to internal public debt when facing unanticipated 
changes in the sources of tax revenues (output and imports), in government expenditures, 
and in external financing. The simple question is to what extent governments introduce 
changes in taxation to confront those unanticipated changes.
In this section we provide a rationale which attempts to offer a formal answer to that 
question. The importance given by authorities to unchanged tax rates is evaluated in 
terms of the importance attached to the achievement of an internal debt target. The 
estimating equation is specified in such a way that one of the parameters can convey 
information about how commited governments are to invariant tax rates over the business 
cycle.
The technical apparatus is largely based on a multiperiod costs of adjustment model, 
which has been widely applied in different areas of economic research. To mention some 
examples, Kenan (1979) discusses the multiperiod generalization of first-order partial 
adjustment models and its application to employment subjects; Hall, Henry and Wren 
Lewis (1986) apply the model to the case of manufacturing stocks; and Cuthbertson 
(1988), Cuthbertson and Taylor (1987) and Muscatelli (1988,1989) use the model in 
discussions about the buffer-stock role of money. In this section we apply the framework
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in the area of public finance, and in particular test the model on the internal public debt 
for Colombia during the period 1925-1985.
Our guiding theoretical reference is the literature on "financial buffers" as exposed by 
Laidler (1984,1988) and Goodhart (1984), and critically reviewed by Bain and 
McGregor (1985). Essentially, the literature recognizes that financial buffers smooth the 
response of the financial system to disturbances, so that equilibrium can be restored over 
time. In our case the financial buffer is a liability, the internal public debt, with the 
function of smoothing the treasury's response to disturbances so that budget balance can 
be achieved over the business cycle.
The remainder of the section is divided into three subsections. In subsection A we outline 
the model and show how it can be applied to the analysis of internal public debt. In 
subsection B we introduce alternative methods of econometric estimation of the model 
and discuss the corresponding results. Finally, in Subsection C we summarize the 
empirical results and highlight some links between this econometric section and other 
sections of this work.
A. Setup of the model
Consider the following aggregate expression for the current internal financial resources 
of the government, Rf,
R t=Tt+dFt  (1)
where T  ^represents current annual income revenues, and dF  ^stands for annual changes 
in internal financing. dF  ^is the difference between the end-of-year stocks of internal 
public debt, F^ . All these concepts are given in real terms. There is an important precision 
to be made about dF .^ This is an actual value which may be described as the sum of two 
components: a planned component and an unplanned component, as follows
dF t= dF P t+ dF ^t (2)
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How governments choose the planned component is a central aim of this section. The 
unplanned term in (2) reflects unsystematic annual deviations from the planned changes 
in F^ . The determination of the planned component may be seen as a target-seeking 
decision problem, namely, governments face the problem of deciding on dFP  ^in order to 
attain targets dF^*.
The following characteristics of the model are crucial for its further development and 
understanding: First, governments recognize the shock-absorber role of internal public 
debt. While public debt is seen as a buffer stock, taxes are regarded as the non-buffer 
component of the government financial resources. Due to a great extent to institutional 
factors, governments find less costly to change the stock of internal public debt rather 
than introducing changes in taxation. As a result of the different roles of debt and taxes, 
adjustments in taxation are penalized. Second, governments adopt internal debt targets. 
Finally, governments seek to minimize the costs of deviating from the debt targets, as 
well as the costs associated with changes in taxation.
Before going on it is convenient to express (1) and (2) in terms of the relative size of the 
economy,
R t / Y t  = T t / Y t  + d F t / Y t  d ' )
d F t / Y t  = dF P t /Y t  + d F ^ t / Y t  ( 2 ' )
where is the annual value of real GDP.
Formally, the problem of the government can be stated as the minimization of a
multiperiod quadratic loss function, which in the infinite time horizon can be written as
1=0
■ o
Min C = Et-il 2 D^{ao[dFt+i/Yt+i - (dFt+i/Yt+i> *] 2
+ ai[Tt+i/Yt+i - Tt+i-l/Yt+i-l]2} (3)
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where is the expectations operator. The process of government's decision-making is 
posed as based on information available at period t-1. is the governments' discount 
factor which in turn can be expressed as = l/(l+s)i where (s) is the "subjective" 
discount rate of the government. The target is given by (dF^+i/Yt+i)*. The first bracket 
shows the difference between actual changes in debt and the target (both as shares of 
GDP). The parameter ag reflects the relative weight given by governments to the 
fulfilment of the debt target. Note that for the moment it is assumed that dF^t/^t = 0.
The second bracket exhibits the difference between the current average tax rate (for i=0) 
and the previous period average tax rate. As seen above, taxes are the non-buffer 
component of government resources, and consequently governments want to minimize 
periodic changes in taxation. The relative importance given by governments to this 
minimization is expressed by the parameter aj. A high value of aj, relative to the size of 
ag, reveals that governments pursue a stabilized average tax rate over time.
The solution of the optimization problem under discussion is characterized by the 
certainty equivalence property. This property is a common feature which emerges when 
solving linear quadratic problems. The solution is equivalent to that which would obtain 
if governments knew all the future values of dFP^+ /^Y^^p This point will be explicit 
below in the derivation of the behavioural equation for dFP /^Y .^
oo
Governments are assumed to choose a sequence {dFP^ +{/Y^ +{} to minimize (3). This
i=0
sequence must satisfy the first-order necessary conditions obtained by differentiating (3) 
with respect to dF^+i/Y^+i, for i=0,l,2,... Taking in account the definition given in (!') 
we get the following system of second-order linear difference equations,
Et+i-l{&0[dFt+i/Yt+i -  (dFt+i/Yt+i)*] 
a'l [ T t + i / Y t + i  “ T t+ i -1  / Y t + i - i  ]
+ a ' | D [ T t+ i+ i / Y t + i + i  -  T t + i / Y t + i ] }  = 0
where i=0 , 1 , 2 , . . . ,
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which can be rewritten as
[ao+a-i (1+D) ]dFt+i/Yt+i - a-j dFt+i-i/Yt+i-i
-  D a i d F t + i + i / Y t + i + i
ao [dFi+j_/Y-|--|-i] * + a-j [R-t+i/Y-t+i - R-t+i-i/Y-t+i-i ]
-  Da-i [Rt+i+1/Yt+i+1 -  R t + i / Y t + i ] '
1=0,1,2,... (4)
The system in (4) is known as the "Euler equations". The corresponding solution requires 
two boundary conditions: the initial debt-income ratio dF^-l/Yt-l* a terminal or 
transversality condition which is a necessary condition for optimality. Sargent (1987, 
p.200) shows that the transversality condition takes the form:
lim {DT[ao(dFt+xA"t+T)* + ai(Rt+x/Yt+T - Rt+T-l/^t+T-l)T->oo
- (ao+ai)dPt+xA"t+T + aidPt+X-l/Yt+T-l]} = 0
The solution of (4) is as follows. Defining a=aQ/a% and using the forward operator 
dF^/Yt = dF^+n/Yt+n, becomes
[1 - (a+l+D)L/D + L2/D]dFt+i/Yt+i = - a/D (dFt+i-l/Yt+l-l)*
- 1/D [Rt+i-l/Yt+i-1 “ Rt+i-2/Yt+l-2]
[ R t + i / ^ t + i  “ R t + i - 1 / ^ t + i - 1  ] (4 ' )
The coefficient on the left-hand side of (4') can be factorized as
[1 - (a+1+D)L/D + l 2/d ] = (1-q^L)(1-q2L)
= 1 - (q^+q2)L + q ' \ q 2 l j ^ (5)
from which it is seen that q2 = l/Dqj, and (l-qi)(l-q2) = -a/D. (This last equation will 
be recalled later in the interpretation of the estimates of qj). The roots q%, q2 lie on either
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side of the unit circle rendering one stable (say qi<l) and one unstable (q2>l) root.
Thus, (4') has a unique stationary solution, 0<qi<l. Substituting from (5) into (4') gives
d-q^L) (1-q2L)dFt+i/Yt+i =
[ 1 - q d  [ 1 - ( q i D ) - 1 ]  [ d F t + i - l / Y t + i - l ] *
- 1/D [Rt+i-l/Yt+i-1 - Rt+i-2/Yt+i-2]
[ R t + i /Y t+ i  ~ R t + i - 1 / ^ t + i - 1  ]
To satisfy the transversality condition the unstable factor (l-q2 L) must be removed from 
both sides of (6). Recalling that q2>l» such elimination can be performed by applying the 
forward expansion of the polinomial 1/1-q2 L, as explained by Sargent (1987, p. 178 and 
203). The final outcome of the solution is the following equation for the planned ratio 
dFPt+j/Yt+i, where according to the certainty equivalence property quoted above, future 
values of dF/Y and R/Y are replaced by their expected values based on information at t- 
1:
dFPt/Yt = qi(dF/Y)t-1 +
(1-qi) (1-qiD)S^^qiD)ÎEt-i (dF/Y) *t+i +
1/D.sJqiD)iEt-i [(R/Y)t+i - (R/Y)t+±-l] -
1—1
oo
S^^lD)iEt-i[(R/Y)t+i+l - (R/Y)t+±] (7)
Equation (7) shows that governments' current decisions about dFP /^Y  ^depend not only 
on the historical record (first term on the right-hand side) but also on the expected future 
values of dF/Y (second term on the right hand side). An additional source of information 
is the expected future behaviour of government resources as a share of GDP (third and 
fourth terms on the right- hand side). The model imposes testable restrictions on the 
parameters in two ways: First, the weight (qj) which appears affecting the forward-
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looking variables, also affects the lagged value of the dependent variable. Second, the 
weights on the expected variables decline geometrically as time elapses into the future. 
These aspects are discussed later when estimating the model.
How can we interpret the expectational terms in (7)? The second term in the equation 
indicates that if governments pursue stochastic targets, the planned ratio dFP /^Y  ^will 
depend on the variables determining (dF/Y)*^+pl Alternatively, if governments define a 
fixed ratio [dF/Y]* as a target, the second term becomes a constant value, and the 
expectational effects are reserved to the last two terms of the equation.
Regarding only the third and fourth terms, the final outcome for dFP /^Y  ^depends on the 
growth rate of R/Y and on the value of D. Consider some examples. Given a steady 
growth in R/Y with 0<D<1, dFP /^Y  ^increases. In the extreme case when D=l, a steady 
growth in R/Y leaves dFP /^Y  ^unaffected. Similarly, if R/Y is growing at an increasing 
rate over the planning period, with D=l, dFP /^Y  ^falls. In conclusion, the final effects of 
the third and fourth terms of equation (7) on dFP /^Y  ^depend on the actual value of the 
discount rate and the behaviour of the ratio (R/Y) over time.
The adoption of a fixed target for (dF/Y)* leaves us with a new version of equation (7) in 
which the second term is replaced by the expression
[ 1 + q i D + ( q i D ) 2 + . (dF/Y)* = [ 1 / 1 -q^D] (dF/Y)* 
given that (dF/Y)* is a constant and qi< l. Considering a finite horizon (i=l,2,...T), and 
letting R^ /Y^  = r^ , we get
dFPt/Yt = qi(dF/Y)t_1 + ( 1-qi ) (dF/Y)* +
1/D (q>|D)iEt-i (drt+i) - 
1=1
ET (q iD )Î E t - 1 ( d r t + i + 1 ) (8)
i— I
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Graph 20 displays the paths of and the average tax rate (T /^Y^ ) over time. A small 
positive historical growth rate of 1% characterizes r^  during the period of study. As 
suggested by the graph, the path of r^  is mainly determined by the average tax rate, 
excepting the temporary jumps of the series in the 1930s, 1940s, 1960s, and early 1980s, 
which we documented in our "stylized facts" (Part II). Therefore, governments could 
consider the average tax rate as a proxy of the variable r^ .
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A further simplification implies the adoption of finite series for the expectational 
arguments (say T=2), and a value for D. By choosing a value of D=l, which facilitates 
matters substantially, (8) becomes^
dFPt/Yt = qi(dF/Y)t_i + (1-qi)(dF/Y)* + qidr^t+i +
(qi2-qi)dr®t+2 " Ql^dr^t+S (8' )
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where the superscript (e) indicates the expected values of drt^.j based on the information 
available at time t-1.
This is the moment to go back to equation (2') which divides the actual value of the ratio 
dF^/YI into a planned and an unplanned component. The unplanned component can be 
expressed as follows,
dF^t/Yt =
bo(Y-Y®)t + b-] (G-G®) t + b2(M-M®)t + bg(f'-f'^)t (9)
where the terms in brackets represent current innovations in output, government 
expenditure, imports and foreign financing respectively. As seen, these variables are the 
same explanatory variables which appeared in our estimating equation (equation 7) in the 
previous section. ^
Equations (8') and (9) are the basic ingredients of an estimating equation for dF /^Y .^ 
However, the evolution of the actual series as depicted in Graph 21 suggests that two 
dummy variables are necessary to account for sharp and temporary increases (1932 and 
1962) and decreases (1934,1963, and 1975). The facts are documented next.
The extreme changes in the dF/Y ratio derive not only from sudden changes in the 
nominal debt but from marked movements in the inflation rate (Graph 16, Part II). An 
unprecedented increase in the nominal stock of debt (54%) combined with the lowest 
point of the price deflation of the early 1930s (-23% of inflation rate) produced the 1932 
sharp increase in dF/Y. On the contrary, the one-shot spectacular increase of the inflation 
rate in 1934 combined with a rather stagnated stock of nominal debt led to the lowest 
point of dF/Y in the whole series. The inflation rate in 1934 (39%) is the highest one 
recorded during the period of analysis, and the one-shot nature of that increase is 
revealed by the fact that the inflation rate was 5% in 1933, and 4% in 1935.
277
GRAPH 21
n U S T T E R lS r A I - .  O E B T
ANJSTOAX. C H A N G E S  A S  % O E  G D P
O - OV
O . 0 6
0 . 0 5
O . 0 4
0 . 0 3
O . 0  2
0.01
—  0.01
O . 0 2
2 6  3 0 5 5  6 0  6 5  7  0 S O  S  53  5  4 0  4  5 5 0 7  5
EER.XOD 1 9 2 6  — 1 9 8 5
□ A N N U A L  C H A N G E S
SOURCES 
Informe del Contralor 
CEPAL (1957)
IMF
The sharpest increase of dP/Y happened in 1962; it resulted from the largest one-year 
increase in the nominal debt (125%) in the series excluding the 1980s. The extreme 
positive point achieved in 1962 was followed by a negative one in 1963 due to an abrupt 
one-year increase in the inflation rate; in fact, in only 1963 the inflation rate was 27% 
when the average for the five previous years had been 8%, and the average for the next 
five years did not exceed 11%. Finally, a notable reduction of the nominal debt stock 
(15%) in 1975 led to a negative value of dF/Y similar to that reached in 1963.
The contexts of these changes were described in our "stylized facts" (Part H). The 
alternated positive and negative extremes of dF/Y in 1932 and 1934 occurred during the
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period of active reflationary policies which followed the Great Depression. While in 
1932 the economy was still at the bottom of the recession, by 1934 the whole range of 
activist policies which involved monetary, fiscal and exchange rate measures had 
produced a notable inflationary burst. These were temporary episodes followed by years 
of traditionally conservative financial policies. The events of the early 1960s were 
associated to the external crisis of the time: the sharp increase of internal public debt in 
1962 was principally due to the enlargement of government liabilities aimed to finance 
central bank losses in the foreign exchange market; and the high inflation rate of 1963 
came about after a massive devaluation at the end of 1962 followed by substantial wage 
increases. Finally, the reduction of the nominal debt stock in 1975 arose from processes 
of fiscal reform explicitly orientated to cut down government expenditures, increase tax 
revenues and reduce the size of the public debt.
Back to our formal discussion, the estimating equation can be written as follows
dFt/Yt = qi(dF/Y)t-1 + (1-qi)(dF/Y)* + q^dr®t+1 +
( q i 2 - q i ) d r ® t + 2  “ q i ^ d r ^ t + g  + bo(Y-Y®)t + 
b'l (G-G®) t + b2(M-M®)t + b3(f'-f'^)t + +
V2 + wt (10)
where is the dummy which accounts for the positive jumps in the series, V2  the 
dummy which reflects the negative jumps, and w  ^is an error term.
Having arrived to the estimating equation, the immediate concern is the discussion of 
appropriate methods of estimation. Since equation (10) has been derived under the 
assumption that the internal debt target is deterministically defined, the first task is to 
explain how the target can be obtained. Subsequently, the econometric alternatives are 
presented, before proceeding to estimate and test the model in equation (10).
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B. Estimation and empirical results.
1. Determination of a fixed target.
To start with we indicate how to determine the fixed value of the target (dF/Y)*. 
Consider the real internal public debt as a share of GDP, given by fpF^/Y^. Its historical 
evolution is shown in Graph 22. As expected, according to our previous descriptions, the 
series "peaks" during the external crises periods of the early 1930s, 1940s, 1960s, and 
1980s, when the real internal debt represented about one tenth of GDP. The common 
aftermath of these episodes is a substantial reduction in the actual values of the series, 
coinciding with periods of macroeconomic stabilization and fiscal reforms. Furthermore, 
it is ostensible how the series represented a negligible part of GDP before the outbreak of 
the financial crises of the 1930s and 1980s; both two events followed periods of external 
bonanzas and high growth rates.
The behaviour of F^ /Y^  reveals interesting similarities and contrasts with the traditional 
wisdom about the historical behaviour of public debt, particularly in Western developed 
economies. Public debt achieves its highest proportions of income during periods of war 
or "national emergency", the argument goes, and then declines during periods of peace.
In our case, external crises constitute a crucial source of "national emergencies" and the 
cause of huge increases in public debt. Once "normality" is restablished the F /^Y  ^ratio 
goes back to lower levels. On average, the stock of internal public debt has corresponded 
to 5.23% of GDP.
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Leaving aside the peculiarities of Graph 22 it is worthwhile to ask whether the ratio 
f^=Ft/Y( would ever stop changing given the presence of government deficits which are 
at least partly internally financed. The growth rate of f can be divided as follows,
df/f = dF/F - dY/Y (11)
where dF/F is the annual growth rate of internal government financing, and dY/Y = n the 
annual growth rate of GDP. In the steady state, with df/f = 0, we get dF/F = n, which 
means that an hypothetical stationary value of f- corresponds to the internal debt 
growing at the same rate of the economy. The last equality can be rewritten in terms of 
output, to yield the following result,
nf~ = dF/Y (12)
which says that given the output growth rate and the stationary value of the debt/output 
ratio, the value of dF/Y is obtained. In other words, (12) shows that the change in the
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annual internal financing must be held to an x% of GDP in order to stabilize the F/Y 
ratio at a level hypothetically predetermined by governments.
Equation (12) gives us an idea of how governments can select a target value for (dF/Y)*. 
Suppose that in our case study governments endorse the average value of f, namely, 
5.23%; given a trend growth rate of output of 4.54%, the annual change in the stock of 
internal debt must be held to 0.23% of GDP. This simple procedure is just an application 
of the public debt literature of the 1940s associated with the names of Alvin Hansen and 
Evsey Domar (Domar, 1944), which we discussed earlier in Part I, Section I of this work. 
The seminal idea which was neglected for three decades before being rediscovered in the 
1980s along Keynesian lines (Blanchard, 1984, Eisner, 1987) is that in a growing 
economy there is some equilibrium ratio F/Y consistent with any dF/Y ratio.^
What is the significance of fixed targets and how do they fit in the context of equation 
(10)? Fixed targets represent government commitments not to deviate from a determined 
F/Y ratio for economic and/or political reasons. On merely technical grounds it would be 
desirable to know which of the possible values of f- is consistent with the economy’s 
long-run equilibrium. But it would, at least, demand information on portfolio behaviour 
(Tobin, 1985,1986). Fixed targets can be seen as temporary measures adopted in the 
light of their stabilizing effects. Operationally, they constitute a sort of integral control 
mechanism by which there is an automatic correction for past deviations from the value 
of the adopted target (Artis, 1987).
Back to equation (10) it is worth noting that the model itself implies that governments’ 
decisions regarding planned changes in internal financing are more complex than the 
design of fixed targets. The expected future evolution of government financial resources 
constitute an additional ingredient in the process of decision making. Additionally, the 
actual values of dF/Y are affected by innovations which by definition escape from 
planning processes. A further point is the implication of the chosen value of the target
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(0.23% of GDP) for the estimation results. In fact, the setting of a specific value of the 
target only affects the scale on which the variables of the model are estimated. Particular 
values of (dF/Y)* do not affect the dynamic behaviour of the model. However, the fixed 
target is a simple device applied in the formulation of the quadratic cost function (3) and 
the derivation of equation (10).
2. Estimation methods.
A central idea in equation (10) is that governments form expectations rationally about 
future values of some variables. The (X®^ +i) terms are the unobservable values of the 
explanatory variables (X^ j^) expected by governments at time t-1 to prevail at t+i. It has 
been previously assumed that governments do not foresee more than three years ahead 
when planning their internal financing for period t.
Two methods widely mentioned in the literature are applied to the estimation of (10).
The first method assumes that agents, governments in this case, only utilize part of the 
relevant information in forming their expectations regarding (X^+j). Lagged values of 
(X) constitute the most probable information to be considered by governments. Because 
only a portion of the relevant information is taken in account, the method is termed 
"partly rational" or "weakly rational". According to this approach governments would 
replace the rationally expected variables in (10) by forecasts obtained from univariate 
regressions of the (X^ ) variables on their own lagged values. The method is 
complemented by the application of the chain rule of forecasting, according to which 
future values of a variable can be expressed as a function only of information available at 
the time the forecasts are made.
The second method assumes that agents, governments in our case, use all the relevant 
available information in forming their expectations respecting (X^+j). The procedure 
suggests to replace the expected variables (X^^+j) by observed values of the same
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variables By creating measurement errors in the (X) variables the model will only
depend on observable variables (Wickens, 1982).
a. The ” substitution" method.
The econometric results obtained from the application of the methods just mentioned 
appear in tables 7, 8, and 9. The initial stage in implementing the first method, also called 
the "substitution" method, is the estimation of forecasting equations for the expectational 
variables in (10). Table 7 displays the forecasting equations chosen after running 
regressions of sixth order autoregressive processes, including a constant. The 
parsimonious versions of these processes for real GDP and for real government 
expenditures are given by first-order autoregressions. The five preferred equations offer 
an adequate representation of the empirical evidence in terms of fit (though the for 
the f  equation is somewhat lower) and in terms of absence of serial correlation in the 
residuals of up to order 4 and 6, at the 5% significant level.
The forecasting equations were used to obtain the expected data series required for the 
estimation of (10), The current expected values for output, government expenditures, 
imports and external financing were used to obtain the current shocks on these variables, 
as given by the difference between actual and expected values. The equation for r^  - 
number (1) in Table 1- was applied to generate the current, one-step, two-steps and three- 
steps ahead predictions, by means of the chain rule of forecasting. These 
predictions were used to derive the series for the dr^^+i terms in equation (10).
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TABLE 7
Autoregressive Forecasting Equations
(1) Ratio government internal financial resources to GDP equation, r^  = R^ /Y^
r+ = 0.588rt_i + 0.428rt_5 
^ (5.38) (3.76)
r 2=0.954, SE=1.70, DW=2.36, s i(4)=5.48, S2(4)=1.36 
si(6)=7.25, S2(6)=1.19
(2) Real GDP equation.
Yt = 0.827Yt_i 
 ^ (12.22)
r 2=0.720, SE=0.026, DW=2.42, s i(4)=5.37, S2(4)=1.35 
si(6)=6.94, S2(6)=1.16
(3) Real government expenditure equation
Gt = 0.989Gt_i 
(47.5)
r2=0.974, SE=0.011, DW=2.4, si(4)=5.91, S2(4)=1.50 
si(6 )= 8 .00 , S2(6)=1.36
(4) Real imports equation
Mt = l . l l lM + i  - 0.318Mt_3 + 0.250Mt_6 
(12.57) (-2.85) (2.59)
r 2=0.976, SE=0.209, DW=2.04, si (4)=0.887, S2(4)=0.20 
si(6)=1.003, S2(6)=0.14
(5) Ratio external financing to exports equation.
f t  = 0.685fVl + 0.367ft_5 - 0.288fV 6 
^ (7.42) (2.76) (-2.08)
r 2=0.548, SE=0.172, DW=1.97, si (4)=4.22, S2(4)=1.00 
si(6)=5.69, S2(^=0.89
NOTES
Asymptotic t-statistics are shown in parentheses 
SE: standard error of the regression 
DW: Durbin Watson statistic
Lagrange Multiplier statistics for autocorrelation up to order (n): 
CHISQ(n): si(n)
F(n, T-n-k): S9 (n). T: observations, k: regressors_____________
The results of the OLS estimation of the forward-looking model for the period 1931-85 
appear in Table 8.
285
TABLE 8 
Estimates of the Forward-Lookina Model
1931-1985
(1) (2) (3)
Unrestricted
Model
Restricted
Model
Restricted
Model
Significant
Variables
REGRESSORS
(dF/Y)t-1 0.25
(2.1)
1.19
(2.77)
0.97
(2.89)
(dF/Y)* -0.97
(-0.35)
1 .87 
(2.61)
1 .67 
(2.59)
dr®t+1 -0.40
(-0.16)
<3r®t+2 -0.52
(0.15)
dr®t+3 0.97
(0.17)
dr®t -0.009
(-0.73)
YUt -0.06 
(-1.08)
-0.053 
(-1.075)
G'^ t -0.003
(-0.03)
-0.012
(-0.12)
-0.02
(-2.40)
-0.016
(-2.53)
-0.018
(-3.23)
f'^t -0.008 
(-1.08)
-0.007
(-0.94)
Vi 0.051
(7.56)
0.050
(7.68)
0.049
(8.10)
V2 -0.031
(-5.16)
-0.031
(-5.26)
-0.031
(-5.57)
TESTS
r 2
S'! (4) 
52(4) 
hi (4) 
h2(4) 
N(2)
0.75 
6.78 
1 .41 
1.13 
0.86 
0.22
0.74 
5.59 
1.19 
1 .24 
1 .47 
0.19
0.73 
3.49 
0.78 
1 .27 
2.41* 
0.419
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R(2) 3.18 2.95 3.15
RESTRICTIONS'
TESTS
LR(2) 0.96
F(2, 55-11) 0.40
NOTES
1. Asymptotic t-statistics are shown in parentheses.
2. Tests are defined as in the previous section. They are
also explained in the text.
Are these results consistent with the framework previously exposed? Two elements are 
crucial in the model under discussion. The first concerns the magnitude of the root qj. As 
explained above, 0<qi<l, but the closeness of q j to either one or the other extreme 
shows how important is for governments to keep fixed average tax rates (Tt/Y^ )^ over the 
business cycle. A value of qj close to 1 reveals that governments give considerable 
importance to the constancy of tax rates. In particular, it reveals that governments are 
very much concerned with preserving tax-rates stability than with keeping their debt 
targets. This government behaviour is illustrated in the quadratic loss function (3) by a 
high value of a% attached to the costs of changing the average tax rates, as compared with 
the value of ag [Recall that as seen in (5), q i  depends on a{=ao/ai} and D]. Conversely, 
a value of q% near to 0 signifies that fixed average tax rates are not a policy priority, and 
in any case, that the weight a% is just greater than ag which is the weight attached by 
governments to the fact of being away from a debt target. The second crucial aspect of 
the model is that it implies a testable restriction between the backward-and-forward 
looking variables: q \  which is the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable appears 
affecting the forward variables.
The unrestricted version of the model reports an estimate of q \  equal to 0.25 which is 
significant at the 5% level. This result suggests that a% is not very much higher than ag in 
equation (3), what amounts to say that in our case study governments have not attached 
an important weight to the costs of varying average tax rates. The restricted version of 
the model is obtained after imposing the estimated value of q \  on the backward and
287
forward variables, and on the term (dF/Y)* in equation (10). The validity of these 
restrictions is checked at the bottom of table 8 by applying conventional tests: the 
likelihood ratio test, LR(g), asymptotically distributed as chi-square (g) where g is the 
number of restrictions; and equivalently, an F-test for g restrictions on the unrestricted 
model, distributed as F(g,T-K) under the null hypothesis that the restrictions are valid. 
Given two restrictions (g=2), the 5% critical values are 5.99 and 3.21 respectively. Since 
the results reported in the table are less than the critical values, the null hypothesis that 
the restrictions are valid is statistically accepted.
The restricted model was reestimated only considering the most significant variables 
(Column 3). The estimated coefficients of the lagged dependent variable, and of the 
constant target value are preceded by the right sign, and significant at the 5% level. The 
expectational term which appeared in column (2) preceded by the hypothesized sign (-), 
given D=1 and the positive growth trend of (r^ ), proved to be insignificant, and therefore 
had to be excluded from the regression under column (3). If, hypothetically, governments 
considered the tax rate (T/Y) as a proxy for r^ , as previously discussed, the results in 
Table 8 would be quite similar: in particular, the estimated value of q% in the unrestricted 
model would be the same (0.25) and significant (t-statistic:2.78), and the expectational 
term in column (2) would be significant at the 10% level.
Imports appear to be the most significant shock affecting the actual ratio dF /^Y .^ The 
dummy variables are clearly significant at the 5% level, and their performance is 
illustrated in Graph 23. The first dummy (V^) captures the huge upsurges of public debt 
in 1932 and 1962. The second dummy (V2) fits the noticeable debt decreases in 1934, 
1963 and 1975.
The data coherency suggested by the behaviour of actual and fitted values in Graph 23 is 
better appreciated in the criteria reported in Table 8, where the test statistics denoted by a 
(*) reject Hq at the 5% significance level. The models perform satisfactorily within
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sample regarding the fit: 75% of the total sum of squares is explained by the regressions. 
Additionally, the absence of a systematic lack-of-fit is confirmed by the outcome of tests 
for residual autocorrelation and residual heteroskedasticity.
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Forward-looking model for the real internal public debt (estimating equation 10 and 
estimates in Table 8). Actual and fitted values.
SOURCES 
Informe del Contralor
As in the previous section, si(n) is the Lagrange Multiplier test asymptotically 
distributed as a chi-squared distribution under the null; and S2 (n) is the Lagrange 
Multiplier type F-test. Similarly, h%(n) is the ARCH test in its F-form and h2 (n) a test for 
heteroskedasticity due to squares of the regressors. N(n) is a test for normality of the 
residuals, and R(n) is the RESET test for departures from the linearity assumption. The 
unrestricted model and the restricted model pass all the tests but there is a marginal
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failure of the h2 (n) test in the regression under column (3) which emerges when the 
variable is excluded from the set of explanatory variables.
The time path of the residuals corresponding to the restricted model (Table 8, column 3) 
appears in Graph 24.
GRAPH 24
i c i s r T E T ^ n s r A . i_ .  o e b t
E S T X M A .T E D  R E S X D U A X .S  BXJEEER. S T O C K  M O D E L
O . 0 2
0.01
O - OO B
—O.00  5
—  0 . 0 1
—0.015
—  0 . 0 2
6 0 6 5 7 5 8 03  5 4  0  4  5 5 0 5 5 8  5
B E K IO D  1 9 2 9 —1 9 8 5  
□ E S T IM A T E D  V A L U E S
NOTES
Estimated residuals for the forward-looking model (estimating equation 10 and estimates 
in Table 8).
SOURCES 
Informe del Contralor
It can be shown that the series is statistically stationary.^ Some "outliers" are observed in 
1957, and particularly in 1983 and 1984. Tests for parameter constancy are applied, and 
new estimates obtained after running regressions with 9 forecasts over the period 1931- 
1985 are reported in Table 9. The two tests for parameter constancy used here are the 
"Hendry forecast test" (Hendry, 1983) and the Chow test. The analysis of 1-step forecasts
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reveal that the Chow test is significant for the years 1983 and 1984, but overall, the four 
estimations shown in Table 9 pass the Chow test CH(n, T-k-n). As for the Hendry 
forecast test H(n) the outcomes are rather high.^ The estimate of q% in the unrestricted 
model is somewhat lower than in the previous exercise and significant at 10% when the 
more significant variables are considered.
The validity of the backward-forward restrictions for the estimations in Table 9 is 
corroborated by the corresponding LR(g) and F(g,T-K) tests. Both the restricted and the 
unrestricted models exhibit serial correlation but this characteristic vanishes when 
regressions are limited to the significant variables. Residual autocorrelation is a likely 
outcome in regressions with forward-looking variables where the predicted series are 
generated by repeated substitutions based upon information available at the time the 
forecasts are made. Finally, the R^ and the rest of the tests displayed on Table 9 
substantiate the idea obtained from the regressions in Table 8, according to which the 
models adequately characterize the empirical evidence.
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T A B L E  9
E stim ates o f  the Forw ard-Looking M odel
1931-1985
9 Forecasts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
UNRESTRICTED UNRESTRICTED RESTRICTED RESTRICTED
REGRESSORS MODEL MODEL MODEL MODEL
SIGNIFICANT SIGNIFICANT
VARIABLES VARIABLES
(dF/Y)t-i 0 . 2 0 0 . 1 5 0 . 9 4 0 . 7 2
( 1 . 5 4 ) (1 . 68) (1 . 6 4 ) ( 1 . 5 8 )
(dF/Y)* 1 . 52 1 . 10 1 .01
( 0 . 5 3 ) (1 . 61) ( 1 . 6 7 )
- 0 . 0 7
( - 0 . 0 3 )
d r^ t+ 2 - 0 . 0 9
( - 0 . 0 3 )
d r^ t+ 3 0 . 1 4
( 0 . 0 2 )
dr®^ - 0 . 0 1
( - 0 . 5 0 )
Y^t - 0 . 0 5 - 0 . 0 5
( - 1 . 0 1 ) ( - 1 . 0 6 )
G^t - 0 . 0 3 - 0 . 0 2
( - 0 . 2 3 ) ( - 0 . 2 2 )
- 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 0 1 3
( - 1 . 6 9 ) ( - 1 . 9 3 ) ( - 1 . 7 8 ) ( - 2 . 0 9 )
f*U^ - 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 0 1
( - 0 . 0 2 ) ( - 0 . 0 6 )
Vi 0 . 0 5 0 . 0 5 0 . 0 5 0 . 0 5
( 8 . 2 6 ) ( 9 . 4 1 ) ( 8 . 6 1 ) ( 9 . 0 6 )
V2 - 0 . 0 3 - 0 . 0 2 - 0 . 0 3 - 0 . 0 3
( - 4 . 2 1 ) ( - 4 . 3 3 ) ( - 4 . 3 8 ) ( - 4 . 7 )
TESTS
r 2 0 . 7 8 0 . 7 5 0 . 7 8 0 . 7 6
S'! (4) 1 2 . 8 * 5 . 8 7 1 3 . 0 * 9 . 0 8
82(4) 2 . 9 8 * 1 . 40 3 . 3 * 2 . 2 7
hi (4) 0 . 6 2 2 . 3 6 0 . 7 2 1 .71
h2(4) 0 . 9 8 1 . 29 1 . 04 1 . 8 3
N(2) 0.81 0 . 9 7 0 . 7 9 0 . 9 2
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H(9)
CH(n,T-k-n) 
R(2)
LR(2)
F(2, 46-11)
2 . 0  
1 .5 
1 .44
2.5
2.1
2.36
0.09
0.04
2 . 0  
1 . 6  
1 .4
2 . 1  
1 . 8 
1 .9
NOTES
1. Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses
2. H(n) is the Hendry forecast test, and CH(n, T-k-n) the Chow test 
Other tests as in Table 8.
b. The "errors in variables" method.
The model in (10) will depend only on observable variables if the expected variables, 
dr®t+i (i=l,2,3), are replaced by the first three leads of the actual series dr .^ Because this 
procedure resembles an errors-in-variables model the OLS estimation of the parameters 
of the dr  ^variables is asymptotically biased toward zero. An alternative technique of 
estimation is based on instrumental variables (IV). Thus, (10) can be consistently 
estimated by the IV method, with the instrument for the vector of observations dr  ^being 
the estimated vector dr^| obtained from the OLS regression of dr  ^on a matrix of 
exogenous variables and instruments.
There is a particular reason for the use of the IV approach. It has been documented 
(Pagan, 1984), that the standard errors computed in the second step of the "substitution" 
method are biased downwards, and therefore the t-statistics tend to overstate the true 
values. This drawback of the statistical inference with the two-step estimator is overcome 
by applying the IV method. Additionally, our model satisfies the conditions required for 
identification. As it is recognized, these conditions have to be checked before applying 
rv  procedures (Pesaran,1987). It was formerly explained that the model has two 
characteristic roots, real and distinct (q% and q2), where q2 exceeded unity and -the 
stable root- was less than unity. Then the model is identified as characterized by a unique 
stationary solution.
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The results of the IV estimation of equation (10) over the period 1931-1982 are presented 
in Table 10. A set of instruments chosen according to the goodness of fit of the model is 
used in the case of the first three regressions.^
The first contrast between the two-step estimators regression (1) in Table 8 and 
regression (1) in Table 10 is that the IV estimation reports significant estimates for the 
variables dr^+i and dr^ _|_2 which replace the expectational terms dr^^+l and dr®t+2- A 
second IV estimation with the significant variables of regression (1) as explanatory 
variables yields an estimate for dr^ +^i which is significant at the 5% level, and an estimate 
for (ki^2 significant at the 10% level. By carrying on the process of looking for a more 
parsimonious version of the estimation results the significance of the dr^ +^i terms vanishes 
completely. As seen in the table, after running equation (3) we are left with the simple 
OLS estimation whose results are reported in column (4).
The second contrast with the results in Table 8 is the lack of significance of TV estimates 
of the coefficient q \  of the lagged dependent variable, although the more parsimonious 
regression in column (4) reports an estimated coefficient of q \  equal to that of the two- 
step estimators regression (1) in Table 8. As with the estimation results in Table 9, the 
diminished significance of the estimate of qj appears to be related to the reduced size of 
the sample observations.
TABLE 10 
Estimates of the Forward-Looking Model 
1931-1982 
Instrumental Variables
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( 1 )
IV
(dF/Y)t-1
(dF/Y)*
d^t+1
d r t + 2
d r t + 3
Yut
Gut
Mu^ -
f *ut
V1
V2
TESTS
r 2  
TVS 
S'] (4)
S2 (4) 
hi (4) 
h2(4)
N(2)
R(2)
0.08
(0.94)
1 .03 
(2.25)
-0.0032
(-2.93)
- 0.0021
(-2.35)
- 0 . 0 0 1 0  
(-1.55)
-0.03
(-0.65)
-0.040
(-0.50)
-0.008 
(-1.53)
0 . 0 0 2
(0.34)
0.037
(4.59)
-0.018
(-3.25)
3.71 
1 .47
0 . 6 6  
2 . 1 1  
0.91
( 2 )
IV
Significant
Variables
(a)
0.11 
(1 .33)
0 . 8 6
(2.03)
- 0 . 0 0 2
(-2.42)
- 0.001  
(-1.80)
(3) (4)
-0.009 
(-1.98)
0.040
(5.89)
- 0 . 0 21
(-4.05)
2 . 6  
1 .4
0.84
2.1
0.7
IV OLS
Significant Signifie 
Variables Variables 
(b)
0.14 
(1.49)
0.99
(2.09)
•0.0009
(-1 .1 0)
0.25
(2.9)
1 .24
(2.59)
■0.013 -0.018
(-2.49) (-3.23)
0.047
(7.04)
•0.024
(-4.31)
3.7
1 .5
0.3 
1 .8 
3.0
0.049
( 8 . 1 0 )
-0.030
(-5.57)
0.73
3.5
0.7 
1 .3 
2.7*
0.4 
3.3*
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NOTES
1. The IVS test is the Sargan (1964) test for the validity 
of instruments.
2. Other tests as in Table 9.
The IV estimations corroborate our previous findings according to which shocks on 
imports constitute the more significant statistical explanation of the unplanned 
component of changes in internal financing, dF^ /^Y .^ Significant results are obtained 
when the more significant variables are used as explanatory variables.
Another common element of the regressions as a whole is the clear significance of the 
dummy variables; and a particularity of regressions in Table 10 is the significance of the 
estimate of the constant term which in our case represents the fixed target value of debt. 
Finally, the diagnostic tests which accompany the IV estimations support the idea that the 
models adequately characterize the empirical evidence.
C. Summary of empirical results and links with other sections of this work.
The empirical results can be summarized as follows:
First, the two-step estimation of equation (10) gives a low and significant estimate of the 
coefficient (qj) of the backward-looking variable. Additionally, the restriction between 
backward-and-forward looking variables in equation (10) is found to be valid. Both the 
significance and the low value of the estimate of qj have two important meanings in the 
context of our work. The first and most crucial is the relative closeness of the estimated 
qi to zero rather than to one, which implies that governments have not stuck to 
preserving constant tax rates over time. Had the estimate been close to one, as 
hypothesized by tax smoothing theories, we would have concluded otherwise. In terms of 
the quadratic cost function in equation (3), the low estimate of q% indicates that the 
weight attached by governments to the cost of changing the average tax rates is not far
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above the weight attached to deviations from a debt target. The significance of the 
estimate of qj, regardless of its value, is also important since it highlights the presence of 
persistence effects in the form of a lagged dependent variable. In terms of the Colombian 
experience, this result coincides with one of the conclusions of our estimations in Section 
I, according to which a sluggish adjustment of internal public debt characterized the 
period of study.
Second, the estimated coefficients of the expected variables (dr^t+i^ equation (10) are 
found to be insignificant. On the contrary, the estimates of the coefficients of the 
observed values of the same variables (dr^+j) appear to be significant when the more 
general specification is estimated. However, the significance of these terms (specifically, 
dr^ +^l and dr^+2) evaporates when the model is simplified following the principle of 
parsimony. It can be concluded that independently of the estimation methods applied - 
either two-step estimators, or IV, or OLS- the empirical analysis converge to a simple 
specification in which first, (dF/Y)i^ _%, V%, and V2  form part of the explanatory
variables, and second, the estimated coefficient of qj is low and significant.
Third, two common results characterize most of the estimations; one is that surprises on 
imports are the only significant element of the unplanned component of annual changes 
in internal financing; and the other one is the clear significance of the dummy variables 
included to capture nonnormal variations in the real stock of internal debt -due to either 
sudden changes in the nominal stock of debt or quick changes in the inflation rate-.
The reader may be wondering what the role is of the model discussed in this section and 
the results just summarized, regarding the historical enquiry which we are about to make 
in Part IV. The basic reference is the quadratic cost function in equation (3) which 
includes costs of deviating from a debt target, and costs of adjusting tax rates. Consider 
both quadratic terms in turn.
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Do we find historical evidence of the existence of internal public debt targets? How can 
we justify the quadratic term in dF/Y? As for the first question, official sources do not 
mention the explicit existence of internal debt targets at any time during the period of 
study.^ There were however, institutional constraints to the increase of internal debt. 
These restrictions limited the access of the government to the credit of the central bank 
(Part I, Section II.D., and Part II, C.3.). Along the period of study, authorities tried not to 
exceed those restrictions with the exception of times of deep external crises as in the 
early 1930s and early 1980s. In each case authorities considered the excessive increase of 
central bank loans as a temporary device. In conclusion, although the explicit adoption of 
internal debt targets does not seem to be a fact in the Colombian experience, the limited 
access to the credit of the central bank imposed a maximum which would only be 
temporarily transgressed under extreme circumstances. Regarding the second question, 
the model assumes that deviations from the target are symmetrically penalized. Our 
previous considerations, however, seem to suggest that authorities would much more 
severely penalize, perhaps only penalize deviations above the target, than deviations 
below it.
Can we find historical arguments to support the quadratic term in tax changes? Apart 
from political realities that authorities cannot avoid, there is historical evidence of 
institutional processes which constrain actual tax policies. In an extreme situation of 
economic emergence, governments could legislate about increases in internal public debt 
but not about tax changes. This does not mean that governments were unable to introduce 
tax changes. By going to Parliament governments could get tax changes after a 
legislative process; the implementation of those changes, however, could be significantly 
less quick than changes in internal debt.
Official sources document how governments exercised a simultaneous recourse to 
indebtedness and taxation during the period of study. Sometimes these changes in 
taxation were made to finance ad-hoc purposes such as part of the expenses of the war
298
with Peru in 1932-33, or to finance increases in internal debt service such as during 
World War II. However, in spite of the possibility of simultaneously increasing both, 
taxes and internal debt, the latter appeared to be the source of financing which much 
more quickly could provide the required funding, which in situations of emergency could 
be considerable, such as in the early 1930s and early 1980s. Lastly, while huge increases 
in internal debt proved to be a temporary phenomenon, simultaneous changes in taxation 
were only the first stage of processes of tax reform destined to provide permanent 
resources to the treasury.
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SECTION II 
NOTES
1. A stochastic target implies the existence of a "long-run" function of internal public debt. 
This function could be based on an optimizing approach to fiscal deficits such as the tax- 
smoothing model of Barro (1979) which we Æscussed in Part I, Section VI.
2. For estimation purposes, the restriction D=1 implies the possibility of using a linear 
estimation technique. The "buffer stock" literature on demand for money provides evidence 
of how by allowing for values of D less than one only brings about negligible effects on 
parameter estimates and test statistics. Cuthbertson (1984) adopts D=l, and Cuthbertson and 
Taylor (1986,1987) impose D=0.99. Cuthbertson (1988) shows that the parameter estimates 
and the likelihood function of a forward looking demand for money function are fairly 
invariant to changes in D in the range 1-0.8. Finally, Muscatelli (1988) also reports negligible 
effects on estimated coefficients and test statistics after running regressions with three 
alternative values for D (1,0.5, 0.25).
3. The way these variables enter into the estimating equations is different, however. In the 
previous section they were specified as residuals obtained from semilogarithmic regressions 
of each variable against time. In this section they are specified as differences between actual 
and expected values. Details are offered later in the text.
4. This description hides interest rate effects on the dynamics of public debt. An explicit 
mention of them can be made by discriminating dF in two components, namely, the change 
in the stock of internal financing due to the primary deficit, dF, and the change arising from 
debt service, rF, where r is the real interest rate. Then equation (11) becomes df/f = dF/F + r 
- n, which can be rewritten as dF/Y = df + f (n-r). Additionally Àe stationary value of f in 
(12) is replaced by (n-r)f~ = dF/Y. The last two results can be conveniently used to derive an 
expression of the impacts of the difference (n-r) on the dynamics of f, namely, df = (f-f) (n- 
r). Accordingly, either a real negative value of r, or a positive r with n>r yield stable results. 
Conversely, with r>n any deviation of f from its stationary value f  is magnified rendering 
unstable results (Haliassos and Tobin, 1990).
5. The Dickey-Fuller test for the lagged level of the dependent variable is (-8.8) which is 
significant at the 1% level (Critical value:-2.62). No lags of the differenced dependent 
variable were required to avoid serial correlation in the residuals. Neither a constant nor a 
time trend proved to be significant.
6. The Hendry forecast test H(n) is an index of numerical parameter constancy for (n) 
forecasts, and its value always exceeds the Chow test, CH(n, T-k-n). Because the former has 
a higher rejection frequency than the latter, independently of the correctness of the model 
(Kiviet, 1986), the Chow test is preferred as a test of parameter constancy over the 
forecasting subsample, and the H(n) is used to evaluate the model's ex ante forecasting 
performance. The PC-GIVE computer output shows the H(n) value divided by (n). Under Hq 
this value should be below 2. The results obtained in Table 9 are equal or very close to 2.
7. The instruments chosen are the first three leads of the variable r^ :^ r^+i, rt+2» the first 
three leads of the change in the tax rate: d^+j, dt+2> dt+3! the current v iu e  of the change 
in r^ , dr ,^ as well as the lags dr^.g, drt_4 and dr^ -S* The estimation under column (1) involves 
3 endogenous and 8 exogenous variables with 18 instruments. The validity of the instruments 
chosen is tested by means of the Sargan (1964) test. Under the null that the instruments are 
valid and the model is correctly specified, the Sargan test has a Chi-squared distribution with 
(p-k) degrees of freedom, where p is the number of instruments and k the number of
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regressors. In the case of the regression under column (1) the test yields Chi^(7)=3.71 which 
is less than the critical value of 14.07.
8. The main official sources are the report of the Minister of Finance to Congress (Memoria 
de Hacienda) and the report of the Manager of the Central Bank (Informe del Gerente del 
Banco de la Repûblica).
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PART IV
The public debt in Colombia. From the Pax Britannica to the interwar period.
INTRODUCTION
Our econometric work in Part III sought to formalize our hypotheses about the public debt in 
Colombia. These hypotheses were largely based on historical knowledge and the behaviour 
of economic time series studied in Part II. As for the specification of the estimating equations 
we were guided by the insights of economic paradigms reviewed in Part I. Encouraged by the 
empirical results obtained in Part II and Part m , we now turn back to the historical 
documentation. Our aim is to offer a more complete picture of relevant facts for the 
understanding of the Colombian experience with public debt than the state of affairs existing 
at the beginning of our research. This part of the thesis involves history and economics, and 
is intended to discuss the economics of public debt in Colombia in historical perspective.
As explained in the general introduction to the thesis, although our historical enquiry covered 
the same period of our empirical work in Part II and Part in, namely 1925-1985, we chose to 
dedicate Part IV to examine a complete experience with public debt in Colombia rather than 
offering a global description of facts during the whole period. Such an experience is largely 
related to the first great lending boom of the century during the 1920s. The relevant events 
were not confined to the 1920s, however, since default and renegotiations took place during 
the 1930s and 1940s, and part of the loans defaulted and renegotiated were contracted well 
before the 1920s. In summary, our research covers the Colombian experience with public 
debt since the times of the Pax Britannica (the lending boom of the 1820s, and the 1850s 
through 1914) up to the last renegotiation of external debts in 1949.
The reasons for choosing the period just mentioned are as follows:
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First, the period is probably old enough to be discussed in perspective. Although there may 
be similarities between the foreign lending experiences of the 1920s and 1970s, the latter is 
quite recent and some of its developments are still in process. The former had repercussions 
through the 1930s and 1940s, and by the 1950s it was considered a fait accompli. An 
important amount of information concerning foreign debt contracting, debt buybacks, and 
strategies of renegotiation which would not have been accessible at the time given the 
secrecy and private character of the operations, could be studied today without 
insurmountable problems.
Second, the episodes discussed during the chosen period largely substantiate our underlying 
model. An important characteristic of that model is that regarding the Colombia's experience, 
international finance may be considered supply determined. Outbreaks of foreign lending are 
followed by increased access of the country to external funds, and when foreign capital 
markets retreat, credits to the country dry up. The period under discussion offers a variety of 
illustrations, since the first lending boom of modem times in the 1820s when Colombia stood 
out as one of the major foreign debtors, to the lending boom of the 1920s when the country 
shared the list of highly indebted countries in the Latin American region. Another crucial 
feature of the model is the shock-absorber role of the internal public debt. The early 1930s 
are full of examples; the internal public debt served to cushion severe shocks on the external 
sector, and even a sudden increase of government expenditures demanded by a war.
Third, by concentrating on the chosen period a series of objectives are reached. These 
objectives are described next.
One. A thorough cycle of foreign borrowing is examined. The period of study offers various 
examples of boom-and-bust cycles of external lending during the Pax Britannica, covers the 
conversion of the United States from international debtor to international creditor, and
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encompasses the whole boom-and-bust cycle of U.S. private lending during the 1920s 
followed by defaults and renegotiations during the next two decades.
Two. A fresh insight into the role of the internal public debt is provided. Although examples 
of the cushioning function of the internal public debt are found along the period of study, the 
great depression (1929-34) is perhaps the most complete experience. Since the gold standard 
was the international monetary regime, it became the mechanism through which external 
disturbances (deep depression at the centre -particularly the U.S. economy-, collapse of world 
commodity prices and cutback of foreign lending) were transmitted to peripheral economies 
such as Colombia. It is shown how domestic asset markets were affected by the external 
shocks through a diversity of channels, while authorities remained inhibited to adopt 
offsetting policies. It was only an extreme fragility of the domestic financial system and the 
worldwide demise of the gold standard which led authorities to adopt exchange controls and 
later to negotiate partial suspensions of foreign debt repayments. Recovery was then possible 
and the internal public debt was assigned a crucial role, namely, to absorb those shocks 
according to their channel of transmission to the domestic economy.
Three. This research affords the first fully detailed account of the gradual process of default 
and renegotiation of Colombia’s external debt during the interwar period, based on 
sources of information as yet unexplored. It is the scrutiny of this new documentary evidence 
that allows us to illustrate the long-term relationship between creditors and debtors, which 
remains even when formal debt contracts have been broken.
Fourth. New series of the external debt of Colombia for the period 1925-50 are constructed. 
These series are based on the reconstruction of series of individual loans by taking in account 
the effects of defaults, repatriations and renegotiations.
This part is divided into three sections. The first section offers a general outlook of phases of 
international lending between 1880 and 1985. Particular attention is dedicated to the boom-
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and-bust cycles of international finance during the Pax Britannica and the 1920s. The share 
of Colombia in the surges of foreign borrowing, and her fate after the retreat of external 
capital markets is a central concern in this section. The second section documents our crucial 
hypothesis of the shock absorber role of the internal public debt. It is shown how after 
breaking the binding constraints imposed by the gold standard and starting a gradual default 
on the external debt, authorities adopted recovery policies and rescue actions many of which 
were made possible by the use of the internal public debt. In the final section the reader will 
find how the formal foreign debt contracts which were broken in the early 1930s were 
renegotiated, then completing the last stage of the cycle of foreign lending. Final settlements 
came about after a drawn out process of strategies adopted by both creditors and debtors, and 
an active involvement of governments on the creditors’ side.
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SECTION I
From the Pax Britannica to the Pax Americana.
Introduction
Cyclical patterns have characterized foreign lending since the 19th century. Capital moves 
across national borders attracted by the profitability of some range of investments abroad. 
Foreign lending proceeds until some event arises to stop capital exports. Borrowers find it 
difficult to service the debt, and periods of default, negotiations and reschedule of debt 
payments then ensue. Foreign lending is reduced to a minimum for perhaps decades, until a 
new set of opportunities overseas attract the investors' attention.
The access of Latin America to international capital markets since the beginning of the 19th 
century has been determined by the cyclical character of the foreign lending process. The 
main lenders have been Great Britain and the United States, the former since the 1820s up to 
World War I, and the latter since the 1920s. In this section we focus our attention on the 
boom-and-bust cycles of British and U.S. foreign lending and on the share of Latin America 
in those periods of large scale capital movements.
Colombia became an international borrower immediately after her political independence 
from Spain in 1819. She was one of the main borrowers in the first modem cycle of British 
capital exports. This was an ephemeral experience, however, since the country became a 
small participant in the London financial markets for the rest of the period of Pax Britannica. 
Colombia reappeared in foreign financial markets with the U.S. lending boom of the 1920s. 
The country got a place in the list of highly indebted borrowers worldwide, and was one of 
the four major South American debtors though still at a notable distance from the two most 
important debtors of the time, Argentina and Brazil. In the recent lending boom of the 1970s,
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Colombia was again a highly indebted country, both in the South American region and 
worldwide. In this section as in the remaining historical sections, we discuss the Colombian 
experience as international borrower in the Latin American context.
We organize the section as follows. First, we offer a general outlook of phases of 
international lending between 1880 and 1985. Particular attention is dedicated to the foreign 
investment’s cycles of Great Britain and the United States, and the relative importance of 
Latin America as a borrower. Second, we discuss the leading role of Great Britain as a capital 
exporter during the period of Pax Britannica. Our central concern is the description of long 
swings in the British foreign lending. We examine the fate of the Latin American borrowers 
during the boom-and-bust cycles of British capital exports. Third, we describe the process by 
which the United States evolved from being a debtor nation to be a creditor nation during 
World War I, and how a new international lending boom was forged in the mid-1920s. Once 
more we highlight the share of Latin America in the enlarged borrowing with particular 
reference to the four main debtors, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Colombia.
Fourth, we scrutinize the Colombian experience during the euphoric borrowing of 1926- 
1928. We discuss the financial conditions of the access of the country to the U.S. lending 
boom in comparison with other foreign debtors. Fifth, we describe the collapse of the U.S. 
foreign lending in 1928. A good deal of attention is dedicated to the fortunes of the main 
South American debtors in the aftermath of the exhaustion of the U.S. loan boom. Sixth, we 
present a brief balance of changes in the distribution of foreign investments between the end 
of the Pax Britannica and the downfall of the U.S. lending boom. Finally, we offer general 
conclusions and mention links with other sections of this work.
A. Phases of international lending.
During the last century international lending has been characterized by notable changes in the 
level of capital exports from industrialized to industrializing countries. A first panoramic
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view of such changes is offered in Table 11, where the concept of absolute value of the 
current account of the balance of payments is used to illustrate the magnitude of international 
capital flows. Three countries -Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States- have 
been chosen with the only criteria that they have played protagonist roles in international 
finance over the last century, and that the addition of other countries does not significantly 
alter the results.^
TABLE 11
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
CURRENT ACCOUNT* 
PER CENT OF GNP
(Annual Averages)
PERIODS United
Kingdom
United
States
Germany TOTAL
1. 1880-1914 4.50 0.91 1 .82 2.41
1880-1890 4.98 0.95 2.34 2.76
1891-1903 2.63 1.17 1 .65 1 .82
1904-1909 5.30 0.59 1 .50 2.46
1910-1914 7.73 0.28 1 .41 3.14
2. 1924-1938 1.15 0.56 1 .54 1 .08
1924-1929 1 .60 0.82 1 .92 1 .45
1930-1938 0.85 0.39 1 .22 0.82
3. 1950-1985 1.10 0.57 1 .96 1 .21
1950-1972 0.94 0.38 2.12 1.14
1973-1985 1 .40 0.86 1 .66 1 .31
Sources: Mitchell (1983)
IMF. International Financial Statistics
* Absolute Values
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The history of capital movements is broken down into three different periods: the pre-World 
War I period starting about 1880, the interwar years with the main developments happening 
since the mid-1920s, and the second post-War period between 1950 and 1985. Table 11 sets 
out the ratios of the absolute values of the current account of the balance of payments to 
GNP, for the periods just mentioned. It is shown how the average ratio for the three countries 
sharply fell -55%- between the pre-War I era and the interwar period, and then partially 
recovered -12%- during the post-War II decades. Accordingly, the figures achieved during 
the period 1880-1914 would not be reached subsequently.
New facts are revealed when particular country experiences are compared and the main 
periods subdivided. Unweighted averages by countries and for the three periods as a whole, 
indicate that relative to their GNPs, capital movements across the United Kingdom national 
borders largely outstripped those of Germany, and trebled those of the United States. The 
predominance of the United Kingdom is mainly explained by her capital exports during the 
1880-1914 period when on average they represented 4.5% of GNP. The importance of such 
capital exports was unevenly distributed over those years, though. They averaged about 5% 
of GNP in the 1880s and 1900s doubling the ratio for the 1890s, and reached a figure of 
nearly 8% in the five years immediately before the outbreak of World War I.
Additional contrasts are offered by the experience of the 1920s and the second post-War 
period. Capital flows across borders expanded in the second half of the 1920s and retreated 
during the 1930s; the figures show that relative to the size of the economies, capital 
movements in the 1930s fell by more than 40% compared to those of the second part of the 
1920s. As for the decades since World War II, it is shown how the figures obtained by the 
United Kingdom and the United States during 1950-1972 are similar to those obtained during 
the 1930s, the contrast being offered by the relatively high figure for Germany. It is only after 
1973 that higher levels of international capital flows come into the scene. Considering the 
periods 1924-1938 and 1950-1985 as a whole, it is the higher averages achieved by Germany 
during the second period which bring about an improved global result for this last period.
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Three ideas can be derived from this introductory inspection. First, international capital 
movements have experienced considerable fluctuations during the last hundred years.
Second, on each one of the periods under consideration, subperiods of intensified capital 
exports have alternated with subperiods of reduced capital movements across national 
frontiers. Third, the period 1870-1914 stands out as the time in which the largest allocations 
of capital in recent history have been made.^ These conclusions motivate a further discussion 
of the changing phases in the volume of foreign lending with reference to two central capital 
exporters -Great Britain in the pre-World War I period, and the United States afterwards-, 
and the share of Latin America in the allocation of capital exports.
As for the British case, the cycles of overseas investment over the period 1865-1914 are 
depicted in Graph 25. The actual data is based on estimates of "capital calls" due to Simon 
(1968).^ Three positive cycles are projected along the period 1865-1914, separated by two 
periods in which British capital calls grew at a rate lower than the historical trend. These 
periods of depressed overseas lending corresponded first to the worldwide recession which 
dominated most of the 1870s, and second, to a decade of episodes adverse to international 
lending which started with the Argentina's inability to meet her financial obligations during 
the Baring crisis of 1890.
The destination of British investments abroad changed over time. Table 12 shows the 
composition of capital calls during the three positive cicles displayed on Graph 25. It is seen 
how new capital calls shifted from Europe to North America, Africa and Asia. Afro-Asian 
regions received slightly more investments than North America during the 1880s, but North 
America was definitely the main recipient during the last positive cycle. The share of North 
America, Africa and Asia as a whole in new British investments raised from 47% in the 
1870s to 70% during the lending boom before World War I. Contrasting with these figures, 
capital exports to South America kept a constant participation of about 20% during the three
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positive cycles. This means that British capital exports to South America increased at the 
average rate of British capital outflows during the period 1865-1914.
GRAPH 25
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TABLE 12
BRITISH INVESTMENT ABROAD 
CAPITAL CALLS BY CONTINENTS 
SELECTED PERIODS 
(Millions of £)
Europe
North America 
South America 
Africa & Asia^
Total
1870-75 1880-90 1906-14
£ % £ % £ %
142.9 35.8 102.3 11 .7 164.2 10.9
125.9 31 .6 280.0 32.0 638.2 42.2
69.0 17.3 189.5 21 .6 303.4 20.0
61 .1 15.3 304.0 34.7 407.5 26.9
398.9 100.0 875.8 100.0 1513.3 100.0
Source: Simon, M (1968)
' Includes Australasia and Oceania
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Regarding the U.S. experience, the evolution of private investment abroad -as a percentage of 
GNP- over the period 1900-1980, is depicted in Graph 26. The series have been smoothed by 
using five-year moving averages. As seen, the extent of capital outflows of the World War I 
period and the 1924-1928 period could not be repeated until the mid-1970s. A marked 
tendency for capital exports to rebound after the U.S. financial crash of 1928 was followed by 
a long inactivity which lasted until the early 1940s.
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A more explicit account is offered in Graph 27 which discriminates portfolio and direct 
investments. Five main periods may be distinguished. First, the decade before World War I 
during which direct investment represented a relatively constant proportion of GNP of about
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0.3% and trebled portfolio investment. Second, the period between the outbreak of World 
War I and the onset of the Great Depression. Two phases can be observed in this period: the 
first one -1913 through 1918- dominated by a vertical increase of portfolio investment which 
notably displaced direct investment; and the second one -1919 through 1928- characterized 
by a continuous recovery of direct investment and the relative decline of portfolio 
investment. During the whole period, portfolio investment averaged 0.7% of GNP and direct 
investment 0.16%.
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Third, the interval between 1929 and 1942 during which both types of investment sharply 
declined -though direct investment at a slower rate- and eventually vanished. Furthermore, 
during the 1930s the United States became a net capital importer through the reflow of 
income from debt service and dividends. Fourth, the revival of foreign investment which
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cautiously started during the second half of World War II, and decidedly after 1945. With a 
clear lead of direct investment this period lasted until the end of the 1960s. It is seen how 
even at its hightest points in the mid-1960s, direct investment could not reach the heights 
scaled in the late 1920s. As for portfolio investment, the levels achieved during the 1940s and 
first part of the 1950s were practically negligible and the lowest within the net positive values 
of the whole series. The first signs of sustained recovery of portfolio investment since its 
collapse in 1928 were felt in the mid-1950s when from a percentage of GNP as low as 0.05 in 
1954, the share increased to 0.20% in 1964, before a new slightly declining period which 
lasted until 1967.
Finally, the fifth period covers the 1970s during which portfolio investment reached levels 
never scaled since the 1920s. While portfolio investments grew continuously during the 
1970s reaching 1% of GNP at the end of the decade, direct investment declined, and its share 
of GNP at the end of the period was half as important as it had been in the mid-1960s.
The relative importance of Latin America as a recipient of U.S. private investments is shown 
in Graph 28. As seen, the heights achieved during 1927-1930 which averaged 0.34% of the 
U.S. GNP were neither reached before nor would be reached later, at least until the late 
1970s. There is not clear correlation between the two paths in the graph, with exceptions such 
as the period 1930-1943, when the reduction of capital exports to Latin America was less 
intense than the average reduction of capital flows to all areas, and the 1970s when the 
increase of capital exports to Latin America was less intense than the increase of capital 
exports to the rest of the world.
As a whole, the U.S. private financing to Latin America during the first two and a half 
decades of the century represented about 0.17% of the U.S. GNP, or 25% of total U.S. private 
capital exports. After the Second World War those figures declined to 0.13% or 23% 
respectively. These results suggest that the share of Latin America in U.S. private external
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investments for the period under study was rather similar to the share in British capital 
exports mentioned above. Finally, if the short lending boom of the late 1920s and the bust of 
U.S. external investments during the 1930s are taken into account, the overall share of Latin 
America increases to about 27%.
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Graph 29 offers additional information since it includes U.S. government loans to Latin 
America. These loans started in 1938 and became important after the war. It has to be noted 
that U.S. private portfolio capital flows to Latin America were negative since the early 1930s 
to the mid-1950s, and therefore it was due to private direct investment that U.S. capital 
exports to the region became positive after the war (Graph 28). Government loans came to
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supplement the direct investment, and became the main source of U.S. financing during the 
1960s when direct investment slackened and portfolio investments were still too weak. The 
better defined increasing trend of U.S. investments after 1945 in Graph 29 as compared with 
Graph 28 is explained by the contribution of government loans. Only the last four years of 
clearly increasing trend in both graphs are due to the renaissance of private portfolio 
investment.
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We now attempt a closer look to the foreign lending aspects of the period of Pax Britannica. 
We discuss the leading position of Great Britain between major creditors and review some 
outstanding characteristics of British foreign lending. In particular, we mention
316
developmental finance as a dominant aspect of British lending. Our intention is to highlight 
not only the share of Latin America as a borrower of British funds, but the importance of the 
region as a profitable customer, and for the implementation of developmental finance. 
Finally, we study the period of Pax Britannica from the perspective of Latin American 
borrowers. In the context of the long swings which characterized British foreign lending we 
examine the boom-and-bust cycles of external financing lived through by the Latin American 
clients.
B. The period of Pax Britannica
1. Great Britain as a leading capital exporter.
The United Kingdom stands out as the major international creditor before the First World 
War. While on average the United Kingdom invested abroad 4.5% of GNP during the period 
1880-1914, the relevant figure for France was 2.5% and for Germany 1.8%.^ The gross 
position of the United Kingdom and other international creditors, as well as the gross 
positions of main debtors on the eve of World War I, appear in Table 13.
Three quarters of gross credit were supplied by three countries only, though their respective 
contributions were far from uniform. Within this limited group of suppliers, while the United 
Kingdom provided 55 cents of each dollar, France contributed with 27 cents and Germany 
with 18 cents. However, the table indicates that the European continental economies as a 
whole reached a creditor position superior to that of the United Kingdom. On the debtors 
side, two groups are distinguished at first sight, with the two Americas lagging behind Asia, 
Africa and Oceania, and Europe.
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TABLE 13
INTERNATIONAL CREDITORS AND DEBTORS 
GROSS POSITIONS 
1913
(Millions of US$ and %)
CREDITORS %
Main Creditors 32.8 74.5
United Kingdom 18.0 40.9
France 9.0 20.4
Germany 5.8 13.2
Other Creditors 11.2 25.5
Belgium, Netherlands,
Switzerland 5.5 12.5
United States 3.5 8.0
Other countries 2.2 5.0
TOTAL 44.0 100.0
DEBTORS
Asia, Africa and
Oceania 13.0 29.5
Europe 12.0 27.3
North America 10.5 23.9
United States 6.8 15.5
Canada 3.7 8.4
Latin America 8.5 19.3
TOTAL 44.0 100.0
Source: United Nations (1949)
Table 14 offers further illustration of how the three main creditors allocated their long-term 
investments. France and Germany concentrated their investments in Europe. In both cases, 
political considerations notably influenced the destination of foreign investments. The fact 
that one-third of German capital exports had been allocated in Austria-Hungary, Turkey and 
the Balkans was currently interpreted as an official scheme to strengthen the economies of 
potential military allies. In the French case, one-fourth of foreign investments were 
represented by Russian government bonds. Russia -the largest European borrower before
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World War I- enjoyed a permanent access to the Paris capital market after the formation of 
the Alliance in 1891. In contrast with these experiences, the bulk of the British capital 
exports turned largely to regions of new settlement.^
TABLE 14
GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF LONG-TERM INVESTMENTS
MAIN CREDITORS 
1913
(PERCENTAGES)
United
Kingdom
France^ Germany:
EUROPE 6.4 61 .1 53.2
Russia 2.9 25.1 7.7
Austria-Hungary 0.2 4.9 12.8
Spain-Portugal 0.7 8.7 7.2
Turkey 0.6 7.3 7.7
Balkan States 0.5 5.6 7.2
Rest of Europe 1 .5 9.5 10.6
NORTH AMERICA 33.7 4 .4b 1 5 .7b
United States 20.0 3.5 13.0
Canada 13.7 0.9 2.7
LATIN AMERICA 20.1 1 3 .3b 16.2b
Argentina 8.5 3.3 3.6
Brazil 3.9 5.8 9.0
Mexico 2.6 3.3 c
Rest of 
Latin America 5.1 0.9 3.6
AFRICA, ASIA AND
OCEANIA 39.8 21.2 14.9
British Empire 
French Colonies 
German Colonies 
Other countries
33.6
6.2
1 6 .2b
4.9
12.8
2.1
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0
SOURCES: FEIS (1974), pp. 23, 51, 74
a: Figures for 1914. b: Discriminated by countries according 
to Woodruff (1966), p. 154. c: Absence of detailed statistics 
d: French colonies plus Egypt,
Suez and South Africa.
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In comparison with her competitors, dominion and colonial territories attracted an important 
portion of British investments. The Empire share in the British portfolio was nearly a half 
(47%), or one-third when Canada is excluded. Another difference was the percentage of 
investments placed in the Americas: when no account is taken of Canada, that figure is of 
40% evenly distributed between the United States and Latin America. A final contrast can be 
mentioned about foreign investments in Latin America. It is shown how they were 
concentrated in the three major countries -Argentina, Brazil and Mexico-, regardless of the 
creditor country. However, the rhythm of investments in Latin America was not the same for 
each lender; while British investors kept a rather constant portion of 20% for Latin America 
at least since the 1850s, French and German interests in the region were more significant 
after 1900 (for instance, the Latin America's share in French portfolios increased from 7.1% 
in 1900 to 13.3% in 1913)6
2. Long swings in British foreign lending
The foregoing experiences of foreign lending were part of the unprecedented development of 
the international economy since the middle of the nineteenth century. International 
movements of the factors of production, labour and capital, built a bridge between the 
industrialized Western European economies and undeveloped overseas regions. There existed 
a contrast between the increasing productivity and growing population of the developed 
world, facing the restricted availability of regional resources, on the one hand, and the 
abundancy of natural resources in overseas areas of incipient settlement, on the other.
Notable technological changes in transport and communications made easier the positively 
correlated emigration of labour and capital.^ Institutional changes facilitated the 
international movements of factors of production and the configuration of a truly 
international economy. Mercantilist policies - notably trade barriers and navigation laws- still 
in vigor during the first half of the century were significantly loosened after 1850.^
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Though the boom of foreign lending in the pre-World War I was fed by various Western 
European countries, the predominant role of Britain in the whole process may be emphasized 
for reasons different from the amount of capital exported. Private profitability was the 
guidance in the British case, rather than the achievement of national objectives, which in the 
case of France and Germany constituted an underlying motive for foreign lending. British 
investors sustained a process of developmental finance and integration of the center and the 
periphery. Developmental finance meant that a substantial portion of long-term investments 
were conveyed to railways and to public utilities related to the urbanization process.^
The predominance of developmental finance is illustrated by the fact that 40% of long-term 
investments was applied to the construction of railways, 20% to the provision of urban 
facilities, and 10% to the extractive industries -principally mines and oil- as seen in Table 15.
TABLE 15
BRITISH OVERSEAS INVESTMENTS 
BY SECTORS 
1913
Millions 
of Pounds
£ %
Government Bonds 
Railways 
Public Utilities 
Commerce and Industry 
Raw Materials 
Banks and Finance 
Miscellaneous 
Total
1.125.0
1.531.0
185.1
208.5
388.5
317.1 
8.1
3.763.1
29.9
40.6
5.0
5.5
10.3
8.4
0.3
1 0 0 . 0
Sources: Feis (1974) p. 27
Royal Institute (1937) p. 122
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The fact that 30% was invested on government securities does not imply that loans were 
necessarily devoted to finance current budget deficits or nonproductive undertakings. Further 
on we will discuss Latin American experiences in which governments offered long-term 
securities in the London market for developmental purposes.
Two outstanding characteristics of the British experience were also clear constrasts with 
developments in continental capital-exporting countries. First, foreign investments followed a 
pattern of long swings between 1856 and 1914. And second, British foreign and domestic 
investments moved in opposite directions over the same period. These characteristics 
contribute to explain the exceptional magnitudes of British foreign lending during the period 
and the interplay between center and periphery during the Pax Britannica. Our first 
illustration of long-swings in British foreign investments was given in Graph 25 above. A 
similar shape is obtained when instead of cycles around a deterministic trend, it is the path of 
the ratio of net foreign investment (NFI) to GNP which is depicted.This  path as well as the 
trajectory of the gross domestic fixed investment (GDFI) as a percent of GNP are shown in 
Graph 30.
The inverse long-swing motion of the two lines, firstly analyzed by Caimcross (1953), brings 
out periods during which markedly increasing ratios of foreign investment were accompanied 
by declining ratios of domestic investment, such as 1878-1887 and after 1903, and periods of 
expanding ratios of domestic investment paralleled by stagnating ratios of foreign investment 
such as 1870-1877 and 1890-1900. Analysts after Caimcross have dismissed a causal 
mechanism of the long swings, and described, instead, a "complex set" of interrelationships 
between centre and periphery behind the long swings of British national investment flows.
Not only the home and overseas investment flows but also the realized rates of return on 
those investments were subject to inverse long swings. Edelstein (1982) found that for the 
period 1870-1913 as a whole, British foreign investments realized a higher average rate of 
return than domestic investments. In this sense, foreign investment paid. The same author
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shows that overseas rates of return dominated during the periods 1877-1886 and 1897-1909, 
which alternated with periods of home rates of return dominance.
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Latin America played a key role for the dominance of foreign returns. During the 1877-1886 
period the realized returns on Latin American investments in banking, railways and social 
overhead equity placements outstripped those obtained on other overseas regions. While 
equity investments on Latin American railways yielded an average return of 18.7%, the 
figure for the U.S. railways was 11.5%, and 5.2% for British domestic railways (Edelstein, 
1982). Once again, during the long period of overseas dominance, 1897-1909, Latin
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American equity and bonds performance was critical, but this time under the lead of U.S. 
railway investments.^^
A closer look to the Latin American experience during the Pax Britannica can be obtained by 
examining the fate of the continent in the long swings of British capital exports just reviewed. 
An important precedent not mentioned so far was the boom-and-bust cycle of British external 
investment during the 1820s, in which Latin America, and Colombia in particular reached an 
important share. We discuss these facts next.
3. British capital in Latin America.
a. The boom-and-bust cycle of the 1820s.
The prosperity reached in the mid-1820s has been recognized as "the first truly modem 
cyclical boom in British economic h i s t o r y E a s y  money policies fostered a general fall in 
interest rates and expanded bank lending. The index of share prices grew steadily during 
the first years of the boom (1821-1822), and at a greater pace since 1824 led by mining 
prices. In fact, the index rose about 120% between October 1824 and January 1825, 
contrasting with an increase of 20% during the four previous years. The index then collapsed, 
falling about 110% during the rest of the year, and other 30% during the first three quarters of 
1826.
What was the scale and scope of private investment behind the Stock-Exchange boom? And 
what was the Latin American involvement in this historical experience? Figures about joint- 
stock companies are eloquent. While 156 companies with a capital of £48 million existed 
before 1824,127 with a capital of £103 million were founded in 1824-25 and still existed in 
1827 after an avalanche of bankruptcies. It is significant that out of more than £15 million 
paid on the shares of the 127 surviving companies, about £4 million were advanced on the 
shares of companies -mostly mining companies- formed to operate in Latin America. Private
324
investment in foreign government bonds played a crucial role in the stock market boom. 
Loans contracted in London increased from £1.5 million in 1821 to £16 million in 1822-23 
and finally to £27.5 million in 1824-25. Approximately 75% of the nominal contracts, 
namely £33 million were paid-in by British investors. Latin America secured nearly one half 
of the nominal contracts as seen in Table 16.^^
TABLE 16
BRITISH LOANS TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS 
CONTRACTUAL AMOUNTS 
1822-1825
(THOUSANDS OF POUNDS)
(£ 0 0 0) %
EUROPE 23,300 53.4
AUSTRIA 2,500 5.7
DENMARK 5,500 12.6
GREECE 2,800 6.4
NAPLES 2,500 5.7
PORTUGAL 1 ,500 3.4
PRUSSIA 3,500 8.0
RUSSIA 3,500 8.0
SPAIN 1 ,500 3.4
LATIN AMERICA 20,329 46.6
BRAZIL 3,200 7.3
ARGENTINA 1 ,000 2.3
CHILE 1 ,000 2.3
GRAN COLOMBIA 6,750 15.5
CENTRAL AMERICA 163 0.4
MEXICO 6,400 14.7
PERU 1,816 4.2
TOTAL 43,629 100.0
SOURCES. Gayer, Rostow and Schwartz (1953) p.189 
Rippy (1959) p.20
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Parallel developments in foreign trade accompanied the stock market boom. As internal 
investment developed, higher imports of staple commodities were required. And on the 
export side, foreign investments fed an unprecedented expansion of real domestic exports. 
The Latin American economies constituted the driving markets for British exports during the 
period 1821-25. In fact, while during these years British exports to the Continent -by far the 
largest export market representing about 45% of total exports- showed a slight decline, 
exports to Latin America doubled; in 1821 shipments to Latin America were equivalent to 
18% of the British sales to the Continent, and at its peak in 1825 the comparable figure was 
45%.
The boom in the Stock Exchange and in foreign trade was accompanied by speculative 
manoeuvres. Private banks in London and provincial banks which had financed the bull 
phase in security markets, found it difficult to preserve their liquidity positions. The bullion 
reserves of the Bank of England practically vanished when holders of private bank notes 
demanded their redemption. A financial crisis was evident in December 1825 and the Bank 
sought to reduce the magnitude of unprecedented bankruptcies by authorizing extraordinary 
rediscounts. The crisis spread across national borders affecting mercantile transactions and 
banking operations in the Continent during the next two years (Kindleberger, 1989). But the 
most striking and adverse results endangered the financial relationships between Britain and 
the Latin American economies. With the banking crisis of December 1825-January 1826 the 
lending and foreign trade booms came precipitously to a halt. The fact is that London bankers 
had been not only broker-dealers of foreign government loans but their interests had covered 
a wide range of trade operations (shipments, import contracts) and mining investments.
Bankers lived through the commercial and banking panic of 1825 without distress from their 
investments on Latin American government bonds, owing to the short-term sinking funds - 
one-and-a-half year of interests and amortizations- created with the purpose of helping peg 
the market. However, the drying up of external loans which followed the short-lived and 
unprecedented lending boom suddenly strained the weak finances of the Latin American
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States. Besides, the suspension of investments in mining and other private projects frustrated 
initiatives in which British capital, technology and labour had just recently been involved. To 
close this picture, external trade collapsed -British exports fell by 50% between 1825 and 
1826- and a timid réanimation towards the end of the decade was due to the particularly 
favourable position of Brazil as source of staple commodities required by Britain.
What followed was a series of bankruptcies of private projects and a sequence of sovereign 
defaults which involved all but one of the debtor-States, the only one which enjoyed a 
privileged trade position, Brazil. Sovereign defaults set off in 1826-27 after the exhaustion of 
short-term sinking funds and deposits of the states in London private banks. Government 
bonds quotations collapsed after peaking in 1824-25 and remained depressed there after until 
renegotiations in the following years or decades revived the prospects of repayment (Dawson, 
1990, Appendix 1).
What was Colombia's share in the lending boom, and what her fate after the financial 
crisis? Colombia, then Gran Colombia formed by the present-day nations of Colombia, 
Ecuador and Venezuela, was the first Latin American country who received a loan -£2 
million- from private bankers in London at the beginning of the boom in 1822. Later, in 
1824, Gran Colombia negotiated a loan for £4.75 million, the largest one received by a Latin 
American country, and the second largest -after Denmark- contracted by any country during 
1821-1825. The two loan operations were strongly dominated by the necessity of 
consolidating the independence from Spa in .Gran  Colombia's accumulated debts were, 
then, typical war debts. Reasons of international politics facilitated the access to external 
financing; in fact, Britain formally recognized the independence of the new Latin American 
states in 1824 when the final military campaigns were still in process.
In 1832 Gran Colombia was split up into the three modern-day separate Republics, and in 
1834 the total external debt of £9.8 million of which £3.2 million were interest arrears was 
apportioned between the new states; Colombia was left with 50% of the total debt, Venezuela
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with 28% and Ecuador with 22%. This apportionement of debt responsibilities was followed 
by a complete default of interest payments till 1841 when Venezuela signed a settlement with 
her creditors. Colombia followed suit in 1845, and Ecuador did the same but only until 
1855.20
A general conclusion is in order before turning to the discussion of the Latin America's share 
in the long swings of British capital exports. The international loan boom and subsequent 
debt crisis was closely linked to the cyclical boom in Great Britain. A financial innovation at 
the center -the expansion of provincial and private banks-, reinforced by easy money policies, 
increased the availability of funds for domestic and potential foreign lending. The political 
independence of Latin American Republics opened up a new field for foreign investments. 
The cycle came to a halt when a financial crisis at the center in 1825 stemmed domestic 
credit and the outflow of capital. Since not only external finance but international trade were 
curtailed, sovereign default spread through Latin America since mid-1826. Only one debtor 
(Brazil), with a privileged trade position, could fulfil regular debt payments.
b. The Latin America's share in the long swings of British overseas lending.
Large-scale British investment in Latin America was resumed during the 1860s. In 1865, 
foreign government debt amounted to about £62 million, three times the stock accumulated 
before the crisis of 1825, which exceeded £20 million. But neither the increased debt 
corresponded to a similar increase of new loans, nor was it evenly distributed over the four 
decades. No more than 65% of the enlarged debt -£26 million- corresponded to 'fresh' loans, 
the rest being made up by debt conversions and capitalizations of interest arrears. As for 
temporal distribution, less than 10% of the new loans were contracted between 1825 and 
1850, 25% during the 1850s, and over 65% from 1860 to 1865. Foreign investment in private 
projects -mainly mines and railways- also revived in the 1860s; 50% of the companies 
formed between 1845 and 1865 were established between 1860 and 1865. (Stone, 1968)
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British investments in Latin America grew continuously between 1865 and 1914. According 
to data due to Rippy (1959) and Stone (1968) the stock of investments accumulated in 1914 
was fourteen times the level reached in 1865. This upsurge was characterized by sharp 
fluctuations rather than by a smooth growth rate, as we saw in our previous discussion of the 
cycles of British foreign investment (Graph 25). As noted above, during the periods 1870-75, 
1885-95 and 1905-13, investments in Latin America grew at a rate higher than their historical 
rate. A similar idea is conveyed by the estimates offered in Tables 17 and 18 based on Stone 
(1968). Table 18 duplicates the format of Table 15 above, and Table 17 discriminates 
investments according to individual countries.
Investments in foreign government bonds (hereinafter government loans) constituted about 
75% of total investments during the four intervening decades between the financial crash of 
1825 and the resurgence of capital exports in the 1860s.^^ This absolute preponderance 
shrank during the period down to World War I, particularly through the years 1885-1895, and 
1905-1913. By 1913 government loans represented less than 40% of total investments, 
although still representing the leading individual investment. Private investments as a whole 
outstripped government debt since the decade 1885-1895 under the indisputable 
predominance of the railway industry, and later owing to the attractiveness of public utilities 
-mainly tramways- when railways investments stagnated. This evidence suggests that British 
investments in Latin America followed the general pattern of declining share of government 
loans and enlarging share of investments in developmental finance. As seen in Table 18, in 
1913, 62% of British investments had been placed on private undertakings, contrasting with 
1875 when the comparable figure was 26%.^^
As shown in Table 17 the governments of Mexico, Brazil and Colombia were the main 
debtors in 1865.^^ The Colombian debt stock comprised a series of conversions of her 
reapportioned debt (Note 20) and a small credit (1863) for £0.2 million mainly (90%) 
destined to refinancing purposes. Other important debtor was Venezuela who similarly to 
Colombia enlarged her original obligations with a sequence of conversions, and two
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flotations in the London market (in 1862 and 1864 for a total of £2.5 million), also 
predominantly orientated (70%) to refinancing purposes. To complete the picture, it has to be 
mentioned that Brazil, Chile and Cuba were the only countries in the region which managed 
to get 'fresh' loans from British investors during the 1850s.^
i) 1865-1875
Important changes in international markets -capital and commodities- are screened by the 
figures for the period 1865-1875 in Table 17. The first long swing of British foreign 
investments stands out in the background. Prospects of profitable investments in the United 
States -accelerated urbanization-, and Europe -French and Russian railways- since the 1850s, 
and the onset of developmental projects in Latin America during the late 1860s, all 
contributed to the upward trend of British investments abroad. As discussed above, the 
long swing was not exempt of reversals and contractions. A non trivial setback hit capital 
markets in 1866 after the outbreak of the Prussian-Austrian war, and the crash of the Overend 
Gurney Company in London. Simon (1967) showed that between 1865 and 1867 total 
capital calls by British investors fell about 57%, the comparable percentage for South 
American capital calls being 71%. According to the same estimates. South American capital 
calls dropped to minimum levels in 1868-1869, and a general recovery of portfolio foreign 
investment was not felt until 1870.
More significant for its world-wide repercussions was the crisis of 1873. The most dramatic 
episode on the financial side of the crisis was the stock market collapse in Vienna. An 
euphoric speculation process had taken place since 1871 with the Franco-Prussian indemnity 
payments, which occasioned an unprecedented movement of gold from France to Germany 
via London. Speculation spanned from European to flourishing U.S. railway securities, and 
when stock markets collapsed in Vienna and Berlin, new lending to the U.S. projects was cut 
off, and well-known companies involved in railroad building -such as Jay Cooke and Co. in 
New York- went bankrupt. In 1870,42% of the world's railroad mileage had been established
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in North America, and the misfortune of important builders became a new reason for the 
retreat of foreign investors.^^ According to Simon's estimates total annual capital calls 
sharply declined along the period 1873-1877, the estimates for 1875 and 1877 being 51% and 
80% lower than the estimate for 1872. The South American set back is illustrated by the fact 
that money calls amounted to £21.4 million in 1871 and 1872, and to only £8 million in 1873, 
before declining gradually to £0.6 million in 1877.
One of the sequels of the crisis of 1873 was an extended default on sovereign debt. Turkey, 
the largest debtor, defaulted by the end of 1875.^^ In Latin America, the fate of different 
countries was tied to the fortunes of their external trade. Countries such as Argentina, Chile 
and Brazil, who enjoyed a favourable position in British imports within the region, endured 
the anaemic foreign lending of the time without suspending their debt service. In 1865 only 
one borrower government -Venezuela- had stopped payments on most of its obligations. By 
contrast, in 1875, 9 out of 15 Latin American borrower governments were in default, and the 
amount of principals involved represented 35% of total British held Latin American 
government debt. By the end of this year, government debts in default worldwide represented 
approximately 30% of the aggregate value of British capital invested abroad (Stone, 1968)
The individual experience of Latin American countries during 1865-1875 starts with the 
suspension of payments by Mexico in 1866, a moratorium which would last for two decades. 
As suggested by the previous description of money calls in the region, the largest loans were 
contracted between 1870 and 1872. Argentina -National government and Provinces- floated 
20% of the loans negotiated during the decade, most of them aimed to finance public works, 
though also military operations (the participation of Argentina in the Paraguayan war). 
Backed by her strong commercial relations, Brazil managed to sell a significant loan in the 
midst of the financial crisis (1875). In a smaller proportion, Chile also marketed securities 
during the years of major lending stringency. A different experience was lived through by the 
smaller nations in the area. Central America, and Bolivia and Paraguay, sold issues whose 
amount though being just smaller than that marketed by Argentina, had a completely
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different fate. Representatives of investors and contemporary analysts denounced the 
speculative excesses and loan-push manipulations of merchant bankers in the case of these 
loans. By the end of 1875, the smaller Latin American states were in default.
The most striking case of large borrowing during the pre-crisis years followed by failure to 
meet the debt service was protagonized by Peru. In fact, 45% of the flow of resources 
chanelled to Latin America during 1865-75 went to finance developmental projects in Peru, 
principally railways. Peruvian prospects were enhanced by the availability of marketable 
exports -cotton, sugar, and nitrates-, but crucially by the natural monopoly of guano, a 
fertilizer highly demanded by European farmers. A marked decline of guano exports after 
1873 triggered internal financial instability and left the economy on the verge of failing to 
meet the external debt service. An international intermediary -the Dreyfus Frères of Paris- 
was granted the concession of guano commercial explotation in exchange for the repayment 
of the external debt. In 1875 this institution declared its inability to fulfill its obligation given 
gloomy prospects of guano exports. A formal suspension of debt service was not announced 
until the beginning of 1876.^^
What happened to the rest of Andean countries? Even before the crisis a complete default 
took place in the cases of Venezuela (1867) and Ecuador (1868). As for Colombia, Table 17 
shows a reduction of the stock of debt from £7.3 million to £2.1 million. No loan was 
marketed during the period, and in 1873 the stock of debt had been reduced, by means of 
amortization payments and buybacks in the London market, to £6.6 million. By mutual 
agreement signed during the same year, this amount of debt was converted into a new debt of 
£2.0 million.^ ^
ii) 1875-1895
These two decades are dominated by a new long swing of British capital exports which starts 
in the late 1870s, reaches its peak in the late 1880s, and then fades away during the first half
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of the 1890s. During the expansion phase of the long swing, 1878-90, capital calls were far 
from evenly distributed. Nearly 40% of the total calls was concentrated on the last three 
years, 1888-90. The Latin American calls were even more concentrated, with around 55% of 
the calls for the period during 1888-90. Over the whole period, the Latin American share in 
total calls was 21%, enlarged to 29% when only the years 1888-90 are considered. During the 
contractionary phase, 1891-1901, the Latin American participation in total calls declined 
substantially to only 10%. This diminished access of Latin America to the anaemic 
international lending of the 1890s followed the collapse of the London firm Baring 
Brothers.
Argentina was the third largest borrower from Britain during the 1880s, after the United 
States and Australia. Within the Latin American region, Argentina, Mexico and Brazil, in 
that order, were the main beneficiaries of British investments during the 1875-1895 period. 
These countries concentrated 78% of total investments in the region during the period -89% 
of government loans and 73% of direct investments-. Argentina by far outstripped her main 
competitors, monopolizing 45% of total investments in the region, while Mexico and Brazil 
achieved smaller and similar shares, 17% and 16% correspondingly.
Furthermore, in 1895, private investment represented more than half of British investments in 
Mexico and Argentina, leading a general trend in Latin America, while government loans 
still predominated in Brazil. As mentioned above, the decisive reason behind this trend, was 
the formidable upsurge in railway investments during the 1875-95 period (Table 18). And 
although Argentina, Mexico and Brazil secured 85% of that extraordinary increase, the 
individual share of Brazil was only 15% (Stone, 1968)
The South Cone and the Rio de la Plata regions -Argentina, Chile, Uruguay-, attracted 58% 
of the British investments during the period. In sharp contrast, the North Andean countries - 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela-, as a whole, not only did not attract new 
investments but experienced a reduction of the stocks existing in 1875. Investments in Peru,
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the major Latin American capital importer during the 1870s, fell 40% during the period. 
Ecuador, together with Bolivia and Paraguay one of the countries with the lowest British 
investments in South America, also went through a curtailment of previous investments. 
These experiences did not mean that the countries involved became net capital exporters. 
Instead, they reflected bilateral arrangements to reduce the outstanding debt balances. For 
instance, in the Peruvian case the government debt was not only reduced but transformed into 
private investment, as seen in Table 17; as a result of this conversion, known as the Grace 
Contract (1890), British investors were given the posession of all state railways and various 
concessions.' '^^
As mentioned before, the Baring crisis (November 1890) marked the end of the financial 
frenzy of the late 1880s. Historians have described a state of financial distress since at least 
1888, and the critical role of Argentinian loans. The process can be summarized as follows. 
Sales of Argentinian bonds by German investors -probably induced by uncertain economic 
and political prospects of Argentina-, loaded the London market. Fresh loans to Argentina 
were contracted at increasing discounts, and even some offerings failed. To alleviate the 
situation. Baring offered short-term credits to Argentina, which eventually could not be met 
as they came due, owing to the deteriorating trade conditions of the country.
Stoppage of capital inflows since 1889, combined with terms of trade deterioration created a 
debt service transfer problem. Baring found itself with unsold securities -mainly Argentinian 
bonds-, and restricted access to short-term borrowing. The London market became tougher 
when Baring was warned by the Bank of England not to exceed its short-term lending to 
Argentina. When the Baring's position became unsustainable, a major financial crisis was 
avoided by immediate intervention of the British government and the Bank of England. 
Baring's liabilities were guaranteed but the repercussions on international lending could not 
be averted (Kindleberger, 1989. Fishlow, 1989 a,b).
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Foreign lending ebbed in the early 1890s reaching a bottom in 1893. British foreign 
investments during 1891-1893 were just 35% of the amounts invested in 1888-1890. Latin 
America was the main but not the only casualty of the credit crunch, the comparable figure 
having been 20%, while the percentages for Europe and North America were 28% and 37% 
respectively. Even the British Empire as a whole had to bear a significant credit restriction of 
60%.^^ As noted before, a weak recovery of foreign lending started in 1894, but a new 
upswing of foreign investment would not take place until the first-half decade of the new 
century.
During the expansion phase of the 1875-1895 period, various Latin American countries 
which had defaulted before or as a result of the 1873 crisis, concluded agreements with 
British bondholders aimed to restablish access to new external credit. As a result of these 
agreements, only four countries -Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica and Honduras- responsible 
for 16% of the Latin American external debt, were in default. This situation contrasted with 
the more gloomy scene of nine defaulter countries representing 35% of the external debt of 
the region two decades earlier (Stone, 1968). Two important agreements in the context of 
defaulting countries were those negotiated by Peru on the basis mentioned above, and by 
Mexico (1886) which proposed a new arrangement to its creditors after two decades of 
suspended debt service. The Mexican negotiation and further redemption of the debt 
represented a reduction equivalent to 75% of the original external debt.^^
The two main beneficiaries of government loans during the 1880s -Argentina and Brazil-, 
experienced the major difficulties with debt servicing in the 1890s. Argentina after the Baring 
crisis, and Brazil at the end of the decade, faced debt service transfer problems. Both 
countries were unable to meet their debt payments, and as a result, unprecedented agreements 
with creditors took place. There was a sharp contrast between the treatment of defaults in the 
Near East and the treatment given to Argentina and Brazil. Instead of the debt relief option 
applied in the cases of Turkey and Egypt, agreements were based upon flexibility on the 
creditors side and willingness to pay on the debtors side. More precisely, conditionality terms
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and the conciliatory role of financial intermediaries between lenders and borrowers applied, 
instead of military intervention or direct control of fiscal sources as it happened in the Near 
East.
The Argentinian and Brazilian experiences of the 1890s constitute an important precedent for 
our discussion of negotiation processes during the 20th century. The Argentinian agreement 
(1893), considerably reduced the burden of the debt service for a fixed period of time: 
amortizations were suspended for eight years, and interest remittances were reduced by about 
30% during five years. The center piece of the Brazilian arrangement (1898) was the granting 
of a funding loan enough to cover three years of interest, and the suspension of amortization 
payments for thirteen years.
The borrowers' counterpart in these agreements was a stringent reduction of aggregate 
demand by means of higher taxation and compression of public expenditure. The reason for 
these deflationary policies was that not only external shocks -the rationing of external loans 
in the case of Argentina, and the falling coffee prices in the case of Brasil- contributed to the 
inability of these countries to meet their debt repayments. In Argentina since the mid-1880s, 
and in Brazil since the early-1890s, expansionary monetary and fiscal policies had been 
pushing up the price of gold m terms of inconvertible national currencies. As a result, higher 
gold premia became a factor of an increasingly costly external debt. The adjustment burden 
would be gradually smoothed by the favourable trend of international trade at the turn of the 
century. Brazil, in particular, would not endure more than four years of hardship; a new cycle 
of growing international coffee prices would invigorate the economy from 1903 down to 
World War I (Fishlow, 1989 a,b).
iii) 1895-1913
A massive outflow of British capital characterized the period from 1905 to 1913, leaving 
behind fifteen years of anaemic foreign lending. The annual average of capital calls jumped
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from £74 million during the 1896-1904 period to £160 million during the years from 1905 to 
1913. The importance of this last period is underlined by the fact that capital exports 
represented 37% of the total exported between 1865 and 1913. The Americas were the main 
beneficiaries of the last British foreign investment boom before World War I, with 62% of 
the capital calls. The North -including Canada-, with 42% of the calls, clearly outstripped the 
South with the remaining 20%. Considering the political status of the borrowers, 61% of 
capital calls were placed in independent countries, and 39% in the British Empire.
The upswing of capital exports initiated in the 1900s is reflected again in the inverse long- 
swing motion of overseas and domestic investments (Graph 30). Foreign investment as a 
ratio of GNP vigorously increased since its last trough in 1901 to its final peak in 1913, 
excepting the years 1906-1907 when London substantially reduced foreign lending after the 
distress created in the Continent by the collapse of stock markets in Italy (Kindleberger, 
1989). At the turn of the century British investors were exporting an amount of capital 
equivalent to 1% of GNP; by 1905 the comparable figure was 4% and at its height in 1913, 
the relevant percentage was 9.1.
Students of the period have found a mixture of overseas and domestic forces behind the 
reported massive capital outflow. Overseas pull factors such as unprecedented mining 
opportunities in South Africa, and population- sensitive investments in major food suppliers 
to Great Britain such as Argentina, attracted the interest of foreign investors (Paish, 1914). 
These overseas accumulation pressures coincided with contracting domestic investment 
opportunities. And though declining opportunities at home had been felt since the early 
1870s, they became more influential on investors' decisions in the two decades before World 
War I. Right across the industrial and transportation sectors home returns were weaker than 
overseas returns, and investors found this dominance stronger and more prolonged during the 
1900s than it had been during the mid-1870s to mid-1880s (Edelstein, 1982)
339
According to Table 17, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, in that order, captured most of the 
interest of British investors during the period under discussion. Three-quarters of the stock of 
total investments in Latin America in 1913 were placed in these countries -78% of 
government loans and 71% of private investments-. These estimates show that the tendency 
to allocate investments in the three countries became more accentuated between 1895 and 
1913. In 1895 these countries appeared to be controlling 68% of total investments, while the 
comparable figure for 1875 had been 47%. The geographical concentration is also illustrated 
by the distribution of the British railway portfolio. In 1913 railways accounted for more than 
a half of private investments, and more than one-third of total investments (Table 18). 
Argentine railway securities represented 54% of total investments in the field, well ahead of 
Brazil (15%) and Mexico (8%); altogether, the three countries gathered 77% of the most 
dynamic an profitable investment of the time.
c. Conclusions
The Latin American share in the long swings of British capital exports was to a great extent 
represented by investments in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. Colombia barely acceded to the 
distribution of British foreign investments. A stylized version of the capital export cycles can 
be as follows: The upswing is associated with prospects of profitable investment in the 
periphery (as in the case of railways). The end of the upswing is frequently related to 
financial crises at the center which cut back the financing of projects at the periphery (e.g. the 
1873 crisis). Also policies adopted in the periphery can upset creditors' attraction towards 
foreign investment and precipitate a retrenchment of external financing (such as in the Baring 
crisis of 1890). The situation is made worse if a simultaneous deterioration of terms of trade 
in the periphery increases the debt burden. Sovereign default is a likely outcome, and foreign 
capital markets stagnate. Debt settlements follow ranging from military intervention and 
direct control of fiscal sources (the experiences of Turkey and Egypt), to negotiated 
reductions of debt principals (the Mexican solution in the 1880s), and to conciliatory
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approaches based on flexibility on the creditors side and willingness to pay on the debtors 
side (the Brasilian and Argentinian cases in the 1890s).
The two great lending booms of the 20th century (1920s and 1910s) reproduce characteristic 
elements of this stylized description. The remainder of this section explores the boom-and- 
bust cycle of the 1920s.
C. From the Pax Britannica to the Pax Americana.
The massive outflow of British capital during the first decade and a half of this century came 
to a halt with the outbreak of World War I. It was also the end of the Pax Britannica. A new 
lending boom developed a decade later prompted by the urgency of financing the 
reconstruction of Europe, this time under the auspices of the Pax Americana. This lending 
boom, previously depicted in graphs 26 and 27 reproduced characteristics already found in 
the long swings of British foreign investments. The boom of U.S. private capital exports was 
linked to the financing of the European reconstruction and the rise of New York to a 
predominant position as foreign financial center. The wave of U.S. direct investments and 
loans went beyond the European boundaries, and South America was one of the major 
recipients of external funds. The extraordinary U.S. capital outflows came to an end with the 
stock market boom in 1928. Later, with the onset of the Great Depression, the debt servicing 
capabilities of most borrowers were adversely affected, and the prospects of a recovery of 
international lending vanished as sovereign default became a world wide phenomenon.
In this subsection we discuss the conversion of the United States into a creditor nation, the 
dominant role secured by New York as a financial center, and the distribution of U.S. 
investments with particular emphasis in South America.
1. The United States: from debtor to creditor Nation36
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After the outbreak of World War I, international lending passed through successive phases 
characterized by different sources of financing. During the first phase -January 1915 to April 
1917-, international lending was based on the U.S. private capital markets. Borrowing by the 
Allies in the United States mounted as growing purchases of munitions and foodstuffs were 
required.The scale of this borrowing is illustrated by the fact that 97% of the total U.S. loans 
during the period were placed on the allied countries. Only 2% went to Latin America. Most 
loans -90%- to the Allies were on a short-term basis, and given the political context of the 
time, on very liberal terms.
The second phase -April 1917-May 1922- was characterized by the implementation of the 
Liberty Loan Acts according to which the U.S. government was authorized to purchase 
foreign obligations of the allied governments. Loans were authorized for a maximum amount 
of US$10 billion, and on even more liberal terms than the private credits of the previous 
phase, namely, pM prices in all loans and interest rates just enough to repay domestic 
investors. International U.S. private lending was substantially reduced while this country was 
at war, and even strictly controlled during the last few months of the conflict. At the end of 
the period, the actual loans under the Liberty Loan Acts nearly matched the authorized 
amount. Out of a total of US$9.4 billion the two main Allies, Great Britain and France, 
received 44% and 31% correspondingly.^^
With the cessation of hostilities, negotiations orientated to convert the whole set of war 
obligations with the United States into long-term debts, culminated in an agreement 
according to which interests accrued down to the date of settlement were scaled down and 
added to the principal to be converted. The new long-term debt, over a 62-year payment 
period, amounted to US$11.7 billion of which 15% represented funded interest. Apart from 
the conversion itself, and the reschedule of a short-term debt into such a long-term loan, the 
agreement left important precedents for future foreign debt negotiations. In particular, the 
principle of "capacity to pay" was recognized and the war debtors benefited from it.^^
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The final phase (1922-29) was marked by the revival and upsurge of U.S. private lending.^^ 
Although an upward trend of U.S. lending was observed since 1922-24, the League of 
Nations' loans and particularly the Dawes loan played a crucial role in the upswing of foreign 
lending during the 1920s."^  ^ As with the Liberty Loan Acts credits, the Dawes loan linked 
U.S. private investors with the European reconstruction. Under the Liberty Loans Acts there 
existed an indirect link by which the U.S. government purchases of foreign government 
securities were financed by selling corresponding amounts of dollar-denominated bonds in 
the internal capital market. The Dawes Loan not only established a direct link, but enriched 
the radius of portfolio investment opportunities. What has to be underlined here is that the 
internationalization of U.S. private investments would go beyond the German and European 
boundaries forming unprecedented waves of lending which would ultimately spread to Latin 
America, Australia and Japan, as we will describe below.^^
Table 19 summarizes the transition process (1914-29) of the United States from debtor to 
creditor nation. The debtor condition by 1914 is revealed by the negative sign preceding the 
net value of assets. Five years later the creditor condition on private account was explained 
not only by increased assets -direct investments and loans to the allied governments-, but also 
by the liquidation of assets owned by foreign investors and repatriation of securities during 
the war."^  ^The private creditor condition of the nation was reinforced by the government 
loans extended under the Liberty Loan Acts. Later, in 1924, the balancesheet showed the 
revival of private lending and the funding of European government debts. Lastly, the private 
lending boom of the late 1920s is revealed in the unprecedented increase of private assets 
registered in the 1929 balancesheet. It can also be seen how the U.S. government ceased to be 
a foreign lender once the operations authorized by the Liberty Loan Acts were completed.^
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TABLE 19
U.S. INTERNATIONAL BALANCESHEETS 
1914-1929 
SELECTED YEARS
(MILLIONS OF US$)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1914 1919 1924 1929
A. PRIVATE ACCOUNTS
ASSETS 3514 6956 10754 17009
LIABILITIES 7200 3985 4044 8931
NET PRIVATE ASSETS -3686 2971 6710 8078
B . INTERGOVERNMENT 
DEBTS
TO THE U.S. GO­
VERNMENT 
BY THE U.S. GO­
VERNMENT
NET GOVERNMENT 
ASSETS
C. TOTAL NET ASSETS
9982 11774 11685
— —  391 —  —  — —
9591 11774 11685
-3686 12562 18484 19763
SOURCE: Based on Lewis, C. (1938), pp.447 and 450
Two unambiguous conclusions can be drawn from our reading of Table 19. First, the creditor 
condition of the United States was already apparent at the end of the war, even without taking 
in account government loans. Second, also without considering government loans, it appears 
that the creditor position of the United States was twice as large during the first decade after 
the outbreak of the war than it was when only the 1920s are taken into account. This idea had 
already been suggested in Graph 26 where the net U.S. capital exports as a proportion of 
GNP reached during World War I could not be repeated during the lending boom of the late 
1920S.45
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2. New York, the dominant financial center.
Important changes in the position of international financial centers and in the structure of 
financial intermediation took place during the first decade after the war. The new wave of 
foreign lending was accompanied by a crucial change in the identity of investors. About 
US$16 billion in new capital issues (namely, excluding refunding operations) on overseas 
account were publicly offered in London and New York between 1920 and 1930. The 
redistribution of foreign lending is revealed by the fact that over 60% of those issues were 
placed on New York; and during the lending boom of 1924-1928 New York's share 
exceeded two-thirds of new issues in both markets. With the collapse of international lending 
in 1928-29 net capital issues faded in both markets though not at the same rhythm. The two 
markets reacted positively in 1930 after the downfall of 1929 which was much more severe in 
New York than in London. Public offerings fell again in 1931, and since then up to 1935 
practically evaporated in New York and just languidly survived in London."^^
Table 20 shows the evolution of new foreign capital issues in the New York market during 
the 1920-35 period, and their geographical origin. Three subperiods are clearly distinguished. 
The first one shows an upward trend of foreign issues suddenly interrupted in 1923 after the 
French occupation of the Ruhr."^  ^During these years there was not a clear predominance of 
any of the main borrowers, Europe, Canada and Latin America. Foreign issues peaked during 
the 1924-28 subperiod when 60% of the issues for the whole period were placed. The Dawes 
Loan had a catalytic effect on the upsurge of new capital issues, and a half of those issues 
was destined to Europe. Latin America ranked second with nearly one-fourth of the funds, 
and it can be seen that her position became progressively stronger while the European 
securities became relatively weaker.
The subperiod 1929-35 shows the halting process of U.S. foreign loans: first, an abrupt 
reduction in 1929 when new capital issues represented 58% of the annual average for the
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previous five years; second, a temporary upturn in 1930 coinciding with the flotation of the 
Young loan; and, third, the dying out of U.S. private long-term lending after 1931. While 
Canada was the beneficiary of the meagre loans floated in New York between 1932 and 1935 
the access of Europe and Latin America to the scanty capital market was negligible.^^
TABLE 20
FOREIGN SECURITIES PUBLICLY OFFERED IN THE U.S.
1920-1935
(MILLIONS OF US$ AND PERCENTAGES)
YEAR NET LATIN REST 1
NOMINAL EUROPE CANADA AMERICA THE W
VALUE a
(US$m) % % % %
1920 497 49.7 37.0 9.9 3.4
1921 623 25.1 31 .0 36.8 7.1
1922 764 27.7 22.0 29.3 21 .0
1923 421 25.7 28.5 27.2 18.6
1924 969 54.3 15.7 19.3 10.7
1925 1076 58.5 12.7 14.7 14.1
1926 1125 43.0 20.1 32.7 4.2
1927 1337 43.2 17.7 25.4 13.7
1928 1251 47.8 14.8 26.4 11 .0
1929 671 21 .1 43.1 26.1 9.7
1930 905 40.1 30.8 22.0 7.1
1931 229 34.0 54.8 1 .4 10.1
1932 29 --- 100.0 — — —
1933 11 32.3 50.4 17.3 ---
1934 —  — —  — — —  — —  —
1935 45 94.2 0.4 5.4
SOURCES: UNITED• NATIONS (1964) p. 20
ROYAL INSTITUTE (1937) p .171 and 182
^ The concept of net nominal value corresponds to the 
value of annual issues excepting those for refunding purposes
After the war, potential borrowers faced different financial conditions in the U.S. and London 
markets. Table 21 shows some relevant rates for borrowers and investors on long-term bonds. 
Each market offered higher yields on foreign bonds as compared
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with domestic bonds, which could be interpreted as a
relative measure of risk. The London market discriminated not only between foreign and 
domestic bonds, but between foreign bonds according to their political status, namely, bonds 
issued by members of the British Empire, and bonds issued by independent countries. During 
the lending boom of 1924-28 the annual average yield on foreign bonds from outside the 
Empire was 7.33%, far above the average risk-free return of 4.48% offered by Consols. The 
discrimination between foreign bonds is revealed by the fact that during the same period, 
while the annual average difference between yields on Empire-members bonds and Consols 
was of 0.6 points, the difference between yields on independent- and Empire-members 
countries was 2.2 points.^^
In the U.S. market, the annual average yield offered on foreign bonds during the loan boom 
of 1924-28 was 6.36%, while that on domestic bonds was 4.63%. This means that while the 
U.S. domestic yield was slightly higher than its British similar, the cost of foreign borrowing 
in the U.S. was nearly 1.0 point cheaper than that of independent countries borrowing in the 
London market. Given this difference, only Empire members -with the important exception 
of Canada, and to some extent Australia-, still found it convenient to float their capital issues 
in London. The fact is that while the annual average borrowing rate for Empire countries was 
5.3% during the period 1921-1929, Canada managed to get an average rate of 5.2% in the 
U.S. market, well below the 6.36% imposed on the rest of foreign borrowers.^^
The rise of New York to an unrivalled position within international financial centres is not 
thoroughly reflected in the volume of new issues or in the structure of interest rates. An 
important institutional factor was the change experienced by U.S. banks. The conventional 
role of trade financing was supplemented by investment banking services. These services 
implicated not only broker-dealing activities, but promotion of foreign bond issues. More 
importantly, by creating security affiliates, traditional short-term commercial banks became 
involved in long-term foreign lending. Because the security affiliates were not constrained by 
the laws that regulated branch banking, those new organizations were able of opening offices
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throughout the United States and abroad. By 1930, banks and their affiliates had generated 
about 45% of all securities offered in the United States.^ ^
3. Geographical distribution of U.S. investments.
We now turn to discuss the geographical location of U.S. foreign investments and the net 
cash flow of U.S. foreign dollar-denominated loans during the transition period. Our starting 
point is the distribution of investments at the beginning of World War I. As seen above 
(Table 13), U.S. foreign investments represented no more than 8% of world foreign 
investments at that time. The discrimination of this relatively low proportion -as compared 
with those of Great Britain, France and Germany-, by kind of investment and destination 
appears in the first column of Table 22. Direct investment was overwelmingly important, 
with 75% of the total. Latin America as a whole was the main beneficiary, with 47% of total 
investments, far ahead of Canada with 25% and Europe with 20%. In the Latin American 
context, Mexico gathered 50% of investments in the continent, and Cuba 20%; Mexico and 
the rest of Central America accumulated 78% of investments, while the South American 
region was left with the remaining 22%.
Portfolio investment became increasingly important during and after the war. Its share in total 
investments passed from one-fourth in 1914 to over one-half in 1929. The biggest "jump" 
happened between 1914 and 1919 when the share of portfolio investments grew by 15%, 
contrasting with more moderate increases of 5% in the first and second halves of the 1920s. 
As expected, this evolution coincided, first, with the enlarged lending to Europe during the 
war, and second, with the comparable absolute increase of direct investments which 
accompanied the expanding loans to regions such as South America and Africa-Asia, and to a 
lesser extent, Canada.
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TABLE 22 
U.S. Foreign Investments 
Geographic Areas 
Selected Dates 
(Millions of US$)
1914 1919 1924 1929
Europe D 573.3 693.5 921 .3 1340.3
P 118.5 1293.3 1731.5 3260.2
T 691 .8 1986.8 2652.8 4600.5
Canada D 618.4 814.3 1080.5 1657.4
P 248.8 728.5 1551.2 2002.8
T 867.2 1542.8 2631.7 3660.2
Mexico D 587.1 643.6 735.4 709.2
P 266.4 265.3 269.7 266.0
T 853.5 908.9 1005.1 975.2
Cuba D 281 .3 567.3 993.2 1025.5
P 55.0 38.9 108.1 128.4
T 336.3 606.2 1101.3 1153.9
Central D 89.6 112.5 143.5 250.9
America P 3.6 2.3 11 .8 35.4
T 93.2 114.8 155.3 286.3
South D 323.1 664.6 947.1 1719.7
America P 42.6 111.6 464.1 1294.1
T 365.7 776.2 1411.2 3013.8
Africa D 149.5 258.7 442.8 725.3
and Asia P 126.6 136.2 428.4 837.3
T 276.1 394.9 871 .2 1562.6
Banking D 30.0 125.0 125.0 125.0
P - - - 15.1
T 30.0 125.0 125.0 140.1
Total D 2652.3 3879.5 5388.8 7553.3
Long-term P 861 .5 2567.1 4564.8 7839.3
T 3513.8 6455.6 9953.6 15392.6
Short-term
credits 500.0 800.0 1617.0
All
Investments 3513.8 6955.6 10753.6 17009.6
Source : Lewis, Cleona. (1938, Appendix D)
D: Direct Investment 
P: Portfolio Investment 
T: Total Investment
NOTES
1. Portfolio investment mainly consists of foreign government or private 
bonds publicly offered in the United States-
2. Direct investment is defined as investments in which U.S. nationals 
or enterprises held control of at least 25% of the equity capital.
3. Direct investments were later corrected by the U.S. Department of 
Commerce. Accordingly, direct investments for Latin America in 1929 
were reduced from US$3,645.8 million to US$3,462 million. United 
Nations (1964), p.32.
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Latin America and Europe protagonized the main distributional changes during the period. 
The former lost a share of 10% of total U.S. investments in favor of the latter. Even so, in 
1929, Latin America retained the major portion of investments -35%-, followed by Europe - 
30%-, which displaced Canada to the third position -24%-. This last country managed to keep 
a stable share of investments during the period, though progressively attracting more 
portfolio than direct investments. Important variations occurred in Latin America as U.S. 
investments moved from Central to South America. Investments in Mexico stagnated, and 
South America gathered 56% of the investments in the region at the end of the period.
Tables 23 and 24 provide information about the net flow -disbursements minus repayments- 
of U.S. dollar-denominated loans. The former offers a general outlook of the two decades 
after the outbreak of World War I. It shows the upsurge and collapse of net flows and their 
distribution across regions. As seen, Europe played a dominant role both as net borrower and 
net repayer. The comparatively secondary position during 1920-24 is explained by the 
substantial repayment of short-term war loans previously mentioned; in fact, Europeans - 
mostly Great Britain and France- dedicated 67% of their gross borrowing during 1920-24 to 
finance those repayments. Net repayments dominated during the first half-decade after the 
foreign lending crisis of 1929: 77% of these repayments came from Europe, mostly from 
Germany, France, and Great Britain.
The overall balance of net loans (Column 5 in Table 23) confirms the predominant position 
of Europe followed by Canada. These two regions received two-thirds of total net loans.
Latin America gathered only 22%, a share similar to those achieved during the expansionary 
cycle of British capital exports between 1870 and 1913. Finally, it is seen how only 43% of 
the gross flow of U.S. loans during the period actually became net loans. This outcome 
mainly follows from the fact that debtor countries as a whole became net capital exporters 
after the virtual interruption of foreign lending in 1929.
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TABLE 24 
Net flow of U.S. loans 
(Long- and short-term) 
1924 through 1929 
(Millions of dollars)
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( 1 ) ( 2 ) (3)
(=2 - 1 )
(4)
(3/2 XI00)
U.S.
Portfolio
1924
U.S.
Portfolio
1929
Net flow 
1924-1929
% change
1924-1929
BORROWERS *
EUROPE 1708.8 3054.5 +1345.7 + 78.8
France 436.6 334.6 -102 -23.3
Germany 121 .9 964.4 +842.5 +691.1
U. K. 298.9 143.0 -1 55 -51 .9
Italy 17.3 315.0 +297.7 + 1721
Norway 94.7 180.7 + 86 + 90.8
Poland 29.6 131 .7 +102.1 +344.9
CANADA 1487.6 1858.4 +370.8 +24.9
SOUTH AMERICA 437.4 1263.6 +826.2 +188.9
Argentina 178.0 358.7 +180.7 + 101 .5
Brazil 136.8 314.8 +178.0 +130.1
Chile 52.1 236.3 +184.2 +353.6
Colombia 14.1 164.9 +150.8 +1069.5
Rest 56.4 188.9 +132.5 +234.9
OTHER LATIN
AMERICA 263.5 301 .4 + 37.9 + 14.4
Cuba 76.3 94.8 + 18.5 +24.2
Mexico 143.6 139.0 -4.6 -3.2
OTHER
COUNTRIES 457.1 861 .3 +404.2 +88.4
Australia 23.0 240.6 +217.6 +946.0
Japan 179.0 327.2 +148.2 + 82.8
OTHERS ** 0.6
TOTAL 4354.4 7339.8 +2985.4 + 68.6
Source: Lewis, Cleona (1938, Appendix E-5)
Only main debtors are discriminated. **Banking
353
The distribution by countries of the U.S. lending boom of 1925-1929 appears in Table 24. 
Nearly a half of the net flow of loans went to Europe, and Germany alone received 28%. 
Germany and Italy obtained 85% of the net loans to Europe and 38% of the total loans. Net 
loans to Germany alone exceeded those to South America and were just inferior to those to 
the whole Latin America. After Germany, the second important debtor country was Canada, 
though the latter did not achieve one-half of the credits extended to the former.
In the South American region, Chile just exceeded the loans to the traditional major debtors, 
Argentina and Brazil. Colombia appeared in the group of major international debtors for the 
first time since the 1820s, and in the list of outstanding Latin American debtors for the first 
time since the 1860s. Chile, Argentina, Brazil and Colombia as a whole accounted for one- 
fourth of total U.S. foreign loans during the 1925-29 period. Finally, as previously noted, 
Mexico, an important international debtor before World War I, did not share in the U.S. 
lending boom of 1915-29.
4. The U.S. lending to South America
The distribution of U.S. loans in South America during the 1921-31 period is shown in Table 
25. In terms of individual countries, Argentina was by far the main beneficiary with 42% of 
gross total borrowing, followed by Brazil with 19%, Chile with 16% and Colombia with 
10%. Short-term borrowing was unusually characteristic of Argentina. That is the reason why 
in spite of the hugeness of gross borrowing, the Argentinian net borrowing was similar to 
those of Brazil and Chile in Table 24.
As seen in Table 25, the flow of loans was neither continuous nor regular. Two-thirds of total 
flow of loans were concentrated during the lending boom of 1924-28; and even more 
significant, one-half of total flow of loans was allocated during 1926-28, the only years when 
all the South American countries which had access to the U.S. foreign market in the 1920s 
actually received any loans.^^ At the beginning of the
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1920s there was a short experience of huge expansion followed by retreat of foreign lending. 
The influx of U.S. loans in 1921-22 was completely unprecedented; in fact, the accumulated 
loans since the outbreak of the war up to 1920 barely exceeded one-half of those of 1921- 
22.^^ U.S. loans were practically stopped for one year, before the spurt of lending in 1924- 
28; this ephemeral stoppage was only a minor precedent of the permanent halting of private 
loans since 1928. The reaction observed in 1930 was basically due to a huge loan contracted 
by Argentina, and only one-third of the loans of the year were negotiated on a long- term 
basis. In 1931, a short-term credit also to Argentina was the only remainder of the large cycle 
of U.S. private loans to South America in the 1920s.
a. The destination of U.S. investments. The debtors' perspective.
There was a diversity of objectives behind the U.S. loans to South America. On the debtors' 
side and at different moments during the decade, countries appeared to be guided either by 
developmental- or revenue-finance motives. Revenue finance could have predominated 
during the first half of the decade, but developmental finance was the prevailing issue during 
the second half. It can be estimated that about 52% of the long-term loans extended to South 
America during 1925-29 were contracted for the purpose of developmental finance, around 
27% were exclusively negotiated for revenue finance reasons, and the remaining 21% were 
obtained for a mixture of developmental and revenue finance goals. Then, it is not adventured 
to say that roughly one-third of the loans was destined to solve budgetary problems.
Revenue finance did not limit to refunding operations of external debt. A frequent practice in 
the 1920s was the application of external loans to the reduction of the internal debt burden; 
the usual operation was the conversion of the floating internal debt into long-term external 
bonds. The experience of the two main debtors, Argentina and Brazil, is illustrative. In the 
Argentinian case, around 80% of the 1921-22 loans (Table 25) was destined to repay 
advances by domestic banks and to cancel short-term loans. Later, the repayment of 
Government Treasury Notes and the consolidation of the floating debt were central aims in
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the negotiation of about 45% of the 1924-25 loans. As a whole, and for the entire decade, 
debt conversions represented about 45% of the Argentinian dollar loans, while developmental 
projects represented around 40%.^^
Brazil also found support in the U.S. capital market to alleviate her internal debt problem. 
About one-third of her heavy indebtedness during the 1926-28 period (Table 25) was 
destined to reduce the floating internal debt. Even more characteristically, Brazil applied 
external resources to the stabilization of the internal price of coffee. The last Brazilian access 
to U.S. foreign financing in 1930 (Table 25) was part of a bigger external debt operation 
intended to finance large unsold coffee stocks. British banks played the major role, managing 
to float Brazilian bonds for about US$60 million in London and other European markets, in 
the midst of the withdrawal of international lending. Some years later, the British Royal 
Institute of International Affairs interpreted these loans as part of "an attempt to stave off the 
crisis".
Countries with minor participation in the lending boom also sought to convert part of their 
internal into external debt. That is the case of Peru which applied external funds to the 
reduction of one-half of its internal debt.^^ Other countries did not float bonds abroad with 
the explicit aim of reducing the burden of internal debt, but given the access to external funds 
their treasuries managed to lower the stock of internal debt. The Chilean experience during
1925-28 is illustrative; while the national government increased the external debt by 71%, the 
stock of internal debt was curtailed by 63%. Finally, the Colombian case during 1925-27 is 
an example of substantial increase in the external debt of the national government -117%-, 
accompanied by a moderate reduction of 10% in the internal debt. Later, when the external 
capital market became increasingly stringent during 1928-30, both the Chilean and 
Colombian governments turned back to internal financing.
b. The destination of U.S. investments. The investors' and bankers' side.
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On the investors' side, the exploitation of natural resources and development of public 
utilities captured a great deal of attention. Direct investments were concentrated in the 
industrial mineral sector and in the petroleum production sector. Important examples of the 
former were the copper companies in Chile, and of the latter, the investments in Venezuelan 
and Colombian oil. Portfolio investments in securities issued either by national, provintial or 
municipal governments, or by investment banks, were notably intended to finance public 
utilities, the construction of infrastructure (roads, railways, portworks, power plants), and 
agricultural development.^^
Apart from the prospect of exploiting the endowment of natural resources. South America 
promissed to be "good business" for bankers. The ultimate investors were not banks but small 
private investors who followed the engaging financial propaganda of the newly created 
security affiliates of commercial banks. Bankers competed not only for allocating foreign 
bonds between potential investors, but for encouraging foreign governments to borrow.^^ 
Bankers obtained an average commission of 3.3% over the par price of U.S. loans along the 
period 1915-29, though neither the discount asked by the public nor the spread required by 
banks were uniform across regions. At one extreme, bankers obtained a spread of 2.1% on 
loans to Canada, while at the other extreme bankers obtained a 4.4% spread on loans to South 
America. In the middle, loans to Europe left a bankers' spread of 3.4%.^^
It seems that lenders' discrimination between borrowers was affected by geographical 
proximity, relative importance of U.S. direct investments, and political factors. Central 
America and West Indies -mainly Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica- played the role 
of sphere of influence of the United States. Canada was not only the immediate neighbour, 
but the recipient of one-fourth of total U.S. direct investments in 1930. Altogether Canada, 
Central America (excluding Mexico) and West Indies accommodated 40% of the stock of 
foreign U.S. investments in 1930. In contrast, the remote Asian countries were the recipients 
of no more than 5% of world U.S. investments, or 7% when investments in Australia are 
included.
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Bankers were not alone in searching for profitable opportunities abroad. It has been 
documented how U.S. companies, notably construction companies, played an important role 
in obtaining external finance. In this context the access to foreign lending during the 1920s 
was facilitated and even stimulated by the way in which financing was made available when 
public works were contracted with U.S. companies.^^ It is important to note that the presence 
of contractors was encouraged by the increasing number of branches of U.S. factories 
operating abroad, a fact of major relevance in South America; as seen before with reference 
to Table 22, South America was the major recipient of U.S. direct investments in the 1920s 
and particularly in 1924-29, far ahead of Canada and Europe. Given the dependence of direct 
investments and public works not only on U.S. private finance, but also on technology, 
prosperity in borrowing countries became an additional factor of prosperity at the center. This 
was another reason for borrowers and creditors alike to hold on foreign lending through the 
1920s.
Finally, it has to be noted that Latin America as a whole satisfied commonly accepted 
indicators of creditworthiness. As for the trade balance, during the first-half of the decade the 
average surplus represented 15% of exports. As for the fiscal balance the results were less 
encouraging, since a persistent deficit had dominated during the first-half of the decade; 
however, while government expenditures had been growing at an annual rate of 2.2%, 
revenues had been increasing at the rate of 2.8% per year.^  Any reservations about fiscal 
stability could have been moderated by processes of financial modernization in the region, 
and particularly by the adoption of the Gold Standard. In fact, by 1926, ten Latin American 
countries had adopted such monetary regime, and by 1928 the list included sixteen 
countries.
D. The access of Colombia to foreign lending during the 1920s.
1. Institutional precedents
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Although the U.S. lending wave did not fully arrive in South America until the second-half of 
the 1920s (Table 25), a series of events and institutional changes prepared the country for the 
influx of foreign financing. An important fact was the indemnity payment -US$25 million- 
offered by the U.S. government to Colombia for the loss of Panama in 1903, which improved 
the diplomatic relationships between the two nations (Urrutia-Thompson Treaty). The 
indemnification was paid by instalments -US$10 million in 1923 and single payments of 
US$5 million between 1924 and 1926-. Meanwhile, Colombia implemented an integral 
reform of her financial and fiscal structures. Outstanding results of these reforms were the 
foundation of a highly independent central bank -the Bank of the Republic- and the 
reorganization of government budgeting processes. These reforms coincided with the 
adoption of the Gold Standard in 1923, a salient event in the region since Colombia was the 
first South American country to return to gold. Other prominent borrowers followed suit: 
Chile in 1926, and Argentina and Brazil in 1927.
Of vital importance for the implementation of the institutional changes was a financial 
mission headed by the U.S. expert Edwin W. Kemmerer. Universally recognized as the 
"money doctor", Colombian authorities required his advice and support as a means of 
securing the credibility of the reforms at home and abroad. For as long as two decades 
successive government initiatives had sought to restore convertibility with only temporary 
and partial success. The creation of an independent monetary authority was also a permanent 
aspiration during those years. More even, the political decision of banning money-financed 
deficits led in 1910 to the constitutional prohibition of new issues of fiat money, as seen in 
Part I, Section II. With these longstanding institutional precedents and with the prospect of 
receiving the indemnity payment from the U.S. government for the loss of Panama, the 
contracting of the Kemmerer mission had the characteristic of a housecall to the money 
doctor to enhance the viability and success of the reforms.
By 1923 the crucial financial and fiscal reforms were already in place. Such changes 
improved the prospects of access to foreign credit markets. More even, there were explicit
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attempts to encourage large-scale foreign borrowing. For instance, a legislation of late 1922 
(Law 102) authorized the national government to float external loans up to the limit of 
US$100 million intended to finance railways and ports. Later, in 1924, one of the objectives 
of the new Agricultural Mortgage Bank was the flotation of external loans destined to 
agriculturalists. These financial ambitions were partially materialized when the U.S. lending 
wave plentifully reached the South American shores in 1925-28.
The Colombia's access to foreign lending during the 1920s can be described by trying to 
answer two questions. First, we inquire who the ultimate borrowers were, and second, we 
investigate the financial conditions under which loans were arranged. The total borrowing 
reached about US$236 million between 1920 and 1929. The overwhelming majority of 
Colombian bonds -92%- was placed in the United States. The remaining 8% was acquired by 
British investors. U.S. loans were mostly negotiated during 1926-28, while the few British 
loans were floated at the extremes of the period -one in 1920 when the U.S. lending boom of 
the late 1920s hardly could have been foreseen, and three loans in 1928-1929 coinciding with 
the stagnation of U.S. loans-.
2. The borrowers
A global description of borrowers is offered in Table 26. Three different government entities 
-Nation, Departments, Municipalities-, and mortgage banks, floated bonds in the United 
States. As seen, the Nation had a direct control and responsibility over only 35% of 
contracted loans. Departments (regional authorities) got a share of the borrowing similar to 
that of the Nation. Departments and Municipalities (local authorities) altogether, were 
responsible for nearly a half -48%- of total borrowing in the United States. Additionally, 
mortgage banks managed to sell bonds for an amount equivalent to 17% of that total 
borrowing; one of these banks -the Agricultural Mortgage Bank (AMB)-, offered its bonds 
backed with the guarantee of the national government. These bonds represented 42% of the 
total offered by banks. Because the guarantee implied a contingent liability on the national
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budget, it follows that the responsibility of the national government would cover from 35% to 
42% of contracted loans, was the AMB unable to fulfill its debt service obligations. Finally, it 
has to be noted that mortgage banks other than the AMB floated 10% of total loans; this 
figure represented the share of the private sector in the total value of Colombian securities 
publicly offered in the United States during the 1920s.
It is clear from Table 26 that most loans were negotiated during 1926-1928. In terms of 
value, 9 out of 10 loans were contracted during these three years. The Nation, six 
departments, four municipalities -the most important cities in the country-, the AMB, and 
three private mortgage banks raised funds on United States bond markets. Such funds were 
not proportionately distributed between borrowers. As revealed in Table 27 one department - 
Antioquia-, floated 15% of total loans, or 45% of the funds obtained by the six Departments. 
Similarly, one municipality, Medellin, floated 8% of total loans, or 55% of the funds received 
by the four municipalities. Given that Medellin is the capital of Antioquia, the immediate 
conclusion is that only one region accounted for 48% of credits received by regional 
governments, and 23% of total credits to the country.
It is worth saying that Antioquia’s and Medellin’s loans did not result from few and big 
lending contracts, as it was the case of the National government credits of 1927 and 1928. On 
the contrary, their access to foreign funds was made up of frequent and relatively small 
lending contracts. Antioquia and Medellin accounted for nearly a half -48%- of the successful 
attempts of regional governments at selling bonds abroad. The outstanding position of 
Antioquia is not surprising given its historical role of leading industrializing region, and the 
second most important center of coffee production in the country.
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TABLE 27
COLOMBIA
TOTAL LOANS FLOATED IN THE UNITED STATES 
BY BORROWERS 
1920-1929
(MILLIONS OF US$ AND PERCENTAGES)
A. NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
B . DEPARTMENTS
ANTIOQUIA
CALDAS
CAUCA VALLE
CUNDINAMARCA
SANTANDER
TOLIMA
C. MUNICIPALITIES
BARRANQUILLA
BOGOTA
CALI
MEDELLIN
D. MORTGAGE BANKS
1 . WITH GOVERNMENT GUARANTEE 
AGRICULTURAL MORTGAGE BANK
2. WITHOUT GOVERNMENT GUARANTEE 
BANK OF COLOMBIA 
MORTGAGE BANK OF BOGOTA 
MORTGAGE BANK OF COLOMBIA
US$
75.45
72.40
32.35
1 0 . 2 0
9.90
15.75
2 . 0 0
2.50
31 .59
2.50 
8.70 
2.89
17.50
38.11
16.00
3.05
6 . 0 0
13.06
%
34.6
33.4
14.8 
4.7 
4.5 
7.3 
0.9 
1 .2
14.5
1 .2
4.0 
1 .3
8 . 0
17.5
7.3
1 .4 
2 . 8  
6 . 0
E. TOTAL 217.85 1 0 0 . 0
SOURCES
Appendix to this section
3. The financial conditions
Our second question refers to the financial arrangements of loans. In our general discussion 
of bankers' spreads during the 1920's, we mentioned how bankers obtained spreads from
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South American loans which turned out to be larger than those from other borrowers. We 
now examine the Colombia's position in the context of major indebted countries, and 
according to the identification of particular borrowers -government entities and corporations- 
Table 28 offers information about the two largest international borrowers -Germany and 
Canada-, and the leading South American borrowers.
TABLE 28
INTEREST RATES ON U.S. LONG-TERM LOANS 
SELECTED COUNTRIES 
1924-1929
A. NATIONAL AND 
PROVINCIAL 
GOVERNMENTS
GERMANY
CANADA
ARGENTINA
BRAZIL
CHILE
COLOMBIA*
B. MUNICIPAL 
GOVERNMENTS
GERMANY
CANADA
ARGENTINA
BRAZIL
CHILE
COLOMBIA*
C. CORPORATE
GERMANY
CANADA
CHILE
COLOMBIA*
( % )
CONTRACTUAL
RATES
6.54
4.56
6.18
6.80
6 . 0 0
6.53
60
70
60
90
33
35
6.38
5.05
6.32
6.72
YIELD TO 
INVESTORS
6.94 
4.65 
6.36 
7.22 
6.40
6.94
6.92
4.83
6.80
7.13
7.36
7.68
6.78
5.20
6.58
7.12
YIELD TO 
BANKERS
7.28
4.73 
6 . 6 8
7.74
6.75 
7.34
7.32
4.95
7.13
7.60
7.66
8.55
7.10
5.35
7.13
7.75
SOURCES : LEWIS (1938), APPENDIX E3
APPENDIX TO THIS SECTION FOR COLOMBIA ONLY 
* Calculations for Colombia correspond to the
period 1920-1929. Because 95% of U.S. loans to 
Colombia were contracted in 1924-29, the figures 
for both periods are practically the same.
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A first general point is that in almost all cases, rates charged on municipal loans exceeded 
those on national and provincial loans. A second observation which corroborates previous 
descriptions is the privileged situation of Canada, the second biggest borrower of the 1920s, 
which secured the lowest interest rates -contractual and yields to maturity-.
Within the sample of countries in Table 28 Colombia shows the highest interest rates on 
municipal and corporate loans, and shared with Germany the second-highest interest rates on 
national and provincial loans. In the case of municipal loans, Colombia was charged with the 
highest contractual rate just above Chile, but in comparison with this country investors 
demanded a higher yield from Colombian cities. An even stronger discrimination came from 
the bankers, who obtained their by far maximum effective rates from the intermediation of 
loans to Colombian municipalities. The experience repeats itself in the case of corporate 
loans, though less markedly than in the case of municipal loans; once more, the highest 
bankers' yield was obtained from the intermediation of Colombian loans, but the difference 
with the yield paid to investors just exceeded that achieved in the intermediation of Chilean 
loans. Finally, according to the figures, the rates paid by Colombia on national and provincial 
loans were only surpassed by those paid by Brazil. The contractual rates and the effective 
rates demanded by investors were similar in Germany and Colombia, but once more the 
bankers' commission resulted more rewarding in the Colombian example.
Table 29 exhibits the financial conditions of the credits given to Colombian borrowers during 
the 1920s. The first column shows the average length of life of bonds issued by each 
borrower. As seen, while the average length of life of the few British loans exceeded 30 
years, the average term of U.S. loans was 24 years. The two U.S. big loans to the national 
government in 1927 and 1928 were for 33 years, but the greater number of the loans were for 
about 20 years' duration. The second column displays the average values of the interest rates 
which the issuing borrowers promised to pay on the face value of the bonds; as a rule, 
contracts established that interests would be payed semiannually. According to the figures.
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the national government got the lowest contractual rate of the time -6%-, on the U.S. loans as 
well as on the solitary British loan of 1920. Departmental loans were contracted at rates 
which on average exceeded in one percentage point the loans to the national government, and 
municipal loans were contracted at even higher average rates. Finally, mortgage banks'loans 
were accepted at average rates similar or inferior to those of the departmental loans.
The third column lists the rates of interest equivalent to the return which investors expected 
to earn when they purchased Colombian bonds. The fourth coliunn records the rates of 
interest required by bankers, which are equivalent to the effective rates paid by the 
borrowers. The last column reports the commissions actually earned by bankers, measured as 
the difference between the yields received by investors (column 3) and those paid by the 
borrowers (column 4). Bankers' commissions were not equivalent across borrowers. It can be 
seen that they varied from less than one-sixth of a percentage point for credits to the national 
government, to two-thirds of a percentage point for credits to the departments, and to nearly a 
full percentage point for credits to the municipalities. From the borrowers' perspective, it can 
be observed that the higher the contractual rates, the larger the commission demanded by 
bankers; thus, while bankers required a commission of 0.87 of a percentage point on 
municipal bonds bearing nominal rates of 7.4%, they only required 0.16 of a percentage point 
on national loans bearing bond rates of 6%.
Some hypotheses can be offered to explain bankers' discrimination across borrowers. At first 
sight the figures seem to suggest an inverse relationship between the size of the loans and 
bankers' commissions; that is the impression obtained when the small commissions on the big 
national loans are compared with the larger commissions on the smaller individual credits to 
departments and municipalities. Hypothetically, then, it could be argued that economies of 
scale in the marketing of big loans would render low commissions. However, the hypothesis 
does not seem to follow when individual loans of different sizes to departments and 
municipalities are compared. An alternative hypothesis would suggest that reputation and 
political factors, such as the closeness of regions to the centers of political decisions, could
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have influenced bankers' criteria. Medellin, "the industrial capital of Colombia", and Bogota, 
the political capital, were charged with the smallest commissions, and the same happened to 
their corresponding geographical locations, Antioquia and Cundinamarca.
Ultimate investors seem to have held criteria different from those of bankers. Investors 
charged higher discounts on the national government loans, and lower discounts on the 
departmental and municipal loans. On average, investors demanded a discount of 6.2% on the 
par values of national government loans, 5.2% on the par values of departmental loans, and 
3.9% on the par values of municipal loans (Appendix to this section). More precisely, the 
information suggests that contractual rates and term of the loans constituted the main appeal 
for investors. Departments which offered contractual rates above 7% were charged with the 
lowest discounts by ultimate investors and with the highest discounts by bankers. The case of 
the Department of Caidas is illustrative; given a high contractual rate of 7.5%, and a time to 
maturity of 20 years, U.S. investors paid a price of 96.8% of the par value, while the price 
paid by bankers was of only 84.3% of the par value. Similar experiences are offered by the 
municipalities, of which that of Barranquilla is the most dramatic; given the highest average 
contractual rate of the whole period, 8.0%, and a time to maturity of 17 years, U.S. investors 
paid a price of 100.2% (with premium!), while bankers demanded the largest commission of 
the period by paying only 87.6%.
Finally, Colombia also shared in the worldwide phenomenon of excesses of borrowers and 
lenders. During the lending boom U.S. bankers roamed Colombia scrambling for investment 
opportunities. Departments and municipalities were an easy target for loan pushers. Some 
contemporary testimonies are illustrative. "At one time,..., there were 29 representatives of 
American financial houses in Colombia alone trying to negotiate loans for the national 
government, for the departments, and for other possible borrowers"^^. By 1928, when the 
downfall of U.S. foreign lending had already started, the U.S. ambassador in Colombia issued 
the following critical statement: "The Legation has frequently in the past expressed its strong 
conviction that the various American banking houses who have during the past three years
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floated various Colombian national, departmental, and municipal foreign loans were not 
exercising due care in protecting the interests of the American bondholder and were not 
assuming that degree of moral responsibility towards their clients which is necessary to a 
sound policy of foreign financing".
The Colombia's overenthusiasm for foreign financed public works was also described by the 
American legation in Bogota. Writing to the Department of Commerce at the end of 1928, 
the U.S. commercial attaché at Bogota expressed: "I think Colombia is going wild on 
borrowing. She has started too many roads and too many highways, and she has not any idea 
where she is going to get all the money, except that the money is coming so readily now that 
she just thinks she can borrow ad infini tum.That  overenthusiasm was, however, coming to 
an end, since by 1928 the abundance of U.S. foreign credit was no longer in place. A chain of 
events starting with the boom (1928) and crash (1929) of Wall Street, followed by the Great 
Depression, brought about the collapse of U.S. lending, to which discussion we now turn.
E. The collapse of the U.S. foreign lending
The boom of U.S. external loans came to an end after a series of adverse shocks. These 
shocks not only reduced the U.S. capital outflows but undermined the ability to pay of debtor 
countries. Some shocks were mainly originated at the centre such as the Wall Street boom of 
1928, and the downturn of the business cycle, while other shocks were enhanced by policies 
adopted in the periphery. Different debtors fared differently according to the commodity 
lottery, the relative downfall of their real exports, and specific relationships with countries in 
the centre.
1. The exhaustion of the U.S. loan boom.
The U.S. boom in foreign lending came to a halt in the second half of 1928. The crucial 
factor was another and shorter boom, this time in the stock market. The way bond and stock
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issues evolved during the 1920s is shown in Table 30. Though bond issues predominated 
through the decade -in a proportion of 9 to 1- the share of common stocks shows a gradual 
improvement up to 1927; additionally, it is seen that in spite of the boom of foreign bonds, 
their share in total bond issues was rather steady during the decade. What these observations 
suggest is that domestic investments kept pace with the unprecedented overseas investments 
of the time.
The boom in the stock market in 1928-29 substantially reduced both foreign and domestic 
bond offerings. In 1929 foreign bond issues were only a half of the level achieved in 1927, 
and domestic bond offerings declined in 37% also in comparison with the level of 1927. In 
terms of the composition of the investors' portfolio, it is illustrative to say that while in 1927 
stock issues represented no more than 7.5% of total issues of bonds and stocks, in 1929 the 
relevant figure was 49.6%. This one-to-one investors'choice was short-lived since the stock 
market boom came to an end with the Wall Street crash of October 1929.
An ephemeral revival of foreign bonds at the core of which was the Young loan, took place 
in 1930. Because of the U.S. external credit crunch since 1928, Germany, the major borrower 
of the time, found it difficult to satisfy the reparation payments. The Young Plan sought to 
secure the continuity of those payments, and a loan for US$300 million intended to revitalize 
international lending. However, in sharp contrast with the Dawes loan, the Young loan did 
not encourage a new boom of foreign lending; in fact, the U.S. tranche of the loan for 
US$100 million was barely sold (June 1930) at discount when the Dawes loan had been 
oversubscribed ten times. Renewed German financial troubles led to the Hoover moratorium 
on reparations (june 1931) and final demise of the reparations' idea (Lausanne Conference in 
1932)70
Long-term borrowing by Canada, the second major recipient country, lasted until 1931. In the 
South American region few countries -mainly Chile and Brazil- had access to long-term 
funds until 1930. The Brazilian experience was exceptional: London merchant bankers and
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New York banks managed to float a US$60 million loan in European markets and a US$35 
million loan in New York; the purpose of the operation was to finance the liquidation of 
voluminous unsold coffee stocks, as we will explain below. Finally, Argentina succeeded in 
floating a big short-term loan in 1930, the largest one contracted by any South American 
country during the U.S. lending boom. It was the end of the line.^^
An important development after the collapse of the U.S. foreign bond market was the 
extension of bank loans to foreign governments. It has been estimated that bank credits 
amounted to U.S.$1.8 billion at the beginning of 1931, which were roughly equivalent to 
about 23% of long- term U.S. portfolio investments at the end of 1930. Germany was, once 
more, at the center of these operations: U.S. bankers supported state and private projects 
while expecting that the Young loan would revive the foreign bond market. When such an 
expectation vanished in 1931, the withdrawal of bank loans from Germany was avoided by 
the implementation of standstill agreements which froze foreign claims against Germany. 
Other countries in Central Europe and also in South America benefited from bank lending; 
Chile negotiated bank credits for about US$22 million, a non-negligible amount given the 
size of bond loans contracted by South America at that time, and other borrowers such as 
Peru negotiated much more modest bank credits.^^
Colombia also got access to short-term bank lending, and the main operation became a clear 
precedent of conditionality exercised by foreign bankers. The country turned up to foreign 
banks since 1928 to alleviate Treasury difficulties. By 1930, official statistics indicated that 
the debt with U.S. banks amounted to U.S.$4.9 million, representing 7% of the total external 
debt of the national government. By 1931, this proportion had increased to 21% as a result of 
a single negotiation. The loan agreement was made in June 1930, when by coincidence the 
issue of the Young loan created the expectation of a revival of U.S. foreign lending. This 
operation was the last access of the country to U.S. private foreign lending during the 1920s- 
1930s, and the first one celebrated with a bank syndicate. This sort of operations would not 
be repeated until the mid-1950s, and more systematically until the 1970s.
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The syndicate was originally headed by the National City Bank of New York and the First 
National Bank of Boston, and later reinforced by the British branch of Lazard Brothers7^ As 
a whole, the national government received US$16.9 million, although it was not the only 
beneficiary. The departmental governments made part of the ultimate beneficiaries and 
applied the proceeds of the loan to their external debt service. The negotiation of the loan and 
the disbursement of instalments were affected by the conditionality imposed by the banks. 
The bankers demanded a debt ceiling law, the continuity of government expenditure 
retrenchment so as to restablish budget balance, a reorganized management of the national 
railroads, and appointment of the same bankers as fiscal agents for the government. The 
bankers' demands were satisfied, and in particular a ceding on the total of the external and 
internal debt was imposed; that ceiling meant that the total internal and external debt should 
not exceed an amount whose financial service was over 30% of the average fiscal revenues of 
the last six years.^^
A context of tensions in which oil interests played an important part surrounded the 
disbursements of instalments.^^ There existed the possibility of holding back instalments so 
as to derive oil advantages, and signs of this pressure were felt when the government 
expected the last installment in March 1931. The intransigence of bankers exceeded any other 
pressures, however, to the point of provoking reactions from both the Colombian and U.S. 
governments. The Colombian president expressed his disappointment after having played 
"the game with the Americans" by accepting their conditions, and the U.S. ambassador 
expressed that "the best efforts of the Department of State and our diplomatic missions 
abroad may be almost nullified by prejudicial activities of American business concerns. I 
have in mind especially the recent action of the group of American bankers, which has had 
such an unfortunate effect on our interests here in general in Colombia...".
To sum up, the Wall Street boom of 1928 truncated the continuity of U.S. overseas lending 
based on bond issues. Attempts made to restablish the foreign bond market after the Wall
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Street crash proved to be ineffective; new flotations since 1932 were practically negligible. 
Short-term bank credits ephemerally flourished during 1931, and for many countries they 
were their last link with foreign capital markets. Current conditions in the world economy - 
economic and political- prevented the recovery of foreign lending. In particular, the debt 
servicing capabilities of most borrowers had been severely damaged by changes in relative 
prices and adverse demand shocks. It is to these disadvantageous events on the borrowers' 
side to which we now turn.
2. The downfall of terms of trade in the periphery.
World commodity prices had been slipping since 1925. For a diversity of causes, agricultural 
surpluses became evident in the second half of the 1920s.^^ According to a general index of 
all commodities, between 1925 and 1930 prices fell by 57% while stocks increased by 79%. 
How individual producers fared in this process depended not only on the fate of specific 
commodities -the "commodity lottery"-, but on policies of the producers.^^ The experience 
with coffee in the 1920s is illustrative at least in three respects. First, the price stabilization 
policies of Brazil, the dominant producer; second, the application of external debt to finance 
such policies; and third, the positive externalities of the same policies on other producers, 
particularly Colombia.
Various attempts to stabilize coffee prices during the 1920s with the support of external 
financing were associated with the so called "permanent defence" policy of coffee prices.^^ 
Towards the end of the decade, this policy was on the verge of collapse after exceptional 
harvests in 1927-28 and 1929-30. It was estimated that in late 1929 around 16 million bags of 
coffee remained unsold.^^ In these conditions, coffee prices which were shrinking since the 
first quarter of 1929, fell by one-third (from 22.5 cents to 15.5 cents of dollar per lb) only in 
the last quarter of the year. Coffee was not the only commodity badly hit. In the aftermath of 
the stock- market crash, various commodity prices fell sharply also in the last quarter of
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1929: rubber by 20%, hides by 18%, zinc by 17%, cocoa by 15%, only to mention the most 
adversely affected.
Authors like Kindleberger have underscored the role of bank credit rationing in the downturn 
of commodity prices. Accordingly, traditional domestic lending to merchants in the United 
States was cutback after the stock market crash, with the consequent adverse effects on 
demand for commodities.®^ It follows then, that rationed loans to importers of commodities 
could have compounded the eventually counterproductive effects of Brazilian policies on 
coffee prices. As seen before, the downfall of coffee prices largely exceeded those of other 
selected commodities.
Overwhelmed by financial difficulties, the Brazilian coffee sector turned again to the external 
credit.®^ The short-lived prospects of a rebirth of international lending towards the end of 
1929 made easier a new approach between the State of Sao Paulo and foreign issue houses. A 
coalition of British merchant bankers and New York banks floated a £12 million (US$60 
million) loan in European capitals, and a US$35 million in New York. Altogether, these sums 
made up the "coffee realization loan", whose dollar tranche with a maturity of 10 years was 
sold to US investors at a discount of 4%; when the loan was issued in April 1930 coffee 
prices had fallen by 38% since the simultaneous crisis of the Brazilian "permanent defense" 
policy and the New York stock-market crash in October 1929. The proceeds of the loan were 
applied to finance 16.5 million bags of unsold coffee in Brazilian warehouses. Though one of 
the conditions put forward by the bankers was that the State of Sao Paulo would have to 
abandon its price boosting-policies, it was the over-production of coffee which brought about 
the failure of interventionist policies.®^
By the mid-1920s Colombia was already an important coffee producer. Her share in the U.S. 
coffee imports -given in terms of bags of 60kg- since the beginning of the century is 
illustrative; while during the 1905-14 period that share was only of 6.5% compared with 
76.2% of Brazil, it evolved into 17.4% during the 1920-29 period compared with 65.9% of
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Brazil.®^ Two factors contributed to Colombia's successful expansion in the international 
coffee market during (and beyond) the 1920s. First, the fact that coffee was predominantly 
produced in small farms in which families were significant suppliers of labor; and, second, 
the distinctive higher quality of the produce. The "valorization schemes" implemented by 
Brazil constituted an additional incentive for the expansion of coffee plantation in Colombia 
and other areas such as Central America. And when such a schemes broke down in 1929, 
Colombia and other beneficiaries of the Brazilian policies lived through the adverse effects of 
collapsing prices.
The deflationary spiral of commodity prices deepened along the 1929-1933 period. For 
debtor countries which derived from those commodities the trade surplus required to service 
the external debt, the severity of the shock was apparent by mid-1931. In two years (June 
1929-June 1931) coffee prices had fallen by 60%, and most other commodity prices had 
fallen by magnitudes oscillating between 50% and 55% (cocoa, wheat, zinc, lead, cotton, 
silk), not to mention the extreme cases of rubber (70%) and copper (90%). Deflation had 
further adverse effects on debtor countries. Because the U.S. price level had fallen by 11% 
between 1929 and 1931 (for 1929-1933 the figure would be 24%), the real burden of the 
dollar denominated debt increased as the nominal contracts which estipulated fixed interest 
rates remained unaltered.®^
In conclusion, although commodity prices were declining since the mid-1920s, they sharply 
dropped during the Great Depression. Debtor countries found themselves with export prices 
reduced by one-half between 1929 and 1931. Additionally, countries which borrowed during 
the U.S. lending boom saw their real debt burden enlarged as the deflation spiraled. One 
further item on prices was the significance of the collapse of domestic price stabilizing 
policies to explain the decline of commodity prices. In this respect, the breakdown of the 
Brazilian valorization schemes had a great deal of responsibility in the abrupt decline of 
coffee prices in 1929.
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3. The adverse shock of the international business cycle.
If falling commodity prices impaired the debt-servicing ability of borrowers, an additional 
adverse shock which weakened even further the financial stance of indebted countries was 
the downswing of the quantum of exports. The relationship between center and periphery was 
crucial. The predominance of the United States at the center in the late 1920s has been 
documented; estimates reveal that in 1929 more than 50% of the industrial output of 15 major 
industrial countries had its origin in that country. And the vulnerability of the periphery with 
respect to the U.S. business cycle is revealed by the fact that also in 1929, the United States 
accounted for about 40% of the primary product consumption of the same group of 
industrialized countries.®®
The downturn in advanced economies and its reflection on Latin America is illustrated in 
Table 31. Starting from the peak of businesses of the center economies in 1929 the slowdown 
reached its deepest point in 1932-33, but the pre-crisis levels of activity were recovered only 
until the second half of the 1930s. It is clear that import volumes in the center economies fell 
to deeper levels as compared with the downswing of output, and how they reacted only 
sluggishly to the upturn of the economy; analysts of the period have interpreted this lethargic 
revival of imports as a result of protectionist measures at the center.®^ Finally, a sharp 
change in relative prices in favour of the center economies occurred between 1929 and 1933; 
this adverse development for the periphery fully turned back by 1936, but reappeared at the 
end of the decade during the U.S. recession of 1937-38.
A variety of constrasts unfold the Latin American experience. The terms of trade initially fell 
sharply, and then remained stagnant at the bottom, until a slow recovery started in 1934. The 
export quantum also fell but less than the terms of trade, and a sustained recovery since 1934 
reached the pre-crisis level of export quantum before the end of the 1930s. In other words, 
since 1934 at least, the recovery of the export quantum smoothed the negative effects of 
depressing terms of trade. The Latin American output declined since 1929 achieving its
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lowest level in 1932. However, the pre-crisis levels of output were recovered since 1934, 
earlier than in the center economies. Strikingly, observers of the period have concluded that 
the favourable contrast with advanced economies was explained by the industrial 
performance of the periphery during the 1930s.^^
Finally, it is seen how imports fell by more than 60% during the first and worse three years of 
the world recession; and though there was a gradual recovery through the rest of the decade, 
the import quantum was still 30% below its level in 1929. The drying up of external 
financing from 1928 was a major cause of the vertical reduction of the import quantum, since 
Latin America faced the complicated situation of having to service the external debt while 
living through declining terms of trade and without access to "fresh" external lending. Later, 
since 1933, due to the dynamic behaviour of exports, but most of all due to the generalized 
suspension of the debt service, the import quantum recovered steadily though far from 
achieving the level of 1929.
Table 32 exhibits foreign trade indicators for the four major South American recipients of 
external loans during the 1920s. As seen above, these countries appeared within the group of 
eight leading borrowers at that time. Different fortunes accompanied these countries during 
and after the Great Depression. The terms of trade (TOT) give an introduction to those 
differences. While every one suffered a deterioration of their TOT between 30% and 40% 
during 1929-33, Argentina recovered the pre-crisis levels since 1936; other fate affected the 
remaining countries whose TOT continued stagnant at levels similar to those of 1933. A 
different message is conveyed by the performance of exports: Brazil and Colombia, in that 
order, did not see their export quantum affected during the worst years of the crisis, while 
Chile faced a dramatic fall of hers; as seen, the Chilean export quantum in 1933 was only 
29% of the level reached in 1929. Argentina was an intermediate case, closer to those of 
Brazil and Colombia, than to that of Chile.
A complementary idea is offered by the evolution of the
TABLE 32
FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 
SELECTED SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES 
1929-1938
ARGENTINA BRAZIL CHILE COLOMBIA
A. TERMS OF TRADE
B,
1929 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1930 95.9 61 .6 95.7 73.6
1931 71 .4 53.6 67.0 83.6
1932 74.5 67.5 55.1 72.9
1933 70.4 60.3 60.0 63.6
1934 85.7 62.9 57.3 81 .4
1935 85.7 55.0 61.6 64.3
1936 105.1 54.3 70.3 64.3
1937 120.4 58.3 76.8 67.1
1938 110.2 43.0 54.1 60.0
PURCHASING POWER 
OF EXPORTS
1929 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1930 66.9 67.1 62.2 81 .7
1931 68.5 62.0 40.5 80.3
1932 65.3 54.4 15.5 71 .8
1933 58.1 59.5 25.0 63.4
1934 74.2 69.6 37.8 84.5
1935 78.2 70.9 41 .9 73.2
1936 86.3 77.2 47.3 83.1
1937 115.3 74.7 73.0 84.5
1938 67.7 67.1 48.0 78.9
VOLUME 
OF IMPORTS
1929 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1930 87.8 59.4 92.0 52.3
1931 61 .5 39.1 48.0 44.6
1932 46.8 36.2 17.0 36.9
1933 51 .3 50.7 19.0 50.8
1934 56.4 55.1 25.0 63.1
1935 58.3 62.3 38.0 69.2
1936 61 .5 63.8 43.0 78.5
1937 80.8 78.3 48.0 90.8
1938 76.3 72.5 44.0 84.6
VOLUME 
OF EXPORTS
1929 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1930 69.3 109.6 65.0 109.8
1931 95.3 117.3 60.0 96.1
1932 87.4 80.8 28.8 98.0
1933 81 .9 100.0 41 .3 98.0
1934 85.8 111.5 66.3 103.9
1935 90.6 128.9 67.5 113.7
1936 81 .9 142.3 67.5 127.5
1937 95.6 128.8 95.0 125.5
1938 61 .4 155.8 88.8 131.4
SOURCE: Maddison (1985), p.87
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purchasing power of exports (PPE). As expected, Chile presents the worst results of the 
group due to the misfortune of her real exports. At the other extreme, Colombia exhibits the 
best results based principally on the good fortune of her real exports. Colombia fared slightly 
better than Argentina in spite of the superior behavior of the Argentinian TOT. Finally, if the 
Chilean PPE conditioned her import quantum, that was not the case of Brazil and Colombia. 
In the Colombian experience, the import quantum fell far more rapidly than the PPE. During 
the critical years 1930-33 the Colombian import quantum was less than a half of the 1929 
level. At that time, it was the cessation of foreign lending combined with an increased debt 
burden due to the deterioration of the TOT what led to the 50% fall in the import quantum.
As U.S. lending dried out since 1928 and exports of primary producers fell down during the 
Great Depression, the standard sovereign debt-export ratios soared. The figures for the four 
major South American borrowers between 1928 and 1931 when the wave of defaulting 
countries began spreading around the region are eloquent. As for Brazil, the major Latin 
American debtor, the ratio for the total external debt went up from 2.6 in 1928 to 5.6 in 1931. 
This upsurge was explained by just an 8% increase in the stock of debt combined with a 
reduction of 50% in the flow of exports. In the Chilean case, the ratio for the national debt 
only raised from 1.1 in 1928 to 3.2 in 1931 after a 23% increase in the stock of debt 
accompanied by a 58% decline of exports. In the Colombian experience, the ratio for the total 
external public debt increased from 1.2 in 1928 to 1.8 in 1931 after only a 3.8% increase in 
debt combined with a 28% reduction in exports. Finally, in the Argentinian case, and 
considering the national debt only, the debt export ratio raised from 1.04 to 1.31, because 
although the stock of debt significantly fell by 33%, exports fell even more heavily by 
47%.91
Although the magnitude of the external shocks severely impaired the ability to pay of debtor 
countries, the individual degree of vulnerability to those shocks also depended on factors not 
directly associated with the PPE. Domestic policies have been reported to have had some 
responsibility for individual debt-servicing difficulties. Eichengreen and Portes (1986) found
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that countries which ran more austere fiscal policies were less prone to suspend debt 
payments. Also, more highly indebted countries were more likely to stop debt payments. 
Finally, factors of international politics made a difference (Diaz-Alejandro, 1983). Apart 
from countries in the military orbit of the United States, other international relations secured 
the continuity of debt service payments. Argentina was the outstanding case after the 
acceptance of a treaty with Britain (the Roca-Runciman treaty of 1933) which guaranteed the 
service of the sterling debt in exchange for the purchase of Argentine exports.
F. The main international creditors in 1930
What was the distribution of foreign investments at the end of the U.S. lending boom? Great 
Britain was still the major international investor after the assets' liquidation during the First 
World War, and the huge foreign investments of the United States in the 1920s. Rough 
estimates of total investments of both countries and their geographical distribution are given 
in tables 33 and 34.
TABLE 33 
Long-term Investments Abroad 
Great Britain 
1930
Millions 
of US$
Per cent
British Empire. 10633.2 58.7
Australia 2401.8 13.3
India and Ceilon 2625.5 14.5
Canada 2552.6 14.1
South Africa 1278.7 7.1
Other Countries 1774.6 9.8
Independent Countries. 7482.6 41 .3
European countries 1434.3 7.9
Argentina 2187.9 12.1
Brazil 923.8 5.1
Rest of South America 646.6 3.6
Mexico and Central America 286.9 1 .6
United States 977.3 5.4
Japan 359.8 2.0
Other countries 666.0 3.7
’AL. 18115.8 100.0
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Source :
The Royal Institute (1937), p. 142
The original data in sterling pounds were converted into 
dollars at the 1930 rate of US$4.862 per £1.
TABLE 34
LONG-TERM INVESTMENTS ABROAD 
UNITED STATES 
1930
(Millions of US$)
REGIONS
DIRECT
INVESTMENT
PORTFOLIO
INVESTMENT
TOTAL
PER CENT 
OF WORLD 
TOTAL
EUROPE 1468
France 162
Germany ' 244
Great
Britain 497
Other 565
CANADA 2049
LATIN
AMERICA 3634
Cuba 936
Mexico 694
Argentina 359
Brazil 210
Chile 441
Colombia 130
Other 864
ASIA, AFRICA
OCEANIA 690
Australia 155
Japan 62
Other 473
TOTAL 7841
SOURCE:
3461 4929 31 .4
310 472 3.1
1177 1421 9.1
144 641 3.9
1830 2395 15.3
1893 3942 25.2
1610 5244 33.5
131 1067 6.8
- 694 4.4
449 808 5.2
347 557 3.5
260 701 4.5
172 302 1 .9
251 1115 7.2
870 1560 9.9
264 419 2.7
383 445 2.8
223 696 4.4
7834 15675 100.0
The Royal Institute (1937), p.187
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According to tables 33 and 34, British investments represented 54% out of a total of US$33.8 
billion in 1930. It is to be noted, however, that British investments were slightly lower in 
1930 than they had been in 1913.^^ But if it is true that the nominal stock of British 
investments remained practically unchanged between 1913 and 1930, it is also true that there 
happened important changes in its composition.
The main variation was the substantial reduction of nominal investments in the United States 
from US$3667 million in 1913 to US$977.3 million in 1930, which implied a reduction of 
the proportion of those investments from 20% in 1913 to just 5.4% in 1930 (tables 14 and 
33). This liquidation of assets was compensated in about three-quarters by increased 
investments in members of the Empire. As a result, the corresponding share increased from 
47.3% in 1913 to 58.7% in 1930. Investments in other regions registered slight changes; such 
was the case of those in Latin America which passed from 20.1% in 1913 to 22.5% in 1930.
A different shape is observed in U.S. investments, where one-third of them were allocated in 
Latin America, closely followed by European investments; one-fourth of investments went to 
Canada, and only 10% to countries in Africa, Asia and Oceania. By consolidating British and 
U.S. investments it appears that 48% went to countries which happened to be members of the 
British Empire; even excluding Canada, the most important single beneficiary with one-fifth 
of total investments, and in spite of a relatively low U.S. interest in these regions. Empire 
countries collected 30% of investments. Latin America offers a more equilibrated picture, 
regardless of the strong U.S. investment of the 1920s; in fact, 44% of foreign investments in 
the region was of British origin. As a whole, Latin America gathered 28% of total 
investments.
The liquidation of British foreign assets -direct investments and loans to independent 
countries- and increasing lending to Dominion and Colonial countries is shown in Table 35. 
The fact that direct investments represented 70% of international assets in 1913 was 
interpreted as an indicator of the British emphasis in developmental finance as opposed to
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revenue finance. The outbreak of the war put an end to that tendency. A substantial
liquidation of assets in railways, particularly in the United States, reduced the share of this
sector in total overseas investments from 41% in 1913 to 23% in 1930. Because railways
constituted the leading sector of British investments abroad, their breakdown led direct
investments to represent just 53% of total overseas assets in 1930.^^
TABLE 35
GREAT BRITAIN 
LONG-TERM INVESTMENTS ABROAD 
TYPE OF INVESTMENT 
1913 AND 1930 
(MILLIONS OF US$)
1913 % 1930
A. GOVERNMENT AND 
MUNICIPAL
DOMINION AND 
COLONIAL
FOREIGN
5467 30.0 6988 38.6
3283 18.0 5253 29.0
2184 12.0 1734 9.6
B. DIRECT INVESTMENT 12821
BRITISH COMPANIES N.A.
FOREIGN AND COLO­
NIAL COMPANIES N.A.
70.0 9662 53.3
5857 32.3
3805 21 .0
C. INVESTMENTS NOT 
DISTRIBUTED BY 
TYPE 1465 8.1
TOTAL 18288 100.0 18115 1 0 0 . 0
SOURCES:
Royal Institute (1937), pp.148 and 150
Exchange Rates: 1913, US$4.8595 per £1. 1930, US$4.862 per £1 
N.A.: not available
387
G. Conclusions and links with other sections of this work.
The central hypothesis of this section is the cyclical character of the foreign lending process. 
Certainly this hypothesis does not deal with the question of why capital export volumes have 
varied over a series of foreign lending booms since the 19th century, but proved helpful in the 
reconstruction of the long-term relationship between Latin American borrowers and their 
creditors since the 1820s to the 1920s.
The access of Latin America to external lending during the period under scrutiny was 
dominated by alternating phases of boom and bust in international capital markets. 
Relationships between creditors and debtors were frequently affected by breach of formal 
debt contracts or default, but renegotiations appeared to be the device through which the 
long-term relationship between creditors and debtors was restablished. Our perusal of the 
period of Pax Britannica (the lending cycle of the 1820s and the cycles of British capital 
exports between the 1860s and 1913) offer historical support to this claim.
We have deliberately highlighted the transit from the Pax Britannica to the Pax Americana. 
From the Latin American perspective that transit was not only a shift of foreign financial 
centres, but a change of axis of international politics. After the collapse of the U.S. long-term 
foreign lending in 1928, and the wave of sovereign defaults in the 1930s, the U.S. diplomacy 
played a crucial role in the restablishment of the creditor-debtor relationship. Later, after 
World War U, U.S. international agencies provided concessionary lending to Latin America 
until the revival of foreign private lending in the 1970s.
Colombia appeared in the scene of major international borrowers during the first modem 
cycle of British capital exports in the 1820s, before becoming a minor and ocassional 
borrower for most of the Pax Britannica. The main Latin American protagonists on the 
borrowing side were Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Peru which became important suppliers 
of British goods markets. These countries stood out not only because of the magnitude of
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their borrowing, but because of the variety of negotiating experiences between creditors and 
debtors. A good deal of recent literature on debt recontracting has relied upon the chronicles 
of negotiations during the Pax Britannica. Colombia came forth again as an outstanding 
debtor during the U.S. lending boom of the 1920s. After the Wall Street crash and the 
collapse of the U.S. foreign lending, Colombia joined the list of sovereign defaulters. The 
available records show that this time default was a partial and gradual experience.
For an historical analyst of external debt, the next section should be dedicated to the 
renegotiation of the debt contracts which were defaulted in the 1930s. Our case is different, 
however, since as explained in Part II and Part III of this work, the internal public debt played 
a role on its own, which was particularly meaningful during the great depression of the 
1930s. Thus, in the next section we will discuss how did Colombia react to the external 
shocks of the time, and how the shock-absorber function of the internal public debt took 
place through actual policy measures. We wdl also explain how regarding the external debt, 
default came about as a drawn out process during which authorities insisted on the temporary 
character of the suspension of external debt payments.
The renegotiation of the loans which went into default after the U.S. foreign lending boom 
came to a halt, will be the exclusive topic of Section III below. The reader wiU be informed 
of the bargaining process through which debtors and creditors restablished their long-term 
relationship.
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SECTION I 
NOTES
1. Fishlow (1986) bases his "lessons from the past" on a review of the experience of 
Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. More recently Eichengreen (1991) has 
included other six rapidly industrializing countries, namely, Canada, Denmark, Germany, 
Italy, Norway and Sweden. The broad trends, however, remain similar.
2. Eichengreen (1991) has examined the relative merits of three hypotheses about changes in 
the extent of capital flows. One school of thought sees capital flows as a direct function of the 
international monetary stability. A more stable financial system encourages an increased 
extent of capital flows. Another school of thought suggests the existence of a stage process 
through which countries would evolve from debtors to creditors. The classical example is the 
UnitW States since the mid-1800s. Finally, the third school focuses on the cycles of 
international lending. Booms of international lending are followed by periods of paralysis in 
foreign lending. Historical examples are the international lending cycles of the 1920s-1930s 
and the 1970s-1980s.
2. Capital calls are defined as "the actual payments made by British investors in acquiring 
fo rei^  and colonial issues" Simon (1968) p. 19
4. The figure for France is documented in Green and Urquhart, (1976).
5. This characterization of the main creditors draws heavily on the classical work by Feis 
([1930], 1974), Chapters 1 to 4, and the review of foreign investments before World War I in 
Royal Institute of International Affairs (1937), Chapter 9.
6. In the mid-19th century, however, European securities were a predominant component of 
the British portfolio of foreign investments. Early estimates due to Jenks indicated that in the 
mid-1850s about 57% of the stock of British foreign investment was represented by European 
issues and the rest by U.S. securities (25%) and Latin American bonds (18%). Additionally, 
23% of the total investment and 41% of the investment in European issues was in 
government debt (French, Belgian, Dutch and Russian securities). Jenks ([1927], 1963), 
p.413.
7. These topics are discussed in Hall (1968).
8. A discussion of institutional changes associated with the formation of the international 
economy in the 1800s is found in North (1962).
9. Center and periphery were integrated in various ways. Not only capital exports were 
significantly chaneled to the construction of ports and railroads for the exporting of goods 
and raw materials, but labour immigration enhanced the productive capacity of capital 
importers. Furthermore, trade and finance coincided whenever foreign investments were 
destined to the purchase of capital goods, and through the finance of the debt service with 
exports proceeds. A full discussion of these aspects is made by Fishlow (1985)
10. The inverse movement of the two series is clearly observable in most years after 1870.
11. Since Britain’s capital exports were positively correlated with British labour emigration, 
and with capital formation -railways and public utilities- in overseas areas, alternative
390
hypotheses have emphasized the role of either demografic factors or the long gestation period 
of social-overhead investments in the determination of the long swings of British investment 
flows. A review of the debate is found in Hall (1968).
12. Edelstein (1982) p. 149 launched the hypothesis according to which realized rates of 
return -at home and overseas- could reflect the long swings in investment flows. According to 
this hypothesis, realized returns would have risen bœause of the emergence of unanticipated 
opportunities and the competition of factors of production trying to take advantage of these 
opportunities.
13. Edelstein (1982), Chapter 6.
14. Gayer, Rostow, and Schwartz (1953) p. 171
15. Two important measures were adopted in 1822, namely, the extension of the privilege to 
issue bank notes to the country banks, and the reduction of the discount rate of the Bank of 
England which for the first time dropped to 4%. These episodes were followed in 1823 by a 
partial conversion of public debt aimed to reduce the interest burden. The results of these 
actions were felt in 1824-25. While the Bank's note issues rose steadily between 1822 and 
1825, country banks circulation which represented a 23% of the note circulation of the Bank 
of England in 1822, reached a 43% in 1825. The stock market boomed as far as the 
availability of cheap money increased and former holders of public debt looked for new 
investment alternatives. Gayer et al (1953) pp. 185
and 202.
16. The full amount of nominal credits contracted by Latin American governments, £20 
million, largely exagerates the sums paid-in by investors and the sums finally received by 
debtors. Given an average price to the public of 80% the sums received by bankers were of 
about £16 million, and according to estimates by Rippy, debtors did not obtain much more 
than £12 million. Apart from short-term sinking funds, the difference is explained by 
commissions and otiier deductions. The magnitude of such commissions is illustrate by the 
fact that Colombia paid £0.5 million to her bankers, equivalent to 7.3% of the contracted 
amount. Rippy (1959), Jenks ([1927], 1963), p.49
17. Brazil became the main Latin American importer of British goods, with an average of 
40% of total imports of the region between 1825 and 1850. Marichal (1989) p.49 . D etaiie 
information about trade between Britain and Brazil is off e r e  for selecte dates in Woodruff 
(1966), Statistical Appendix.
18. In 1825, 75% of Gran Colombia's government outlays was destine to military objectives. 
Ocampo (1988) p. 114
19.The British recognition was anteated by a similar decision adopte by the U n ite  States 
in 1822 when this country recognize the independence of the Gran Colombia. Details about 
the British recognition are o ffere in Dawson (1990), Chapters 4 and 5.
20. These settlements were followe by various suspensions and renegotiations during the 
1840s and 1850s. Venezuela defaulted in 1847 and although temporary agreements and 
payments were made in 1851, a global settlement was deferred until 1859. Ecuador fully 
complied with the 1855 arrangement until payments were suspended in 1868. Colombia 
started punctual payments after the Powles-Ordonez convention was signed in 1845. As the 
government faced cash problems in 1848-49, creditors were offered Treasury Bills for the 
coupons due during those years. Coupon payments were suspended during 1851-54, but in 
1855 the British creditors accepted Peruvian bonds in the hands of the Colombian Treasury 
in exchange for coupons unpaid between 1850 and 1853. Finally, a new settlement -the 
Convention of Paris- was signed in 1861, which stated that the Colombian debt amounted to 
£7.4 million, and determined new conditions for the resumption of debt service. CFB(1938)
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pp.173-74 for Gran Colombia and Colombia; pp.209-10 for Ecuador; pp. 505-06 for 
Venezuela.
21. In 1825,1840 and 1865, government loans represented 84.5%, 76.5%, and 76.3% 
respectively. Stone (1968) p.315 and Stone (1977) p.694.
22. The sectoral distribution of British investments in Latin America shown in Table 18 and 
based on Stone (1968) differs from earlier estimates published by Rippy (1959). According to 
this author (p.68), in 1913 total investments amountal to £999.4 million -instead of £1180 
million as in Table 18-, government loans amounted to 31.7% of investments, and railways to 
45.8%. This distribution not only changes the relative importance of the two main sectoral 
investments but leaves railways as the single predominant investment. Stone(1968) estimates 
are based on a more recent revision of primary information.
23. The relatively huge Mexican balance is explained by successive conversions of the loans 
contracted in the 1820s (£6.4 million according to Table 16) and a big credit (£8.0 million) 
negotiated by the Maximilian government in 1865, aimed to consolidate the French 
intervention in Mexico. The Brazilian balance, the second in magnitude, is principally 
explained by early credits (1858 and 1860 for a total of £2.8 million) to finance railways, and 
by a large military loan (£7.0 million negotiated in 1865) destined to finance the Paraguayan 
War. For Mexico, Aggarwal (1989) p. 144 and CFB(1938) p.329; and for Brazil, Marichal 
(1989), pp.90-94.
24. The information about Colombia and Venezuela was consulted in CFB(1938) pp. 175 and 
506, and in Marichal (1989) p.80. For Brazil, Chile and Cuba, Marichal (1989), Chapter 3.
25. The pioneering role of British railway technology and finance is documented by 
Woodruff (1966), Chapter 6. Jenks ([1927], 1963) p. 413 showed how in the mid-1850s, 
12.9% of British fo re i^  investments was concentrated in French railways. The high 
investment demands associated with the regional integration and urbanization of the U.S. 
economy is highli^ted by Edelstein (1982) pp. 290-95. Stone (1968) pp.318-22 describes the 
renaissance of British investment in Latin America around 1865.
26. Kindleberger (1989), p. 144
27. Kindleberger (1989), p. 145-46
28. As documented by Feis ([1930], 1974) pp. 313-315, between 1854 and 1875 Turkey 
contracted an external debt of about 200 million Turkish pounds (worth $4.40 at par 
according to Feis), of which she received no more than 60%. Payments were reduced in 1875 
and suspended in 1876. By 1881, principal and interest arrears amounted to 252 million 
Turkish pounds. This amount was reduced to 117 million as a result of an agreement 
achieved under plans for international financial control set in motion by European powers.
29. Marichal (1989) pp. 104-110. Stone (1968) pp. 326-327.
30. Marichal (1989) pp.85-90
31. CFB (1938) p.175
32. These calculations are based on annual capital calls distributed by continents. As before, 
the source is Simon (1968), Appendix I.
33. Marichal (1989) p.119-125
34. Calculations based on Simon (1968), Appendix I.
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35. In 1886 the existing sterling debt was consolidated, and its value reduced from £22 
million to £14 million. This new debt was eventually redeemed by a cash payment of £5.5 
million in 1888. Aggarwal (1989) p.l76. CFB(1938) p.330.
36. The general reference for the international debt problem brought about by World War I, 
and further negotiations and agreements is Moulton and Pasvolsky (1932). A description of 
the consecutive phases of foreign lending during and after the war is found in Lewis (1938). 
Kindleberger (1984) discusses the sources of financing of the war, the financial plans to 
rescue foreign trade after the war, and the facts and controversy around the reparations issue. 
Our descriptions heavily draw on these accounts.
37. Lewis (1938) p.358 documents how the Allies negotiated consecutive loans under 
increasingly softer conditions as the first phase of the war went along. Five loans contracted 
between October 1915 and February 1917, which amounted to US$1360 million (57% of the 
short-term loans of the period) with interest rates varying between 5% and 6%, were taken by 
the public at an average discount of 1.2% and by the bankers at an average discount of 3.1%. 
However, it has to be noted that in most cases borrowers were asked to deposit collateral 
securities which exceeded the face value of the loans.
38. Lewis (1938) p.362
39. Moulton and Pasvolsky (1932), Chapter 5.
40. This does not mean that private lending was negligible immediately after the end of the 
war, but only that the net value of private loans disbursed during 1922-24 had no comparable 
precedent since the U.S. war declaration in 1917. More even, since 1917 up to 1921, only in 
this last year new disbursements exceeded repayments, and for the period as a whole (1917- 
21), net repayments amounted to US$468.1 million. This figure sharply contrasts with the net 
amounts loaned during 1922-24 which came to US$1736.2 million. Calculations based on 
Lewis (1938) p.368.
41. Canada, Japan, a group of European countries -mainly Norway, the Netherlands and 
Czechoslovakia-, and Latin America, in that order, were the beneficiaries of 80% of the net 
amounts disbursed during 1922-1924. It is worth mentioning that Canada was the main net 
borrower during 1917-1924, while the major borrowers of the war years -Great Britain and 
France- became net repayers. In fact, these net repayments completely wiped out the short­
term borrowing contracted during the first phase. It has to be also observed that Germany, 
and to a lesser extent Austria and Hungary (former enemy powers) became borrowers since 
1923. Austria and Hungary floated loans under the auspices of the League of Nations, and 
Germany followed suit after the implementation of the Dawes Plan.
42. The Dawes Plan was conceived in April 1924 to facilitate the German Reparations. An 
important consideration was the Germany's capacity to pay, since the issue of the negotiation 
was shifted from what Germany should pay to what she could pay (Moulton and Pasvolsky, 
1938, p.l61). The Plan provided a reparation schedule according to which payments were to 
begin with 1 billion marks (some US$0.27 billion) the first year, gradually increasing to 2.5 
billion marks (some US$0,675 billion) in the fifth year. The Plan also provided for an initial 
recycling operation of some US$200 million, of which US$110 million were sold in New 
Yok, having been oversubscribed 10 times! Kindleberger (1984) pp.302-303.
43. An important source of foreign financing for the belligerents was the sale of foreign 
assets. It has been estimated that Great Britain reduced her foreign investments in about £850 
million (US$3520 million) between 1915 and 1921, of which over two-thirds were placed in 
the United States (some US$2350 million). The Royal Institute (1937, p.l30)
44. It can be observed that private liabilities in 1929 were twice as great as they were in 1924. 
How can this substantial increase be explained during the U.S. loan boom period? Lewis 
(1938) p.450, has documented that the increase was mostly caused by the accumulation of
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proceeds of U.S. loans still in American banks waiting to be transferred abroad, and by 
appreciation of the value of foreign securities.
45. The comparison is just illustrative since the methodologies and data employed in Graph 
26 and Table 19 are different. Basically, in Table 19 it is the stock of assets which is set 
against liabilities, while in the graph it is the net flow of capital exports which is weighted by 
the size of the economy. According to the moving averages on which the graph is based, the 
average percentage ratio of net capital exports to GNP during the first decade after the 
outbreak of the war was 0.9%, while the relevant figure for die 1920s was 0.8%. The growth 
rates of the economy did not make an important difference since while the average figure for 
1914-24 was 3.1%, the relevant percentage for 1920-29 was 3.6%.
46. Calculations based on the series of new capital issues in London on overseas account 
published by the Royal Institute (1937) p. 134, and the series of overseas securities offered in 
New York detailed in Table 20 of this section.
47. French and Belgian troops invaded the industrial province of Ruhr in January 1923 on the 
grounds that Germany's reparation payments had fallen into arrears. Germany was supposed 
to be fulfilling the "agreement" with the Allies of May 1921 according to which war 
reparations would amount to 132 billion gold marks (some US$33 billion) plus 26% in export 
taxes over 42 years. The recognition of the failure of military intervention to restore 
payments led the Allies to design the Dawes Plan at the heart of which was the Dawes Loan. 
Moulton and Pasvolsky (1932) pp.270-272, Kindleberger (1984) pp.298-301.
48. The Young Plan signed in 1930 made a "final and definitive settlement" according to 
which the total reparation bill amounted to 121 billion gold marks and was to be paid over 59 
years. Because of Germany's current need of foreign credit, a US$300 million was issued in 
June 1930. Two-thirds of die proceeds of the loan were to be distributed among the 
reparation creditors, and one-third was to be invested in Germany. Moulton and Pasvolsky 
(1932), Chapters 10 and 12.
49. The Colonial Stocks Acts stimulated the investment in securities issued by the British 
Empire and Commonwealth countries. These securities were given trustee status, and 
therefore borrowers were able to borrow more cheaply in London. An important condition 
was for the borrowers not to issue any legislation against the interest of final investors. 
Additionally, some securities were guaranteed by the British government. According to 
estimates by the Royal Institute (1937) p. 149, Dominion and Colonial government securities 
represented 75% of a total of £1.4 billion of British investments in foreign securities in 1930.
50. The evidence about the average contractual rate paid by Canada is taken from Lewis 
(1938), Appendix E, p.646.
n .  White (1985) p.485
52. Paraguay and Ecuador did not share in the U.S. lending boom of the 1920s. Furtherly, 
Paraguay did not receive any external financing during the period. Ecuador's only external 
loan during the 1920s was obtained from an European creditor, the Swedish Match Company 
in 1927. % e credit for 10 million sucres was intended to finance the initial capital of a 
Mortgage Bank, according to a recommendation of a Kemmerer mission which visited the 
country in 1926-27. The loan was granted in exchange for the monopoly on matches for 25 
years. CFB (1938) pp.220 and 358.
53. During the years 1915-1919 South America received around US$195 million of which 
nearly 70% was destined to Argentina. At least one-sixth of these resources was applied to 
retire Argentinian debts due in London. Lewis (1938, p.356 and Appendix El).
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54. The estimates are based on information about the nominal amounts and purpose of U.S. 
loans to Latin America in the 1920s. The list of loans is provided in Marichal (1989), 
Appendix C.
55. CFB (1938) pp.80-81 and White (1986) p.486
56. Royal Institute (1937) p. 134. Details about the substitution of external for internal debt in 
Brazil are offered in Villanova and Suzigan (1973) p.340.
Lewis (1938) p.383
58. Data for Chile and Colombia are found in United Nations (1948), pp.38 and 42.
59. Considering Latin America as a whole, the three sectors which attracted most U.S. 
investments as of 1929 were agriculture, mining, and petroleum, with 24%, 22%, and 20% 
respectively of the total stock of investments. About 75% of agricultural investments were 
concentrate in sugar plantations, and most of them -83%- were locate  in only one country: 
Cuba. Regarding South America alone, U.S. investments mainly focuse on industrial 
minerals (excluding oil), and on oil préuction. As for the former sector. South America 
concentrated 75% of the U.S. investments in Latin America, and 50% of the U.S. world 
investments; Chile in particular attracte 80% of the U.S. investments in the region. As for 
oil production. South America collected 68% of the U.S. investments in Latin America, and 
52% of the U.S. world investments; Venezuela concentrated 54% of the investments in the 
region, followed by Colombia with 31%. Lewis (1938) Appendix D.
60. There was a crucial difference between U.S. bankers in the second-half of the 19th 
century, and the same bankers during the 1920s. While in the past century they roamed 
Europe searching for foreign lenders, during the lending boom of 1925-29 "they were 
searching the world over for foreign borrowers". Lewis, C.(1938) p.377. The Latin American 
experience with U.S. bankers in the 1920s has offered evidence to loan-push theories. Darity
(1985)
61. Bankers more harshly discriminated against South American loans than the ultimate 
investors did. While investors paid an average price of 96.7% on all loans,
the average price paid on South American loans was barely lower, namely, 96.5%. Instead, 
while bankers paid an average price of 93.4% on all loans, the average price on South 
American loans was 92.1%. It is interesting to note that Central American countries -Cuba, 
Panama, Dominican Republic-, ranked first in terms of the highest prices paid by investors - 
98.1%-, and second regarding the smallest bankers' spread. The figures then suggest that 
lenders granted a more favourable treatment to the Central American borrowers, compared 
with the South American clients. These calculations are based on Lewis (1938), Appendix 
E.3
62. The Royal Institute (1937) pp.186-187. Proximity and political factors shed some light 
with respect to the aforementioned cases but do not seem to account for other experiences 
such as that of South America. While ultimate investors required from South America the 
same discount that they demanded from European borrowers -3.5%- bankers obtained the 
highest commission from the South American loans. It can be hypothesized that bankers 
assigned a major risk to the Latin American countries, particularly to the less well-known 
provincial and municipal governments.
63. Lewis (1938) pp.378-379 provides a variety of examples of the association between 
constructors and bankers in different borrowing areas. Regarding South America, the 
following paragraph is illustrative:
"The big American construction companies sometimes 
helped finance public works in foreign countries, 
sometimes secured their contracts on a competitive 
basis after the financing had been arranged. Ulen
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and Co. usually worked with an associated group of 
bankers, financing and building public works 
throughout the world:...; irrigation works in Chile; 
and port works in Colombia. Frederick Snare and Co. 
h e lp^  finance some of their contracts in South 
America, for example in Peru. Warren Bros., working 
under contracts secured on a competitive basis, were 
building roads in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Cuba 
and Guatemala. The Foundation Company was building 
roads, sanitation works, and public buildings for 
the national governments of Peru and Bolivia, and 
some public works in Argentina, Chile and Colombia
II
64. Stallings (1987), Appendix III
65. Eichengreen (1992), p.l88
66. By 1925, 23% of total coffee bags of 60 kg. was produced in Antioquia, the second most 
important producer after Caldas with 27%. As seen, these two neighbouring regions 
concentrated one-half of the total coffee production. Ocampo (1988), p. 178.
67. Testimony before the Senate Committee on Finance investigating the sale of foreign 
securities in the United States, 1932. Quoted by Lewis (1938) p.377
68. Statement quoted by Drake (1989), p.58
69. Lewis (1938), p.381
70. Aldcroft (1987) pp.84-86
71. Short-term credits to Argentina in 1930 amounted to US$135 million, representing 65% 
of short-term loans received by aU countries during that year. Lewis (1938), Appendix E, 
pp.623 and 629.
72. Estimates due to Lewis (1938) pp.395-396.
73. Informe Financiero del Contralor. Annual Reports, 1928 through 1932.
74. The members of the syndicate were: The National City Bank of New York and its 
affiliate The National City Co.; The First National Bank of Boston and its affiliate The First 
National Old Colony Corporation; Lazard Brothers and Co., Ltd., London, on their behalf 
and on behalf of Lazard Frères & Cie., Paris; Continental Illinois Co., affiliated to the 
Continental Illinois Bank and Trust Co., Chicago; International Manhattan Co., Inc. affiliated 
to International Acceptance Bank, Inc., New York.
75. Law 75 of 1930. Pérez (1990) Part II, p.84
76. Links between the "oil issue" and U.S. lending to Colombia were not new. It has been 
documented that in the mid-1920s the U.S. government discouraged some loans to Colombia 
until concessions were granted to the U.S. company. Gulf Oil. Drake (1989), p.56. Later, in 
1929, the British Embassy at Bogota informed that with the encouragement of the State and 
Commerce Departments, issue houses were denying loans to Colombia and driving down the 
prices of Colombian bonds to obtain oil concessions. These facts are quoted by Eichengreen
(1986),p.72
77. According to documentation quoted by Drake (1989) p.66. President Olaya complained to 
the U.S. ambassador in the following terms: "I have tried to play the game with the
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Americans; I have had the oil law they wanted passed, the Barco Contract [Gulf Oil 
concession] signed, have tried to protect American interests on tariff, etc., etc. It breaks my 
heart to have Americans let me down at the end."
78. An important factor was the disruption of agricultural production caused by World War I. 
The decline of food production in Europe encouraged other areas -United States, Canada, 
South America, Australia- to expand their own supplies. In this context, the postwar 
restoration of European agriculture led to accumulating surpluses, increasing stocks and 
falling prices. Technological advances of the time, from fertilizers to more efficient farm 
machinery, further increased world supplies. A second factor was the length of the gestation 
period of some staples; while planting coincided with high prices of primary commodities 
during 1916-20, marketable harvests were not available until the mid-1920s. Garraty (1986)
79. Kindleberger (1986) p. 76. Diaz-Alejandro (1983) p.6
80. The first stabilization policies, called "valorization schemes" were applied early in the 
century (1906) with the purpose of insulating the internal price from changes in world 
demand and from the effects of changing climatic conditions on production. The scheme was 
applied for the first time in 1907 to buy up a bumper crop with internal financing. Later, 
h i^ e r  external coffee prices brought about by a favourable shift in world demand, lasted 
since 1909 until the markets retreat during World War I. Dwindling prices during the war, 
and the perspective of bumper crops in 1917-18 led to the second valorization scheme; the 
success of this plan was reinforced by a natural accident -a big frost which destroyed part of 
the crops-, and the boom of foodstuffs after the war. In 1921 an expected big bumper crop led 
the government to buy up more than one-third of the harvest, and external financing was a 
vital source in the process. In 1922, a credit for £9 million was used to refund internal and 
external debts; this external support played part in the institutionalization of the so called 
"permanent defense" policy of coffee prices. Villanova and Suzigan (1973), sections 3.3,4.4, 
and 5.3.
81. In 1924, the Sao Paulo Coffee Institute was set up to implement the "permanent defence" 
policy by means of buying up excessive harvests, storing them, and selling them in periods of 
rising prices. In 1926 die British branch of Lazard Brothers - a banking house closely related 
to the floating of external credits to Brazil and Colombia, and with businesses in the 
international coffee trade- arranged the issue of a £10 million loan to the Institute. This loan, 
intended to support the Institute policies, provoked the protest of the U.S. government which 
considered that attempts to hold up coffee prices were in conflict with the interests of U.S. 
consumers. Marichal (1989) p.l96. The permanent defence policy broke down in the late 
1920s. An unprecedented crop in the coffee year 1927-1928 led die Institute to adopt a policy 
of subsidies to the coffee growers. The Banco do Estado, created with the resources of die 
Lazard loan of 1926, was authorized to pay about £1.5 per bag of coffee. The "permanent 
defence" policy collapsed at the beginning of the coffee year 1929-30. It was expected a crop 
even greater than that of 1927-28, and the Banco do Estado found itself on the verge of 
bankruptcy; in fact, since the exceptional harvest of 1927-28, an enormous quantity of unsold 
coffee had been stored in warehouses. It was estimated that in late 1929 around 16 million 
bags of coffee remained unsold, with the obvious adverse financial implications on the Banco 
do Estado. Villanova and Suzigan (1973), sections 5.3 and 6.3.2.
82. Kindleberger (1986) p. 139
83. The argument is based on usual trade procedures of the time and on the reaction of the 
New York banks to the withdrawal of call-money from the stock market. Commodities were 
shipped on consignment, and commodity brokers based their purchases on bank loans. After 
the stock-market crash some participants in the call-loan market -firms, individuals, out-of- 
town banks- retreated and the New York banks took their place. This movement implied the 
cutback in lending to merchants, and consequently the adverse effect on demand for 
commodities and falling prices.
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84. Additional financial difficulties threatened the coffee sector and also the banking sector: 
the coffee growers lacked funds to finance the transport to seaports and commercial banks 
which had previously financed the coffee growers exhibited cash shortages. On top of that, 
the government rejected the idea of "rescuing" the coffee sector by means of increases in the 
money supply, given the current policy of exchange and monetary stability. The only way out 
of the immediate financial pressures was the external credit, a difficult enterprise given the 
current international credit crunch. Villanova and Suzigan (1973), section 6.3.2.
85. Kindleberger (1985), Marichal (1989) p. 196. Abreu (1978-79), p.30, indicates that only 
£8.5 million were obtained from the European floatation and therefore the government had to 
start buying coffee with internal resources in 1931.
86. Ocampo and Montenegro (1982), p.52
87. Kindleberger (1986), p.l39 and 186. U.S. Department of Commerce (1976).
88. Eichengreen and Portes (1986), p.612
89. Diaz-Alejandro (1984), p.21, was particularly emphatic on this point: "The emergence of 
a protectionist and nationalistic center was the greatest shock to Latin American economies 
during the 1930s, going beyond its direct negative impact on the region's terms of trade" The 
central protectionist measures under discussion were the American Smoot-Hawley tariff of 
1930 and the British Abnormal Importations Act of 1931.
90. Diaz-Alejandro (1983), p.9
91. Data for Brazil was taken from Villanova and Suzigan (1973); for Chile from United 
Nations (1948) and League of Nations, Annual Statistical Yearbook (1933); and for 
Argentina from League of Nations, Annual Statistical Yearbook (1933).
92. According to Feis ([1930], 1974) estimates, British investments in 1913 amounted to 
£3763.3 million, or US$ 18,288 million. According to Table 14,47.3% of investments were 
allocated in members of the British Empire -inclucSng Canada-.
93. Royal Institute (1937) pp. 122,148,153.
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SECTION n
The Public Debt in Colombia during the Great Depression. 1929-1934
Introduction
The world crisis of the 1930s in Latin America has attracted the attention of international 
economists and other social scientists. Classical examples of this literature are due to Diaz- 
Alejandro (1982,1983) and Thorp (1984). In Colombia the interest on the great depression 
mushroomed during the 1970s covering the economic, social and political transformations of 
the time. General studies of the economic aspects of the crisis are provided in Ocampo and 
Montenegro (1982) and Patino (1981). In our case, the public debt is the common thread of 
our discussion of the great depression.
Two main topics are treated in this section, namely, the events which document the 
cushioning role of the internal public debt, and the process of default on the external debt. 
How do these topics fit into the general argument? The default on the external debt is the last 
step in the boom-and-bust cycle of foreign lending of the 1920s which we described in 
Section I. Colombia's adhesion to the gold standard and full external debt service were 
maintained until after there were clear indications that the international economy was going 
off gold, exchange controls and default were spreading in Latin America, and the 
international reserves of the country were on the brink of exhaustion. In this section we 
describe how default on the Colombian external debt was a partial and gradual process which 
started in late 1931 after the adoption of foreign exchange controls. The internal public debt 
enters this tale as a crucial recovery device after years of deflation, and once exchange 
controls were imposed. That function was performed in different ways as explained next.
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Our underlying model sustains that the internal public debt is a negative function of 
macroeconomic variables such as output, imports and external financing, and a positive 
function of government expenditures. This section argues that during the great depression the 
economy was severely damaged by adverse shocks on the first three variables. As the 
financial sector was heavily dependent on external markets, the stoppage of external 
financing left the banking system on the verge of collapse. The downfall of imports 
substantially impaired tax revenues, and to recover government budget balance authorities 
had to engineer a drastic cutback of public expenditure. The collapse of coffee prices and 
other staples not only weakened the external sector but depressed domestic activity. Since the 
economy was thus affected through a diversity of routes by the great depression, once 
controls on foreign exchange and external debt repayments were established, the 
"cushioning" increase in the internal public debt was carried out through a variety of ways 
according to the channel of connection from the external shock to the domestic economy.
The public debt literature recognizes that war has been one of the major historical causes of 
public debt increases. In our case, a border conflict with Peru came to demand an increase of 
the internal public debt far beyond what authorities have thought it would be necessary to 
cushion the shocks of the great depression. Importantly, authorities also raised taxation in 
order to assure a quick amortization of the increased public debt. This is an illustrative 
episode of how authorities found it less costly to increase the internal public debt than taxes 
to cushion the shock of the war on government expenditures, but were also disposed to 
increase taxation so as to reduce the future debt burden. As the reader will recall from the 
econometric sections, our research was designed in order to check to what extent 
governments do not change taxation when the internal public debt is used as a shock 
absorber. The events just mentioned give factual support to the econometric findings.
The section is organized as follows. Firstly (subsection A), we introduce the reader to the 
great depression in Colombia by describing the channels through which external shocks were 
transmitted to the domestic economy. Secondly (subsection B), we concentrate on the
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diversity of ways through which the cushioning role of the internal public debt took place. 
Finally (subsection C), we discuss the gradual process by which Colombia formally defaulted 
on the external debt.
A. Shocks on asset-markets during the great depression.
We start by drawing a picture of the great depression in Colombia by means of crucial links 
between asset markets. The scheme resembles that publicized by Eichengreen and Portes
(1987) to express the "essential anatomy of financial crises". We apply a modified version to 
the Colombian experience to show how shocks on the external sector (current and capital 
accounts) affect domestic financial markets and government finance, and how domestic bank 
stability and prospects of external credit to the country are affected by the reaction of foreign 
creditors to worldwide debt problems.
We divide our discussion as follows. First, we describe a variety of external shocks, namely, 
shocks on foreign exchange markets, shocks on domestic financial markets, shocks on public 
finance, and shocks on the market for government bonds. Second, we examine the linkages 
through which crises in one market are transmitted to other markets.
We indicate how in the 1930s authorities reacted to the shocks by firstly following orthodox 
policies prescribed by the monetary regime (gold standard), long before adopting exchange 
controls. This critical measure was not imposed until the international reserves had been 
nearly depleted, the domestic financial system was about to collapse, and the world economy 
was going off gold. A partial default on the external debt was negotiated shortly after the 
adoption of exchange controls. Both measures were regarded as temporary devices to halt the 
exhaustion of foreign exchange.
A crucial addition to the aforementioned scheme is that the internal pubHc debt acts as a 
cushion against external shocks, in different ways according to the channels of connection
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from the external disturbances to the domestic economy. We introduce this role in this 
subsection, but it is in subsection B that the experience with internal public debt during the 
great depression is treated in detail.
1. Shocks on foreign exchange markets
Peripheral countries experienced negative shocks on their external goods and capital markets 
during the great depression. Colombia's fortunes were tied to the fate of coffee prices (Table 
36).
TABLE 36
COLOMBIA 
KEY MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1925-1938
YEAR GDpI INFLATION^ COFFEE 
PRICE3
NOMINAL
EXCHANGE
RATE^
REAL
EXCHANGE
RATES
(1935=100)
1925 1 .1 27.6 1 .01 74.9
1926 8.6 22.7 28.5 1 .03 62.2
1927 7.8 -10.4 25.1 1 .02 69.0
1928 7.5 0.4 27.3 1 .02 65.7
1929 2.1 -0.4 22.8 1 .03 67.6
1930 -Q. 8 -20.7 17.2 1 .03 70.9
1931 -1 .6 -13.5 15.6 1 .03 75.0
1932 6.6 -23.3 11 .4 1 .05 89.5
1933 5.6 5.0 10.5 1 .25 96.2
1934 6.3 38.8 13.7 1 .63 93.4
1935 2.4 4.3 10.3 1 .78 100.0
1936 5.3 6.0 11 .3 1 .75 93.2
1937 1 .6 3.3 11.6 1 .77 95.4
1938
NOTES
6.5 12.6 11 .0 1 .79 84.0
Annual rate of growth of GDP.
Average of monthly annual inflation rates.
Average of monthly quotations of the Colombian coffee 
in New York.
Average of month-end quotations of the US dollar in 
terms of Colombian pesos.
Calculations based on the CPI of both Colombia and the 
United States.
SOURCES
For GDP, Cepal (1957). For inflation rates, Mitchell (1993) 
For coffee prices and nominal exchange rates, IGBR, various 
years. For the U.S. CPI, Department of Commerce (1976).
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Colombia enjoyed unprecedented high coffee prices during 1925-1928 when the external 
quotations reached levels 50% higher than during the first half of the decade; on average, 
these prices were over US270/lb and peaked in 1926 when they reached the level of 
US28.50Ab. Things changed dramatically after the collapse of the Brazilian valorization 
policies and the New York stock market crash in late 1929. Coffee prices had been 
deteriorating since early 1929 but plunged downward after those adverse events. By 1933 the 
average coffee price was only USlO.50/lb. But as seen in Section I.E. of this part, the 
negative impact of declining prices was to a great extent absorbed by sustained levels of real 
exports during 1929-1933. The major detrimental shock in the Colombian experience was the 
cutback of foreign lending which provoked a massive outflow of international reserves 
between 1929 and 1931.
Table 37 illustrates the contrasting experiences of the external sector during the second half 
of the 1920s and first half of the 1930s. As seen, a negative trade balance dominates during 
the late 1920s. A more dramatic description is offered by the adverse evolution of net export 
revenues (column (5)) up to 1929.^ In fact, during 1924-1928, 70% of the net inflow of 
external funds (column 7) went to finance the excess of imports over export revenues, and the 
remaining 30% to finance a continuously increasing stock of international reserves (column 
6). This process came to a halt after foreign lending was suddenly cut off in 1928. The figures 
show how the net outflow of external funds was at first financed by a substantial loss of 
international reserves, and secondly, by a net inflow of export revenues. During 1929-1931 
international reserves were practically depleted, and trade surplus was regained after a vast 
reduction of imports -50% in 1930 only.
Both the huge influx of foreign funds of the late 1920s and the heavy drain of foreign assets 
during the great depression came about under the "rules of the game" of the gold-exchange 
standard. Authorities were extremely reluctant to abandon those rules even under the 
precarious foreign exchange conditions of 1931. It was not until exogenous events of 
universal repercussions convinced the Colombian authorities of the international
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diseiLchantment with the gold standard that measures were adopted, first to avoid the 
complete exhaustion of international reserves, and second, to foster reflationary measures. 
The 1931 (September 21) devaluation of sterling and the 1933 devaluation of the U.S. dollar 
were the episodes which broke the resistance of the few countries stül on gold.
In order to stabilize the exchange rate (Colombian pesos per U.S. dollar) around the parity 
levels, the central bank (Bank of the Republic) defined a band which was narrower than that 
corresponding to the gold export and gold import points. The Bank did not find major 
obstacles to stabilize the exchange rate within the self-imposed limits during 1926-1928. 
However, the drying up of foreign lending since 1928 and the collapse of coffee prices in 
1929 made stabilization more difficult; by November 1928 the exchange rate had reached the 
upper limit self imposed by the Bank and by April 1929 the exchange rate exactly matched 
the gold export point. The Bank managed to sustain this level under the gold standard 
framework until September 1931, when exchange controls were adopted to halt what became 
a massive drain of international reserves. It is illustrative to note that during the 28 months 
during which the Bank was selling gold and foreign exchange at the gold point of exports 
under the gold standard, international reserves fell by 72%, and 46% during the first-three 
quarters of 1931 o n l y . ^
Authorities presented the imposition of exchange controls as a temporary measure due to 
exceptional events while expecting to restore the gold exchange standard in full once 
normality was recovered. To corroborate that intention, authorities implemented a hybrid 
system according to which exchange rate stability within the gold points would continue to 
be the policy target, but the Bank of the Republic would be the only authorized seller and 
purchaser of foreign exchange. The system was known as the "controlled gold standard".
In practice the exchange controls barely avoided a further decline of international reserves 
and even at the end of the first-quarter of 1932 the stock of reserves was lower than that on 
September 1931. By that time the gold export point had reached a higher level and the Bank
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of the Republic adopted that level for its exchange operations.^ A year later (February,
1933), under pressure of exporters, authorities introduced a multiple-exchange-rate regime in 
which the gold export point was retained for government transactions. Although this scheme 
of differentiated rates was once more presented as a transitory device, it constituted the first 
movement away from the bounds of the gold standard."^
Expectations of a restoration of the gold standard vanished after the devaluation of the U.S. 
dollar. An emergency legislation authorizing the establishment of exchange controls was 
pushed through the U.S. Congress in March 1933, and by mid-April the dollar had fallen; in 
only one week (April 15-April 22) the dollar declined 11% with respect to the sterling pound. 
The dollar devaluation became part of reflationary measures adopted by the Roosevelt 
administration, and other economies allowed their currencies to move downward along with 
the dollar. To minimize the negative effect of the dollar devaluation on the coffee industry, 
Colombia adopted a fixed parity between the peso and the dollar. However, this parity turned 
out to be artificial, and in September 1933 the peso was devalued against the dollar. This 
determination, the first outright decision of devaluation after the abandonment of the gold 
standard was followed by a managed floating arrangement under which the peso depreciated 
even further against the dollar. By 1935 the exchange rate had stabilized and at the new level 
authorities reestablished a fixed exchange rate regime which then prevailed between 1936 
and 1948.^
2. Shocks on domestic financial markets
After the financial reforms of 1923 (Section I.D. of this part) which created the Bank of the 
Republic and reorganized the banking system, the money supply (Mj) increased 
continuously until the collapse of net external financing in 1928 (Table 38). M j grew at an 
annual rate of 17.7% between 1924 and 1928 due to the substantial accumulation of 
international reserves during the same period. Thereafter Mj shrank as the drain on the 
international reserves gathered speed. By 1931, with the stock of reserves nearly exhausted.
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Mj had come back to its incipient level in 1924. It was the combination of the monetary 
regime -the gold-exchange standard- and the boom-and-bust swings of foreign lending which 
caused the burst and further drop of monetary aggregates.
TABLE 38
COLOMBIA 
MONETARY INDICATORS 
1924-1937
(Millions of Pesos and Percentages)
MONEY SUPPLY INTEREST RATES (%)
Long-term Rates
Central National Mortg<
Total Rates of Growth (%) Bank Government Bank
Year Ml Ml B Discount Bonds Bonds
Rate
1924 57.6 7.0 10.0 9.8
1925 73.3 27.3 14.0 11 .6 7.0 10.0 9.1
1926 89.9 22.6 19.5 2.6 7.0 10.0 8.7
1927 94.5 5.1 5.7 —0.6 7.0 10.0 8.5
1928 110.6 17.0 13.5 3.1 7.0 9.4 8.0
1929 80.9 -26.9 -22.3 -5.8 9.0 9.2 8.0
1930 64.2 -20.6 -19.3 -1 .7 7.0 9.1 8.0
1931 56.9 -11 .4 -8.9 -2.7 7.0 9.1 8.0
1932 68.2 19.9 15.0 4.3 6.0 7.4 8.0
1933 84.6 24.0 21 .8 1 .9 4.0 6.0 6.2
1934 100.7 19.0 18.0 0.8 4.0 5.5 6.2
1935 103.2 2.5 12.1 —8.6 4.0 5.6 6.8
1936 124.2 20.3 17.2 2.7 4.0 5.6 6.8
1937 128.0 3.1 0.3 2.7 4.0 5.6 6.9
Sources.
Money Supply (M^). Informe Gerente Banco de la Republica, 1964 
Monetary Base (B). Estimated according to data in Triffin 
(1944) p.38-39
Central Bank discount rate. Preferential discount rates to the 
agricultural sector: 8% in 1929, 6% in 1930, 5% in 1931, 4% in 
1932, and 3% in 1933. Informe Gerente Banco de la Republica, 
various years.
Long-term interest rates. Weighted averages estimated 
according to data in Informe del Gerente del Banco de la 
Republica, 1964.
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As expected under the "rules of the game", the instrument of monetary policy was the 
discount rate of the central bank. Under those "rules" authorities were to intervene by raising 
the discount rate whenever the central bank was losing foreign reserves. The Bank of the 
Republic kept constant discount rates along the foreign lending boom period, and increased 
them temporarily in 1929 when the economy experienced the worst outflow of international 
reserves, as seen in tables 37 and 38. When commercial banks started losing bank reserves 
due to the drain of foreign assets, the rediscount mechanism was intensively used by those 
banks so as to protect their liquidity position. Because the central bank sought to control its 
loans to commercial banks rather than to cut them out, the rediscount rate was reduced to its 
previous level when the magnitude of loans went back to historical levels. Once the exchange 
control was established in 1931 and the outflow of international reserves moderated, the 
strain on banks liquidity subsided, and therefore the commercial banks dependence on the 
central bank funding was significantly reduced.
By using the discount rate and by permitting changes in the exchange rate toward the gold 
export point, the Bank of the Republic managed to preserve the exchange stability required 
by the monetary regime during the three years between the collapse of coffee prices and 
extinction of external lending, and the imposition of exchange controls. The liquidity position 
of commercial banks under threat given the massive outflow of external assets was secured 
by last resort lending. The price paid for defending the monetary regime was the exhaustion 
of international reserves and the resulting internal deflation (as seen in Table 36, the average 
rate of inflation during 1930-32 was -20%).
The adverse conditions of 1928-31 were faced by the Bank of the Republic in a "fortunate 
way from the technical point of view" according to a thorough report by Robert Triffin 
(1944). But as the same author observed, Colombians ended up considering that achievement 
an "insignificant victory" for the paralizing effects of the deflation on the internal structures 
of credit. The réanimation of such structures required the abandonment of the gold standard
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and the setting up of reflationary initiatives, at the center of which would be internal public 
debt policies, on which we will concentrate in Section B.
Financial intermediation flourished and collapsed with the boom-and-bust cycle of foreign 
lending. The financial market was institutionally segmented by the existence of commercial 
banks specialized in short-term lending operations, and mortgage banks specialized in 
providing long-term funding to the agricultural and housing sectors. This structure was 
critically important at the time for various reasons. The internal market only provided one- 
fourth of the resources of the mortgage banks, and therefore long-term loans to agriculture 
and housing substantially hinged upon the access of mortgage banks to external markets. 
Further, by 1929 mortgage banks accounted for 45% of total bank lending in the economy, 
corroborating the significance of long-term lending, but also the notorious dependence of 
bank lending activities on external funds. Finally, short-term loans given by foreign- 
commercial banks to commercial banks in Colombia represented an important proportion of 
resources available for lending.
The apparent dependence of financial institutions on external funds made them vulnerable to 
adverse shocks on foreign financing. Long-term lending to mortgage banks evaporated in 
1929 and short-term funds for commercial banks faded in 1931. The consequent strain on the 
liability side of the balancesheet was compounded by deflation abroad and at home. The 
experience of mortgage banks was illustrative: mortgagors (mainly coffee growers) found it 
difficult to service a debt which was constant in nominal terms, at a time when prices, wages 
and profits were falling. Thus, mortgage banks found themselves in a blind alley with their 
productive assets at risk, without access to fresh funds abroad, and without alternative 
comparable sources of funds at home, in the midst of the great depression. During the first 
three years of the crisis commercial banks defended their liquidity position by using the 
rediscount mechanism in the central bank, but by 1931 a generalized inhability to pay on the 
debtors side left commercial banks and also mortgage banks on the verge of insolvency. The 
rediscount mechanism was no longer a sensible solution, and extraordinary measures
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orientated to solve the so-called "debtors' problem" were required. These measures were 
adopted after the imposition of exchange controls in September 1931. As we will see in 
Section B, some of those measures resulted in increases of the internal public debt, and some 
others in a change of its composition.
3. Shocks on government finance and public debt assets.
The boom-and-slump of the 1920s dramatically affected the shape of public finances. On the 
revenue side the strong dependence on import duties (Table 39, column 2) made revenues 
extremely vulnerable to the fate of the purchasing power of exports and the availability of 
external financing. Current revenues boomed first (1924-1928), fell sharply in 1930 and 
continued falling until 1932, following the cycle described by imports. On the spending side, 
current outlays (excluding interest payments) followed the pace of revenues up to 1926, 
before the influx of external credit in 1927-28 (Table 39, column 8) made possible the spurt 
of government expenditures of those years. Once hopes of fresh foreign lending vanished and 
revenues crumpled after 1929, a draconian adjustment of nominal government expenditures 
was imposed along the 1929-32 period; while at their climax (1927-28) government 
expenditures averaged C$93 million per year, during the retrenchment period (1929-1932) 
they averaged C$51 million. Given the evolution of revenues, the path of curtailed outlays 
led to small alternate surpluses and deficits, and it can be observed that an incipient average 
primary surplus during 1929-31 added up to the deflationary monetary policies of those 
years.
Two important periods dominate the experience with public debt in the 1920s and 1930s. The 
external loans to the national government in 1927-28, and the internal loans of 1932-34. 
According to Table 39, internal debt changes were rather low or negative when the national 
government had access to external financing, and became gradually important when massive 
foreign lending came to a halt in 1928. But it was in the 1932-34 period that changes in 
internal public debt reached their apogee. Once exchange controls were established in
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September 1931, an important fraction of the internal public debt increase was financed by 
the central bank as part of reflationary policies. The resort to the central bank was seen as a 
temporary measure restricted to the attainement of reflationary targets. Later, in 1935, once 
the great-depression years were left behind, a process of fiscal reform revitalized tax 
revenues and made it possible to start reducing the stock of internal public debt.
As financial assets, government bonds had to compete at home with private bonds issued by 
mortgage banks (mortgage bonds or cedulas). Although during the 1920s mortgage banks 
sold about 65% of their bonds in international markets, the internal mortgage bonds became 
the dominant long-term financial asset. Government bonds represented about 60% of the size 
of mortgage bonds sold at home during 1923-30. Interest rates on government and mortgage 
bonds were always high according to international standards though mortgage banks 
progressively reduced their rates in the late 1920s (Table 38). In 1929, the interest rate on 
domestic mortgage bonds was 8%, still higher than the 6.7% paid on mortgage bonds sold 
abroad (Table 29). At the same date, the interest rate paid on domestic government bonds, 
9.2% was far higher than the 6.5% paid on bonds sold in the U.S. markets. The discrepancy 
between domestic rates paid on government versus mortgage bonds was a subject of 
controversy. The reduction of interest rates on government bonds during the late 1920s was 
carried out by the issue of bonds of lower interest rates (bonds of 8% and 8.5%) while issues 
of bonds of higher rates (10%) were suspended.
As for the market prices of bonds, external quotations rose during the loans boom, peaked in 
1928 just on the brink of the collapse of international lending, and shrinked with the retreat of 
foreign financing. For instance, the bonds of the national government sold in the New York 
Stock Exchange (1927 and 1928 issues only) were quoted at 91 in 1928,78 in 1931,40 in 
1932 and 36 in 1935. The steep drop in bond market prices was due not only to the drying up 
of external loans. A chain of events such as the wave of sovereign defaults which affected 
various South American nations during 1931, and the adoption of exchange controls in 
Colombia in late 1931 could have contributed to drive down the debt quotations, regardless
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of the continuity of debt service payments. In the case of the bonds just mentioned which 
constituted the two biggest single issues of the 1920s, although interest and sinking fund were 
paid in full until mid-1933, the international quotation had actually fallen to 40% of their par 
value in 1932. Domestic bond prices had to endure a similar fate, reaching quotations above 
90% by 1928, and just 50% of the par value by 1931.
4. Asset-market linkages at work
Our previous descriptions of individual asset markets showed some reflections of the world 
depression of the 1930s on each market. Additionally, they suggested the existence of 
linkages between crises in individual markets. Two crucial linkages can be defined regarding 
the crisis of the banking system. The first performs between shocks on the exchange market 
and their effect on bank stability. The second operates between the unfolding of external debt 
problems and their impact on bank stability. Two other meaningful linkages highlight the 
crisis of government finances and external creditworthiness. They are also originated in 
shocks on the exchange market and in the deterioration of the international country-debt 
situation.
The first linkage summarizes the devastating effects on internal financial markets of the 
shocks on the external goods and capital markets. As seen above, the international reserves 
and the principal monetary aggregates collapsed returning to the nominal values they 
achieved around 1924 before the lending boom actually started. The banking system lost one- 
third of its reserves during 1928-1931. The problem was not only the downfall of financial 
resources, however. The collapse of terms of trade and the general deflation of the period 
1929-32 badly undermined the ability to pay of exporters and other commercial debtors, then 
putting at risk the recovery of bank loans. By 1931, the "debtors’ problem" was so deep that 
the paralysis of the banking system could only be averted by extraordinary measures of 
government intervention.
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The second linkage shows how bank stability is impaired by tensions arising between foreign 
creditors and debtors. An example taken from the experience of both, the 1930s and the 
1980s, is the interruption of short-term lending by international bankers. In the 1930s it was 
an universal phenomenon which hit European and Latin American debtors, and Colombia 
was not an exception. Contemporary observers and authorities considered the cutback of 
short-term loans as one of the major setbacks received from international creditors. These 
pressures from abroad were particularly intensive during the first three quarters of 1931, at a 
time when the Colombian external debt was being fully served by private and public debtors. 
From the banks viewpoint the reduction of short-term loans caused new strains to their 
already deteriorated financial situation and made difficult the financing of normal operations 
of international trade.
The third linkage highlights the demolishing effects on public finance of the unfavourable 
shocks on the external sector. The drastic reduction of imports prompted by the collapse of 
foreign lending provoked a severe downturn of tax revenues (custom duties). So as to balance 
the budget, fiscal authorities imposed a radical retrenchment of government spending - 
particularly government investment expenditures-. It was a policy applied under the orthodox 
framework of the monetary regime, whose recessionary effects added up to the deflationary 
forces arising from the negative external shocks. There were more implications. 
Creditworthiness of the public sector and the nation was adversely affected by deteriorating 
terms of trade. Because exports fell sharply between 1928 and 1933, and long-term foreign 
lending had been suspended since 1929, standard indexes of indebtedness reflected a rapidly 
increasing proportion of debt by unit of exports, therefore weakening the reputation of 
creditworthiness among foreign creditors. While the external debt of the Colombian public 
sector represented 1.23 times the value of exports in 1928, the relevant figure for 1931 was 
1.77, after a reduction of 28% in the value of exports. All this happened while foreign debt 
obligations of Colombia were being punctually and entirely fulfilled.
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The fourth linkage points out how debt problems in neighbouring countries affected the 
external credit to the country. It is important to note that in some critical respects Colombia 
followed a different way from its debtor partners. The country stood out in Latin America for 
its protracted resistance to abandoning the gold exchange standard, and its commitment to 
service the external debt. Colombia avoided to enroll the list of pre-sterling depreciators, a 
group in which other prominent debtors became involved, such as Argentina and Brazil in 
1929, and Chile in 1930. Colombia adopted a exchange control system in September 1931, 
"forced" by the near exhaustion of its international reserves and an international context 
which was going off the gold standard. As the foreign situation of the country got worse, 
authorities announced a "temporary" and partial suspension of debt service in February 1932. 
Default came about as a partial, gradual and intermittent process which became more clearly 
defined since 1935, though even then some specific payments were maintained.
The fact that Colombia not only stood by the gold standard for a considerable longer time 
than other salient South American debtors, but honoured its external obligations more 
persistently than them (with the conspicuous exception of Argentina which did not default 
this time), did not render the country a more favourable treatment by foreign creditors. The 
wave of currency depreciations which spread around Latin America since 1929, the outbreak 
of sovereign defaults which in the first three quarters of 1931 involved 5 South American 
countries, and the political upheaval frequently associated with default decisions, made the 
whole region an unattractive risk for potential creditors.
How could authorities block the damaging results of these links over the internal credit 
structure and the government finances? For three years, 1928-31, authorities followed the 
orthodox prescriptions, under the assumption that international cooperation would eventually 
restablish a stable equilibrium under the gold standard system. Individual efforts at the 
periphery to avoid financial instability and recession proved to be ineffective under the gold 
standard, and reflationary measures, either fiscal or monetary, were discarded for 
incompatible with the maintenance of gold convertibility. Eventually, a crucial measure was
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the establishment of exchange controls in September 1931. However important, this measure 
was not designed to restablish the internal credit structure and to start reflating the economy. 
This was the role to be played by the internal public debt as we will show in Section B.
B. The "cushioning” role of the internal public debt 
during the great depression.
Three periods can be recognized in the evolution of the internal public debt (hereinafter IPD) 
during the 1920s and 1930s (Table 40). The first one between 1923 and 1927, during which 
the nominal stock of IPD was continuously falling and represented no more than 1.3% of 
GDP. The second one between 1928 and 1934 during which IPD increased at the annual 
exponential rate of 36% and represented about 5.5% of GDP. Two phases can be 
distinguished along this second period: the 1928-30 years during which IPD represented 
some 1.8% of GDP, and the 1931-34 years during which the comparable figure was 8.2%. 
Finally, a period of slightly declining nominal IPD after 1935, although still representing 
around 7% of GDP.
Bonds constituted the dominant instrument of IPD throughout the period, though their 
importance declined from an overwhelming 84% up to 1929 to 52% during the rest of the 
period. As seen in Table 40, this change was mainly due to the significance achieved by the 
credit extended by the financial system to the government; on average, one-third of the stock 
of debt was held by the financial system. As we will show below, the bulk of that fraction 
was in the hands of the Bank of the Republic.
The exposition is divided as follows. In the first place we examine the IPD experience during 
the gold-standard period, 1923-1931. Later we explore the leading position of the EPD in the 
recovery policies implemented during 1932-1933. We also discuss the importance of the IPD 
during an armed conflict with Peru (1932-33) and how authorities combined internal public 
debt and taxation to pay for the war. Finally, since much of the IPD increase was in the form
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of central bank loans to the government, we review the reflection of this process on monetary 
aggregates.
In our econometric discussion (Part HI, Section I), we observed how the IPD grew well 
below trend before 1931, and how the highest IPD growth rates in the whole series (1925-85) 
were achieved during 1932-33. Explanatory variables such as output, imports and external 
financing grew well above trend up to 1928, shrinked after this date, and by 1931 were just 
growing at the historical rate (output) or well below it (imports and external financing). The 
next two subsections investigate the facts behind the cyclical behaviour of the IPD between 
the mid-1920s and the mid-1930s.
1. Internal public debt management under the gold exchange standard. 1923-1931.
a. 1923-1927
The nominal stock of the IPD fell by more than one-half between 1923 and 1927. A series of 
causes interacted to yield this result. Apart from the macroeconomic facts just mentioned 
which led the IPD to grow well below trend, there were institutional reasons of domestic and 
also external origin. An important domestic motive was the unification of the national 
currency after the foundation of the Bank of the Republic in 1923. Since some government 
securities were being used as money by the public, the withdrawal of those securities from 
circulation was considered a prerequisite for the success of the Bank, and by 1927 only a 
negligible amount of the debt instruments under question (Treasury Bonds of 1922 and 
Treasury Certificates of 1919) was still in circulation. This process of monetary unification 
accounted for about two-thirds of the internal debt reduction between 1923 and 1927. The 
other one-third involved the nearly complete liquidation of accumulated Notes issued by the
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Treasury, and an exiguous reduction of Colombian Bonds of Internal Debt (the main 
instrument of internal debt at that time).^
The need of improving the external image of government finances was another motive to 
reduce the IPD. Since the sustainability of the gold standard to be adopted in 1923 could 
require access to external financing, contemporaneous legislation (Law 102 of 1922) had 
authorized the government to negotiate huge external loans. Additionally, legislation enacted 
at the end of 1922 (Law 116) provided for the conversion and reduction of the IPD by 
authorizing custom tariff increases specifically assigned to that end.
There are indications based on private correspondence that the necessity of improving the 
credit position of the government could have been "suggested" by foreign bankers as a 
condition for negotiating new loans. For instance, in a communication sent to the [British] 
Council of Foreign Bondholders enclosing a copy of the Law 116 of 1922 mentioned above, 
the British Department of Overseas Trade observed: "The question of the consolidation of the 
internal debt has for some time past been urged on the Colombian government by foreign 
financiers almost as a condition precedent to the granting of loans on satisfactory terms".^ 
Since the inactivity of foreign capital markets after World War I could not be overcome until 
the launching of the Dawes loan in 1924, the reduction of the IPD had no practical 
implications for the access of the national government to fresh foreign lending. The statistical 
series reveal that both the internal and external debt of the national government fell 
uninterruptedly between 1922 and 1926 as seen in Table 39 above. Altogether, this parallel 
decline implied a reduction of 40% of total national debt between 1923 and 1926. This trend 
was broken down in 1927 when a loan floated by the national government in U.S. markets 
nearly tripled the stock of external debt. As for internal debt, its decline continued until the 
end of 1927.
As far as the policy of reducing the internal debt went on, the indebtedness of the government 
with the Bank of the Republic was sporadic. Since its foundation, the Bank was authorized to
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make loans to the government and to invest in government bonds for an amount no greater 
than 30% of the capital and reserves of the Bank. As said, loans were occasional, represented 
just 6% of the capital and reserves of the Bank during the 1923-27 period and were rapidly 
liquidated.^
b. 1928-1930
Key macroeconomic indicators reached a turning point in 1928 (Tables 36, 37, 39). It was the 
last year of high coffee prices before their continuous faU during 1929-33. It was also the 
year when the net external financing to the country achieved their maximum before 
collapsing in 1929 and becoming negative in 1930. The treasury revenues which also reached 
their height in 1928 were one-third lower in 1930, and although public expenditure was 
curtailed by one-half between 1928 and 1930, the treasury experienced financial strains 
during these years. To a great extent these difficulties arose from floating debts to regional 
governments. Since these obligations were financed by issuing internal debt, the IPD started 
performing a countercyclical role since late 1928. As a whole, the IPD nominal stock 
increased by 1.7 times during the 1928-30 period.
Before the turning point in late 1928 authorities were considering a reduction of interest rates 
on the IPD. The 10% Colombian Bonds of Internal Public Debt were the only possibility 
offered to potential investors since 1918 through 1927 (Table 41 ,1.A.), and it was thought 
that 10% was an excessively high domestic yield compared with the 6.5% average rate paid 
on bonds sold in the United States. Some sectors close to agricultural interests denounced 
what they judged to be "speculative" investments which discriminated against agriculture, 
"the true source of wealth".^ The mortgage banks which were also selling 10% mortgage 
bonds replaced these securities by new 8% issues. The government intended to follow the 
same procedure by issuing 8 1/2% and 8% bonds, but its intention failed. Why? First, the 
Treasury found itself compelled to sell 8% bonds for financial motives (mainly debts to 
regional governments), alongside the original idea of bond conversion; and second, the
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demand for both 10% and 8% government bonds was stimulated after the New York stock 
market boom cut off lending on foreign mortgage bonds, therefore depressing the quotations 
of both foreign and domestic mortgage bonds. These two reasons lay behind the increase of 
Colombian Bonds of Internal Debt and the proportionate distribution of 10% and 8% issues 
in 1930 (Table 41,1.A.).10
The collapse of foreign lending did not take long to affect the market prices of the internal 
debt. The Colombian Bonds of Internal Debt whose quotations had been close to their par 
values between 1923 and 1928, were being quoted at about 50% during the first quarter of 
1930, and authorities were looking for new sources of financing outside the open market. An 
important initiative was the issue of 8% Treasury Promissory Notes (Law 20 of 1930) 
destined to finance the share of regional governments (Departments) in the national revenues, 
as well as railway bonds due to pay during the fiscal year.^^ In the depressed conditions of 
the time, authorities found out three potential buyers, namely, foreign firms (the Tropical Oil 
Company and the Andian National Corporation), commercial banks, and the Bank of the 
Republic itself. Each buyer acquired one-third of the C$6 million Promissory Notes issued by 
the Treasury (Table 41, H, A). The contractual rate, 8%, though equal to that on more recent 
issues of government and mortgage bonds resulted too high relative to the declining 
international interest rate levels and an internal deflation reaching 20% in 1930. Later, the 
contractual rate was reduced to 6% (Law 56 of 1930).^^
The sale of the corresponding one-third of promissory notes to the central bank was not a 
straightforward matter. As seen before, there existed a limit for the Bank of the Republic to 
make loans to the government and to invest in government bonds; that limit was of 30% of 
the capital and legal reserves of the Bank. During 1928 and 1929 the average bank loans to 
the government were C$1.7 million and the average investments in Colombian bonds of 
internal debt C$0.4 million, altogether equivalent to 16% of the capital and reserves of the 
Bank. Under pressing reasons, in 1930 the government decided to use its full credit quota in 
the Bank, which amounted to C$4.2 million. To that end, the Bank sold 90% of its
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investments in government bonds with discount in the market, and extended loans to the 
government up to the legal limit (Table 41, IV, A). Given this situation, the government 
found itself unable to seU promissory notes to the Bank, and a legal change was required.
The government proposed the enlargement of its credit quota in the Bank from 30% to 45% 
of the capital and legal reserves of the institution, as part of a broad range of reforms to the 
Bank. Most of these reforms were inspired by the idea of making more flexible the gold 
exchange standard; the initiative coincided with an international move orientated to lessen the 
stringency of the monetary regime. It was thought at the time that an international liquidity 
problem could arise due to a global shortage of gold, and consequently, initiatives were 
launched to moderate the gold demand for monetary purposes.Congress was urged to 
aprove (Law 73 of 1930) two units of the reform package, namely, the reduction of the 
Bank's minimum reserve requirement on its notes and sight deposits (from 60% to 50%, still 
far above the internationally required range of 29%-34% depending on the amount of foreign 
exchange held by central banks), and the aforementioned increase of the government credit 
quota in the Bank. With the first measure, authorities sought to prevent any possible 
deficiency of metallic reserves given the continuous decline of international reserves since 
1928, and with the second, authorities aimed to increase the access of the government to the 
central bank credit. Specifically, the second measure was put forward to allow the Bank to 
purchase its share in the Treasury Promissory Notes of 1930; the increased credit quota just 
allowed the Bank to make that investment.
To recapitulate, two different phases characterized the behaviour of the IPD under the gold 
exchange standard. Its nominal stock continuously declined along the prosperous 1923-28 
period during which the process of monetary unification took place. Subsequently, it 
increased during the recessionary period ushered in by the collapse of foreign lending and 
coffee prices in 1928, reaching the figure of 2.8% of GDP in 1930. During the second phase, 
authorities ended up increasing the credit quota of the government in the central bank to 
finance compelling requirements of the Treasury. The orthodox institutions of the gold
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standard lost ground to more flexible views which backed a monetary regime more 
responsive to the depression. Those flexible views were brought about by the pressing 
economic conditions of the time, although still representing slight modifications of the 
monetary regime. Nevertheless, such movements away from the original orthodoxy created a 
precedent for more substantial changes in the years to come.
2. The role of the internal public debt in the context 
of reflationary policies. 1932-1934.
By September 1931, three full years of depression had critically weakened the economy. 
Output had been falling since 1930, and prices had followed a downward spiral since 1929 
(Table 36). As far as the situation deteriorated, authorities complied with the prescriptions of 
the gold standard, namely, changes in the discount rate of the central bank so as to discourage 
commercial bank lending, and control of public spending in order to balance the budget. As 
seen above, the most drastic medicine applied by authorities was a sharp retrenchment of 
public spending which led to a reduction of 60% in nominal current expenditures (excluding 
debt service) between 1928 and 1931. The case is that in spite of these deflationary measures, 
by the third quarter of 1931 international reserves had been nearly depleted and the paralysis 
of credit institutions was well under way.
Although a countercyclical behaviour of the IPD had been observed since late 1928, such a 
role turned out to be crucial during 1932-34 after the imposition of exchange controls and a 
partial default on external debt in late 1931. It was during 1932-34 that the cushioning role of 
the IPD was fully brought into play. The whole experience can be summarized as follows. 
First, the IPD was an important instrument of reflation through the application of central 
bank credits to finance Treasury deficits, and public work programs intended to accelerate 
recovery; this is the subject of subsection 2a below. Second, the IPD was a critical instrument 
for avoiding the collapse of the banking system and restablishing normal creditor-debtor 
relationships in the economy; this experience is discussed in subsection 2b. Third, the IPD
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was used to subsidize vital sectors of the economy which were the most adversely affected by 
the negative external shocks of the late 1920s; the case of the coffee growers is presented in 
subsection 2c. Finally, the IPD was the main source of financing of the armed conflict with 
Peru in 1932-33; this episode is examined separately in subsection 3.
a. Extraordinary financing of the central bank to the government.
The following points are highlighted in this subsection. There existed a strong oposition in 
the government and in the private sector to increase the IPD by resorting to the credit of the 
Bank of the Republic. The gold standard was defended as a guarantee of sound monetary 
policies, fiscal discipline and creditworthiness abroad. However, once the international 
economy started going off gold, authorities imposed exchange controls, and extraordinary 
though limited loans of the Bank to the government were authorized.
i) The context
The fact that the Bank of the Republic's foundation charter was modified in 1930 in order to 
increase the credit quota of the government did not mean that old antagonists of money- 
financed government deficits had conceded points in the controversy with enthusiasts for 
active reflationary policies. In March 1931, a parliamentary commission proposed to create 
an additional and temporary credit quota to the government in the central bank; given the 
magnitude of the resources under discussion, the total credit quota of the government would 
have raised from 45% to 80% of capital and reserves of the Bank, had the proposition been 
passed. The government as well as the Bank of the Republic firmly opposed the 
parliamentary initiative. It was argued by the minister of finance that a new credit quota "will 
open the way to all future fiscal crisis and point to the exclusive financial resource: the Bank 
of the Republic".President Olaya and his cabinet backed the minister by indicating that 
they opposed any measures "that could endanger the soundness of the Bank of the Republic, 
put at stake the monetary stability, and adversely affect national creditworthiness abroad...
4 2 7
It was not until the last quarter of 1931 when having imposed exchange controls (September 
24) and agreed with foreign creditors a partial default on the external debt, that an initiative 
of extraordinary lending to the government could be approved. The presence of controls was 
seen as a framework for starting reflationary policies financed by the central bank without 
going off the gold standard. The minister of finance referred to the new regime as a 
"controlled gold standard" and introduced it as a "splendid base of recovery and financial 
equilibrium".^^
Representatives of the private sector denounced the inflationary risks of going off the gold 
standard. Influential traders of Medellin expressed:
"The sound money is not opposed in any way to the progress and public welfare, but 
promotes and maintains it, instead. To attribute the cause of the crisis to the gold standard 
and ask the issue of paper money as a remedy,...is an invalid argument which in practice 
would be ruinous for the community... Colombia still remembers hard lesson of the turn 
of the century when paper money without gold cover was issued".
President Olaya himself in his reply to the quoted traders did not hesitate to identify the paper 
money as a cause of misery and discredit:
"I entirely coincide with your opinion about the fundamental need of preserving a sound 
money and maintaining the gold standard. Every sacrifice is worthwhile if with it we avoid 
coming back to the regime of the paper money which together with the civil wars brought 
about misent and discredit to the 
country".
The Bank of the Republic also intervened in the controversy, but to explain that the adoption 
of exchange control did not necessarily implied a break away from the gold standard:
"Colombia goes on under the gold standard monetary regime, enjoying the advantages of a 
stable change and of a sound and safe money, and in that respect constitutes a unique case 
among the Latin American nations".
Two points should be noted regarding the previous quotations. First, the coincidence of 
different sectors of public opinion regarding the importance of maintaining the gold standard 
to avoid the reproduction of past inflationary experiences. There was a sort of "gold
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standard’s ethos", to use a recent discussion by Eichengreen (1992, p.292), who found that 
Eastern European countries were hesitant to expand their money supplies after imposing 
exchange controls in the 1930s. These countries had had recent experiences of high inflation 
and political instability which prevented them from embarking in new expansionary policies. 
Although the gold standard institutions were no longer in force, authorities stuck to the 
orthodoxy they have practiced under the gold standard.
Second, the Bank of the Republic highlights the Colombian adhesion to the gold standard as 
"unique" in the region. What was the practical meaning of this statement? Colombia did not 
share in the group of pre-sterling depreciators but maintained the exchange rate within the 
metalic parities after imposing exchange controls, all the way until the beginning of 1933. In 
the first quarter of this year a "provisional" system of multiple exchange rates was adopted, 
and later, after the U.S. dollar devaluation (March 1933), the Colombian peso was allowed to 
drift along with the dollar. What has to be added here is that a great deal of the monetary 
expansion that followed after the adoption of exchange controls was performed while the 
exchange rate was still within the bounds of the gold standard. In fact, about 60% of the loans 
of the Bank of the Republic to the government, and of the investments of the Bank in 
government bonds during 1932-1934 were actually carried out during 1932 when authorities 
managed to sustain the exchange rate at the gold export point.
ii) Loans and investments in public bonds
The loans extended by the Bank of the Republic to the government are displayed on Table 
41, IV, A. Their total increased nearly six times between the end of 1930 and the end of 
1934. This unprecedented change represented 40% of the increase of the IPD during the same 
period. However, loans, as important as they were, did not constitute the only way of central 
bank financing to the government. Investments in public bonds provided an expedient 
mechanism of supplying additional funding to the government; for every C$2 in loans to the 
government, the Bank invested C$1 in government bonds during the 1930-34 period. A less
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orthodox but effective method consisted for the Bank of the Republic to become a 
shareholder of institutions which played a key role in the recovery of the financial system. 
Although this method was applied in only one single case, its magnitude was just less than 
that of investments in government bonds, with the result that during the 1930-34 period total 
investments -bonds and shares- of the central bank were slightly higher than the reflationary 
loans to the government.
By using the mechanism of central bank’s investments in government bonds and shares, 
authorities avoided having to increase the government debt with the Bank by the entire 
magnitude of the reflationary policy financed by the Bank itself. In fact, loans to the 
government represented one-half of that magnitude. This behaviour was consistent with the 
established idea of restraining the increase of IPD financed with central bank’s loans.
Three-quarters of government loans during the 1930-34 period are explained by a single 
negotiation. The government was not given a blank cheque in the central bank. The main 
loan was negotiated in advance of expected yields on government estates; accordingly, the 
Bank received in concession the estates represented by some salt mines, giving in exchange 
an advance on the expected returns of their explotation. Though this was an heterodox 
operation for a central bank, the contract itself underscored that there was not such a thing of 
a free access of the government to the central bank. The interest rate of 3% charged by the 
Bank on the advance was lower than the preferential discount rates applied by the Bank, and 
much lower than the average rates on public debt as of 1931 when the concession was 
approved (Table 38). The reason for the lower level was not only the guarantee offered to the 
Bank by the concession; it happened that in contrast to most of public bonds, the new rate 
was negotiated in the midst of the deflation and at a level closer to international discount 
rates.
The Salt Mines Concession (SMC) loan, as it was called, was approved at the end of 1931 
(Decree 2214) and its main developments were felt in 1932. The contract stipulated an
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advance of C$15.5 million with the option of future increases, and already in 1932 the actual 
loans reached C$14.8 million (Table 41, IV, A).
TABLE 42
COLOMBIA 
SALT MINES CONCESSION LOAN 
1932
(Millions of Pesos)
C$ PURPOSE
6.0 Liquidation of backlog of payments
of the Treasury in the form of 
arrears of unfulfilled orders, and 
debts to other government entities 
(Departments).
3.5 Share of the government in the
initial capital of the Caja 
Agraria and of the Caja Colombiana 
de Ahorros.
1 .0 Interest-free government
deposits in mortgage banks to
facilitate the settlement of 
private debts.
4.3 Public Works.
14.8
Sources.
Memoria de Hacienda, 1934, pp.36-55
Table 42 shows the distribution of the loan at the end of 1932, according to which C$10.3 
million equivalent to 70% of the loan were used to finance a huge backlog of the Treasury 
and public works carried out by the national government; part of the backlog was represented 
by payments due to regional governments (Departments) which applied the new resources to 
provincial programs of public works. The SMC loan was increased in the following years 
reaching a maximum of C$20.3 million in 1938, the new resources having been applied to
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aid public works’ programs. As a whole, 78% of the SMC loan went to finance Treasury 
deficits and public works; the remainder was destined to ease the recovery of the financial 
system as we will see below.
b. The rescue of the financial system.
In our discussion of asset-market linkages during the great depression (subsection A.4. 
above), we observed how external shocks adversely affected internal financial markets, to the 
point that by 1931 the banking system was on the verge of collapse. In this subsection we 
describe how the IPD was a vital instrument in the rescue of financial institutions. First of all, 
the reader will find a description of the magnitude of the banking crisis. Secondly, the reader 
will be offered a detailed presentation of the rescue measures which involved IPD. It is 
important to mention at the outset, that while some measures implied an increase in the 
nominal stock of the IPD, other measures only implied a change in its composition. 
Additionally, some policy actions entailed a substitution of internal for external debt. Overall, 
authorities sought to restore the operation of the financial system by offering bank borrowers 
a subsidy financed with IPD as a compensation for wealth losses during the great depression.
i) The destabilizing effects of adverse external shocks on the domestic banking svstem.
By mid-1931 the domestic credit structure was on the verge of collapse. The adverse shocks 
of the world depression ended up undermining both sides of the bank balancesheet. Banks 
confronted a problem which could not be overcome by the last resort borrowing mechanism 
in the central bank. Both long-term and short-term sources of funds were substantially eroded 
by the cutback of foreign lending and the weakening of internal sources after three years of 
continuously falling international reserves. On the other hand, the customers ability to pay 
was significantly impaired not only by worsening TOT but by a deepening deflation at home 
and abroad. Far from being a liquidity problem, the situation in mid-1931 offered the 
prospect of an incoming solvency problem.
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The financial squeeze of the banking system was not an isolated fact. 1931 dramatically 
illustrated the links between international and domestic financial systems. Financial crises 
spread around Europe in the summer of 1931. International short-term credits were a crucial 
factor of financial instability. Germany, Britain, Hungary and Austria, in that order, were the 
largest short-term debtors. Germany, Hungary and Austria ended up going off gold and 
imposing exchange controls after large-scale withdrawals of short-term credits by foreign 
banks. Britain was also forced off gold, but this time the banking system was not directly at 
stake; the already weakened external accounts as of 1930 worsened through 1931 as far as 
overseas earnings declined due to the international recession and spreading sovereign 
defaults. This condition was aggravated by the defensive measures adopted in Germany, 
Hungary and Austria which restricted the repatriation of interest earnings and short-term 
credits to Britain. ^ 0
In the Colombian case, the withdrawal of foreign short-term credits also played a role in the 
crisis of the banking system and offered powerful reasons for the imposition of exchange 
controls. But there were particular differences derived from the distinctive structure of 
Colombia's banking system. As seen in Part B.D., at that time the banking system was 
divided in two classes of institutions: the commercial banks specialized in short-term lending, 
and the mortgage banks especialized in long-term lending.
Mortgage banks were of capital importance not only because of their significant access to 
long-term external funds (18% of total Colombian bonds sold abroad during the 1920s), but 
for their implications for the macroeconomy. Mortgage banks became intermediaries 
between foreign long-term financial markets, and local agriculturalists and urban developers. 
The downfall of mortgage banks started after mid-1929 when these institutions were unable 
of floating bonds abroad, and worsened thereafter as far as their clientele found it difficult to 
meet their payments. The crisis of commercial banks came about in a different way.
Although the liquidity position could be safeguarded by borrowing in the central bank, the
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quality of loans deteriorated as as the recession cum deflation deepened in 1931. It was 
during this year that the drying out of foreign short-term credits added up to the existing 
financial strains on the balancesheet of the commercial banks.
Some key concepts of the consolidated balancesheet are shown in Table 43. The importance 
of external sources and uses of funds up to 1929 is evident. Thus, while in 1925 only 2%  of 
total sources were of foreign origin, in 1929 they represented 48%.^^ On the assets side, 
while mortgage loans represented 25% of total loans in 1925, the relevant figure arrived to 
46% in 1929; importantly, in 1925 the entire amount of mortgage bonds was sold internally. 
contrasting with the situation of 1929 when 72% of the stock of mortgage bonds appeared to 
have been sold in external markets. Finally, it can be seen how foreign short-term credits 
varied their significance over time as a proportion of total short-term funds; the relevant 
figure changed from 2% in 1925 to 26% in 1929, and to 15% in 1931. It is shown that foreign 
short-term credits fell by 61% during 1931, the critical international year of this sort of loans, 
as noted above.
After their last exceptional flotations in London and other European markets (Section I.D. of 
this part), mortgage banks tried to expand their internal market with very modest results in 
1930. As seen, in the 1929-31 period the nominal balances of mortgage bonds and loans were 
practically constant. But more than stagnation, mortgage banks faced a financial collapse on 
both sides of the balancesheet. After two years of continuous deflation, and without any 
prospect of revival of external financing, mortgage bonds were quoted in the internal market 
for about one-half of their par value. At the same time, borrowers had to confront the 
prospect of paying fixed nominal obligations to the banks while the value of their assets and 
products was being eroded by the deflation. In this context the future viability of mortgage 
banking in Colombia was at stake unless radical measures were put in place.
Bank conditions aggravated through 1931 so far as foreign banks withdrew their short-term 
credits from Colombian banks. This adverse process was compounded by the reduction of
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foreign exchange deposits by firms closely tied to external trade. The cutback of foreign 
short-term lending was of definitive importance not only for its adverse effects on the 
banking sector itself but for its implications on the stock of international reserves. In fact, the 
decline of short-term credits to the banks between mid-1930 and the end of 1931 was 
equivalent to a drain of 58% of the total reserves of gold and foreign exchange of the central 
bank. What foreign bankers left on the verge of collapse was not only the financial 
intermediaries but the monetary regime based on the gold standard.
Contemporary observers were rather critical of the behaviour of foreign bankers.
Commenting on hearings before the U.S. Senate related to U.S. investments in Colombia, 
Lewis (1938, p.406) noted that "the immediate cause for the break in Colombian exchange 
and the imposition of exchange controls in 1931 was the withdrawal of short-term funds from 
Colombia by various American investors". The Bank of the Republic went further to remark 
the unstable behaviour of foreign banks and how the withdrawal of credits actually worsened 
the already weakened ability to pay of debtor countries: "The credit policy followed by 
foreign bankers in Latin America was shortsighted. Although extremely flexible in 
prosperity, it became implacable during the recession, drawing home foreign credit balances, 
without understanding that by doing so the precarious conditions of their debtor countries 
would deteriorate even further More even, it was President Olaya himself who left a 
dramatic description of the way foreign bankers drew down their credits from Colombian 
banks:
"Our banking system ...had to endure the utmost imaginable violent attacks...To have to 
recognize that tiie foreign support was abruptly withdrawn, then threatening the basis of the 
banking system, was a distressing experience. I remember the dayly news of the withdrawal 
of the significant bank credits that our banks enjoyed abroad, in a compulsory fashion rather 
than in a considered way that could make it easier for the banks to fulfill their financial 
commitments. By cablegram, foreign bankers asked the immediate reimbursement of credits 
granted to our banks...Many times those bankers considered that Colombian banks would not 
resist such strong 
demands".^
Short-term foreign credits vanished to the point of just allowing the financing of external 
trade transactions. For as long as a decade, those credits were maintained at that minimum.
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and granted to the Colombian branches of foreign banks; only exceptionally some major 
domestic banks registered the availability of short-term credits. These facts indicate that the 
repatriation of foreign short-term credits involved a discriminatory gesture against banks of 
domestic origin.
ii) The role of the internal public debt in tackling the problem of bank debtors.
By 1931, the compounded effect of three years of deflation would have eroded the value of 
state properties by some 38% according to the inflation data reported in Table 26. No wonder 
borrowers called for an adjustment of their nominal debts in accordance with the rhythm of 
deflation. A climate of social pressure was described by the superintendent of banks:
"... there was a widely expressed opinion in the country which tended to organize a sort of 
pressure group of mortgagors; in every important trade center committees were formed with 
the intention of obtaining a reduction of debts in proportion to Ag loss of value of state 
properties... and to the increased purchasing power of money".
As far as the adverse conditions faced by mortgage borrowers reflected the general situation 
of borrowers in the economy, there existed a debtors' problem which became a crucial 
challenge for authorities. The minister of finance recognized the central priority of the 
debtors' problem:
"The problem of debts of every kind is at the center of the current crisis...It stems from the 
fact that while those debts being denominated in foreign and highly quoted currencies 
continued to be the same,... things destined to repay them unceasingly lose value in 
extraordinary proportions..."^^
Since agriculture contributed with more than a half of the domestic output, and given the 
predominance of agricultural exports, it was not strange that the debtors' problem became 
particularly acute in this sector of the economy. Because coffee growers were at the center of 
agricultural and export interests, a strong campaign demanding extraordinary rescue 
measures from the government was led by the National Federation of Coffee Growers. A 
variety of policies of salvaging flavour was put forward by the Federation since 1930. They 
ranged from general measures such as administrative reduction of interest rates and
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suspension of payments to banks, to specific proposals such as the creation of official credit 
institutions in favor of agricultural producers, particularly of small coffee farmers.
The campaign for official banks triumphed for the first time in 1931 (Law 51), with the 
foundation of the Caja de Credito Agrario (Bank of Agricultural Credit). Because the official 
capital of this institution was financed with funds from the SMC loan (Table 42), the 
corresponding increase in internal public debt was linked to the general purpose of credit 
restoration, and to the particular end of rescuing indebted small coffee producers.
The foundation of the Caja de Credito Agrario was not an isolated achievement of 
agriculturalists during the deflation of 1930-31. Parliament also passed a reform of the Bank 
of the Republic board's composition to accept new members within which the National 
Federation of Coffee Growers and the Society of Agriculturalists were included. These 
reforms (Law 82 of 1931) gave direct influence to agricultural interests in financial policy 
making, although still in a restrictive way since the gold standard was still in force. However, 
in a matter of two months exchange controls were adopted (September, 1931), and therefore 
authorities found room for autonomous financial policies to be implemented. The debtors' 
problem monopolized a significant share of government decisions, and the IPD proved a 
crucial factor in its solution.
During the first quarter of 1932 authorities were prolific in the adoption of measures to tackle 
the debtors' problem. The decisions enacted were of two classes: First, measures of general 
coverage such as the extension of terms of all commercial debts (one-year moratorium in the 
case of bank debts), and the determination of maximum levels of interest rates. Second, 
specific actions in favour of either mortgage banks or commercial banks. Since most of these 
actions brought about increases or changes in the composition of the IPD, we turn to describe 
those measures.
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As for mortgage banks it can be recalled that the SMC loan already contained a contribution 
to banks’ recovery in the form of interest-free deposits in mortgage banks (Table 42); in 
retribution, mortgage banks accepted to receive their own bonds -either domestic or extemal- 
as part of repayments, in a proportion of at least 50% of due instalments. Banks were to 
receive domestic mortgage bonds by the par value and external ones with a discount of 
20%.27
Because since 1928 both the domestic and external market prices of mortgage bonds had 
been falling, the operation resulted beneficial for both debtors and banks. At the end of 1931 
domestic mortgage bonds were being quoted for about 50% of their par value, and external 
ones for about 40% of their par value. Under these conditions, debtors could obtain a real 
reduction of some 20% of their debt, and banks could reduce their liabilities without having 
to amortize their nominal values. In the case of the external mortgage bonds the procedure 
ended up propitiating a repatriation of debt at the abated market prices, apart from the usual 
way of payments to the issue houses. Although loan contracts originally accepted the 
application of cumulative sinking funds to purchases under par, the operation became a 
highly controversial issue, since as we will see below (Section HI), repatriations were made 
after the Colombian government expressed to the creditors its . /inability to entirely satisfy its 
external debt obligations.
As for commercial banks the most important bills were passed in April (Decree 711 of 1932). 
One set of acts implied the use of public bonds as a means of redemption of debts with 
commercial banks. Another group of acts authorized the creation of a new mortgage 
institution, the Central Mortgage Bank (CMB), with the initial purpose of helping recover 
private bank loans. In the first case there was a continuous involvement of debtors, banks, 
central bank and government, which in some cases led to an increase in the stock of IPD and 
in others to a change in its composition. The second case was that of the single operation 
referred to above by which the central bank purchased shares of an institution created with
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the original intention of contributing to the recovery of the financial system. Such single 
operation did not imply any change in the stock of IPD.
The main measures for the rescue of commercial banks which involved public debt were as 
follows:
First, banks would accept 10% and 8% bonds of IPD for as much as 50% of debt repayments 
provided that the remainder was repaid by cash. This measure presupposed that debtors 
would buy bonds in the open market at a discount which initially could be of some 50% of 
the face value, and offer them to the banks for as much as one-half of debt repayments. 
Analytically, this action implied neither a change in the money supply nor in the stock of 
bonds.
Second, the 10% and 8% bonds collected by banks in repayment operations would be 
exchanged by the Treasury for new 7% bonds. This action implied a change in the 
composition of the IPD with an obvious reduction of the debt burden for the government.
Third, banks were also authorized to receive external debt government bonds in payment of 
private credits in the same proportion determined for internal bonds. The external bonds 
repatriated in this way would also be exchanged by the new 7% bonds of IPD, and as in the 
case of mortgage banks, commercial banks would accept them with a discount of 20%. 
Analytically this was a sort of open market operation in which the money supply was reduced 
to repatriate external debt bonds which were later exchanged by the government for IPD 
bonds. As a result, the stock of the IPD increased.
What were the results of these policies for both mortgage and commercial banks? As for 
mortgage banks. Table 43 shows that between the end of 1931 and the end of 1933, both the 
stocks of mortgage loans and bonds sold abroad fell by 25%, and the stock of bonds sold 
domestically declined by nearly 65%. When measured in U.S. dollars rather than in domestic
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currency, the decline of mortgage bonds sold abroad is even stronger, reaching the figure of 
38%.^^ Although these figures indicate that the process desired by authorities was being 
carried out, a full and rapid solution to the debtors' problem could not be achieved under the 
existing framework for at least two reasons: First, two-thirds of the stock of domestic 
mortgage bonds available when the policies were enacted (February 1932), had already been 
used in repayments to the banks. The remainder was too small in terms of the size of the 
outstanding mortgage loans to be liquidated, and the attractive market discounts initially 
enjoyed by debtors had considerably faded away as the demand for existing bonds increased. 
Second, the prospect of further significant repatriations of mortgage bonds was constrained 
by a low availability of international reserves which was also subject to exchange controls.
Given these difficulties, and a mounting pressure from mortgage debtors, authorities opted 
for a radical measure which could solve the problem of long-term debts swiftly. It was 
decided that the mortgage assets of private mortgage banks would be taken over by the only 
mortgage bank of official origin -the Agricultural Mortgage Bank (AMB)-, which assumed 
the liability for the bonds placed abroad. Once the takeover was materialized, the 
government decreed an across-the-board reduction of all mortgage debts by 40% satisfying a 
permanent claim of long-term debtors, particularly of coffee growers. Two related reasons 
could have encouraged authorities to adopt such decision: first, the average high quotation of 
external bonds of the AMB during 1932 had been only 39% (Table 51 below); and second, 
the possibility of repatriating the external debt of the AMB at depreciated quotations. The 
adjustment of mortgage assets in the banks' balancesheet between 1933 and 1934 reflects the 
impact of that measure (Table 43).
As for commercial banks, the recovery policies implied changes in the size and/or 
composition of the IPD. There were two main reasons for these changes. On the one hand, 
the repatriation of external bonds of the national government and their replacement by 
government bonds of internal debt. This process of "internalization" of external debts, 
obviously led to an increase of the stock of internal debt. On the other hand, because
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authorities decided to change the bonds received by banks by new bonds of lower interest 
rates, the composition of internal debt changed as far as debtors used bonds in their 
repayments to commercial banks. Table 41 ,1. A. shows how the size and composition of the 
denominated Colombian Bonds of Internal Debt substantially changed between the end of 
1931 and the end of 1934. The size of these bonds increased by 120%, and its original 
composition based on 10% and 8% bonds was replaced by bonds of 7%, 6%, and 3.5%.
The changes in Colombian Bonds of Internal Debt can be summarized as follows: First, the 
increase in 7% bonds during 1932 (C$2.6 million) does not seem to have implied any 
significant exchange for previously existing internal bonds; instead, since repatriations 
actively started in 1932, the increase in those bonds could be seen as the result of exchanges 
for external bonds. Such repatriations involved bonds floated by the national government in 
U.S. markets during 1927 and 1928.^^ Second, in 1933, apart from repatriations, there was a 
substantial exchange of old internal bonds for new 7% bonds. Altogether, these exchanges 
represented about C$14.8 million.^^ Additionally, during 1933 the government issued new 
6% bonds to be also offered in exchange for both repatriations and old internal bonds. This 
decision was adopted after an agreement between government and bankers which extended 
for one more year the moratorium of redemption of private debts to the banks.^^
Third, because the reduced stock of international reserves became an obstacle for further 
repatriations, instead of foreign exchange authorities offered to the applicants a new bond at 
50% of its nominal value, which would be received by banks at par. Since these bonds were 
to be accepted for one-half of the value of debt payments, debtors eventually would obtain a 
reduction of one-fourth of their debts. The new bond was issued at 3.5%, a rate substantially 
lower than those existing in the market, but in line with current international rates. 
Analytically, this measure resembled an open market operation in which the government 
offered a subsidy of 50% to the applicants. In 1934 the net increase of Colombian Bonds of 
Internal Debt was thoroughly explained by the enlarged allocations of 3.5% bonds followed 
by 6% bonds (Table 41,1.A.).
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By the end of 1933 the central measures for the recovery of bank loans had been applied, and 
the prospect of a banking crisis eradicated. The whole package of measures implemented 
during 1932-34 came to around C$42 million. This sum was equivalent to 20% of the 
average value of total assets, and to 40% of the average value of risky assets of the banking 
system (excluding the central bank) during the same period. About C$30 million -70% of the 
whole package- corresponded to changes in either size or composition of the IPD. More 
precisely, 43% of the whole package corresponded to increases of the IPD (Table 44).
It is worth noting that as a result of the rescue process, the banking system (excluding the 
central bank) substantially increased its investment in securities. While at the end of 1931 
these investments represented no more than 7% of total assets, two years later the 
corresponding figure was 17%. At the end of 1933, for every C$1 invested in loans, the 
banking system had allocated C$0.35 in securities.^^ The major accumulation of government 
bonds by the banking system took place during 1933, when the old 10% and 8% bonds of 
internal debt were exchanged.
In abstract terms banks faced the alternative of either use the accumulated bonds as a 
collateral for rediscounts in the central bank, or keep them as an investment to be served and 
amortized by the government. Things were different in practice. In the first place, the 
liquidity position of the banking system had been improving with the implementation of 
expansionary policies. Banks had reduced their rediscounts in the central bank and started 
accumulating excessive reserves. In this context, rediscounting was not an option for 
commercial b a n k s . T h e  alternative was not an entirely free choice; as early as March 1933, 
and under the pressure of a border conflict with Peru, the Colombian government suspended 
the sinking funds on its internal bonds. This was a partial default since interest payments 
were to be continued. Once this extreme decision was taken, bank investments in government 
bonds became a forced loan to the government, and a resumption of sinking fund payments 
would not occur until the 1940s.
443
TABLE 44
FINANCIAL SECTOR RECOVERY MEASURES 
1932-1934
(Millions of Pesos)
A. PUBLIC DEBT
1. Salt Mines Loan
2. Repatriations
3. Substitutions
4. Other
C$
4.5
6.4
11.7
7.0
TOTAL 29.6
EXPLANATION
Increase in internal debt. 
Table 42.
Increase in internal debt. 
Bonds of external debt of 
the national government 
(1927 and 1928) repatriated 
and exchanged for 7% 
Colombian bonds of internal 
debt.
Change in composition of 
internal debt. Existing 
bonds of 10%, 8 1/2% and 
8% received by banks and 
initially exchanged by 7% 
Colombian bonds, and later 
by 6% Colombian bonds of 
internal debt.
Increase in internal debt. 
Instead of foreign exchange 
for repatriations, 
applicants received 3.5% 
Colombian bonds of internal 
debt which were accepted by 
banks in partial payment 
for outstanding debts.
B. CENTRAL BANK 
INVESTMENTS *
Share in initial 
capital of BCH
C. GREAT TOTAL
1 2 . 0  
41 .6
SOURCES.
Tables 41 and 42, and discussions in text 
* Only shares are considered.
The Bank of the Republic itself multiplied its investments in government bonds during the 
period of financial recovery. At the end of 1931 the only government securities held by the
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Bank were the Treasury Promissory Notes referred to above, and an exiguous balance of 
Colombian Bonds of Internal Debt; these holdings came to only C$2.2 million, equivalent to 
4% of total assets of the Bank. At the end of 1934 those holdings reached C$13.2 million, 
equivalent to 15% of total Bank's assets. But, as mentioned above, apart from involving 
public debt, recovery policies included the foundation of a mortgage bank, the CMB, with the 
original intention of helping to liquidate risk-assets of private banks. The Bank of the 
Republic became the predominant shareholder with a total investment of C$12 million (Table 
44). Altogether, investments in bonds and shares amounted to 28% of total Bank's assets at 
the end of 1934.^^
To sum up, internal public debt played a key though temporary role in the context of the 
financial sector recovery policies of 1932-1934. Either in the form of credits of the central 
bank (Salt Mines Loan), or through the internalization of external debts, or by exchanges of 
old issues of depreciated bonds accepted in payment to financial institutions, or finally, by 
means of new issues to subsidize repayments to the banks, internal debt contributed to the 
solution of the debtors' problem. Other measures such as those related to the creation of new 
institutions had a more permanent character. Though conceived to help overcome the 
paralysis of credit of the early 1930s, those institutions became integral part of the financial 
system lasting through recent times.
c. Coffee growers' subsidies
So far the reader has come across various examples in which coffee growers appear to 
receive the benefit of policy actions. In this subsection we show how authorities offered a 
fiscal subsidy financed with internal public debt to a pressure group as important as the 
coffee growers in order to defend the exchange rate regime. This measure became part of the 
reflationary package adopted in early 1932. Our underlying model is once more at work: the 
IPD is increased to finance a subsidy to a vital sector of the economy affected by the collapse 
of world commodity prices and the drying up of foreign credit.
4 4 5
Coffee growers intense pressure to solve the debtors' problem was not limited to lobby for the 
scaling down of long-term debts, the foundation of credit institutions, or the use of the IPD to 
liquidate accumulated debts with banks. There was another issue about which they felt quite 
strongly. After the imposition of exchange controls in late 1931, coffee growers pushed hard 
for either devaluation without altering the exchange control arrangement or a free exchange 
rate market. Having endured a great enlargement of their real debt due to the deflation, coffee 
growers were at the front of those pressing for a depreciation of the exchange rate.
Apart from the heavy weight of financial obligations, coffee growers argued that for reasons 
of competitiveness the exchange rate should be depreciated. Other coffee producers had gone 
off gold and depreciated their currencies; Brazil the major coffee producer, was an early 
depredator (1929), and Mexico and other Central American producers had turned to 
depreciation by the end of 1931. Additionally, coffee growers contended that because the 
exchange rate in the parallel market had exceeded the official exchange rate since the 
adoption of exchange controls, their incomes would have been higher had they been 
authorized to sell their foreign revenues in the free market. Colombia was not in the mood for 
devaluation, however, as we stressed before. The suspension of convertibility and adoption of 
exchange controls in September 1931 was presented as a temporary measure, and authorities 
persisted in sustaining the exchange rate within the gold points. When in January 1932 
authorities fixed the exchange rate exactly at the gold export point, the political pressure of 
the coffee group for devaluation became more intensive. The government rejected the idea of 
allowing the exchange rate to depreciate since "it would benefit exporters at the price of 
weakening monetary stability and ruining the gold standard...A ccording to the manager 
of the central bank, policy makers found themselves in the position of sacrificing the interest- 
group politics in order to save the "interests of the majority of the Nation"^^ Nevertheless, 
both the central bank and the government eventually agreed that there existed a "genuine 
aspiration" in coffee growers complaints.^^
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That "genuine aspiration" led to an agreement between the National Federation of Coffee 
Growers, the Bank of the Republic and the government, according to which a 10% bonus 
would be paid over the foreign exchange proceeds of coffee exports, during one year (March 
15,1932-March 15,1933). Such bonus would be financed by the issue of a 6% bond of 
internal public debt. According to Table 41 that issue amounted to C$4 million equivalent to 
7% of internal public debt in 1932. The Bank of the Republic was authorized to purchase the 
new bonds up to the limit of 15% of its capital and reserves. Towards the end of the decade 
the Bank was holding 85% of the bonds still in circulation.^^
Before the expiration of the subsidy (March 15,1933), coffee growers called for an extension 
of the bonus. This time circumstances were different. A great deal of reflationary measures 
had by then been taken -for instance three-quarters of the total SMC loan spent during the 
decade had already been disbursed-, and extraordinary increases in internal public debt were 
being carried out to finance the armed conflict with Peru which broke out in September 1932. 
Authorities then decided not to increase public debt once more but to adopt unprecedented 
measures concerning the exchange rate. Without affecting the exchange control arrangement, 
a system of multiple exchange rates was implemented. For the first time since the adoption of 
the gold standard in 1923, the government fixed exchange rates beyond the gold export point. 
Under the new system, the gold export point was chosen as the exchange rate for government 
payments in foreign currency, and higher and differentiated exchange rates were determined 
for exports and imports. In determining the differential, authorities sought not only to satisfy 
coffee growers aspirations but to extend that benefit to the rest of exporters. It was importers 
rather than the government budget who assumed the burden for such differential, as it would 
be the case under freely floating exchange rates.
What happened in Colombia with coffee growers’ pressure for devaluation was the local 
experience of the then current behaviour in countries depending on primary exports. 
However, also in industrialized economies, farmers producing internationally-traded goods 
pressed hard for depreciation of the domestic currency. Wheat farmers in the United States
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were an outstanding case.^^ In general, peripheral countries either in the sterling or the dollar 
area, and which were not involved in the group of pre-sterling depreciators, rapidly reacted to 
devaluation at the center by allowing their currencies to drift along with the sterling after 
September 1931, and with the dollar after March 1933.^^
The fact that the United States went off gold in March 1933 had definitive implications for 
the Colombia's position regarding the exchange rate regime. As highlighted previously, 
Colombia strongly resisted the abandonment of the gold standard; the exchange rate was 
maintained within the gold points during eighteen months after the adoption of exchange 
controls, and even the implementation of the multiple exchange rate system in March 1933 
was presented as a temporary measure while the gold standard could be reinstated. This 
strong persistence came to an end after the US dollar devaluation when the government 
allowed the Colombian peso to float with the dollar.
d. War debt financing
In mid-1932 policymakers could not foresee that a fact not directly related to the great 
depression would demand a huge expansion of internal public debt. Our underlying model is 
present here since the spurt of government expenditures demanded by a war with a 
neighbouring country was financed by an increased IPD. Further, as this subsection shows, 
authorities combined IPD and taxation so as to assure a rapid amortization of the costs of the 
war. This is an example of how authorities found it less costly to increase debt than taxation, 
but at the same time wanted to limit the expansion of the IPD. As the reader will remember, 
this is a central idea in our buffer-stock model of the IPD in Part HI.
On September 1,1932, a border conflict with Peru broke out. The indispensable 
reconstruction of the military sparked defense expenditures and significantly changed 
government spending composition. The disbursements by the Ministry of War increased from 
C$3.8 million in 1932 to C$16.8 million in 1933 and to C$24.6 million in 1934. These
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changes explained 75% of the increase of total government expenditures between 1932 and
1934.^2 Regarding the destination of government expenditures, Table 45 shows that it 
substantially changed for the third time in less than a decade. During the foreign-lending- 
boom period 1926-1928, public works absorbed one-half of total spending. Next, during the 
adjustment period 1929-1932, public works involved less than one-fourth of official outlays 
while the Ministry of Finance became the major single source of government expenditures. It 
can be seen that during these periods, defense (or war) required less than 8% of official 
expenses, much less than the shares of public works and finance ministries. It was this 
situation which was to be altered during 1933-35 because of the armed conflict with Peru.
TABLE 45
COLOMBIA 
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE 
MAIN DESTINATIONS 
1926 - 1940
(PERCENTAGES)
PERIODS FINANCE AND 
PUBLIC DEBT
NATIONAL
DEFENCE
PUBLIC
WORKS
OTHERS TOTAL
1926-28 15.0 7.2 50.5 27.3 100.0
1929-32 32.9 7.8 23.2 36.1 100.0
1933-35 26.2 27.8 15.8 30.2 100.0
1936-40 19.5 14.2 31 .3 35.0 100.0
SOURCE. 
Informe Financière del Contralor. Various Years.
Although the state of war between the two belligerents ceased in May 1933, expenditures 
concerning national defense continued on a large scale for some years. As a result, a different 
structure dominated in 1933-35 when expenditures by the Ministry of War were the major 
single cause of government outlays. A very close share in expenditures was achieved by the 
Ministry of Finance; public debt payments constituted the largest single item, representing
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80% of the outlays of that ministry. As expected, the importance of national defense declined 
substantially during the second half of the decade, but without turning back to the low levels 
of the 1920s.
How to pay for the war? Policymakers conceived a scheme in which resources would be 
provided by both internal indebtedness and taxation. Accordingly, the increased military 
expenditures would be immediately financed by bond issues or loans from the central bank, 
and the resulting increase of the stock of debt would be gradually amortized by specifically 
created taxes. There were practical financial reasons but also guiding rules behind this 
financial policy. It was easier to increase debt but authorities wanted to avoid a future 
excessive burden of interest payments. As stated by the minister of finance:
"... by following the guidelines of a sound financial policy the government has adopted the 
system of combining loans and taxes to support the requirements of the international conflict, 
since the exclusive use of debt would contribute to major future fiscal deficits, and the 
exclusive option of taxes would not be viable to finance the urgent expenses of the war".^^
Apart from controlling the size of future deficits, authorities expressed the view that the 
current generation of citizens should contribute to the payment of the war. Not only for fiscal 
reasons, but also on grounds of justice, ordinary citizens should afford to sustain the 
conditions of citizens going to the battle front. In summary, the present generation should pay 
for the war, or at least, for most of it.
The first important measure to finance the war was the issue of the 4% Patriotic Defense 
Loan in 1932. The total issue amounted to C$10 million and was entirely sold out before 
mid-1933. By the end of this year, the new bonds represented 26% of total government bonds 
in the market (Table 41). 42% of the total issue was bought by the public, 31% by 
commercial banks, and the remaining 27% by other government entities. A new tax, the 
National Defense Tax was imposed in order to finance the amortization of the bonds.^
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As the conflict went on, and the Patriotic Defense funds became insufficient, authorities 
turned to the central bank credit. In the first place, the government got an extraordinary loan 
for C$5 million, and once more imposed a special tax, the Military Quota, to finance its 
amortization. This was not the end of the story, however. The government had to borrow 
again from the central bank in two different ocasions, the first time C$5 million in 1933, and 
the second time C$3 million in 1934. On top of that, it was necessary for the government to 
issue Promissory Notes for C$5 million, and Notes for C$2 million during 1934. Table 41 
shows the increase of internal debt with the central bank of some 30% due to defense loans 
between 1932 and 1933-34, and the additional sources of funding through Notes and 
Promissory Notes.
A summary of the contractual amounts and creditors of the war loans appears in Table 46. 
Some characteristics are worth noting. First, 5 out of the 6 loans were financed by the central 
bank; three of them were direct credit operations, and the other two purchases of notes and 
promissory notes. Regarding the amount of the loans, 67% of the resources borrowed by the 
government were originated in the central bank. Second, only 14% of the government 
securities involved in the defense loans were finally left in the hands of the public. Third, 
specific taxes were imposed to finance the amortization of the first two loans which 
represented 50% of all credits. Finally, in order to illustrate the relative importance of the 
national defense measures in the context of the reflationary policies of the time, a comparison 
of tables 44 and 46 reveals that the resources involved in the rescue measures of the financial 
sector which implied an increase in public debt represented only a 60% of those required by 
the national defense measures.
By 1939 the amortization of the national defense loans had been nearly accomplished. The 
Patriotic Defense Loan and the Military Quota Tax Loan had been amortized by the specific 
taxes created to that end.^^ The amortization of the remaining credits was carried out in a 
different way. By 1934 the government found it difficult to fulfil its financial obligations 
with the Bank of the Republic, and therefore a new arrangement between both parties was
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agreed upon.^^ Regarding only the national defense loans it was agreed that they would be 
amortized during the next five years, and that the government would receive and apply to the 
reduction of its debt some of the profits resulting from the revaluation of the gold reserves of 
the Bank upon the devaluation of the national currency. The Bank was authorized to revalue 
its gold holdings according to the world price for gold, but the gold content of the Colombian 
peso was not redefined until 1938."^  ^Once this redefinition was made, the balances due on 
the loans authorized by the Decrees 2028 of 1933 and 578 of 1934, as well as the 3% 
Promissory Notes of 1934 were paid off with part of the profits obtained by the government 
from the revaluation of gold reserves.^^
TABLE 46
WAR DEBT FINANCING 
(COLOMBIA - PERU CONFLICT)
PERIOD 1932 - 1934
(MILLIONS OF PESOS)
DATE LOAN AMOUNT CREDITOR
1932 4% BONDS-PATRIOTIC 
DEFENSE LOAN
1933 3% MILITARY QUOTA 
TAX LOAN
1933 DECREE No 2028 OF
1933
1934 DECREE No 578 OF
1934
1934 3% PROMISSORY NOTES
-NATIONAL DEFENSE
1934 3% AND 6% NOTES-
WAR PURCHASES
10.0 LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
BANKS, PUBLIC
5.0 BANK OF THE
REPUBLIC
5.0 BANK OF THE
REPUBLIC
3.0 BANK OF THE
REPUBLIC
5.0 BANK OF THE
REPUBLIC
2.0 BANK OF THE
REPUBLIC
TOTAL 30.0
SOURCE.
Informe Financiero del Contralor. Various Years.
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In summary, the burst of national defense expenditures after September 1,1932, when the 
border conflict with Peru broke out, constituted a crucial factor of government expenditure 
recovery after the strong contraction of nominal official spending which dominated the 1929- 
31 period. Although hostilities between combatants lasted no more than nine months, defense 
expenditures dominated during the 1933-35 period, and maintained an unprecedented share 
in overall expenditures in the second half of the decade. This experience suggests that at least 
part of the temporary increased expenses required by the war, actually became permanent 
government outlays. The financing of the war implied an enlargement of the IPD which 
could not have been predicted by policymakers when other reflationary policies were put 
forward. Importantly, authorities insisted that the current generation should pay for the war, 
and in fact new taxes were created to amortize one-half of the increase of the IPD demanded 
by the war.
e. Monetary implications of the reflationary policies.
Since our previous subsections showed that much of the increase of the IPD was in the form 
of central bank loans to the government, we finish with a brief discussion of the 
corresponding effects on monetary aggregates. In particular, we concentrate on the changes 
in the monetary base. We also intend to underline the temporary character of the central bank 
loans to the government by comparing the 1932-34 experience with other periods.
Through loans to the government, investment in government bonds and the acquisition of 
shares of the CMB, the Bank of the Republic expanded the monetary base in about C$48 
million during 1931-34. This figure is highly significant since it represented 93% of the 
expansionary changes of the monetary base in that period. Loans and investments are equally 
important regarding their monetary implications: 48% of the C$48 million was represented 
by loans, 27% by investments in public debt securities, and 25% by the investments in shares 
of the CMB.
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A broader perspective of the monetary implications of the recovery policies is offered in 
Table 47, which describes the main expansionary and contractionary sources of the monetary 
base since the mid-1920s. The contrast between the period of active expansionary monetary 
measures (1931-34) and the period of passive accommodation to the gold-standard rules is 
clear. Coinciding with the boom-and-bust cycle of the external sector (1924-1931) the 
predominant factor of expansion (1924-28) and contraction (1929-31) of the monetary base 
was the increase followed by deep decrease of international reserves. Along this external 
cycle the net credit to the private sector was expansionary although in modest magnitudes if 
compared with the relatively huge changes in international reserves; additionally, the net 
credit to the government which caused a negligible expansion during 1924-28, became more 
relevant, though still in small amounts, during 1928-31.
After the imposition of exchange controls, the adoption of reflationary measures, and the 
extraordinary national defense loans, the expansion of the monetary base was led by the 
investments -in government bonds and MCB's shares- and loans to the government made by 
the Bank. These unprecedented operations largely offset the contractionary influence of the 
net credit to the private sector, and substantially exceeded the incipient expansionary 
contribution of international reserves.
Finally, a different picture emerges from the experience of the 1935-37 period: international 
reserves were again the leading expansionary factor of the base money, followed by the 
credit to the private sector, and the credit to the government became a source of contraction 
of the monetary base. The contrast between the 1932-34 and 1935-37 periods, or 
alternatively, the similarities between the experiences in the 1920s and after 1935, 
underscores the temporary character of the extraordinary financing granted by the Bank to 
the government during 1932-34.
C. "Defaulting" on external debt. 1931-1935.
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As noted in the introduction, the second main topic of this section is the Colombian default 
on the external debt in the early 1930s. In the description of asset-market linkages during the 
great depression (subsection A.4. above), we mentioned the negative effects on government 
finances of adverse external shocks. Apart from the cutback of foreign lending and the 
collapse of imports which constituted a vital source of tax revenues, other factors seriously 
eroded the position of the country as foreign debtor: the downfall of exports which 
substantially undermined standard indexes of creditworthiness, and the wave of sovereign 
defaults which spread around Latin America since early 1931 before involving East European 
countries in 1932, and the major foreign debtor, Germany, in 1933.
How did Colombia try to fulfill her international obligations after the outbreak of the great 
depression in late 1928? Authorities always believed that by preserving the gold standard and 
keeping up external debt payments the country would recover the access to external credit.
By mid-1931, after three years of deflationary policies, exhausted international reserves, and 
other countries in the region going off gold and defaulting on their external debts, there was 
little hope of a normalization of foreign financing. After Britain went off gold in September 
211931, Colombia imposed exchange controls (September 24) and announced controls on 
the external debt service (October 31).
The default on the external debt was not an outright declaration but a protracted process 
between 1931 and 1935. The first subsection describes the gradual way in which default on 
the external debt was carried out, and the second one reports the reasons for formally 
defaulting on the external debt; we refer to "formal default" since as we will see in Section 
in, an important fraction of the external debt was repaid while the country was officially in 
default. In the last two subsections we investigate the reactions of foreign creditors to the 
process of default, focusing our attention on three subjects: the behaviour of debt prices, the 
individual relationships between creditor countries and debtor countries, and the official 
declarations of creditors.
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1. The gradual process of formal default
The first measure orientated to control extemal-debt payments was adopted on October 31, 
1931, only five weeks after the "temporary" imposition of foreign exchange control. Under 
the new regulation, all applications for permission to transfer funds abroad by departments, 
municipalities and mortgage banks for payment of the service of foreign loans should be 
subject to the verdict of the Board of Control of Exchange and Exports.^^ That verdict would 
depend on the availability of international reserves. Although the new regulation opened the 
possibility of postponing payments on foreign debt, it also determined that when applying for 
foreign exchange, debtors should make deposits in local currency in the central bank, in favor 
of the creditors; the amount of those deposits would be the required to finance the external 
payments, and the actual transfer of funds out of the country would be authorized by the 
Control Board.
A second step was taken by December 1931, but only officialized two months later.^^ This 
time the government put forward a plan according to which there would be a temporary 
suspension of amortizations on the external debt, and the interest on debts not covered by 
government guarantee would be a responsibility of the national government. This interest 
would be paid not in cash but by means of certificates with an interest rate of 6% and a 
maturity of 3 years. The plan was presented as accepted by the majority of creditors, since 
apart from the capitalization of interests embodied in the issue of the certificates, the local- 
currency-denominated deposits by debtors in the Bank of the Republic would secure the 
continuity of external debt payments once the foreign- exchange situation was normalized.
The practical viability of the plan found insurmountable problems, however. Two decisive 
debtors, the departments and municipalities, altogether responsible for about 57% of the 
dollar-denominated public and publicly-guaranteed debt, defied the national government 
agreement with creditors, and opted for suspending their local currency deposits in the Bank 
of the Republic. This position, adopted during March-April 1932, amounted to an unilateral
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moratorium which led the national government to announce in May its inhability to comply 
with the plan suscribed in February, and its decision of maintaining the interest payments on 
the national debt and on the publicly-guaranteed debt of the Agricultural Mortgage Bank.^^
A final measure was issued in March 1933, which provided that given the financial strains 
created by the border conflict with Peru, the service of interests on the national debt and on 
the obligations of the Agricultural Mortgage Bank had to be suspended.^^ However, 
creditors were offered an alternative way of payment for the interests due in 1933 and 1934. 
Coupons due in 1933 would be paid 1/3 in cash and 2/3 in non-interest bearing deferred 
interest certificates maturing by October 1,1937. Coupons due in 1934 would be paid by 
issuing 4% funding certificates to be redeemed by January 1,1946.^^ Lastly, authorizations 
were given to arrange future negotiations with foreign creditors.
The gradual process of actual default is summarized in Table 48. As seen, default on either 
sinking fund or interests spread along two years between October 311931, and October 1 
1933. Bogota started the chain of defaults by defaulting on the sinking fund of one of its 
liabilities the same day in which the national government determined that external debt 
payments by municipalities and other debtors should be subject to exchange control. Another 
municipality, Barranquilla, defaulted on the sinking fund of all of its liabilities exactly the 
day after. By the end of 1931 when the national government was reaching an agreement with 
creditors in order to temporarily suspend debt amortizations, 70% of the outstanding debt of 
municipalities was already in default as to sinking fund. Additionally, 55% of the same debt 
was also already in default as to interest.^^
Default widened in 1932 embracing all the departmental governments. Interestingly, 46% of 
the outstanding debts was already in default as to sinking fund when the national government 
decreed the suspension of debt amortizations in March 1932. Default also involved the bonds 
sold abroad by mortgage banks; in the case of the Agricultural Mortgage Bank whose debt 
was guaranteed by the government, default on sinking fund took place during the first four
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months of 1932, and on interests between April and August, 1933. As seen above, the 
government offered to pay part in cash and part in certificates for the interests due by the 
Bank in 1933; accordingly, certificates for an amount of £50,037 were issued in London, and 
certificates for an amount of US$340,298 were issued in New York. Additionally, for full 
payment of coupons due from January 2,1934 to January 1 1935, certificates for £73,632 
were issued in London, and for US$666,255 in New York. Finally, coupons due July 1,1935 
and since not paid until offers were made by the Bank to the creditors in 1942. This 
negotiation is discussed in Section III below.
The national government fulfilled its external obligations well into 1933, as far as the dollar 
debt is concerned. In the case of the 1927 loan, interest and sinking fund were suspended in 
July, and regarding the 1928 loan the sinking fund was suspended in April and interest in 
October. In this way, these loans which represented one-third of public and publicly 
guaranteed debt went into default. As for the sterling loans, the evidence suggests that they 
were discriminated against by the Colombian government, since sinking-fund payments were 
suspended in 1932. Interests, though, went into default exactly one year later according to the 
coupon dates. Finally, as previously noted, the national government issued certificates to 
complete the interest service of 1933, and to effect the interest service up to January 1,1935. 
In the first year, certificates for an amount of £36,272 were offered in London, and for an 
amount of US$1,448,570 were offered in New York; in the second year, certificates for 
£82,261 were offered in London, and for US$3,073,410 in New York. Coupons due July 1, 
1935 and since not paid until offers for a permanent settlement were made in 1940 regarding 
the dollar debt, and in 1942, regarding the sterling debt.
Once the process of gradual formal default on sinking funds was completed in mid-1933, the 
outstanding dollar loans represented 93% of the nominal stock of public and publicly- 
guaranteed debt which would be subject to future negotiations. The sterling loans had some 
relative importance in the case of publicly-guaranteed corporate debt, since 32% of loans to 
the Agricultural Mortgage Bank was placed in London, or in other financial centers but
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denominated in sterling (Table 48. Summary IV). Interestingly, the debt of the national 
government represented only 37% of the public and publicly guaranteed debt; and because 
the publicly guaranteed debt amounted to some 9.7% of the same total, the national 
government was left with a direct responsibility over only 46.7% of the public and publicly 
guaranteed debt. The departments (6 different regional entities) represented 38.9%, and 
municipalities (4 different entities) represented 14.4% of the public and publicly guaranteed 
debt. As a whole, 53.3% of the public and publicly guaranteed debt was in the hands of 10 
government entities different from the national government.
What was the nominal external debt service burden by the time the last payment on sinking 
funds was made? An estimate of the service on total external debt (public, publicly 
guaranteed, and private) which debtors would have been charged had they paid sinking funds 
and interests in full during 1933 is offered in Table 49. As seen, the total principal and 
interests charged amounted to about US$19 million per annum, of which 50% resulted from 
departmental and municipal debts. Hence, when after consultation with foreign creditors the 
government put forward its plan of February 1932, referred to above, of temporary 
suspending amortizations and interests on debts not covered by government guarantee, the 
idea was to reduce by one-half the foreign exchange disbursements caused by the external 
debt service until a satisfactory foreign-exchange position of the country could be reached. 
Because as seen before, both departments and municipalities rejected the government's plan, 
and some of them were already in default, the aforementioned reduction of foreign exchange 
disbursements actually took place regardless of negotiations between the national 
government and creditors. Finally, it can be seen that the sole effort of the national 
government for sustaining its total annual debt service and the interest charges of the 
Agricultural Mortgage Bank, as . happened between mid-1932 and mid-1933, barely 
represented more than one-third of the annual external debt service of the country.^^
2. The reasons for formally defaulting on external debt
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By the end of 1931 the foreign exchange situation became a powerful argument for formally 
defaulting on the external debt service. As seen in Table 37, the country became a net capital 
exporter since 1930. The burden of financial payments abroad caused a reduction of 
international reserves from US$37.7 million in 1929 to US$27.4 million in 1930, and to 
US$13.8 million in 1931. Without an important injection of external credit, which by the end 
of 1931 appeared to be unlikely, the existing stock of international reserves could risk 
depletion.^^ To avoid this possibility, the government adopted the measures described 
before, which initially only sought to ration external debt payments according to the 
availability of foreign exchange.
Default was not only a gradual process. Authorities at the national level were clearly 
reluctant to give up payments. In spite of the process of default going on in Latin America 
and Europe, the national government kept up regular amortizations well into 1933. 
Authorities expressed that maintaining payments coincided with "national interests" and 
rejected internal pressures for a moratorium. An explicit statement was left by the manager of 
the Bank of the Republic, just two months before the adoption of the measure which 
determined that debt-service payments should be subject to the decision of the Control 
Board:
"... a debate has arisen about whether it is possible and convenient for the Nation to maintain 
punctual payments on her external debt service, as it has been so far, or whether it is the case 
of applying to her creditors for a moratorium. On account of that debate the President of the 
Republic and the Minister of Finance have emphatically ratified the resolution of the 
government of punctually fulfilling the extem i debt service of the Nation, and the Senate, by 
a nearly unanimous vote declared 3iat the decision of the government of keeping up external 
debt payments is convenient for the high and permanent national interests.
In our coiKppt, the Colombian policy cannot be otherwise, regardless of the sacrifices it may 
demand"
Meanwhile, some international analysts still believed that the ability of the country to keep 
up payments could be assured by the fiscal retrenchment already applied in Colombia, and 
satisfactory trade balances. However, the internal political tensions about the external debt 
service mentioned by the manager of the Bank of the Republic were seen by the external 
commentators as an important source of uncertainty. In an illustrative example, officials of
4 6 5
the Bank for International Settlements informed the secretary of the Council of Foreign 
Bondholders (CFB) which represented the interests of British investors, about recent events 
and prospects of service of the Colombian external debt^^ In discussing the financial 
position of Colombia, those officials remarked that they "had no reason to anticipate any 
failure on its part to meet its external obligations" though some commitments, particularly the 
municipal ones were considerable; however, some elements of "political instability... may 
result in adverse changes of policy and internal lack of c o n f id e n c e W h a t  were those 
elements of concern?
Officials mentioned the internal controversy on the part of both "the public and the press as to 
the desirability of a moratorium or reduction in the payment of interest on the public debt", 
and the fact that Congress had appointed a commission "to discuss the possibility of a 
moratorium amongst other possible means of alleviating the situation". However, the 
correspondence also stressed the position of the government by communicating that "the 
President has attempted to allay fears by cable to the Colombian Minister in Washington 
announcing his government's inflexible determination to meet their obligations".^^
The government was not only unwilling to default on its external bonded debt, but explored 
different alternatives of external financing once the viability of fresh financing with 
international banks was deemed improbable.^^ In particular, the government tried to arrange 
monopoly contracts with foreign firms in exchange for loans. There existed a recent 
precedent in Ecuador where the Swedish Match Company extended the government the only 
public foreign loan negotiated by that country during the lending boom of the 1920s.^^ 
Although eventually this contract was short-lived, it served as a reference for the Colombian 
initiative.^^
Early in 1931 the Colombian government asked Congress to authorize the grant of a match 
manufacturing monopoly in return for US$10 million of advanced royalties. Although it was 
initially understood that the Swedish Match Co. would be the beneficiary of the monopoly.
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further speculations mentioned the name of Kreuger and Toll who would issue a US$20 
million loan in exchange for the monopoly.^ Eventually, when in September 1931 Congress 
granted extraordinary powers to the national government to take extraordinary economic 
measures, explicitly excluded from those authorizations that of establishing monopolies.
This was the end of the monopoly contract initiative of financing.
Without access to long-term private lending since the collapse of the U.S. foreign bond 
market, facing the unlikely possibility of significant short-term loans from international 
banks, and inhibited to arrange, if it were possible, monopoly contracts in exchange for 
foreign financing, the possibility of defaulting on the external debt service had to be 
considered by the government given the extremely fragile foreign-exchange situation. 
Exceptionally, the government managed to contract debts in 1933 with Belgian and French 
companies for railway construction. The total amount of the loans, US$3.2 million, was fully 
amortized by 1935.
Default was seen as a last-resort and temporary option. When the first measures were adopted 
in October 1931, authorities arranged a settlement for the external bonds of the political 
subdivisions which called for making debt service deposits in Colombian pesos. As seen 
before, this settlement had to be abandoned once departments and municipalities interrupted 
such deposits. The reaction of the national government was transmitted to the creditors in a 
public announcement (May 25,1932) as follows:
"The government regrets this decision but the matter permits of no other solution under the 
Colombian Constitution, which ^arantees a considerable degree of automgny to the 
Departments and Municipalities in the management of their own affairs".°°
The failure of the settlement for the debt of the political subdivisions implied that 47% of the 
total external debt of the country, or 57% of the dollar-denominated public and publicly- 
guaranteed debt went into default, not within the temporarv scheme agreed with creditors but 
in a more permanent and uncertain way. The fact is that departments and municipalities had 
found that settlement inconsistent with their precarious fiscal situation, and individually, as
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well as a group, had openly rejected it.^^ Treating the posture of the political subdivisions as 
a fact of life, the government opted for abandoning the offer initially made to the creditors of 
paying scrip to holders of departmental and municipal bonds upon which suspension of 
sinking fund payments had taken place. In this new situation, the government confined itself 
to the payment of interests and sinking fund on the national debt, and of interests on the 
publicly-guaranteed debt. This was a deliberate decision orientated to bolster up the credit of 
the national government, considering future possibilities of foreign financing.
The persistence of the national government in fulfilling its external debt committments was 
broken by the financial demands of the border conflict with Peru. Lazard Brothers and Co. 
Ltda., the banking house which issued the sterling loans to the national government and 
mortgage banks received the following statement from the Colombian minister of finance:
"Notwithstanding the profound financial crisis...the government has been meeting punctually 
up to the present the interest on the national debt and on the bonds of the Agricultural 
Mortgage Bank guaranteed by the government. In order to carry out this policy the country 
has had to endure the restriction of imports, the regulation of exchange transactions and the 
reduction of public expenditure... by more than a half. Unfortunately, an unjust aggression... 
requires to economize the national gold reserve and Treasury 
resources for the expenses demanded...
The termination of payments has a temporary character, and its duration depends upon the 
duration and magnitude of the conflict with Peru..."^^
As noted before, authorities tried to keep a stream of interest service payments by offering a 
combination of cash and scrip payments to holders of bonds of the national government and 
the Agricultural Mortgage Bank. This offer covered coupons due from April 1,1933 to 
January 1,1935 inclusive. A similar or alternative offer was not made at the beginning of
1935. The government communicated its decision to the creditors. Thus, in a laconic 
message, the minister of finance advised Lazard Brothers and Co. that no provisions had been 
made for the payment of coupons due in 1935:
"The government has not received authority from Congress to issue scrip to meet the coupons 
falling due during the current year, and no issue of scrip will consequently be made. The 
government has die whole question of the external debt ui^er earnest consideration and 
hopes to discuss it with its bondholders in the near future"^^
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This statement and similar messages sent to representatives of holders of dollar loans closed 
the intermittent and formal process through which the government tried to avoid or postpone 
a complete default. Although consecutive measures were presented as "temporary" 
restrictions on the transfer of debt payments, it was clear that the national government 
gradually lost control over the external debt of the country, and progressively became unable 
of satisfying its nominal contracts with creditors, until a formal default became total in 1935.
3. The investors' perspective. Colombia's debt prices in the Latin American context.
In our account of asset-market linkages during the great depression (subsection A.4. above), 
we highlighted the adverse effects of foreign debt problems in neighbouring countries on the 
external credit to Colombia. In this subsection we follow the fate of the prices of the 
Colombian borrowers and observe how those prices collapsed before default actually took 
place. We find possible explanations of this development in the mushrooming foreign debt 
crisis of the time. We also notice how individual countries fared differently according to 
considerations of international politics. These political relationships were well mirrored in the 
behaviour of debt prices.
Official declarations were not the only information received by creditors about the future 
course of Colombia's external debt payments. The quotations of Colombian bonds in the 
London and New York stock exchange markets reflected the expectations of investors about 
the quality of the country's external debt. An idea of how these expectations changed over 
time is offered by the evolution of prices of Colombian bonds in the London Stock 
Exchange.^^ Table 50 shows year-end quotations for the 1925-35 period, and Graph 31 
describes a longer perspective for the 1920-sterling loan for which more complete 
information is available.^^
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GRAPH 31
COLOMBIA
LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE PRICES
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The Stock Exchange Yearbook. Annual Issues.
As seen, the prices of the Colombian debt in London were high and improving as the country 
got access to the U.S. lending boom of 1925-1928. At its height in 1928, the weighted 
average price was 95.8%. Thereafter, prices declined, and by 1931 the weighted average 
quotation had fallen to 62.5%. A great deal of the highest and lowest quotations is explained 
by the prices reached by the Mortgage Bank of Bogota loan, the single sterling credit sold by 
the private sector; when this loan is excluded, the relevant weighted averages are 93.7% for 
1928 and 72% for 1931. It has to be noted that by the end of 1931 both the government and 
the banks had entirely fulfilled their financial commitments with British investors; 
consequently the fall of more than 20 percentage points in the average quotation would have 
to be explained by reasons apart from the punctuality in debt service payments.
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The experience in 1932 was different, however; quotations fell sharply after the suspension 
of sinking fund payments on all but one of the loans to the national government (Table 48), 
and on mortgage bank loans. A temporary recovery seems to have happened in 1933, in 
conformity with the scanty information in Table 50; according to reasons given below in 
Section III about debt repatriations, acquisitions of bonds by the government and banks in the 
open market could have prompted a short upturn in 1933. Finally, a sequence of depressed 
quotations dominated the rest of the decade and the early 1940s when the sterling debt was 
renegotiated. The final upswing since 1941 shown in Graph 31 reveals the normalization of 
debt payments..
Some hypotheses can be offered to explain the early decline of bond prices long before the 
first suspension of debt service actually took place in 1932. As previously discussed (Section 
I of this part), indexes of creditworthiness for peripheral countries were adversely affected by 
the world economic crisis. While the real value of external debts increased due to price 
deflation, the ability to pay was weakened by falling terms of trade. As far as this process 
aggravated, markets had to reflect its negative impact on the quality of external debts. Being 
one of the main Latin American debtors, Colombia was exposed to the adverse effects of the 
world crisis, independently of her punctuality in debt repayments. Markets had also to reflect 
the process through which economies in different continents were going off gold and 
imposing exchange control. Finally, markets had to reflect the wave of defaults which 
involved five Latin American countries in 1931, spread to Eastern Europe in 1932, and 
affected the major beneficiary of the U.S. lending boom of the 1920s, Germany, in 1933.
A more complete idea of the Colombian experience is offered by the evolution of dollar-bond 
prices shown in Table 51. This time, the series describe the range between highest and lowest 
quotations for every year rather than year-end prices. To start with 1930, it is seen that the 
highest quotations for departmental, municipal and mortgage bank bonds, in most cases 
exceeded the highest quotations for the national government bonds; however, the range of 
fluctuation was narrower for the national government security prices than for other bond
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quotations. It can be seen that in spite of remaining within the gold standard, enforcing 
an orthodox macroeconomic adjustment, and being punctually fulfilling the external debt 
service, bond prices were far from encouraging: two-thirds of the lowest quotations of all 
securities were already equal to or below 55%, and perhaps more indicative, the quotations of 
the national government bonds did not compare well with the prices obtained by other major 
indebted countries in the region. For loans contracted at the same time that Colombia 
negotiated her national 1927-1928 loans, and for comparable amounts, Chile got a price 
range of 94-70, Brazil reached 87 7/8-47 1/2, and Argentina got 98 1/2-82 1/2. Argentina and 
Chile had so far experienced a light and similar deterioration of terms of trade, while 
Colombia and Brazil had already endured a terms of trade loss of 26% and 38% respectively 
(Table 32 above)
By the end of 1931 a sharp fall in the lowest quotations had affected all Colombian dollar 
bonds, since all but one faced prices below 20%. The range of variation of national bond 
prices was of 60 percentage points, and tended to be higher for other debtors. The year-end 
quotations of the national government bonds offer more information about the declining 
trends. The 1927 loan was quoted at only 31%, when a year before it had been quoted at 67 
1/8%; and the 1928 loan was quoted at 30 1/4% compared with 68 1/2% a year earlier.^^
1931 was the year when Colombia imposed exchange controls without abandoning the gold 
parities (September 24), and adopted the first measures according to which external debt 
service transfers would be regulated by the Control Board (October 31). These episodes alone 
could have adversely affected investors expectations and driven down bond prices. But 1931 
was also a year of major crises of the international monetary regime. Severe banking crises in 
Austria and Germany led to the introduction of exchange control in these countries. Britain 
officially suspended the gold standard (September 21), an event which signalled the end of 
the international gold-exchange standard. A wave of suspensions of convertibility in Europe 
and other continents followed suit.^^ Finally, 1931 was also the year in which default on 
external debts arose and rapidly spread in the South American region. Bolivia went into
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default early in the year (January), and in chronological order was followed by Peru (April), 
Chile (August) and Brazil (October) 7^ The crisis of an international monetary regime which 
had been adopted as a symbol of financial stability, and a deteriorating neighborhood in 
South America could not favour any optimism on the investors' side.
By the end of 1932 all departments and municipalities had gone into default on sinking fund 
and interests. Mortgage banks had also defaulted on sinking fund, but interests on the debt of 
the Agricultural Mortgage Bank were still being punctually paid. The national government 
had actually defaulted on all but one of the sterling loans, but was paying full interests on all 
those loans; as for the dollar loans, sinking fund and interests had been fully paid by the 
national government. As a result of this process of default, the highest prices of departmental 
and municipal bonds collapsed to less than 20% in most cases, and the highest prices of the 
government guaranteed bonds of the Agricultural Mortgage Bank fell to around 40%. But 
also the fully paid national government bonds saw their highest quotations plummeting from 
78% to 40%. As a matter of fact, the year-end quotations of the 1927 and 1928 loans were 
only 28 7/8% and 29% respectively.^^
A sort of price recovery was observed in 1933. The dollar debt of the national government, 
some departments -particularly Cundinamarca and Antioquia-, some municipalities -Bogota, 
Cali and Medellin-, and some loans to the Agricultural Mortgage Bank, reached higher 
although still very depressed prices. As explained before, regarding the sterling debt, 
acquisitions of bonds by some government entities and banks in the open market could have 
caused that positive reaction of prices. This was a temporary increase, though, since the rest 
of the decade was dominated by very low quotations. The negotiation of permanent debt 
settlements for the dollar debt of the national government and of the Agricultural Mortgage 
Bank during the early 1940s induced the continuous recovery of the quotations, as seen in the 
last columns of Table 51.
4 7 7
What can be said about the evolution of the international prices of the Colombian debt 
regarding outstanding Latin American debtors? A general view can be drawn by recalling the 
experiences of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba and Mexico. These countries offer a variety of 
contrasting experiences considering the trajectory of bond prices, which were largely 
influenced by factors of international politics. In this context, the Colombian record could be 
seen as a middle-of-the-road experience, amidst the international tensions and internal 
political turmoil which affected other regions.
Consider first the extreme case of Mexico which did not share in the huge Latin American 
borrowing of the late 1920s. Instead, the country started the decade renegotiating its debt in 
1922 with a Committee of International Bankers on Mexico which represented bondholders 
from United States and Europe. After a short resumption of payments the debt service was 
suspended (1924), and a new agreement formalized (1925). Towards the end of the decade 
payments were suspended again (1927), and another agreement with the bankers in 1930 did 
not receive support in Congress. Mexico then started a decade and a half of complete default 
during which the average quotations of its debt oscillated between 4% and 8% of the face 
value.^ ^
The Cuban example illustrates not only the opposite evolution of bond prices but also a 
contrast of relationship between national governments and international financiers. While in 
the Mexican case default came as a reaction against prerevolutionary debts, and a long 
process of negotiations with bankers was accompanied by strong nationalistic feelings, Cuba 
had been the target of different forms of U.S. intervention.^^ In the early 1920s, political and 
financial reforms were undertaken under the U.S. influence. The main loan contracted during 
the 1920s (5 1/2% loan of 1923 for US$50 million) involved an early act of financial 
conditionality. Before floating the loan, U.S. bankers and officials required from the Cuban 
administration the enforcement of financial reforms. By the end of the decade, there were not 
explicit forms of U.S. military or political intervention in the island, but the American 
economic interests were huge and well cemented, representing the largest U.S. foreign
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investments after Canada and Germany. With those precedents and economic context, 
investors could confidently expect the continuity of very high quotations for Cuban loans, 
although temporary suspensions affected those loans in the mid-1930s (During 1930-45 the 
average high quotations reached 100% and the average low quotations 87% of the face value 
respectively).^^
In Chile, the sharp fall of terms of trade and exports' volume between 1929 and 1932 led to 
the steepest decline in the purchasing power of exports -85% according to Table 32- 
experienced by a country in Latin America during the great depression. In a experience 
similar to that of Colombia, Chile expressed reluctancy to both abandon the gold standard 
and suspend debt service. However, authorities adopted both measures in July 1931, as 
temporary devices to avoid the exhaustion of international reserves; but as these measures 
proved insufficient to stop the drain of foreign exchange, the gold standard was definitely 
abandoned in April 1932.^^ All these decisions were adopted in a context of political turmoil 
and interim governments. Default on loans to Chile -national, municipal and corporate- 
occurred on interest and sinking fund between August 1931 and March 1932. In the case of 
the major national loan floated during the U.S. lending boom (6% loan of 1928 for US$45.9 
million), the lowest bond quotations collapsed since 1931 (from 70% to 7%), and the highest 
ones since 1932 (from 87% to 15% of the face value). These depressed levels remained 
through the decade and continued well into the 1940s. An unilateral plan for the 
restablishment of debt service was carried out by the government since January 1935; 
accordingly some specific revenues were designated to be applied to service the debt, half as 
amortization payments and half as interests. However, a definitive debt settlement with 
creditors was not negotiated until 1948.^^
In Brazil, a series of negotiations with foreign creditors took place since the suspension of 
payments in September 1931, until a definitive agreement was reached in 1943. As Brazil 
was the major Latin American debtor, with debts amounting to some US$1200 million in 
1930, and as about two-thirds of those debts were in British hands, British bankers and
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advisers played a dominant role particularly in early negotiations. Since the first negotiation 
in late 1931 worked to the advantage of European investors, their bonds were remunerated 
with continuous high prices while the highest quotations on U.S. bonds collapsed in 1932 
(the prices of the 6 1/2% loan of 1927 for US$41.5 million fell from 70% to 26% of the face 
v a lu e ) .A  new arrangement was agreed in 1934 by which debt service would continue on 
the basis of the Brazilian ability to pay and a discrimination of loans.^ In 1937 the world 
crisis of coffee prices weakened the country's ability to pay, on which basis debt was being 
served, and authorities decided to suspend debt repayments. This time new arrangements for 
the regularization of the debt service did not follow swiftly as in 1931, and on the contrary, 
some creditors reacted angrily. Bond prices fell to the lowest levels experienced during the 
decade (to an average of 20% for the highest quotations and 10.8% for the lowest ones of the 
6 1/2% loan of 1927 during the 1939-41 period), and a sustained recovery was possible only 
after a definitive settlement was reached in late 1943.
Argentina was the only major Latin American debtor who maintained full debt service 
payments during the 1930s, although some provinces and municipalities incurred in 
payments' interruptions which were promptly readjusted. As in the Brazilian case, more than 
a half of the Argentinian debt was in British hands; but while Brazil had an import surplus 
with Great Britain, Argentina exhibited an export surplus. Being Britain the Argentina's most 
important export market, the bargaining power of the British had implications for the 
continuity of external debt paym ents.These "implications" were officially recorded in the 
Roca-Runciman Treaty of 1933 according to which "the United Kingdom... will not impose 
any restriction on the imports of chilled beef into the United Kngdom from Argentina...below 
the quantity imported in...1932,...[In exchange for which] there shall be available, for the 
purpose of meeting applications for current remittances from Argentina to the United 
Kingdom, the full amount of sterling exchange arising from the sale of Argentine products in 
the United Kingdom..."^^
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The Treaty helped reanimate the expectations of investors about the quality of Argentinian 
bonds. The highest quotations of bonds (consider the 6% loan of 1927 for US$ 40 million) 
which nearly reached 100% in 1930 fell to 68% in 1932, in spite of full payment of the 
external debt service. After the Treaty, a consistent recovery of expectations led the highest 
prices to more than a 100%, and even the lowest quotations reached levels close to 100%. In 
1936 Argentina transformed about a half of her national dollar debt into internal debt, while 
the other half was converted into new loans of longer maturity periods and lower interest 
rates. This was the first step before all outstanding national dollar bonds were called for 
redemption during 1946. By the end of 1949 all publicly offered dollar bonds had been 
redeemed and only a small amount of sterling debt was still outstanding.®^
These individual cases show that within the common framework of the world recession the 
debt service issue and the market price of country debts depended not only on financial 
factors but also on international political considerations. Colombia does not seem to have 
lived through exceptional situations of external pressure. In some examples, such as that of 
Argentina, the depression of bond prices in the early 1930s was reversed after the 
implementation of a bilateral trade agreement which explicitly enforced the continuity of the 
debt service. There were other political influences, though. An important political strategy of 
the time was the Good Neigbour Policy implemented by the Roosevelt administration which 
added up to the multilateral trade relationships sponsored by U.S. officials. The course of 
defaults and further attempts of normalization of debt service in various Latin American 
countries were influenced by that overall political strategy. In the Colombian case, that 
international strategy played an explicit role, as our further discussions in Section in will 
reveal.
4. The creditors' reaction to Colombia's default
Who were the ultimate creditors? Who represented them and what was the authority of 
representatives? This last subsection surveys the initial reactions of institutions which later
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would become the negotiators of debt settlements on behalf of U.S. and British investors 
(Section in below).
External debt bonds were widely distributed between relatively small ultimate investors.
The Council of Foreign Bondholders (CFB) represented the interests of British investors, and 
a similar function was performed by the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council (FBPC) in 
the U.S. since 1933. Before the creation of the FBPC some independent committees were 
founded to negotiate with each foreign country. In Britain, the government fully accepted and 
backed the authority of the CFB to represent the interests of bondholders. In early 1938 the 
Prime Minister reiterated the role of the CFB and added up a final sentence related to the 
possibility of government intervention if no acceptable agreements were achieved with the 
mediation of the CFB. Although the statement was made amidst acrimonious reactions after 
the Brazilian default in 1937, it made explicit that government intervention could not be ruled 
out:
"...The government recognize the Council of the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders as the 
body entrusted by Parliament with the duty of representing the interests of the Bondholders in 
all matters arising out of defaults or threatened defaults by foreign governments, states or 
municipalities... In the case of default, or threatened default, H.M. government expect the 
foreign government or authority concerned to enter into negotiations with the Council. H.M. 
government always follow such negotiations very closely and give to the Council their fullest 
support. Where no acceptable agreement is reached they are always prepared to consider 
what further steps can usefully be taken".
In the United States the FBPC was formed upon request of the Secretary of State. The 
protection of U.S. investors in foreign bonds was considered of "such public significance as 
to make its proper handling a public service". However, it was made clear that it was for the 
private sector to get satisfactory debt settlements: "The traditional policy of the American 
government has been that such loan and investment transactions were primarily private 
actions, to be handled by the parties directly concerned. The government realizes a duty, 
within the proper limits of international law and international amity, to defend American 
interests abroad. However, it would not be wise for the government to undertake directly the 
settlement of private debt situations''.^^
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Official reactions of creditors to the gradual process of Colombia's formal default were given 
by the councils of these two institutions, or less frequently, by ad-hoc committees created in 
the United States. In 1932 the CFB offered an example of mild reaction to the government's 
announcement (February 12) that it had suspended sinking fund payments. In a laconic 
statement published in its annual report the CFB expressed: "The government announced in 
February 1932 that it had been obliged to suspend the sinking funds on its external loans. The 
Council are glad to be able to report, however, that the interest service has been maintained 
during 1932".^^ The CFB felt that British bondholders had accepted the reasons given by the 
government to halt sinking fund payments. Having been asked whether the Corporation "had 
done or intends to do any claim to the government concerning that failure [the suspension of 
sinking fund payments]" the CFB answered: "We have received no representations from any 
bondholders in this matter and as Colombia has continued to pay regularly the interest due on 
the loans in question, we presume ... they are satisfied with the explanation published by the 
Colombian government on the 12th February 1932".^^
New and mixed reactions were heard after the government announcements of meeting the 
coupons of the national debt and of the Agricultural Mortgage Bank (AMB), two-thirds in 
scrip during 1933, and in scrip only during 1934. One of the U.S. independent committees 
complained that scrip plans were attempts "to foist on the American holders of Colombian 
dollar bonds an unsatisfactory substitute for the interest payments which they are entitled to 
receive".Som e journalists expressed their dissatisfaction with the scrip plan for 1934 and 
interpreted it as against the reputation of Colombia in the financial circles of the City. A note 
in The Times discussed the Colombian decision in terms of the recent experience of the 
country as international debtor:
"Colombia's decision to meet her loan coupons during 1934 in scrip only is not a 
surprise...but disappointing. Ever since 1905, when a settlement was reached on the old 
[British] debts of the Republic, Colombia has been building up a name as a good debtor by 
prompt interest payments and regular amortization. In 1931 she was compelled to introduce a 
rigorous exchange control which was unable to provide exchange for provincial and 
municipal debt service. By 1933, the special imports of supplies and munitions required by
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the border conflict with Peru created new strains on the availability of foreign exchange. By 
the end of June [1933]... Colombia announced that she would be able to pay one-third of her 
interest in cash, and two-thirds in scrip. Allowing for the difficulties to be faced, that is not a 
bad record. The 1934 default, however, must be considered a blot on Colombia's 
credit...it would seem that Colombia might, with an effcgl, have maintained the very small 
payments required for one-third of her external debt..."."^
This is, again, a mild reaction to an event which was not "a surprise" to financial observers 
who had understood the foreign exchange difficulties faced by Colombia since 1930. 
Additional complaints were put forward by U.S. committees related to the obligations of 
departments and municipalities; in this respect the issue was not only the default on those 
obligations, but the discrimination resulting from the fact that national debts were being at 
least partially served while no foreign exchange was being set aside for the account of the 
departmental and municipal bondholders.^^ It was also pointed out that all dollar bonds of 
departments and municipalities were secured by assets and revenues, and therefore these 
loans had prior rights over other nonsecured government obligations.^^ From the U.S. 
creditors’ perspective the question of the external debt service of departments and 
municipalities was crucial since, as seen before, they represented 57% of the dollar public 
and publicly guaranteed debt.
The central reason given by the Colombian government to suspend the amortization 
payments on the national debt in 1933 was the compelling expenses demanded by the border 
conflict with Peru. Although actual hostilities ceased in May 1933, the treaty of peace was 
signed only a year later and became effective in September 1935. At the end of this last year 
the Institute of International Finance, an institution conducted by the Investment Bankers 
Association of America in cooperation with New York University issued a bulletin 
concerning Colombia. The focus of attention of the bulletin was the fact that the government 
had so far failed to take effective steps to correct the state of default on its outstanding 
debt.^ ^
Could the government have continued fulfilling its obligations during the war and in the 
interim period until the treaty of peace was ratified? Was the government in the position of
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resuming the normal service of its external debt? Table 52 based on information published by 
the Exchange Control Board was a simple but crucial reference for the Institute’s conclusions.
TABLE 52 
COLOMBIA
FOREIGN EXCHANGE INCOME AND DISBURSEMENTS
1932-1935
(US$ Millions)
March 7- 12 12 1 st 8 1st 8
Dec 31, months months months months
1932 1933 1934 1935 1934
TCOME 53.1 56.2 76.5 39.6 53.1
ISBURSEMENTS 53.6 63.5 77.9 42.1 52.9
IMPORTS 29.9 39.1 50.7 33.7 34.3
RESIDENTS ABROAD 5.5 3.7 2.3 1 .3 1 .6
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 9.8 11 .2 21 .3 4.8 14.4
EXTERNAL DEBT PAYMENTS 4.3 5.7 • • • . . .
OTHERS 4.2 3.8 3.7 2.3 2.6
SOURCES.
Institute of International Finance (1935)
As seen, the national government appeared to be a large buyer of exchange, and the chief 
cause of the exchange shortage during the period. Although the destination of the exchange 
acquired by the government is not revealed, according to the Institute it was "unofficially 
reported that the major portion of it is spent abroad for armaments". The hypothesis of the 
government becoming an important buyer of foreign exchange "destined" to defense 
expenditures is consistent with our discussion of Table 45 above; accordingly, defense 
expenditures became the major cause of government expenditures in 1933-34 before losing 
importance since 1935.
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By 1933 the service of total external debt of Colombia amounted to some US$19 million per 
annum (Table 49 above). Estimates by the Institute were of the same order of magnitude. By 
combining the information in Table 52 and the figures about the external debt service, the 
answers of the Institute to the previous two questions are immediately obtained:
"lit is obvious that, under present conditions, total service charges could not be met, but in 
view of the fact that the treaty of peace between Colombia and Peru finally became effective 
on September 27,1935, it is hoped that the foreign-exchange requirements of the government 
fo)r armaments will decrease and that payments, at least in part, on the external debt service 
cam be resumed".
The Institute appears to be recognizing the reasons offered by the Colombian government to 
suispend external debt payments, but also finds that by the end of 1935 the government would 
seiem to be well capable of restarting service payments at least in part on the external debt.
P.. Looking back and ahead
In Section I of this part we discussed the breakdown of the U.S. lending boom of the 1920s. 
We also looked into the adverse shock of the international business cycle on the periphery, 
pairticularly on the four main South American debtors, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and 
Colombia.
In this section (Section II) we examined how domestic asset-markets in the Colombian 
economy were affected by specific external shocks during the great depression. It was shown 
how authorities stuck to the orthodoxy of the gold standard until Britain and later the United 
States went off gold, and the international reserves of the country were nearly depleted. 
Authorities imposed exchange controls and negotiated "temporary" and partial suspensions of 
the external debt service to avoid a total exhaustion of the Bank of the Republic's foreign 
assets. To combat against the adverse effects of the deflation on the internal credit structure 
and prevent the collapse of the financial system, authorities expanded the internal public 
debt. It was not a typical program of public works financed with internal public debt.
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but a strategy to rescue the financial system and crucial economic sectors affected by the 
worldwide recession. A further expansion of the internal public debt was required to finance 
a war with a neighbouring country.
In the next section we follow the process through which the debt contracts signed with British 
and U.S. investors, and which were affected by default during the great depression, were 
renegotiated. The renegotiation was a long (15 years) and complex process which involved a 
variety of forms (such as debt buybacks, reduction of interest rates and rescheduling), and a 
diversity of strategies adopted by debtors and creditors. Overall, renegotiations were the 
mechanism by which the long-term relationship between foreign creditors and Colombian 
debtors described in Section I of this part was restablished.
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SECTION n 
NOTES
1. The concept of Export Revenues in Column (2) corresponds to Exports FOB in column (1) 
but excluding 80% of oil exports, 60% of gold and platinum exports, and 50% of banana 
exports. These exclusions actually became revenues of foreign companies which exploited 
those economic activities. Ocampo (1988) p.212.
2. In August 1926 authorities adopted a narrow band for exchange rate oscillations between 
C$1.0150 and C$1.0275 per dollar. The exchange rate actually oscillated within this band 
between August 1926 and October 1928. The upper limit of C$1.0275 was reached in 
November 1928 as the first impacts of the U.S. cessation of lending were felt. This level 
subsisted until April 1929 when under market pressure the exchange rate achieved the gold 
export point of C$1.0350 per dollar. Informe del Gerente a la Junta Directiva del Banco de la 
RepubUca, hereinafter IGBR, annual reports for 1927 and 1929.
3. By adopting (January 1932) the new gold export point -C$1.050 per dollar- as the 
exchange rate for its operations, the central bank expected to offer some stimulus to exporters 
without deviating from the metallic parities. IGBR, annual report for 1932.
4. Under the differentiated system the exchange rate for government transactions was the 
gold export point, C$1.050 per dollar, while exporters were assigned a rate of C$1.130 and 
importers a rate of C$1.160 per dollar, respectively.
5. On September 5 1933, the exchange rate for exporters was changed from C$1.130 to 
C$1.230, and that for importers from C$1.160 to C$1.260, namely, an 8% devaluation. 
Further, during the managed floating arrangement -September 1933 through June 1936- the 
exchange rate depreciated by 38%. Finally, the exchange rate was fixed at C$1.75 per dollar 
in June 1936. IGBR, annual reports, 1934 through 1936.
6. Between 1923 and 1927 the stock of internal public debt declined from C$21.1 million to 
C$9.5 million. 63% of this substantial nominal reduction was explained by the withdrawal 
from circulation of Treasury Certificates (C$2.6 million) and Treasury Bonds (C$4.7 
million).
7. Department of Overseas Trade. Special register service of information. 23-3-23. Council of 
Foreign Bondholders (London), hereinafter CFB. Extracts Vol II.
8. Regarding investments of the Bank in government bonds, the only episode to note is the 
acquisition of Treasury Certificates during 1923 as part of the process of monetary 
unification.
9. Revista del Banco de la Republica, Editorial Page, May 1928.
10. The Law 12 of 1928 authorized the government to exchange the 10% bonds in circulation 
for new 8% bonds, or alternatively, to repurchase those bonds at their par value. Diario 
Oficial No 20830 of 1928. Later, the Law 20 of the same year authorized the national 
government to pay its debts to departmental governments by issuing 8% bonds. The 
corresponding issue reached the amount of C$6.5 million shown in Table 41. Bv 1930 the 
comptroller general decided not to approve new issues of the 8% bonds. Perez (1990), Part H, 
p.83.
4 8 8
11. Perez (1990), Part II, p.7. As seen in Table 41 ,1.D., the fiscal subsidy of railways became 
increasingly important between 1928 and 1931. Wiile in the former date railway bonds 
represented only 2% of total bonds in circulation, in the latter they represented 24%.
12. Perez (1990) Part II, p.7.
13. Although the League of Nations Gold Delegation of 1930 found that actual gold cover 
ratios of some 40% exceeded the minimum one-third cover, it was perceived that as 
increasing foreign exchange reserves were accumulated by central banks, a gold shortfall 
could arise in future. Eichengreen (1992), pp. 198-203.
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SECTION III
The renegotiation of the Colombian external debt. 1934-1949.
INTRODUCTION
In this section we discuss the process of renegotiation of the Colombian external debt which 
took place during the period 1934-49. The matter of renegotiation were the debt contracts 
signed with British investors since the beginning of the century, and with U.S. investors since 
1925, and which went into default between 1931 and 1933.
This section is the last one of our historical enquiry and forms a unit with the first two 
sections. Already in Section I we looked into early experiences in which the access of Latin 
American economies to foreign financing was followed by default and renegotiations. Also in 
Section I we described the first great lending boom of the 20th century; in particular, we 
narrated the experience of Colombia during the boom-and-bust of U.S. loans between 1925 
and 1928. In Section II we addressed the topics of gradual default of Colombia's external 
debt, and the crucial role of the internal public debt to cushion the shocks associated with the 
great depression. In this section we concentrate on the agreements between creditors and 
Colombian debtors by which external debt repayments were normalized.
These reflections suggest the existence of a long-term relationship between creditors (British 
and U.S. private investors) and Colombian debtors (public and private sector). Renegotiations 
became an integral part of such a relationship. Since formal debt contracts do not allow for
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contingencies -such as a collapse of TOT- which exonerate debtors from making debt 
repayments, renegotiations are the device through which the contractual relationship is 
adjusted to a new set of circumstances. Renegotiations have been interpreted as a form of 
risk-sharing arrangements between creditors and debtors (Grossman and Van Huyck, 1988), 
or as part of an implicit state-contingent contracting (Kletzer, 1994).
Renegotiations during the 1934-49 period had a bilateral character between British and 
Colombian negotiators, and also between U.S. and Colombian negotiators. However, the 
renegotiating process was governed by complex relationships between parties. At times, the 
British and U.S. creditors appeared to be formulating cooperative strategies, at times the 
British recognized the leading position of U.S. negotiators ("throwing in their lot with the 
Americans"), and at times both creditors conducted independent negotiations. Further, 
governments intervention proved crucial in the achievement of agreements, particularly in the 
U.S. case where in some negotiations creditors' representatives were supplanted by 
government officials. In these events, settlements materialized once ultimate investors in 
Colombian bonds accepted the offers of the debtors despite the disapproval of creditors' 
representatives.
On the debtors side, the prevailing line of negotiation was that some risks should be borne by 
creditors, and therefore the extraordinarily adverse realization of those risks during the great 
depression should also be shared by investors. Since there were different kinds of debtors 
(national, regional and local governments, and also banks), offers of settlement were also 
different. An outstanding negotiating strategy of the national government aimed to get final 
settlements accompanied by fresh loans; the strategy coincided with international extensions 
of the New Deal and succeeded during the recontracting of the dollar debt of the national 
government, but not in the renegotiation of the sterling debt due to lending restrictions in the 
London market during World War II.
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While the gradual process of renegotiation could reach the state of settlements, secondary 
markets in both the United States and Britain provided an important risk sharing mechanism 
through the repatriation of depreciated foreign bonds. It was a worldwide experience 
according to the U.S. Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, which by the end of the 1930s 
stated that most defaulters had been involved in repatriation of depreciated bonds, and that 
such operations amounted to one-fourth of the outstanding debt stock when default was 
declared. Colombian debtors were actively involved in buybacks of their bonds between 1932 
and 1937 when negotiators started discussing concrete proposals of agreement; some of them 
repatriated one-half of their external debt through those buybacks. Recent theoretical 
literature on external debt renegotiations has questioned the advantage of repatriations from 
the debtors perspective, since it is argued, the raising effects of buybacks on the market 
quotations of the debt invalidate their potential attraction (Bulow and Rogoff, 1991). An 
extended characteristic of buybacks in the 1930s was their furtive nature, which could have 
prevented price increases. This secrecy seems to have been crucial for most buybacks in the 
Colombian case, since prices were about the same or less at the end of the 1930s when 
negotiators reached their first agreements.
The information discussed in this section heavily relies on private documentary evidence, 
minutes of lenders' committees, and correspondence files, most of them of British origin. 
Fortunately, since the position of creditors on both sides of the Atlantic was a matter of 
controversy, the British files contained documentary evidence of the strategies played by the 
U.S. negotiators. This section also provides new series of the Colombia's external debt for the 
period 1923-50. In some cases the reconstruction of the series started by tracing the 
experience of individual loans before obtaining more aggregate data.
We start this section by describing the international context of widespread default in which 
the recontracting process commenced as of 1934. The sequence of actual renegotiations is 
divided into three bargaining rounds. The first one began in 1934 and ended during the crisis 
of world coffee prices of 1937. Although no agreement was reached during the first round.
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this period served to make explicit basic rules that creditors and debtors alike would follow 
through the renegotiating events. The second round covered the 1938-42 years. This period 
was fruitful in strategies and agreements, the main achievement having been the settlement of 
the external debt of the national government. The third round ran from 1944 to 1949 when 
the foreign debt of regional governments (departments and municipalities) was settled. 
Finally, the reader will find an appendix in which we explain how the new series for the 
Colombia's external debt were obtained. The main differences with previous series are based 
on the explicit accountancy of defaults, repatriations and settlements.
A. The international context
By the end of 1935, the worldwide propagation of external debt default had reached a crucial 
stage. The chain of Latin American defaults spread to East European countries -Hungary in 
January 1932, followed in quick sequence by Bulgaria and Greece in May, and by 
Yugoslavia in November-. The default process finally involved Germany, by far the major 
beneficiary of the U.S. lending boom of the 1920s. Regarding only the outstanding dollar 
denominated debt, a significant 38.5% was actually in default, and grouping according to 
regions the percentages of outstanding dollar debts in default were as follows: Latin America, 
75.8%; Europe, 49.8%; Far East and Africa, 2.4%; and Canada, 3.8%.^
The international scene of external debts was made even worse by the default on World-War- 
I loans with the government of the United States. As seen above (Section I.C.1 of this part), 
these debts were funded in 1922, amounting to US$11.6 billion. The early 1930s witnessed 
postponements and concessions to the debtors: the Hoover moratorium of 1931 (June) which 
postponed during one year all payments on international debts; the postponement (December 
1931) of amounts payable to the U.S. government during 1932, and their repayment over a 
ten year period; and the acceptance (May 1933) of silver payments from foreign 
governments. However, these concessions were followed by the controversial Johnson Act 
(April 1934) which prohibited "financial transactions with any foreign government in default
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on its obligations to the United States".^ Reactions in Europe to this legal decision emerged 
without delay. Great Britain (June 1934) unilaterally suspended future payments on the war 
debts, and France, Italy and Belgium followed suit. These four countries were responsible for 
90% of the funded war debts of 15 European countries; by the end of 1936 all of them were 
in default, with the exception of Finland.^
In the view of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, the default on war debts "has 
coloured the attitude of governments indebted to American citizens".^ Default in the 1930s 
was accompanied and perhaps stimulated by what Henry Wallich writing in 1943 
denominated a "change in debtor psychology".
"Latin American belief in the sanctity of contracts was undermined by the British default on 
the war debt, Germany's failure to make payments on the greater part of her international 
obligations, and the derogation of the gold clause in the United States...The question 'to pay 
or not to pay' thus tended to be reduced to a simple utility calculus: Did the advantages of 
maintaining a good credit record constitute an adequate reward for the sacrifice of continued 
payments?...Faced with this question, nearly all our South Anjprican debtors decided in 
favour of default, regardless of the relative size of their debt".^
In this context of widespread default countries like Colombia started the renegotiation of 
their external debt. It was a drawn out process commenced in 1934 and concluded late in 
1949. However, neither was it a continuous process nor were all debts renegotiated at the 
same time. Definitive settlements for the national government debt and for the publicly 
guaranteed debt came earlier, during the first half of the 1940s; and settlements for regional 
governments (departments and municipalities) were predominantly achieved at the end of the 
1940s. The whole process of intermittent negotiations and separate settlements can be 
chronologically divided in three bargaining rounds. The first round begins in 1934 and ends 
during the international coffee crisis of 1937. The second round encompasses the negotiations 
since 1938 until 1944 during which bond conversions were agreed for the national 
government and mortgage bank debts. Finally, the third round refers to the negotiation and 
final conversion of most of the external debts of departments and municipalities.
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It is important to note that there was never a total suspension of payments on the external 
debt. The Belgian and French debts were fully amortized during the first round, in 1934 and 
1935 respectively. Full interests were paid on the loan sold in 1931 to the syndicate of 
bankers headed by the National City Bank of New York.^ The non-interest bearing deferred 
interest certificates of 1933 were redeemed in 1937, and the 4% funding certificates of 1934 
were fully served untü its final redemption in 1946. Other small loans contracted with 
Colombian subsidiaries of foreign companies were punctually served.^
B. First Round. 1934-1937
During this brief period, both Colombia and her creditors expressed their preferences about 
the outcome of possible negotiations. Colombia announced her willingness to pay according 
to capacity to pay. An important argument on this side was that the nominal debt contracts 
with fixed interest rates signed during the 1920s had become unenforceable during the 1930s, 
due to the global deflation of the time. Creditors defended the integrity of original contracts 
and to that end were inclined to negotiate temporary settlements while expecting to suscribe 
permanent agreements at the end of the world economic recession. In the meantime, a 
process of buybacks of foreign bonds at depreciated prices took place, bringing about a 
market solution in the absence of agreement between parties. In this subsection, we 
summarize common principles followed by negotiators, and also quarrelsome subjects such 
as repatriations and trade pressures. Towards the end, the reader will find the first concrete 
initiative of settlement of the national debt just before the end of the first round.
1. Early approaches and guiding principles.
Although the intention of starting negotiations had been repeated several times since 1932, 
contacts between the Colombian government and representatives of the creditors did not take 
place until the second half of 1934. Positions of both parties were clearly expressed at the 
outset, with the government protecting its independence and representatives of creditors
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defending their own cause. In a communication to the [U.S.] Foreign Bondholders Protective 
Council (FBPC), the government stated that it would fulfill its external commitments within 
its financial capacity to pay and without having to impose unreasonable constraints on its 
economic programs.^ The FBPC in its turn asked the government to reserve any decision 
related to what Colombia can or cannot pay without previous discussion with the council.^ 
Colombian authorities found joint discussions with the FBPC to be favourable but stressed 
that they could not commit to what the council wanted because it would be restricting their 
own freedom, and also excluding the opinion of other creditors' representatives in the United 
States and Europe.
Representatives of U.S. independent committees visited Colombia and later published 
statements about the "friendly spirit" of the government and its intention of entering "into 
negotiations for the settlement of its external debt".^^ An explicit reference to the 
government's attitude was included in a circular letter to holders of Colombian bonds: "This 
is believed to be the first instance in the history of defaulted foreign bonds in this country 
[the USA] where a foreign government has offered its facilities to representatives of the 
bondholders, and made available to them authoritative and official sources of data and 
information, to assist in determining the capacity of the country to resume payments to its 
external creditors"Importantly, the same circular letter presented the position of the 
government to the bondholders and found it "entirely reasonable":
"The Colombian government has always maintained that Colombia would comply with all 
external obligations to the extent of the Republic's capacity to pay. The position is regarded 
by the Committees as an entirely reasonable one, and the cooperation extended by the 
government of Colombia to the Committees in order to determine for the bondholders the 
extent of such capacity is hence a most constructive development". ^  ^
A country's capacity to pay was a common issue in renegotiations and settlements during the 
1930s and 1940s. It is important to note, however, that formal declarations of principle by 
creditors' representatives were not as generous as the previous quotation. The FBPC stated 
that the phrase capacity to pay did not have "any proper place whatsoever in a discussion
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between a sovereign and his private foreign creditors" and that "whether a sovereign pays, or 
does not pay, depends in greatest part upon his will to pay". The Council did not recognize to 
sovereign debtors the right to invoke lack of capacity to pay unless they had fully exhausted 
their taxing powers; and that was not the case, the Council alleged, of the countries which 
defaulted in the 1930s. These strong declarations would be eventually mitigated during 
actual renegotiations.
The committees did not endeavour to get immediate permanent settlements. It was 
considered that international economic conditions were unfavourable to make definitive 
agreements. In the Colombian case, for example, when the independent committees started 
the conversations mentioned above, financial circles in London recalled that the exchange 
situation in that country was still unsettled and therefore the government could not afford to 
deal with the external debt question. Even as late as 1940 the FBPC found it undesirable 
both for debtors and creditors to try to make final arrangements, and therefore temporary 
agreements were preferred. In fact, 85% of the defaulted debts renegotiated by the FBPC 
during 1934-39 became temporary settlements.^^
Some common principles were defended by the committees during negotiations. Regarding 
the capital value of debts, it should be paid in full according to the nominal contracts. Also 
any interest arrears should be fully paid. A more flexible attitude was shown regarding rates 
of interest or amortization quotas which could be "slightly" reduced according to economic 
circumstances either of the debtor country or of the world economy. On the other side, 
debtors insisted that the real value of contracts had become too high after the deflation of the 
1930s, and that the world levels of interest rates were far below the levels of the 1920s when 
loans were made.
2. Contentious issues: Repatriation of defaulted bonds
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The committees strongly rejected the practice of repatriation of bonds by countries actually in 
default. While defaulting countries claimed their inability to find either funds or foreign 
exchange to service their debts, the FBPC alleged that such countries, -"many and indeed 
most of them"- had found both funds and foreign exchange to buy up their bonds at very low 
prices "at which the bonds are selling due to their own wilful default". According to the 
Council, "thirteen countries in default had at the time of default approximately 
US$1,815,347,000 of dollar debt outstanding. These countries have in some 7 years 
repatriated approximately 25% of this debt, though all the time alleging they had not 
available funds or exchange to serve their bonds".
Repatriations constituted a contentious issue in the Colombia's case. As seen in Section
II.C.3, these repurchases took place at prices well below par. In some cases, contracts 
allowed debtors to make open market purchases of their own bonds with the aim of 
stabilizing market quotations. Additionally, committees representative of creditors found 
legitimate such repurchases even at prices substantially below par where bonds were being 
punctually served, but strongly condemned repurchases of defaulted securities. The 
Colombian case is illustrative of repurchases at low prices of both punctually served and 
defaulted bonds.
Colombia started repatriating bonds at prices below par at least since early 1932. Although 
the amortization service of the external debt was suspended in 1932 (February), it was 
effected for the obligations of the national government until 1933. During these two years the 
national government was repatriating external bonds after the expedition of the legislation 
which authorized the payment of domestic banking debts by means of external bonds. As 
seen in our previous discussion about internal debt and rescue of the financial system 
(Section II.B.2) the government exchanged the external bonds actually repatriated by bonds 
of the internal debt. The repatriation of bonds sold abroad by the national government during 
1932-1933 was not negligible. Repurchases of dollar bonds amounted to U.S.$5,997,500 and 
those of sterling bonds added up to £57,617; the former represented 12% of the outstanding
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external debt of the national government denominated in dollars, and the latter, 4% of that 
debt denominated in sterling. According to tables 50 and 51 above, the repatriation of sterling 
bonds was made at an average price of 45%, and that of dollar bonds at about 35%.^^
The repatriation of dollar bonds by the national government was made while the debt was 
still fully served. Additionally, original contracts allowed the government to make open 
market purchases at prices below par. Therefore, from the standpoint of creditors those 
operations were genuine. As for the sterling debt, although some sinking funds were 
suspended in 1932, interest in most cases was fully paid until the second half of 1933. 
According to the Stock Exchange Yearbook (London) "since 30 June 1932 the government 
have acquired large blocks of these loans and have delivered them to the fiscal agents to be 
credited to the sinking fund".^^ Asked by some critics whether those operations were 
acceptable, the CFB replied: "The purchases of bonds abroad was part only of a general 
scheme designed, not primarily to affect the position as between Colombian borrowers and 
foreign lenders, but to meet a critical situation as between Colombian debtors and Colombian 
creditors".
Repatriations covered not only national government bonds but also bonds of regional 
governments and mortgage banks. Although this topic is discussed in detail further in this 
section, some orders of magnitude can be illustrative at this point of the relevance of 
repatriations. Mortgage banks repatriated about 52% of their dollar debt, and 30% of their 
sterling debt before settlements were renegotiated in the early 1940s. The City of Bogota 
repatriated 60% of its external bonds before normalizing the debt service in 1946. Other two 
municipalities and six departments repatriated some 55% of their debt. It is not adventurous 
to say that most repatriations could have occurred between 1932 and the end of the first 
round of negotiations in 1937, since this was the period of lowest bond quotations, and the 
1940s were dominated by final renegotiations and settlements. Some documentary evidence 
given below supports this conjecture.
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Considering only the dollar debt some rough estimates can be advanced here. Using the 
percentages of individual repatriations given in the previous paragraph, total repatriations 
amounted to about US$56.5 million, namely 38.8% of the outstanding dollar debt in 1932.
By using average prices calculated from Table 51 it is obtained that Colombian debtors paid 
some US$12.8 million, or 23%, for that contractual amount of US$56.5 million. By assuming 
that the remaining 61.2% of the dollar debt was paid at its nominal value, it is concluded that 
by means of repatriations at prices below par, Colombia only paid 70% of the contractual 
value of her external debt.
If repatriations per se were a controversial issue, the Colombian case, amongst others, was a 
subject of inquiry by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. In one of the hearings, 
an official of Baker, Kellog and Co. -the bankers of the Cauca Valley Department- elicited an 
estimate that "Colombian dollar bonds of all descriptions with a market value of $12 million 
have been repatriated during the years that Colombia, its political subdivisions and mortgage 
banks have been in complete default on the same bonds".Furthermore, it was established 
that Hallgarten and Co. -the bankers who floated the two main loans to the national 
government in the 1920s- had aided in repatriation of coupons on defaulted issues. The 
commission brought from a partner in Hallgarten Co., on admission that "the Colombian 
government had been repatriating interest coupons of the defaulted issues. Hallgarten and 
Co., on behalf of the Colombian Treasury, it was brought out, had purchased these coupons 
from bondholders at a price considerably under their face amount"
In the end, one of the effects of the polemic about repatriations was to question the extent to 
which the foreign exchange constraint in Colombia was actually preventing a partial 
resumption of debt service, although as we saw in Section H.C.4., this was the conclusion of 
the report about Colombia prepared by the Institute of International Finance at the end of 
1935.^^ Finally, it can be advanced here that after all the debate, repatriations became an 
integral part of settlements in the early 1940s. In a temporary arrangement agreed in 1940 
(February) to resume the service of the dollar bonded debt of the national government.
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Colombian authorities were authorized to invest a certain sum in the purchase of bonds in the 
market. The FBPC recommended this arrangement to the bondholders as a "step in the right 
direction".^ Details about this agreement are offered below in our discussion of the second 
round of negotiations.
3. Contentious issues: Trade pressures against defaulting countries.
During the first round of negotiations there were attempts to use trade agreements as 
mechanisms of pressure to induce the Colombian government to resume debt payments. In 
1933 the U.S. State Department took the initiative of negotiating reciprocal trade treaties with 
select Latin American countries. These treaties were thought to be part of the New Deal's 
approach to foreign policy. In the Colombian case, although a bilateral trade treaty had been 
agreed by both parties in 1933, the official agreement was not signed until 1935.^^ In the 
meantime, bondholders demanded that compelling methods should be applied to induce the 
Colombian government to resume the debt service, and the trade agreement discussion was 
seen as a proper opportunity to impose those measures. The FBPC revealed to the Colombian 
president that "an increasing pressure is being brought both upon the Council and upon 
Washington by bondholders who are insisting that some sort of coercive measure shall be 
adopted against Colombia along the model set up by European countries or by levying a 
special tariff against Colombian coffee, or by other equivalent method... You could consider 
whether it is prudent to implement measures in the near future destined to resume the debt 
service in order to prevent those actions".
The Colombian president was not to be intimidated given his knowledge of the New Deal's 
approach to inter-American relations^^: "this threat does not modify in any way the intent of 
the Colombian government to study quietly the best plan to meet the external obligations of 
the Republic".Additionally, the U.S. State department clearly stated that trade and debt 
were separate issues, and that the aim of trade agreements was solely the resurgence of
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international trade. When representatives of holders of Colombian bonds appeared before the 
Tariff Commission, the State Department declared:
"The position of the Department is that the primary purpose of the trade agreements 
negotiated under the Act of June 12,1934 is the revival of international trade, and the 
agreement with Colombia, does not, therefore, contain provisions specifically relating to the 
resumption of service of Colombian dollar obligations. However, inasmuch as the decline in 
international trade was one of the principal causes of financial difficulties in many countries, 
it is to be expected that the revival of international trade which the trade agreement program 
seeks to foster will aid in remedying conditions which have led to defaults".^^
There also existed practical reasons not to involve the issue of debt in trade negotiations. If 
U.S. trade negotiators had also to deal with the resumption of debt service, they would be 
asked to give some trade advantages in return. Furthermore, while a bond payment revision 
could be advantageous in a particular case, the precedent could work disaster in other 
cases.^^ In conclusion, the U.S. administration was not in the position of using any trade 
negotiation to protect bondholders, and therefore no provision for payments on bonds was 
included in trade agreements.
The attempt to link the trade and debt issues led to further conflicts on the creditors' side, 
since any trade sanction imposed on defaulters on their long-term debts would affect current 
businesses of short-term and commercial lenders. There was, then, a conflict of interests 
between commercial bankers and bondholders. The FBPC explicitly recognized this 
inconsistency on the creditors' side in a reference to the Colombian case in hearings of the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Accordingly, the FBPC "never took any steps to 
obtain equal treatment for long-term Colombian bondholders with the American banks that 
hold short-term Colombian securities [the bank syndicate headed by the National City Bank 
mentioned in Section I.C.6] and still are receiving interest and amortization. [It was] pointed 
out that trade financing by the large institutions [the bank syndicate] gave them an obvious 
preference, and that this problem remains one of the difficulties faced in the settlement of 
foreign government defaults.^ ^  Additional conflicts were shown to exist between
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bondholders and subsidiaries of big U.S. companies operating in Colombia which were also 
creditors of the national govemment.^^
4. Initiatives of negotiation
Attempts of negotiation flourished as of 1937 with both the British and U.S. creditors. The 
[British] Council of Foreign Bondholders (CFB) was not an explicit negotiating body in the 
Colombian case before 1937; that function was left in the hands of Lazard Brothers and 
Co.^^ Late in 1935 the CFB made it clear that "we do not consider that any useful purpose 
would be served by any intervention on our part at the present time".^^ Some events 
prompted a closer attention of the CFB to the Colombian debt question, and encouraged an 
active negotiating role of the Council. Early in 1937 the British ambassador to Colombia 
(Paske-Smith) conferred with the Colombian president (Lopez) who assured him the 
government was looking forward to the resumption of the external debt service. Additionally, 
the CFB formed a Colombian Bondholders' Committee so as to have a body to whom refer 
any offers made by Colombian authorities. The Committee was supposed to take some steps 
"to set the ball [of negotiations] moving".
Mr. Paske-Smith informed the British Foreign Office about his conversation with president 
Lopez. Accordingly, the president expressed that the improving fiscal situation "enabled the 
Colombian government to consider some step towards the renewal of their service on the 
external debt". Additionally, he assured the ambassador that "British bondholders could rely 
on receiving no worse treatment than that which will ultimately be given to United States 
bondholders". The president added, however, "that some arrangement would have to be made 
for the short-term loan of the National City Bank, the First National Bank of Boston and 
Messrs. Lazard Brothers, before they could reach any settlement with the bondholders".^^ In 
conclusion, there would not be discrimination between bondholders, but the 1931 short-term 
debt with the bank syndicate would be in the first place of the negotiating agenda.
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The reaction of the CFB to the statements of the Colombian President emphasized two 
points. Firstly, though the British investments in Colombia were much lower than the 
American, the sterling debt was considerably senior to the dollar loans since the former was 
backed by some special securities. Secondly, the ambassador at Bogota "should be instructed 
to obtain the president's assurance that we should be kept advised of the Colombian 
government's proposals and that no agreement would be reached with the Americans untü the 
Council had had an opportunity of expressing their v iew s" .T h e  first point -the fact that 
sterling loans were specifically secured-, would be a permanent argument of British 
negotiators until a final settlement of the direct sterling debt was reached in 1942. The second 
point shows a characteristic of the British negotiating style according to which ambassadors 
would play an active role in negotiations on behalf of the bondholders.
In the United States, while the FBPC showed growing impatience about what they considered 
an economically unwarranted position of Colombia regarding the resumption of partial 
external payments, the State Department maintained a more flexible attitude. Although these 
contrasting positions were more explicit since the end of 1935, some testimonies reveal that 
they already existed during the first months of the FBPC. One testimony of these 
discrepancies also shows that early initiatives of settlement by countries like Colombia were 
dismissed by the FBPC. Unfortunately, no specific details of those proposals are available. 
According to the Economic Adviser of the Secretary of State, "before many months had 
passed [since the legal incorporation of the FBPC in December 1933] I was listening to the 
aggrieved protests of the diplomatic representatives of several Latin American countries - 
Brazil and Colombia among them- against the refusal of the officers of the Council to accept 
offers of payment which they thought were the utmost their governments should be called 
upon to make at the time. I formed the opinion -and I was rather well informed about the 
capacity of these debtors to pay- that the representatives of the Council were being too 
demanding".
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Some movements were made in early 1937 towards an initiative of negotiation with 
Colombia. The British "money doctor" Sir Otto Niemeyer who had led missions to Brazil in 
the early 1930s, which paralleled the Kemmerer missions to Colombia and other Latin 
American countries, discussed the question of Colombia with the president of the FBPC 
regarding possible first steps.^^ But the decisive initiative resulted from a concerted effort of 
the State Department and the FBPC. It was agreed to send an academic with previous 
experience in the State Department, in mission to Colombia, representing the interests of the 
bondholders. The State Department arranged a leave of absence from Yale University for 
Dana Munro, former chief of the division of Latin American affairs, and who had led a 
similar mission to Cuba.
Regarding Munro’s appointment, the Secretary of State Cordell Hull expressed that "the 
department would welcome a mutually satisfactory adjustment of this debt situation, both 
because of the benefit to American investors and because its continued unsettlement is an 
unsatisfactory element in its relationship with Colombia" The CFB assumed that Munro 
would also deal with the sterling debt, but the FBPC discarded that presupposition.^^ It was 
then agreed that a representative of British interests would cooperate with Munro without 
participating in actual negotiations. Consequently, the CFB obtained from the Foreign Office 
that "suitable instructions" were given to the British Minister at Bogota.^^
Conversations between Munro and Colombian authorities took place in May and September, 
1937. In the last occasion president Lopez pointed out internal political problems which 
could jeopardize any attempt of definitive settlement.^^ Nevertheless, the comptroller 
general Lieras Restrepo made an offer which happened to be not only the first concrete 
proposal of normalization of debt payments, but the one which became the basis of further 
definitive agreements. The Lieras' plan had the following characteristics. As to current 
interests, payments would be resumed in 1938 at a rate of 2% per annum which would be 
increased by 1/4 of 1% every following year until reaching the rate of 3%; this one would be 
the definitive annual rate starting from the fifth year. As to sinking fund, there would be
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annual payments of 1% on the amounts originally issued. Finally, interest arrears would be 
written off. In summary, the plan invited creditors to forgive interest arrears and to make 
concessions on future interest payments by accepting a reduction of the contractual rate of 
6% to the suggested one of 3% .^
According to Randall (1977), Munro rejected as "impractical" the Lieras' plan, because the 
FBPC was "perhaps trying to drive too hard a bargain" Later in November 1937 the 
Colombian ambassador at Washington was on the point of beginning conversations with the 
FBPC, when the president of the council discontinued discussions with Colombia. It was 
argued that the new coffee policy introduced by Brazil in November 1937, which eliminated 
existing supports of coffee prices, created an uncertain prospect of the Colombian economy, 
therefore making more difficult the process of negotiation.^^
5. Summary
What were the Colombia's preferences during the first round of negotiations? While 
expressing her willingness to pay, the country stated that payments would be restablished 
only according to the capacity to pay, without imposing unreasonable restrictions on 
government economic programs, and only when lenders conceded that the nominal contracts 
signed in the 1920s were unenforceable in the economic reality of the 1930s. On the other 
side, the best expected result for lenders would have been an immediate restablishment of 
payments according to the nominal contracts, without any concessions. In practice, however, 
lenders opted for not pressing immediate and permanent agreements, which did not exclude 
that attempts for a hard bargain were applied in the case of Colombia.
Finally, while debtors and lenders expressed their points of view about the normalization of 
debt payments, repatriations were an active market solution during the first round. This 
mechanism satisfied the preferences of the debtors and secured a partial payment to the 
creditors.
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C. Second Round. 1938-1942
The second round started with initiatives to solve the debt question. Regarding the dollar 
debt, creditors urged the resumption of discussions. In April 1938, the president of the FBPC 
invited the Colombian ambassador in Washington to restart negotiations: "The important 
thing is to have negotiations. The promise of such negotiations has been held out to us as a 
possibility for the last four years...We are at your d isposal" .As for the sterling bonds, 
debtors made a concrete proposal of definitive settlement of the obligations of the Mortgage 
Bank of Bogota which represented an important fraction of the Colombia's debt with British 
investors.
Two different phases are observed during the second round: first the 1938-39 period which 
was richer in controversies, particularly on the creditors' side, than in final settlements. It was 
the prelude of more fruitful years, 1940-1942, when creditors and debtors came to terms on 
the national government debt. During the first phase, the reader will find the strategies played 
by both U.S. and British negotiators. A critical aspect on the U.S. side was the direct 
intervention of the U.S. government. As for the British side, negotiators changed their 
strategies; initially they thought to be in the interest of investors to follow the U.S. 
negotiators game, but later they opted for less cooperative actions. Regarding the Colombian 
government, an outstanding characteristic of the second round was the purpose of getting 
fresh loans while settling the old debts.
1. First phase. 1938-1939
We start by discussing the first successful settlement of an external debt in October 1938. As 
the reader will note, the parties involved and financial observers were satisfied with the terms 
of the agreement. This accord was, however, an isolated outcome since most of the first
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phase was absorbed by the design of strategies which would lead to the settlement of the 
national debt during the second phase.
a. Settlement of the sterling debt of the Mortgage Bank of Bogota.
Although the external debt of the Mortgage Bank of Bogota represented no more than 7% of 
the total external obligations of the country in 1938, a definitive settlement of the sterling 
tranche of that debt was not entirely a minor step forward. This bank was the major external 
debtor among the private mortgage banks, and also the major debtor regarding the sterling 
component of mortgage-banks external debt. As for the composition of its own liabilities, 
67% of the foreign obligations were in sterling. Therefore, a settlement in this case meant 
more than a solution for two-thirds of the external debt of one bank. It implied a solution for 
the sterling debt in private hands, and perhaps more meaningfully, a way out for 40% of the 
Colombian debt with British bondholders.^^
Negotiations took place between the Colombian bank and a committee headed by Lazards, 
the banking house which floated the loans. There was not direct intervention of the CFB 
since this was a private debt, and councils (the CFB and the FBPC) were only concerned with 
public and publicly guaranteed debts. When the agreement was reached in October 1938, the 
outstanding balance was £1,760,000 and the rate of exchange between the sterling pound and 
the Colombian peso in London, £1=C$8.37. Additionally, recent market quotations had 
oscillated around 25 1/4% of the face value of the bonds, a clear illustration of the substantial 
loss of market value of the obligations in question.^^
The concrete proposal of the bank was as follows: holders of the 7% sterling bonds of the 
bank were offered C$415,4% guaranteed bonds in exchange for every £100 bonds held. The 
new peso bonds would be redeemable in 30 years by a sinking fund beginning in 5 years. The 
government would not only guarantee the new bonds and their service, but also the foreign 
exchange required for the transfer abroad of interest and sinking fund payments at the rates of
512
exchange ruling at their maturity dates.^^ As seen, Colombian negotiators offered to pay 
C$4.15 instead of C$8.37 for every sterling pound of debt; although this proposal implied a 
reduction of the nominal value of debt by 50%, it was still a moderate adjustment regarding 
the much lower market prices of the bonds. As for interests, the proposal did not recognize 
payment of interest arrears, and the rate for future payments was reduced to a level closer to 
ruling international interest rates. Finally, the distinguishing feature of the proposal, namely, 
the conversion of sterling bonds into Colombian peso bonds was accompanied by the 
guarantee that foreign exchange wiU be available for the transfer payments.
What was the reaction of creditors and financial observers? Lazards mentioned to the CFB 
that this "offer represented a real effort on the part of Colombia".^^ Additionally, the CFB 
directors declared that "They have no reason to doubt that the terms proposed were the best 
that could be expected in the circumstances and that Bondholders would be wise to accept 
them".^2
Simultaneously, the CFB adopted a defensive and to some extent contradictory or 
discriminatory position when looking forward to the negotiation of the national and publicly 
guaranteed debts. The directors added that "they wish to make it clear that they remain 
strongly opposed to any conversion of a Government, State or Municipal loan expressed in a 
foreign currency, into an obligation in local currency" Further, the CFB insisted that "we 
should of course have a legitimate complaint against the Colombian government if they did 
not make a better offer with regard to their direct debt, or if, having concluded an 
arrangement with the direct debt they were to plead that they could not carry it out owing to 
their undertakings to the Mortgage Bank of Bogota bondholders".^'^
The Financial Times commented in its editorial page that "the offer is evidently a good deal, 
more generous than have been expected... Taking in account the serious depreciation which 
has taken place in the value of the mortgage portfolio on which the bonds are secured, Lazard 
Brothers believes that the offer should be accepted by the bondholders"^^. In fact.
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bondholders accepted the offer. Before one year had passed, 60% of sterling bonds had been 
deposited at Lazard Brothers for exchange for peso bonds, and by 1942 the relevant 
percentage was 98%.^^ Regarding the exchange rate risk, British bondholders enjoyed a 
favourable position, since during the first decade after the negotiation the Colombian peso 
experienced a moderate appreciation with relation to the sterling pound.^^
b. Attempts of negotiation of the national government debt.
By the time the settlement regarding the external debt of the Mortgage Bank of Bogota was 
reached, new contacts for the renegotiation of the national external obligations were getting 
under way. The normalization of external debt payments was given a place among the 
priorities of a new executive administration in Colombia inaugurated in August 1938. The 
new president [Santos] mentioned the external debt question in his inaugural speech, 
expressing the desire of the government of fulfilling its obligations within the limits of what 
is "equitable and possible".^®
The FBPC reacted immediately suggesting the creation of a Colombian committee to be sent 
to the United States to resume negotiations.^^ And in an interview with Sir Thomas Hohler, 
head of a British Trade delegation to Bogota, the president went beyond official declarations 
to express his view of debt settlements accompanied by fresh loans. According to a reference 
of this interview by the CFB, president Santos asserted that he had in mind "the possibility of 
a settlement combined with the grant by England of a credit to be used for developing new 
industries in Colombia".^^ This sort of arrangement -debt settlements going with fresh 
credits- would be present in the renegotiations of the external debt of the national 
government.
By mid-1939 the debt question was central in government policies. Authorities aimed at a 
restauration of both the mtemal and external credit of the national government. In a message 
to Congress the president expressed: "In the whole matter of our public finances, the
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problems of major importance today are, without doubt those pertaining to the national 
debt...The government has felt that the solution of the actual state of things constitute the 
most urgent task in the matter of public finances, and in the execution of that task the 
government has applied itself with all intensity...
An outstanding result of this endeavour was the Law 54 of 1939 which authorized the 
government to adopt measures in connection with points such as the "regularization of the 
service of public debt and resumption of the service of the loans that are now in total or 
partial default, in accordance with new conditions that may be agreed upon by the Executive 
Organ,...". There were also authorizations for the floating of loans destined to the 
development and defense of industries, "especially that of coffee". The law explicitly 
mentioned that no authorizations were being given to establish or increase existing taxes. 
Therefore the new measures were supplemented by authorizations to reduce public 
expenditures in order to maintain a balanced budget. In conclusion, the government was 
authorized to restructure and normalize the debt service, and to float new loans, within a 
framework of government expenditures discipline.
i) Strategies of negotiation on the U.S. side.
Was there a strategy of negotiation on the side of U.S. creditors? As discussed above, 
creditors' representatives based negotiations on principles destined to protect the foreign 
investment of bondholders. In practice, the FBPC drove a hard bargain with Colombia. As 
commented before, initiatives put forward by Colombian negotiators were rejected by the 
council, including the proposal by the comptroller general to the FBPC envoy Dana Munro in 
August 1937. An important change was to be felt since early in 1939, however. The State 
Department was to play a more active and decisive role in negotiations. With this explicit 
involvement of the U.S. government, what was under question was not only the
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normalization of debt payments but the hemispheric aspirations of the United States under 
the New Deal's policies of "good neighbour" and "open door".
In the interest of expanding export markets in Latin America, Colombia was considered as a 
candidate for loans of the Export-Import Bank. While contributing to boost U.S. exports, 
such credits would pave the way for the solution of the debt question. This point of view 
expressed by the Treasury Secretary, Henry Morgenthau, early in January 1939, and backed 
by the U.S. ambassador to Colombia, found some opposition in the State Department which 
sustained that before any financing was given, Colombia should take the initiative of solving 
the current debt problem. Morgenthau's initiative would get through towards the end of the 
year as we will see below.
Recent research has suggested that the persistence of the Treasury Department in normalizing 
financial relations with Colombia was also explained by the foreign oil policy of the United 
States. Changing political situations in Latin America during the 1930s, and the temporary 
lack of access to oil supplies from the East Indies and the Middle East during World War U, 
focussed the attention on oil producers in the Caribbean. By 1942,42% of the world petroleum 
reserves were located in the United States. In the case of an oil shortage for military use, the 
Latin American reserves which amounted to 12% of the world total would be easily 
accessible. Although Venezuela was endowed with three-quarters of the Latin American 
recoverable oil reserves, Colombia was in the second place with 9% of the reserves, and with 
refineries which the U.S. authorities considered could quickly be brought into production in 
the case of a wartime supply problem.^^
On May 25 1939, the Colombian ambassador to Washington began formal conversations 
with the FBPC for the purpose of reaching an agreement regarding the dollar debt of the 
national government. According to the minister of finance, this was a more defined stage of 
negotiations based on a written presentation of Colombia's point of view. Given that Brazil 
had recently made an agreement which comprised credits opened by the Export-Import Bank
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to the Brazilian industrial sector, it was speculated in the media that a similar agreement was 
being sought by Colombia. To attenuate this conjecture, the minister declared that "these 
negotiations have no bearing whatsoever on any other negotiation and they have been 
undertaken by the government of Colombia with the primary object of seeking to comply 
with our foreign committments within the limits imposed by our real capacity to pay".^^
The direct intervention of U.S. government departments in the renegotiation of 
Colombian and other Latin American debts, and the consequent partial displacement of the 
FBPC from the negotiating table was encouraged by official declarations of President 
Roosevelt in October 1939. According to The New York Times, the president expressed 
himself as "rather disappointed with the work of the Foreign Bondholders Protective 
Council", and even "reiterated his stand in favour of scaling [debts] down".^ These 
comments were accompanied by official indications that the U.S. government was preparing 
"a formula with which to deal with the readjustment of Latin American debts as a basis for 
extension of credits to the republics..." (emphasis added). Such a formula would involve 
"substitution of direct government negotiation for the semi-official efforts at debt settlement 
made since 1933 by the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council...". Finally, it was added 
that the "scene for experiments" with the new formula would include Brazil and Colombia. 
This last country was "expected to provide the test of the new contemplated direct 
negotiation policy"
The FBPC rejected Roosevelt's attacks and explained them as a governmental excuse to 
justify New Deal's international programs. They accused the government of attempting "to 
toss good money after bad" in its "latest experiment in international pump priming". More 
even, the FBPC blamed the government for its unwillingness to force foreign debtors to 
pay.^^ In this rather strained situation the conflict was not only between the U.S. government 
and the FBPC; debtors who presumably would benefit from the U.S. administration approach 
would also have to endure some adverse publicity. As for the negotiations between the
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Colombian embassy in Washington and the FBPC, they also would reflect the conflict, with 
the Embassy assuming defensive positions or denouncing the inflexibility of the FBPC.^^
Morgenthau’s initiative of granting credits of the Export-Import Bank to Colombia so as to 
foster U.S. exports and facilitate a debt settlement appeared to have succeeded by the end of 
1939. On December 5 1939, Morgenthau himself, the president of the Export-Import Bank, 
members of the State and Commerce departments, and Esteban Jaramillo, the former 
Colombian finance minister who in vain had tried to keep up the external debt service during 
the early 1930s, met to discuss the Colombia's case. No member of the FBPC was invited to 
this meeting which established a precedent for some other sessions during 1940.^^ Shortly 
afterwards (February, 1940) Colombian authorities announced a provisional settlement 
regarding the dollar national debt as we will see below. Also during the first months of 1940 
the Export-Import Bank granted its first loan to Colombia for US$10 million. This was the 
first time the country got access to foreign financing of official origin.
ii) Defining strategies. Changing British positions.
The fact that only 10% of the bonded external debt of Colombia was in the hands of British 
bondholders determined the negotiating strategy of the CFB. To be precise, only 6% of the 
long-term external debt of Colombia was a matter of direct interest of the CFB, since the debt 
of the Mortgage Bank of Bogota was a private debt. Additionally, while 50% of exports and 
imports of Colombia (as of 1938) was with the United States, only 12% of imports and a 
negligible 0.5% of exports were traded with Britain. To complete the scene, the prospect of 
extending new credits to Colombia was by far more viable in the United States than in 
Britain; needless to say, the flotation of fresh loans in the London market after the outbreak 
of World War II became unlikely. In these conditions, having understood the weakness of its 
bargaining position, the CFB considered it fortunate to obtain no worse terms than those 
given to the dollar loans.
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Even under the limited conditions just mentioned, the CFB remained very active regarding 
opportunities to restart negotiations. An illustrative experience was the attempt of the CFB of 
pressing the resumption of negotiations coinciding with a mission sent by the British Board 
of Trade to Bogota in early August 1938. At that time, there existed an understanding 
between the CFB and the FBPC according to which it was the latter which should initiate 
negotiations at the "opportune" moment. At an international conference of bondholders 
associations held in Paris in June 1938, officials of both councils discussed the Colombian 
debt situation taking in account the intended British delegation to Bogota. The message of the 
CFB was that "negotiations should be resumed by the FBPC early in August so as to coincide 
with the British Trade Mission's visit to Bogota" The CFB did not get an unqualified 
"yes", but only a joint private manifestation that "it might be appropriate that an attempt 
should be made at about the same time or soon afterwards to resume conversations with the 
Colombian govemment".^^
The British government discarded the CFB's aspiration of associating debt negotiations with 
trade arrangements. In this respect, the British government's reaction resembled that of the 
U.S. government in a similar situation in 1934. According to the CFB, "the Board of Trade 
view is that if we now pressed the Colombians to settle their foreign debt, they would insist 
on linking this question with the trade discussions and that neither we nor the Trade Mission 
would make any headway".^^ Also according to the CFB, Sir Thomas Hohler, head of the 
trade delegation "made it clear that he would not discuss the debt problem with Colombia but 
said that he would take any suitable opportunity to impress on the Colombians the 
importance from the point of view of their own credit of coming to an agreement over their 
external debts"
Because the relative bargaining position of the CFB and the FBPC was to the disadvantage of 
the British bondholders, the strategies followed by the former were a continuous matter of 
controversy. Between mid-1937 and mid-1939 the CFB stuck to the strategy of not 
attempting to get better treatment for the sterling government loans than could be given to the
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dollar government loans. The strategy changed in mid-1939 when the council expressed that 
most of the sterling loans to Colombia deserved a preferential treatment. In practice, the 
change of strategy meant that instead of cooperation both councils would conduct separate 
negotiations.
The first negotiating strategy of the CFB was designed in 1937 when the FBPC envoy, Dana 
Munro, initiated negotiations in Bogota. In such occasion the CFB communicated to the 
FBPC that "both you and we are only representing Government and Government guaranteed 
loans, and [we] take it that as between these, neither of us claim preferential treatment...". In 
this context the CFB noted that while the FBPC envoy "will negotiate for the best possible 
terms for the dollar loans and Mr. Paske-Smith [ambassador to Colombia] will help him in 
pressing the Colombians to do their best and will tell them that he is not negotiating for the 
sterling bondholders but that he expects them to be offered the same terms that are offered to 
the dollar bondholders".^'^
Why did the CFB consider that it was maximizing the value of the sterling loans to Colombia 
by acting as a follower of the FBPC actual negotiating? It was not only because of the 
dependence of Colombia with respect to the United States regarding trade and credit, but 
because ongoing negotiations with other countries, with major British interests involved, 
made it inadvisable to antagonize the Americans in the Colombian case. Brazil, the major 
Latin American debtor, was the focus of attention. As seen in Section n.C.3., 65% of the 
Brazilian external debt was in the hands of British bondholders, and therefore the CFB 
wanted to minimize any concessions to the U.S. creditors.
In an explanation of its negotiating strategy to the Foreign Office, the CFB expressed: "The 
Council feel that in the interests of British bondholders in Brazil and in other countries they 
would be unwise to make a separate settlement with Colombia. They have therefore decided 
to throw in their lot with the U.S. bondholders and to demand no better terms for sterling 
loans than are accorded to dollar lo a n s " .B y  mid-1938 the CFB accepted that there could
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be some changes in the strategy in the sense of for instance taking the initiative of inviting 
the Colombian government to negotiate. But even in this case, any action would proceed only 
after consultation with the FBPC, and "in any case the understanding would inevitably be that 
sterling and dollar loans should be treated alike".^^
The committment of the CFB with its own strategy started weakening in early 1939. There 
was a sense of lack of cooperation of the FBPC, but most of all, the evolution of negotiations 
with other debtor countries, particularly Brazil, created doubts about the soundness of the 
strategy adopted in 1937. The results of a visit of the Brazilian minister Aranha to 
Washington at the beginning of 1939 made an important effect on the CFB’s appreciations. 
The Roosevelt's administration invited Aranha not only because of New Deal's reasons, but 
because of considerations of international politics. Germany was the second most important 
customer of Brazil, and given the international expansionism of the former, and the 
importance of the latter in Latin America, German economic interests in Brazil became a 
matter of concern for the United States.^^ The effect of Aranha's visit was the extension of 
credits by the Export-Import Bank in exchange for a partial renewal of debt service (footnote 
64 of this section).
The CFB's Colombian Committee faced, then, a new situation. The president of the CFB 
expressed that "Our experience of attempted cooperation with the American Council and the 
outcome of Aranha's recent discussions in Washington raises the question whether, if we 
believe that at any rate some of the sterling loans deserve better treatment than some of the 
dollar loans, we should do our best to secure it or should abandon it". The answer was 
suggested by the following description of the current U.S. approach to conducting 
negotiations: "One cannot help wondering whether we shall receive any reciprocity from the 
USA in return for any restraint on our part, and whether we have on the other hand much 
reason to believe that the Washington Administration will do anything effective in favour of 
dollar bondholders in Brazil or any other country
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The Committee then decided to abandon an important ingredient of the strategy of throwing 
in its lot with the FBPC, in order to get some measure of practical recognition of the 
preferential claims of the secured loans. What and how important were the secured loans?
Four of the five sterling loans to the national government had some special security. The 5% 
Bogota-Sabana Railway mortgage loan of 1906 was a direct obligation of the national 
government, specially secured by trust deed on Bogota-Sabana Railway (25 miles). The 6% 
loan of 1911, secured on 3% of customs revenues of the Republic. The 6% bonds of 1913, 
secured by 1% of the total custom revenues of the Republic, any deficiency to be met out of 
the general revenues. And finally, the 6% bonds of 1920, secured by a first charge of 5% on 
the Atlantic customs revenues, and by guarantee of the Republic. Although one sterling loan 
was not especially secured, its relatively very small amount implied that 97% of the sterling 
debt was backed by special securities. Finally, it has to be noted that the specially secured 
sterling debt was in the proportion of 1 to 9 with respect to the non-secured dollar debt of the 
national government.
The strategy of getting some measure of practical recognition was then put forward. The 
chance of getting some preference in favour of the secured loans from Colombia was 
"extremely little" according to ambassador Paske-Smith. Colombians would have to make 
their offer first to the Americans, and if a settlement was reached, the ambassador explained, 
the Americans would insist on a clause excluding other creditors from getting better terms.^^ 
The change of strategy was presented by the CFB to the FBPC as representing "a very strong 
feeling amongst the interests we represent that in any debt settlement some measure of 
practical recognition should be given to the preferential claims of the specially secured 
loans". What was being proposed was a recognition of the principle according to which 
government debts with guarantees "should receive a better treatment" than government debts 
without guarantees.®^
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The CFB presented the case of secured loans to Colombia as a reference for other more 
complex negotiations.®^ On the other side, the FBPC's insinuation that the distinction 
between "secured" and "unsecured" loans was meaningless, led to further conceptual debates. 
The FBPC stated that "the situation seems to be that these so-called "securities" are not in 
fact securities and that because they have not been effective against the funds designated the 
idea apparently is to give the bonds an actual preferential position on the general revenues 
and exchange of the country". And in a direct reference to the four "secured" sterling loans to 
Colombia, the FBPC asserted: "All the securities you [the CFB] refer to as pertaining to the 
sterling bonds appear to be unenforceable and they have not been made effective, in fact, 
during the period of default".®^
The CFB defended the point that specifically secured loans had a preferred position. While 
unsecured loans were to be paid out of general revenues of the debtor government, the 
secured loans in addition to also classifying against the general revenues had a specific 
priority against part of those revenues. This priority would not disappear in the event of 
default.®® The CFB highlighted the role played by specific securities in the foreign credit 
market. Such securities had been part of the offer to potential investors, and therefore the 
decision to invest abroad would have been influenced by their own existence. In fact, the 
CFB alleged, bondholders had accepted lower rates because of the special security offered. 
The image of this decision in the market would have been higher quotations for secured 
loans, an experience confirmed "throughout the history of foreign lending".®^
While this interchange of opinions took place, the Colombian embassy in Washington and 
the FBPC came back to the negotiating table. After the storm created by Roosevelt's 
references to the FBPC in October 1939, and coinciding with the appointment of a new 
Colombian ambassador, negotiations were resumed in November. There was also an explicit 
intervention of the Colombian representative on the Inter-American Financial and Economic 
Advisory Committee, Esteban Jaramillo.®® As seen above, Jaramillo attended the meetting 
organized by Secretary Morgenthau at the beginning of December to discuss the Colombian
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debt question. The presence of Jaramillo was not of secondary importance, since according to 
the British ambassador Paske-Smith, Jaramillo "has been given ample powers ... to negotiate 
for a settlement with the United States Bondholders Council".®®
As the negotiations with the FBPC went on, the CFB felt the sensation of being left behind. 
"We understand that discussions are in progress" wrote the CFB to the FBPC, adding that 
"we are also closely interested in this question respect of the sterling bonds".®^ The CFB was 
not confident in obtaining a quick and helpful answer from the FBPC, and therefore tried to 
obtain it through the Foreign Office and the embassy at Bogota: "from past experience of the 
Council, [we] do not expect to get a reply for a very considerable time and in all probability 
not until the American Council has got everything cut and dried for the dollar 
bondholders".®® As a matter of fact, the FBPC replied that although talks were being held, it 
was not possible to forecast what the final situation could be.®  ^Notwithstanding, less than a 
month later the Colombian minister of finance announced that an agreement had been 
reached in Washington, as we will see below.^®
The CFB feared that Roosevelt's policies in Latin America could deprive the value of British 
loans: "in view of the efforts which are being made at the present time between the United 
States government and Latin American countries in various directions ... there is some danger 
that the sterling interests may get pushed into the background" Consequently, the CFB asked 
the Foreign Office to instruct the ambassador in Bogota to try to ascertain the proposals 
discussed in Washington, and to ensure that the sterling debt was not overlooked, 
"emphasizing of course, that four out of five of the sterling state loans are secured whereas 
none of the USA dollar state loans have a specific security".
To sum up, the first phase of the second round of negotiations was not fruitful in final 
agreements. However, the only successful negotiation of the period brought about the 
settlement of 40% of the external debt of British origin. The choice of strategies was the 
dominant characteristic of the period. Furthermore, the first phase showed how governments
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of creditor countries were not passive observers of negotiations, but as the reader will find 
out during the second phase, crucial factors of final agreements.
2. Second phase 1940-1942
The 1940-1942 period was fruitful in offers and settlements. The main achievement was the 
definitive settlement of both the dollar and sterling bonded debt of the national government. 
Offers were made to normalize the service of the dollar debt of mortgage banks, and also a 
final agreement was reached regarding the short-term debt with the group of financiers 
headed by the City Bank of New York. No proposals were made with respect to the 
municipal and departmental debts with the exception of the municipality of Barranquilla. 
Considering only the long-term debt, the settlements carried out during 1940-1942 
represented some 47% of the outstanding balances. The reader will be introduced to the first 
dollar settlement of the time before going into the facts which accompanied the final 
agreements regarding the national debt.
a. Settlement of the debt of the City of Barranquilla
We briefly mention the proposal made by Barranquilla at the end of 1939 (November 22). 
Although Barranquilla floated no more than 8% of the municipal debt, hers was the first 
successful renegotiation of a defaulted dollar debt.^^ What is particular in this case is that 
although funds were not remitted abroad because of the exchange control imposed in 1932, 
the City deposited funds for the service of the bonds in local banks. The proposal sought to 
take advantage of a modification in the exchange control restrictions which authorized the 
transfer abroad of that sort of deposits. The City offered to the bondholders new 25 year 4% 
bonds in exchange for the existing 8% bonds, and for 60% of interest arrears. As an 
alternative, bondholders could sell their old bonds for Colombian pesos at a 60% of their 
nominal values. The negotiation was effected between the City and the City National Bank of 
Chicago which had been the fiscal agent of the loans.
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Although there was not direct intervention of the FBPC, the Council expressed concern for 
the lack of more adequate security for the service of the new bonds, since future payments 
would again depend on the "willingness and the ability" of the government to permit 
remittances abroad. In this context, the FBPC found questionable the fact that the negotiation 
had sacrificed back and future interest.^® In practice, bondholders accepted the proposal, and 
by 1942 no bonds of the 8% issue were outstanding. The local currency deposits made by the 
City in local banks between 1932 and 1939 were enough to retire 17% of the outstanding 
amount of old bonds in 1939. In conclusion, the first negotiation of a dollar debt partially 
forgave interest arrears, accepted peso payments for a non-negligible fraction of old bonds, 
and reduced the interest rate for future payments from 8% -a level "too" high in the 1920s-, to 
4%, a level closer to international rates in the late 1930s.
b. Settlement of the dollar debt of the national government
As noted above, direct conversations with the FBPC resumed in November, 1939, after the 
controversial declarations of president Roosevelt. These meetings would lead to concrete 
though still temporary proposals. Negotiations kept going under the "friendly mediation" of 
the U.S. government officials. According to the Colombian minister of finance, "the kind 
intervention of American officials which was limited to prompt an agreement between both 
the representative of the government and the representative of the council eased the 
negotiation process".
It has been mentioned, however, that some directions of future agreement were "suggested" 
by the U.S. mediators at this stage of negotiations. For instance, according to the British 
Foreign Office, the ambassador Paske Smith informed that "a hint has been conveyed to the 
Colombians that if they will accept 3% interest plus [US]$1 million annually to be applied to 
buying up bonds in the United States market, the State Department would then urge the 
United States Bondholders Council to accept these terms...".^® Further, as the debt
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negotiations evolved, the interdepartmental committee headed by the Treasury Secretary 
Morgenthau carried on discussions on prospects of credit to Colombia. By the end of 
December 1939, Morgenthau confirmed to the New York Times that the Colombian credit 
plan was "still cooking".^®
Early in February 1940, the minister of finance announced that a provisional agreement had 
been negotiated "since existing divergencies have prevented a definitive settlement from 
being reached".Randall (1977) based on correspondence of the Colombian ambassador to 
the United States, to Secretary Morgenthau, asserts that "the interdepartmental committee 
[Commerce, State and Treasury Departments]...persuaded a reluctant Foreign Bondholders 
Protective Council to accept a Colombian proposal for a temporary settlement ...".^® The 
agreement only contemplated the dollar debt of the national government made up of the 1927 
and 1928 loans, which constituted one-third of the total dollar debt of the country.
The provisional agreement, valid for the year 1940 only, implied that interests due during the 
year would be paid at the rate of 50% of their nominal value, namely 3% instead of the 
contractual rate of 6%. Additionally, the government committed himself to purchase bonds of 
the external loans of 1927 and 1928 in the open market for a nominal amount corresponding 
to the investment of US$400,000. Finally, the government undertook to present for 
cancellation and retirement US$5,997,500 principal amount of 1927 and 1928 bonds held in 
Colombia; these bonds had been purchased in the open market and repatriated during 1932 
and 1933 under the legislation enacted to "rescue" the financial system. As we saw in Section
II.B.2, the repatriated bonds were received by the commercial banks in payment of private 
credits, and then exchanged for bonds of the internal debt.^^
Regarding the provisional offer, the FBPC recommended its acceptance by the bondholders: 
"The Council feels that the present resumption of payment on a temporary basis is a step in 
the right direction and the bondholders may consider it to their interest to take the amount 
offered for this year"®^®. Internally, the government defended an accord which not only had
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reduced by one half interest payments, but allowed to make open market operations at the 
depreciated values of the time.
Simple calculations show the advantages derived by the government from the agreement. 
Before the implementation of the offer the oustanding balance of the 1927 and 1928 loans 
was US$51,223,500. This balance was reduced to US$45,226,000 after the cancellation of 
the bonds repatriated in 1932-1933 which were mentioned in the previous paragraph. 
Additionally, during 1940 the price range for those loans was 34%-15 3/4% (Table 51) which 
obviously made open market purchases profitable. In practice, the government bought up 
bonds for a nominal value of US$1,509,500 by investing only US$400,000, which gave an 
average price of 26%. Given these open market purchases, the new interest rate of 3% (plus 
1% for amortizations) affected the final outstanding balance of US$43,716,500. The resulting 
interest payments of US$1,750,000 compared favourably with the fixed annual amount of 
US$4,200,000 which had to be paid under the original contracts. In summary, while 
bondholders obtained cash payments during 1940, the government only paid some 40% of 
the contractual interests, and made capital gains of about 75% with relation to the face values 
of the bonds.
Once the provisional agreement was reached, negotiations went on to achieve a definitive 
settlement. As of mid-1940, the government understood that although negotiations were still 
in process, the limits of the discussion were already established. Then the government took 
the initiative of defining by decree the basis which could regulate the debt service once the 
provisional agreement expired. According to the minister of finance such basis represented 
the maximum commitunents the government could satisfy, and beyond which the 
government could not go in any case.^^^
The basis defined by the government included the exchange of present bonds by new ones 
which will carry interest of not more than 3% per year; capitalization of 50% of interest 
arrears and exchange of unpaid coupons for new bonds; annual allocation during five years of
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US$1.8 million to debt service; and annual allocation from the sixth year on of US$2.0 
million. Additionally, the government was authorized to suspend the debt service if economic 
or fiscal conditions prevented the country from completely servicing the new issue. This 
basis was communicated to the FBPC which according to the minister of finance "opposed a 
strong resistance to it".^^® Based on Morgenthau diaries, Randall(1977) indicates that the 
government formulated its basis for a final settlement with the unofficial approval of the 
departments of State, Treasury and Commerce".
At the end of the provisional agreement in December 1940, the State Department proceeded 
to announce the basis defined by the Colombian government and to recommend it to the 
bondholders. A joint statement by the State and Treasury Departments, and the Federal Loan 
Administrator concluded as follows:
"While the Government of the United States has no direct interest in the matter, the 
Department of State, the Treasury Department and the Federal Loan Administrator have 
acted as friendly intermediaries to assist the parties in reaching an agreement, and they are of 
the opinion that in view of conditions that have prevailed since 1932^ , the offer of the 
Colombian Government constitutes a fair effort on its part to adjust its oblivions. They 
recognize, of course, that the bondholders must make Üieir own decision."^®
The statement highlights the "fair effort" of the Colombian government while minimizing the 
U.S. government interventionist role.®^® Six months later the Colombian government offered 
a debt plan to the bondholders which followed the basis outlined above. The announcement 
of the Offer (June 5 1941) was careful to recall that the State Department had publicly 
commented (December 30 1940) with respect to the fairness of the Offer. Additionally, 
the U.S. bondholders were offered the guarantee of most favoured nation, a precedent which 
would affect the negotiations with British creditors. In the form of the new 3% Bonds, 
holders were advised that:
"The Republic agrees not to offer to holders of other external bonds of the Republic now 
outstanding any settlement on terms more favourable than those contained in the Offer; and 
to the extent that the holders of such other external bonds may be accorded terms more 
favourable than those contained in the Offer, tj^  Bonds shall be entitled pari passu to receive 
proportionately more favourable treatment".®^®
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What was the reaction of the FBPC to the State Department's press release and the Offer of 
the Colombian government? The FBPC strongly disapproved the Colombian debt plan 
explained in both of them. Once the former document was published, the FBPC stated that "it 
[the council] cannot recommend this plan... as a just, fair and equitable offer...". 
Emphatically, it added that "the council feels that it must protest against the inadequacy and 
unfairness of this offer which was not based on what Colombia can plainly do". And with 
respect to the effects of the U.S. government position on the future attitude of the Colombian 
government, the FBPC stated that "the Council does not feel justified in expecting that the 
Colombian government will make any more favourable proposal to the bondholders in view 
of the United States government's characterization of the present offer as costituting a fair 
effort on Colombia's part to adjust its obligations".®^^
The FBPC alleged that the 50% cut in interest rates was out of line with the Colombian 
economic possibilities and her position as credit risk. Additionally, it was argued that 
bondholders were being discriminated against since the 3% interest rate of the Offer was 
inferior to those paid on other external debts -the recent Export-Import Bank 4% loan, and 
the also 3% but short-term loan of the bank syndicate granted in 1931- and on the internal 
debt. Finally, the FBPC objected the fact that the government had included in the basis of the 
offer the right to stop payments due to adverse economic or fiscal conditions.®®^
As seen, the main reason for inconformity of the FBPC was the 50% cut in the contractual 
rate of interest. The council had recommended the provisional agreement for the year 1940 
only, which implied a similar reduction of interest rates, but without affecting the contractual 
rates. What the council opposed was the adoption of the temporary reduction as a permanent 
measure which would modify the contracts against bondholders interests, while the 
government kept the right of suspending the debt service. The FBPC even suggested to 
extend the provisional agreement beyond 1940, until the uncertainty created by World War II 
had receded. Clearly, the council tried to defer a definitive settlement until world economic
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conditions were propitious for an outcome more favourable to creditors. As Colombia did not 
accept that suggestion and decided to launch its own initiative of settlement with the backing 
of the U.S. government, the council refused the offer and accused the Colombian government 
of aiming "to lower the interest rate as much as possible in order to depress the value of the 
bonds...".®®®
Because the FBPC recommended the refusal of the Colombian offer, the final word was left 
to the bondholders who had to decide whether or not to accept the conversion of bonds under 
the conditions of the offer. As seen above, at the end of the provisional agreement the 
outstanding balance of the 1927 and 1928 loans was US$43,716,500. The Colombian debt 
plan offered to exchange the old 6% bonds due 1961 in the hands of the bondholders, for new 
3% bonds due 1970; the plan also offered new 3% bonds to capitalize 50% of interest arrears 
accumulated between 1935 and 1939, which amounted to US$6,283,372.5. To satisfy these 
requirements, the authorized issue of 3% bonds added up to US$50,000,000. What is 
important to note here is that during the first six months of the offer (June 30 to December 
31,1941), 46% of the total authorized issue of 3% bonds was accepted in exchange by the 
bondholders; by 1942 that figure had risen to 76%, and by 1945 to 88%. In conclusion, the 
Colombian debt plan was successful and became a definitive settlement with the bondholders 
in spite of the disapproval of the FBPC.®®^
c. Settlement of the dollar debt of mortgage banks
The next step was the settlement of the dollar external debt of the Colombian mortgage 
banks. By 1933,45% of that debt was publicly guaranteed and in the hands of the 
Agricultural Mortgage Bank (AMB). Other 47% of such debt was in the hands of two private 
institutions -the Mortgage Bank of Colombia and the Mortgage Bank of Bogota-. Also in 
1933, as part of the measures to rescue the financial system, the AMB took over the mortgage 
assets of these two private banks and assumed the liability for their external bonds. Therefore 
when the AMB started negotiations in 1941, it represented about 92% of the mortgage bank
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dollar debt; by extension, the negotiations also involved the remaining 8% of private dollar 
debt in the hands of the Bank of Colombia.
By 1941, Colombian official statistics and the records of fiscal agents in the United States 
indicated that the outstanding Colombian mortgage debt added up to US$22.7 million, of 
which US$10.3 million corresponded to the publicly guaranteed debt, and the remaining 
US$12.4 million to private, non-guaranteed debt.^^^ Negotiations, however, considered 
substantially different amounts. It was revealed that by 1941 the total mortgage debt 
amounted to US$10.9 million, the guaranteed debt being US$5.4 million and the non­
guaranteed one, US$5.5 million. The difference of 52% between the two aggregate amounts 
appeared to be explained by open market purchases of bonds which were repatriated but not 
returned to the fiscal agents for cancellation. According to Table 51 the AMB repatriated 
its bonds at prices ranging between 17% and 29% of the face value between 1936 and 1941.
Negotiations did not take place between the AMB and the FBPC, but between the Bank and 
officials of the U.S. State Department. The formula finally adopted was as follows. Holders 
of guaranteed bonds of the 6% and 7% issues of the AMB were offered in exchange 3% 
Government bonds. The ratio of exchange was of US$1,100 of Government bonds for each 
US$1,000 of guaranteed bonds. This ratio implied that bonds would be exchanged, par for 
par, and that US$100 in convertible certificates were being offered for 7 1/2 years of interest 
arrears. Regarding holders of non-guaranteed bonds the offer was different. Holders were 
offered US$750 of 3% Government bonds for each US$1000 of non-guaranteed bonds. This 
ratio implied that no payment of back interest accumulated during 10 to 10 1/2 years was 
recognized, and that a reduction of the face value of the bonds was determined.^
The plan of conversion received the support of the U.S State Department, and Secretary 
Cordell Hull declared himself "gratified" with the announcement of the offer. In a personal 
statement published on the same date of the offer, the Secretary pointed out that "this is a 
sequel to the adjustment by the government of Colombia in December 1940 of its own
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defaulted bonds. While the government of the United States has no direct interest in the 
matter, and the bondholders, of course, must decide for themselves whether to accept the 
Bank's offer, it is nevertheless considered that this is a further constructive effort to adjust 
Colombian foreign indebtedness on an equitable basis''.^
The FBPC made a statement to make plain that it did not negotiate the offer, and provided 
details about the AMB's plan. Regarding the guaranteed debt, it was shown that for every 
US$1,000 guaranteed bond of the 7% issues, interest arrears amounted to US$525 dollars; 
because only US$100 dollars were being offered for past due interest, it was concluded the 
offer implied that 81% of back interest was being forgiven. Similarly in the case of the 6% 
issues where for every US$1,000 guaranteed bond, interest arrears amounted to US$450, the 
offer implied that 78% of back interest was being forgiven. The FBPC called the attention of 
bondholders to the fact that Colombia had recognized 50% of interest arrears in the case of 
the public national government debt, and was accepting only about 2 0 % with respect to the 
publicly-guaranteed debt.
Concerning the non-guaranteed debt, because interest arrears ranged from US$680 to 
US$735 for different issues of US$1,000 bonds, the 25% reduction of the face amount of the 
original bonds contemplated in the offer implied that for every US$1000 non-guaranteed 
bond, holders would be making a loss of from US$930 to US$985. In conclusion, Colombian 
negotiators moved from recognizing 50% of overdue interest on the national government 
debt, to 2 0 % of overdue interest on the guaranteed debt, to total cancellation of past interest 
on the non-guaranteed bank debt. Additionally, while the nominal amounts of debt were left 
unchanged in the first two cases, it was reduced by 25% in the last case.^^^
Did bondholders accept these offers? According to the Exchange Agent, the National City 
Bank of New York, 81% of the AMB debt, and 71% of the non-guaranteed debt had been 
exchanged by 1946. Because no additional new 3% Government bonds were authorized for
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these exchanges, these operations were carried out by using 3% bonds actually redeemed by 
the Colombian government since July 1941.
d. Settlement of the sterling debt of the national government.
The CFB followed the course of the Colombian dollar debt negotiations through information 
sent by the British embassy in Bogota to the Foreign Of f i ce .^The  CFB found the dollar 
debt agreement to be a "distinctly generous" one. Why? Because among other things the offer 
contained a "most favoured nation" c l au se .Fo rm a l  negotiations with representatives of 
British creditors started in April 1940, when the provisional agreement with U.S. creditors 
was already in force. Conversations took place in Bogota between the minister of finance. 
Lieras Restrepo, and the manager of the Bank of London & South America in Bogota, Arthur
Thompson. 121
i) Coffee and debt settlement
Coffee was an important issue during negotiations in 1940. Colombia was seeking to find 
markets for 600,000 bags of coffee formerly taken by Germany, and European creditors 
explored the possibility of taking advantage from this situation. The French government 
offered to purchase 300,000 bags on the condition that 35% of the price was set aside to 
paying off the debt due to Lazard Frères of Paris; this debt was part of the short-term loan 
granted by the bank syndicate headed by the National City Bank of New York in 1931, in 
which Lazard Brothers of London through its subsidiary Lazard Frères of Paris had interests. 
Although the agreement with France failed due to the high price of Colombian coffee as 
compared with the Brazilian coffee, i t  was a precedent for later i n i t i a t i v e s .  122
The CFB although officiallv opposed to find any direct link between coffee purchases and 
settlement of defaulted debts, did its "utmost ...to get [the British government] to cause coffee 
purchases to be made from Colombia..."12^ The CFB asked the Treasury Chambers to find
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the way of importing coffee from Colombia, perhaps by diverting purchases already made 
from Central America. Officials of the Bank of England shared the position of the CFB since 
a "lever" was needed to strengthen the British bargaining position. These pressures proved 
unsuccessful for a variety of reasons such as the existence of already high stocks of coffee in 
Britain and the restriction of imports imposed by the w a r .  124
ii) Credit and debt settlement
The idea of fresh credit to Colombia associated with a permanent debt settlement was not 
new when negotiations commenced in April 1940. As seen above, since the beginning of the 
Santos Administration in August 1938, the President and the British ambassador had 
discussed such idea. The ambassador coincided with that proposition, and early in 1939 when 
visiting Britain, he was doing his utmost to secure credits destined to stimulate future exports 
to B r i t a i n .  125 The link between new credits and resumption of debt service was explicitly 
made by the minister of finance to the British negotiator. Given the depressed economic 
conditions of Colombia during 1940, a resumption of debt service would only be possible if 
there existed "some counter-advantage for [Colombia] particularly if it were in the direction 
of assistance in her immediate p r o b l e m s " .  125
The British ambassador summarized for the Foreign Office the position of the minister of 
finance by mid-1 9 4 0 .127 Accordingly, the minister asked "if it were not possible to arrange 
simultaneously for £1,000,000 credit against coffee either for the United Kingdom or 
France...Should such a credit be given then he would be in a position to justify extra foreign 
exchange needed for pressing payments on the debt". The minister suggested that "if a coffee 
agreement were reached, he would then without hesitation offer a settlement on debt 
including the Agricultural Mortgage Bank as well. He also added that an American credit had 
been received simultaneously with the debt settlement and that it had been in fact this credit 
which had enabled him to justify the settlement".128
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The aforementioned credit for £1 million represented some 20% of the Colombian direct 
sterling debt. The ambassador communicated to the British negotiator that the evolution of 
the war in Europe had affected foreign credit operations, and particularly, "that the question 
of the £1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0  deal had advanced considerably in the days before the attack on the 
Netherlands but had since remained in abeyance". Based on their discussions with the finance 
minister and direct knowledge of current economic conditions in Colombia, both the 
ambassador and the negotiator concluded that "unless something were arranged in the matter 
of taking coffee or helping Colombia in some other way there was little likelihood of getting 
anywhere ... as regards the bonded debt...".129
Proposals of coffee purchases and money advances to Colombia sank because of the 
constraints imposed by the war. In the draft of a telegram from the Treasury to ambassador 
Paske-Smith it was expressed that "the Treasury do not feel able to agree to the Colombian 
£1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0  credit proposal and it is therefore clear that the present shortage of sterling in 
Colombia will rapidly become still more acute . H.M.G. regret that the exigencies of the war 
should compel to treat old and valued customer like Colombia in such an unfavourable 
way...".180 The failure in finding the counteradvantages required for a definitive settlement 
with Colombia would postpone that final agreement for two years, at least with respect to the 
sterling debt of the national government.
iii) Proposals and final offer
The initial proposals of the Colombian government were associated with the possibility of 
using coffee as means of partial payment. 181 Similar proposals were made at the time by 
Brazil, which was not only the major world producer of coffee but the major Latin American 
debtor, most of her debt being of British origin. A concrete proposal discussed with the 
British negotiator in June 1940 suggested an immediate repayment of 20% of the total debt in 
Colombian coffee. The price would be determined according to current quotations for the 
debt and the Colombian coffee in London, granting a good margin for the bondholders.
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Although the market value of the debt would be well below par, implying a reduction of the 
nominal value of capital, the transaction would be justifiable on the grounds of immediate 
settlement. The rest of the debt would be subject to a settlement similar to that offered to the 
U.S. bondholders.
The British negotiator argued that the terms of the proposal were inferior to those actually 
offered to the U.S. bondholders, and that no measure of recognition was being given to the 
fact that four out of five sterling loans were specifically s e c u r e d .  182 Further initiatives of the 
minister of finance considered the possibility of making cash redemption offers, fixing the 
price of the debt somewhat above current quotations in L o n d o n .  188 On the creditors side 
pressure was made in order to obtain a simultaneous settlement for both the national and the 
publicly guaranteed (AMB) debt. This proposition was discarded by the Colombian 
government which had separated the two settlements in the case of the dollar debt; only when 
a possible coffee agreement was under discussion, Colombia was willing to accept a 
simultaneous settlement.
The distinction between secured and unsecured loans, and therefore the practical recognition 
expected by the CFB on the secured loans, were of very "relative" importance for the 
Colombian government. According to the British negotiator, the minister of finance "looks at 
the guarantees as purely nominal -a relic of former days when it was customary to make such 
stipulations- and as meaningless because the government intends to comply faithfully with 
any settlement reached irrespective of any so called g u a r a n t e e s " . 884
What was the strategy of the CFB once the offer to the U.S. bondholders was a fait accompli? 
Did the "most favoured nation" clause contained in that settlement discourage the bargaining 
initiative of the CFB? The situation was not easy since the CFB was not in the position of 
getting a more favourable arrangement than that offered to the dollar bonds, but also a similar 
arrangement could be interpreted as a capitulation of the preferential claims of the specially 
secured loans. The CFB then became interested in a settlement which being similar to the
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dollar debt agreement was not strictly comparable to it. In this movement the CFB came to 
coincide with some recent developments of the negotiations in Bogota. These were the above 
mentioned possibility of a cash redemption offer, and the suggestion of the British negotiator 
of overstamping the existing bonds without changing them for new bonds.
The proposal of the British negotiator had the merit of preserving all former characteristics of 
the bonds other than terms of payment. Therefore the formal guarantees attached to four of 
the five loans would not be altered. As expressed by Thompson, "if the finance minister 
really considers the guarantees are meaningless he could scarcely object to this and the 
bondholders would retain exactly the same advantage, for what it may be worth... This would 
be very different from restating the guarantees in a new conversion issue, because the 
Americans would immediately claim and the Council's object would be d e f e a t e d . . . " . 885 The 
idea of overstamping the bonds was presented by the negotiator to the minister as a method 
of covering the point of securing some preferential treatment for the guaranteed i s s u e s . 8 8 6
Given these advances of the negotiations, the president of the CFB defined the desired 
settlement with Colombia on the following basis: First, future interest would be reduced by 
50% as in the case of the dollar debt settlement. However, in contrast with the dollar 
settlement, the sterling loans should not be converted into a new loan, but overstamped. 
Second, interest arrears should be redeemed by cash, instead of being capitalized as in the 
dollar arrangement. How much could be asked for the nominal value of the arrears? Based on 
the dollar offer which recognized 50% of overdue interest and a market quotation of the 
dollar bonds of about 30%, a hypothetical cash redemption in the dollar loans case would 
have represented about 15% of the nominal value. Accordingly, the British negotiator could 
start asking 25%. Finally, the specific sinking fund of every individual loan should be 
replaced by an annual lump sum which would be applied on a certain basis between each
loan. 887
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The CFB backed this desired formula but expressed that "the main objective should be to 
obtain a settlement...on terms no worse to those given to the direct dollar loans, and nothing 
should be done to jeopardise t h i s " .  888  Early in 1942 the minister of finance sent a formal 
proposal to the CFB in which some elements of the desired formula were integrated. The 
bonds of the old loans were to be overstamped to the effect of reducing future interests by 
50%, the former sinking funds were to be replaced by a centralized cumulative sinking fund, 
and amortizations could be made by open market operations. However, no cash redemption 
of overdue interest was offered, and new 3% government bonds were offered for an amount 
equivalent to 50% of the value in a r r e a r s .  889 The British negotiator explained the absence of 
a cash offer from the proposal as a result of the fiscal difficulties endured by the government 
since the beginning of World War 11.840
By May 1942 the minister of finance made a new and final offer for the settlement of fund 
arrears -50% for the nominal value overdue until the end of 1939 and 60% for interests 
unpaid since that date-. This amendment to the formal proposal sought to compensate British 
bondholders for the fact that their American counterparts were receiving interest payments 
since 1940.841 The government officially projected the resumption of the service of the 
sterling external debt (July 2), and the CFB recommended the terms of the agreement to the 
bondholders as the "best obtainable". The minister of finance thought the CFB could have 
described the agreement as "equitable" or at least the efforts of the government could have 
been lauded. The CFB rejected to recommend the settlement on grounds of equity since "we 
have never disguised our view that prior and secured loans should have received 
better...treatment..." But also the CFB recognized the Colombian government's "desire to
reach a settlement".842
The implementation of the sterling debt settlement was delayed until the beginning of 1944. 
Because of tight regulations in the London financial markets due to the war, there was some 
uncertainty about the possibility of effecting the open market operations anticipated in the 
agreement. Additionally, sterling bonds for the amount of £57,617 had been repatriated
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during the years 1932-1933 but not cancelled; and depending on the facilities granted to the 
Colombian government for purchases in the London market, those bonds should be either 
cancelled or used for delivery in satisfaction of sinking fund payments. The British 
government although indicating that no exception to the general restrictions on sale of 
securities could be made, definitely intimated that "operations arising out of this agreement 
will receive their s a n c t i o n " . 843 More definitive reasons for the delay were associated with 
the change of government administration in Colombia (August 1942) and the fiscal crisis 
which absorbed government energies right through 1943. Finally, the offer was announced on 
January 6,1944.
e. Settlement of the sterling debt of the Agricultural Mortgage Bank.
The AMB and the CFB started negotiations after the agreement on the national debt. The 
original intention was to reach a settlement on a similar basis to the offer made to the U.S. 
holders of the Bank's bonds. In practice, however, it was difficult to replicate that 
e x p e r i e n c e . 844 The minister of finance, then, offered a cash settlement in dollars or pesos, or 
both, basing calculations on the American offer and on the current quotations of the 3% 
government dollar b o n d s . 845 The British negotiator personally favoured either a cash 
settlement or the issue of entirely new bonds to be exchanged by the old Bank's i s s u e s .  846 
The CFB rejected the initiative of a cash settlement, and suggested the alternative of 
overstamping the existing b o n d s .  847
Although the nominal debt under negotiation amounted to £1,132,800 according to statistics 
provided by Fiscal Agents and the CFB, the Manager of the Bank revealed to the British 
negotiator that by the end of 1942 the balance was only £804,900, the difference of 29% 
being explained by repatriations made by the Bank between 1934 and 1942.848 Early in 1944 
(March 17), the CFB announced a plan for resumption of the debt service. Accordingly, the 
Colombian government would assume sole responsibility for principal and interest payments 
on the bonds the holders of which accepted the offer. It was offered to pay a capital cash
540
bonus of 5% of the nominal amount of assented bonds; as for future interests (since April 
1942 to coincide with the American offer) it was offered to make cash payments at 3%; but 
also, the offer required the cancellation of 7 1/2 years of interest arrears. The formal offer 
was made on March 21,1945.
In conclusion, the settlement of the sterling debt of the AMB did not follow suit the 
American example as it had been predicted. Under the new arrangement British bondholders 
surrendered 7 1/2 years of back interest in exchange for a capital cash bonus and the 
nationalization of the debt.
f. Settlement of the short-term debt with commercial banks
The short-term debt of the national government with commercial banks had a history of its 
own as seen in Section I.E above. The government contracted short-term debts with British 
and U.S. banks since 1928 which were subsequently renewed until 1930 when a U.S. bank 
syndicate headed by the National City Bank of New York took over the government debt. By 
then, the debt amounted to US$4.8 million. The syndicate extended a fresh loan for US$3.8 
million in 1930, and two new loans for US$4 million each during 1931 after the syndicate 
was reinforced by Lazard Brothers of London and its subsidiary Lazard Frères et Oie. of 
Paris. A total debt of US$16.9 million at 3% was successively renewed during the 1930s and 
the interest payments punctually served. Although there was no default on the service of this 
debt, and small amortizations were semiannually made, the continuous renewal of the 
contracts transformed an originally short-term obligation into a long-term debt.
The obligation with the bank syndicate represented about 21% of the dollar debt of the 
national government at the beginning of the 1940s, and the agreement reached in May 1942 
established a new schedule for its amortization. It was determined that the balance at the 
beginning of 1943 -US$14.3 million- would be converted in 41 promissory notes which 
would be amortized quarterly until 1952 (Memoria de Hacienda, 1942).
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3. Balance of the second round.
Colombia started the second round asking for additional concessions. To the positions 
defended during the first round, the concession of fresh loans was seen as a desirable 
component of a debt settlement. On the creditors side, a crucial change was the decisive 
intervention of the U.S. government and the displacement of the FBPC. Offers of settlement 
of the dollar denominated debt made by Colombian authorities were officially backed by the 
U.S. government while being openly opposed by the FBPC. It was the ultimate bondholders 
who finally decided the success of the Colombian offers.
Given their relative low interests in Colombia as compared with other countries in the region, 
British lenders adopted the strategy of getting no worse settlement than the U.S. bondholders. 
It was thought that a belligerent position in the Colombian case could have exacerbated the 
American aspirations in other cases such as in the Brazilian negotiations where the British 
had substantial interests. The strategy was changed, however, when the British realized that 
such a moderate position would not make any difference for other negotiations. Britain 
started an independent process of negotiation with Colombia looking for a settlement similar 
to that achieved by the Americans, but without resigning to the preferential treatment which 
characterized most of the British loans. In contrast with the dollar debt settlements, the 
sterling debt negotiations were directly carried out by Colombian authorities and 
representatives of the British bondholders.
At the end of the second round, Colombia had regularized the service of nearly 55% of the 
total external debt. A third round would be necessary to normalize the service of the 
remaining half of the external debt.
D. Third Round. 1944-1949
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The settlement of the external debt of departments and municipalities (with the exception of 
Barranquilla whose settlement was negotiated in 1939) was reached between 1944 and 1949. 
To be more precise, only one debtor, the Municipality of Bogota, settled her debt in 1944, 
and the rest of municipalities and all the departments settle their debts between 1947 and
1949. The third round was a period of quick settlements rather than one of controversy about 
negotiating positions. These settlements were the last in a series of stages for the full 
restoration of the external debt service of the country which had been formally interrupted 
since the early 1930s. In quantitative terms, departments and municipalities (excepting 
Barranquilla) accounted for 51% of the dollar bonded debt, and 46% of the total external 
long-term debt of the country when negotiations started in the late 1930s. The reader will be 
introduced to the final negotiation of the external debt of the Municipality of Bogota, aud later 
on to the settlement of the debt of departments and municipalities still in default.
1. Settlement of the debt of the Municipality of Bogota
As seen in Table 48 above, the two loans floated by Bogota during the lending boom of the 
1920s altogether amounted to US$8.7 million representing 23% of total loans floated by 
municipalities. After the suspension of debt service in 1932 the outstanding balance 
amounted to US$6.9 million. This was the official outstanding debt when initiatives of 
settlement were made in 1940 and 1944. In 1940 the Council of Bogota defined the grounds 
on which the debt service could be resumed; basically, they implied the cancellation of 
interest arrears, the conversion of existing dollar bonds into new peso bonds -at the rate of 
US$1=C$1, and the reduction of the interest rate for future payments to 3%. 849 The 
bondholders rejected the plan as "inadequate" and asked the FBPC to represent them in 
negotiations with the Municipality. 850
On November 1944, Bogota made a formal offer to the bondholders. The City offered 3% 
bonds of the national government in exchange -par for par- of her original bonds. In this way 
the City expected to reduce the original average interest rate from 7.2% to 3%. The 3% bonds
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in offer did not constitute a new issue; they were the same bonds offered by the national 
government in its settlement with U.S. bondholders in 1941, after being repurchased by 
Colombian authorities in the open market. Additionally, the City did not recognize interest 
arrears. This measure implied that 13 years’ past due interest amounting to US$1,040 on each 
US$1,000 8 % bond of the loan of 1924, and to US$834.5 on each US$1,000 6  1/2% bond of 
the loan of 1927, were cancelled.
Once more, the U.S. State Department and the FBPC published contrasting views. The 
former stated that "The offer marks a further stage of progress in resuming service on 
Colombian dollar bond indebtedness".851 The latter asserted that "The Council was not 
consulted in regard to this offer, took no part in its discussion and cannot judge whether 
representations made in behalf of the bondholders would have affected the terms... While 
considering that unilateral offers by debtors and complete cancellations of past due interest 
are both unsound in principle, the Council can hold out no prospect of a better offer to the 
holders of the bonds of the City of B o g o t a " . 852
What was the reaction of bondholders? First it has to be noted that the amount of bonds to be 
exchanged was not US$6.9 million according to the official sources, but US$2.8 million 
according to the National City Bank of New York designated as Exchange Agent. The 
difference of US$4.1 million, equivalent to 60% of the official outstanding balance, is 
explained by repatriations made by the Municipality between 1933 and 1944 when the 
average quotations of bonds were most of the time below 20% according to Table 51 above. 
As for the process of exchange, by 1946 43% of the bonds in the hands of the public had 
been delivered to the National City Bank in acceptance of the o f f e r .  853
2. Settlement of the debt of departments and municipalities.
The last step in the process of settlement of the dollar external debt involved six departments 
and two cities. Although it was the last negotiation, the bargaining process itself was very
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quick, and in contrast with previous definitive settlements of the dollar debt, it ended up with 
the mutual agreement between Colombian negotiators and the FBPC. By initiative of the 
Colombian government, negotiations took place in Bogota in April 1947. The negotiators 
representing the departments and cities were Esteban Jaramillo -the minister of finance under 
which default had been produced in 1932- and Carlos Lieras -the minister of finance under 
which the settlement of the national external debt had been achieved in the early 1940s-. On 
the other side of the negotiating table, the president of the FBPC, James Rogers, represented 
the bondholders.
The negotiators rapidly converged to a conversion formula which implied the issuance of 
new bonds by the original debtors, with the guarantee of the national government. It was 
agreed that 2 0 % of interest arrears would be capitalized, and the new interest rate for future 
payments would be 3%. 854 An immediate statement of the FBPC considered the terms 
proposed as "reasonable and f a i r " . 855 gy 1 9 4 7  jegal procedures in Colombia had been 
completed but further actions in the United States delayed the formal offer until 1949. Once 
more the FBPC recommended the acceptance of the o f f e r . 856
How quickly did bondholders accept the offer? The success of the acceptance of the 
exchange offer is illustrated by the fact that by December 31,1949 -only one month after the 
official offer was made- 31% of the amount subject to the offer had been exchanged. By 
December 1931 1950, the percentage of exchange had been 77%.857 Apart from this 
success, it has to be noted that the amount subject to exchange was not that suggested by the 
statistics published either by Colombian official insdtutions or by fiscal agents in the United 
States. According to these sources, the outstanding balance when negotiations started was of 
US$73.4 million. More even, this was the amount of debt considered in the discussions 
between the Colombian negotiators and the president of the FBPC which led to the plan of 
settlement. The FBPC, however, announced that "it is believed that purchases have reduced 
the total amount held by the public to a figure in the neighborhood of US$40,000,000".858 jn
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the light of this statement it was being revealed that bonds for about US$33.4 million had 
been repatriated by departments and municipalities during the period of default.
By the time the formal offer was made, it was divulged that the accurate outstanding balance 
was US$34.0 million instead of the official amount of US$73.4 million. This revelation 
meant that 54% of the amount outstanding in 1932 had been purchased in open market by the 
six departments and two municipalities involved. As suggested by Table 51 above, the six 
departments repurchased their bonds at prices ranging between US$4.62 to US$46.00 per 
US$100 bond, and the two cities repurchased their bonds at prices ranging between US$6.13 
and US$45.00 per US$100 bond. Table 53 shows the distribution of repatriations between 
individual departments and municipalities.
TABLE 53
EXTERNAL DEBT OF SIX DEPARTMENTS AND TWO CITIES 
PARTICIPANTS IN THE SETTLEMENT OF 1947 - 1949 
(Thousands of U.S. dollars)
Debtors and Loans Original Amortizations Outstanding Repatriations Outstanding
Issue up to 
1932
Balance
1932
1933-1946 Balance
1946
I. DEPARTMENTS
Antioquia, 7% 1925 20,000.0 2,828.0 17,172.0 9,633.4 7,538.6
Antioquia, 7% 1927 12,350.0 843.0 11,507.0 6,684.0 4,823.0
Caldas, 7 1/2% 1926 10,000.0 1,409.0 8,591 .0 3,979.0 4,612.0
Cundinamarca, 6 1/2% 1928 12,000.0 463.0 11,537.0 6,597.0 4,940.0
Santander, 7% 1928 2,000.0 209.0 1,791.0 548.0 1,243.0
Valle del Cauca, 7 1/2% 1926 4,000.0 591 .5 3,408.5 1,281.0 2,127.5
Valle del Cauca, 7% 1928 4,500.0 635.0 3,865.0 1,667.0 2,198.0
Tolima, 7% 1927 2,500.0 388.0 2,112.0 1,212.0 900.0
TOTAL 67,350.0 7,366.5 59,983.5 31,601.4 28,382.1
II. Municipalities
Cali, 7% 1927 2,885.0 477.0 2,408.0 1,357.5 1,050.5
Medellin, 7% 1926 3,000.0 356.0 2,644.0 1,315.0 1,329.0
Medellin, 6 1/2% 1928 9,000.0 622.0 8,378.0 5,119.0 3,259.0
TOTAL 14,885.0 1,455.0 13,430.0 7,791.5 5,638.5
GRAND TOTAL 82,235.0 8,821.5 73,413.5 39,392.9 34,020.6
SOURCE :
Based on FBPC (1949).
5 4 6
Total repatriations turned out to be distributed in proportion to the respective outstanding 
balances, with departments accounting for about 80%. Additionally, while departments 
bought back some 53% of their own debt, the corresponding figure for municipalities was 
58%. Among the departments, Antioquia alone explained over a half of buybacks, and 
Medellin alone accounted for 83% of municipal repurchases. Given the position of Medellin 
as capital of Antioquia, it is possible to conclude that 58% of buybacks were originated in 
this region of the country.
In sum, the settlement of the external debt of departments and municipalities dominated the 
third round. Although the negotiation itself was a swift process, it took place only in the late 
1940s when the settlements of the national and corporate debt had been fully accepted. In 
contrast with the two previous rounds there was not astringent confrontation of points of 
view, and for the first time it was possible for the government and the FBPC to reach an 
agreement. Debtors obtained new concessions in this negotiation without provoking the 
strong disapproval of the FBPC as it happened at the beginning of the decade.
E. Looking back.
If default on the long-term Colombian external debt was a gradual process (Section n.C of 
this part), renegotiations proved to be a complex task which required a decade and a half to 
be completed.
The loan contracts signed by Colombian debtors with British and U.S. investors were 
renegotiated through a variety of forms, not all resulting from a formal bargaining in a 
negotiating table. Bond repatriations at depreciated prices are a good example. Some of them 
were pre-announced buybacks, such as the repatriations carried out by the national 
government in 1932 to facilitate the repayment of private debts to the banking system. Some 
others were "secret" buybacks, such as the repatriations made by Departments and
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Municipalities. Finally, some settlements reached in the negotiating table included open 
market bond purchases at depreciated prices.
Actual renegotiations differed according to individual loan contracts. There were cases of 
partial or total forgiveness of interest arrears, and agreements about reduction of contractual 
interest rates. A few agreements involved partial cash repayments in either foreign currency 
or Colombian pesos, and also conversions of foreign currency denominated bonds into 
Colombian peso bonds. There were also bargaining situations in which the possibility of new 
loans was considered alongside the formalization of agreements.
Overall, buybacks were the main form of renegotiation before firm discussions started in the 
late 1930s. Altogether, Departments and Municipalities (which represented one half of the 
long-term external public debt in default by 1933) repatriated one half of their external debt 
at depreciated prices. Common results of the bargaining process were the rescheduling of 
debts, and the reduction of the contractual interest rates by 50%. Characteristically, the 
recontracting process between creditors and debtors did not yield any write down of 
contractual debt principals.
The Colombian experience is illustrative of the complexity of negotiations and the influence 
of governments of creditor countries on final agreements. Strategies on the creditors'side 
were affected by tensions among representatives of investors, and some settlements reflected 
the presence of those conflicts. Considerations of international politics also affected the final 
outcome of negotiations. The U.S. government decisively intervened in the bargaining 
process to the point of partially displacing the creditors' representatives from the negotiating 
table. Interestingly, the dollar debt of the national government was settled amidst the open 
support of the U.S. government and the strong opposition of the creditors' representatives.
The renegotiation of the Colombian external debt over the 1934-49 period became an integral 
part of the long-term relationship between Colombian debtors and their foreign creditors. It
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was the last renegotiation of British long-term loans for over a century, and the first 
renegotiation of U.S. private long-term loans. Regarding the sterling debt, it was the last link 
of a chain of formal contracts, defaults and renegotiations through the whole period of Pax 
Britannica. As for the dollar debt, the recontracting process restablished the relationship 
between creditors and debtors after the suspension of debt service in the early 1930s.
In the process of writing this section we constructed new series of the Colombia’s external 
debt for the period 1923-1950, which largely coincides with the period under discussion in 
this part of the thesis. The new series differ from previous ones by explicitly considering 
defaults, repatriations and agreements. The detailed reconstruction of the series is presented 
in the appendix to the section.
APPENDIX
The accountancy of defaults, repatriations, and settlements.
Defaults, buybacks and bond conversions affected the accountancy of loans. In most cases 
the magnitude of repatriations was not revealed until final offers for the resumption of debt 
service were made; and in the few cases where repatriations were known, the corresponding 
amounts were not reported or at least not cancelled by Fiscal Agents in New York and 
London. As a result, the information offered by Fiscal Agents about outstanding balances of 
loans was, for many years, the same published before the suspension of the debt service. The 
case of the six departments and two municipalities which settled their debts in 1949 is 
illustrative; for seventeen years Colombian authorities, foreign fiscal agents and 
representatives of the bondholders, continuously published the outstanding balances
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corresponding to 1932. Even worse, some original agents failed to reconcile their records 
well into the 1950s.^^^
In this appendix we attempt to offer new series of the Colombian external debt taking in 
account changes due to buybacks and conversions. With some exceptions, it was not possible 
to discriminate repatriations year by year, and therefore we had to distribute equally a certain 
amount of buybacks within a period. In most cases individual loans are revised separately, 
and later on aggregated in order to obtain a revised series of the total external debt This 
revision covers the period 1923-1950 which coincides with the last boom and decline of 
international bonded debts.
1. National government
a. Dollar debt
Table 54 summarizes the experience with the two most important dollar loans to the national 
government. It shows normal amortizations before default in 1933 as well as the open market 
purchases carried out during 1932-33. As seen in Section II.B.2 these repatriations were 
made as part of the measures to rescue the financial sector after the great depression. 
Commercial banks were authorized by government decree (Decree 711 of 1932) to receive 
external bonds from coffee growers and other debtors in partial payment for credits affected 
by the international deflation. Then, the national government received these bonds from the 
banks m exchange for bonds of the internal debt; the amount of 1927 and 1928 bonds 
actually received by the government is shown in the table. According to Colombian 
authorities, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission was informed of these facts (note 
99 of this section). In 1940, as part of the Provisional Agreement, the government offered to 
present for cancellation and retirement the bonds held since 1932-33 (US$5,997,500).
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New open market purchases were carried out in 1940 in fulfillment of the Provisional 
Agreement between the national government and the FBPC. This time repatriations 
amounted to one-fourth of the nominal amount repurchased in 1932-33. In 1932-33 the 
government bought back its bonds at prices ranging from US$13.50 to US$49.50 per US$100 
bond; in 1940, prices fluctuated between US$15.70 and US$34.00 per US$100.00 bond 
(Table 51 above). Since the average price for the 1940's buybacks was 26.5% -US$400,000 
were enough to buy back US$1,509,000 bond- and given the price range for the 1932-33 
purchases, it is possible to adventure that by means of these repatriations the government 
obtained a reduction of at least 70% on the nominal value of 15% of the outstanding balance 
after default.
The process of bond conversion after the definitive offer of June 1941 is shown at the bottom 
of Table 54. As seen, about 88% of old bonds were presented by their holders to be 
exchanged by the new bonds during the first four years of the offer. This public reaction 
implied the success of an offer which was strongly rejected by the FBPC. It can also be seen 
how the government repurchased 25% of the new bonds in open market, along the 1940s. 
These new buybacks meant further reductions compared with the nominal value of the 
outstanding debt. Although market quotations increased rapidly during the decade, the 
government could still obtain substantial reductions in terms of the par value of the debt.^^^ 
Finally, it can be remembered that these buybacks of 3% bonds were used in exchange for 
old bonds of the AMB, as well as for old bonds of the City of Bogota.
Table 55 shows final series for the 6% 1927 and the 6% 1928 loans. It also presents series for 
the new 3% 1940 bonds, and for the convertible certificates for 3% 1940 bonds. These 
certificates were issued to holders of coupons of unpaid interest corresponding to the 6%
1927 and 6% 1928 bonds. The authorized issue of these certificates reached the amount of 
US$6,283,500 equivalent to 50% of past due interest. Holders were entitled to exchange 
these certificates for like amounts of 3% 1940 bonds, on or before December 31,1945. As
553
seen, no outstanding balance existed by 1946. Table 56 shows the series for the 1933 
Deferred Interest Certificates, and for the 4% Funding Certificates of 1934.
TABLE 55
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT EXTERNAL DEBT
1927 AND 1928 LOANS AND CONVERSIONS 
PERIOD 1927 - 1950
(US Dollars)
YEAR
1927 
6% Loan
1928 
6% Loan
1940 
3% Bonds
1940
Convertible
Certificates
1927 24 750 000
1928 24 355 250 34 670 214
1929 23 960 500 34 016 643
1930 23 565 750 33 351 072
1931 23 171 000 32 691 500
1932 22 025 000 28 759 250
1933 18 913 000 26 313 000
1934 18 913 000 26 313 000
1935 18 913 000 26 313 000
1936 18 913 000 26 313 000
1937 18 913 000 26 313 000
1938 18 913 000 26 313 000
1939 18 913 000 26 313 000
1940 18 273 500 25 443 000
1941 10 126 500 13 710 500 22,238,500 380,070
1942 4 475 000 5 715 500 36,396,000 387,383
1943 3 443 500 4 035 500 38,637,500 350,748
1944 3 009 500 3 149 000 39,394,000 243,505
1945 2 649 000 2 546 500 39,724,500 216,205
1946 2 128 000 2 008 500 39,875,500 -
1947 1 260 500 1 438 500 40,356,500
1948 922 500 954 500 39,634,000
1949 713 500 713 000 38,232,500
1950 600 500 566 000 36,866,500
SOURCES.
1927 6% Loan
1927: The payment of the contribution to the sinking fund (1% 
of the total issue) is assumed and deducted from the original 
loan. 1928 through 1931: amortizations of bonds for 
US$1,829,000. Informe del Contralor (1937). This amount is 
divided in four equal payments during the period. No 
amortizations in 1932. However, in accordance with the Decree 
711 of 1932 the government repatriated US$2,292,000 during
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1932 and 1933. This amount is equally divided for each year. 
Additionally, a large block of bonds (US$1,966,000) was 
acquired in January 1933 and reported to the Fiscal Agents. 
Informe del Contralor (1937) and the Stock Exchange Yearbook 
(London, 1933). 1934 through 1939: no amortizations. 1940:
Open market purchases for US$639,500 in accordance to the 
Decree 305 of 1940. 1941 through 1950: balance of exchanges 
for new 1940 3% bonds. FBPC, annual reports between 1941 and
1950.
1928 6% Loan
The government amortized US$2,308,500 between October 1928 and 
October 1931. Informe del Contralor (1937). Dividing this 
amount in 7 payments gives the data for 1928 through 1931. In 
October 1932 and April 1933 the government acquired large 
blocks of bonds for US$2,079,500 and US$593,500 
correspondingly. Informe del Contralor, 1937. These bonds were 
delivered to the Fiscal Agents to be credited to the sinking 
fund. The Stock Exchange Yearbook (London). Additionally, 
in accordance to the Decree 711 of 1932 the government 
purchased US$3,705,500 in the open market during 1932-1933. 
1934 through 1939: no amortizations. 1940: open market 
purchases according to the Decree 305 of 1940, reaching the 
amount of US$870,000. 1941 through 1950: balance of exchanges 
for new 1940 3% bonds. 1940 3% Bonds. FBPC, Annual Reports.
1940 Convertible Certificates. FBPC, Annual Reports
TABLE 56
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT EXTERNAL DEBT 
U.S. SCRIPS OF 1933 AND 1934 
(US Dollars)
SCRIP SCRIP
YEAR 1933 1934
1933 1,788,868 —
1934 1,086,428 3,739,665
1935 724,285 3,354,672
1936 362,142 3,354,672
1937 59,644 3,043,310
1938 - 2,616,030
1939 2,241,305
1940 1 ,936,825
1941 1,758,688
1942 1,571,773
1943 1,450,245
1944 1,376,848
1945 1,235,587
1946 -
SOURCES.
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SCRIP 1 9 3 3 .
1933 : Scrips issued by the national government for 
US$1,448,570 and by the Agricultural Mortgage Bank (AMB) for 
US$340,298. Total issued, US$1,788,868. Informe del Contralor 
(1937). 1934: 1/4 of the national government scrip plus full 
amortization of the AMB scrip. 1935-1936: 1/4 of the national 
government scrip each year. 1937: balance due in 1937. Informe 
del Contralor (1937).
SCRIP 1934.
1934 : national government scrip for US$3,073,410 plus AMB 
scrip for US$666,255. Informe del Contralor (1937). 1935: 
amortization of US$384,992 by the Bank. No amortizations in 
1936. 1937: amortization of US$30,100 by the government and 
the balance due by the Bank, US$281,262. Informe del 
Contralor, 1937. 1938: The Stock Exchange Yearbook (London). 
1939 through 1946: FBPC, annual reports.
The series so far illustrate the experience with private long-term foreign financing. The single 
case of access of the Colombian government to commercial bank foreign lending was that of 
the 1931 loan with a banking group headed by the National City Bank of New York. As 
explained before, although this was a short-term one-year credit, it was extended from time to 
time and finally renegotiated in 1942. Table 57, column 8 shows the series of outstanding 
balances of the credit, which appear to be progressively amortized since 1942. Another 
source of unfunded debt were some American and French companies involved in 
construction work; the outstanding balances with the undertakers are also shown in Table 57, 
column 9. Finally, the table shows the first years of access of the national government to 
foreign official financing through the credit of the Ex-Im Bank.
The evolution of dollar loans is summarized in Table 57. The long-term bonded debt which 
represented about 75% in 1933 lost part of its predominance to the investment credits 
extended by the Ex-Im Bank during the 1940s. By 1950, the bonded debt amounted to 58% 
of the total. This still prevailing figure would continuously recede during the ensuing 
decades.
b. Sterling debt
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The outstanding balances of the sterling debt of the national government are presented in 
Table 58. As explained before, the 1942 agreement did not imply the exchange of the old for 
new bonds, and therefore the old issues were amortized right through the 1940s -as shown in 
the table- and during the next decades up to their complete amortization during the 1970s.
The consolidated external debt of 1896 was redeemed in 1931 (July); the service of this loan 
had been punctually paid since 1905.
The repatriation of sterling loans after the extraordinary measures of 1932 and 1933 to rescue 
the financial system, amounted to £57,617, some 4% of the outstanding debt in 1931. The 
bonds repatriated by the government were delivered to Lazard Brothers (London) but only 
cancelled after the 1942 settlement. Buybacks were unequally distributed by individual loans 
(See Sources of Table 58) with 47% of purchases concentrated on the 1911 loan. Although 
the information about bond prices for these bonds (Table 50) is incomplete, it appears that at 
least during 1932 repatriations were made with a discount of over 50% of the par prices of 
the bonds. Finally, Table 58 also shows the series for the Scrips of 1933 and 1934, and the 
outstanding balances of the Funding Stock issued in 1942 in payment for a fraction of interest 
arrears.
c. Departments and Municipalities
Table 59 summarizes the evolution of the external debt of the six departments which floated 
loans in the United States during the 1920s. As mentioned before, departments repatriated 
53% of the outstanding balance in 1932 during the period 1933-1946. Due to lack of more 
specific information, the whole amount of buybacks unveiled during the negotiations of 
1947-1949 was evenly distributed along the period. As for Municipalities, the table shows 
aggregate data for the period before formal default in 1932, and individual information from 
then on. The information about repatriations by Cali and Medellin was treated in a way 
similar to that of the six departments. Specific aspects about repatriations by Bogota, and 
settlement plans by Barranquilla are mentioned in the methodological note to the table.
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d. External Public Debt
Table 60 presents a series of the total external public debt for the period 1924-1950.
TABLE 60
EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT 
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, DEPARTMENTS AND MUNICIPALITIES
1923 - 1950
(Millions of US dollars)
NATIONAL DEPARTMENTAL MUNICIPAL TOTAL
1923 3.0 3.0
1924 19.9 9.0 28.9
1925 16.9 3.0 9.7 29.6
1926 14.0 27.1 12.9 54.0
1927 36.3 40.9 17.3 94.5
1928 71 .2 63.5 24.0 1 58.7
1929 71 .7 66.2 24.1 162.0
1930 69.5 64.4 24.0 157.9
1931 79.4 63.1 23.4 165.9
1932 72.4 59.9 22.1 154.4
1933 69.7 57.7 21 .2 148.6
1934 74.6 55.5 20.3 150.4
1935 78.4 53.2 19.4 151 .0
1936 76.4 50.9 18.5 145.8
1937 74.2 48.7 17.6 140.5
1938 74.7 46.4 16.7 137.8
1939 74.7 44.2 15.8 134.7
1940 71 .9 41 .9 15.2 129.0
1941 72.8 39.7 14.2 126.7
1942 78.5 37.4 13.3 129.2
1943 79.8 35.2 12.3 127.3
1944 78.9 32.9 11 .4 123.2
1945 81.4 30.6 10.1 122.1
1946 79.7 28.4 8.9 117.0
1947 76.6 28.4 8.3 113.3
1948 78.2 28.4 8.0 114.6
1949 70.8 30.2 8.0 109.0
1950 69.3 31 .7 8.0 109.0
SOURCES.
Tables 57 and 59 above.
The series of total external public debt in Table 60 takes into account the repatriations and 
conversions of individual loans mentioned above. Figures indicate that the external public
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debt fell by 20% between 1932 -when most individual defaults happened- and 1942, when 
settlements referring to the national debt were completed, or by 30% also between 1932 and 
1949 when the settlements for the political subdivisions were achieved. Since the national 
debt remained relatively constant along the period, the decline in the total external public 
debt is explained by the repatriations carried out by departments and municipalities.
In the case of the national debt, the credits received from the Ex-Im Bank offset the 
amortizations of bonds effected through open market purchases after the final offers. 
Additionally, it has to be noted that the process of amortization of national government 3% 
bonds was slowed down by the fact that bonds bought back in the open market were used 
again to exchange old bonds of the mortgage banks and the City of Bogota.
e. Mortgage Bank Debt
Table 61 shows the series of outstanding balances of the mortgage loans floated in the U.S. 
markets between 1926 and 1928. Series are discriminated according to the criterion of public 
guarantee. Only the bonds sold by the AMB were publicly guaranteed. Nonguaranteed bonds 
were floated by the Mortgage Bank of Colombia, the Mortgage Bank of Bogota, and the 
Bank of Colombia, in that order of importance (Table 27 above). Repatriations played an 
important role in the amortization of these loans. In our discussion of the first round of 
negotiations, we anticipated that 52% of the outstanding balances of these loans in 1935 had 
been repatriated by 1942 when offers of settlement were made to the bondholders.
The table gives new information about buybacks. Although sinking fund payments were 
suspended early in 1932, there was a decline of 17% of the outstanding balances of the AMB 
between the end of 1931 and the end of 1933, coinciding with the decrees which stimulated 
the repatriation of bonds to solve the crisis of the financial sector. Considering the whole 
period between default (end of 1931) and settlement (1942), total repatriations by the AMB
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and the other banks amounted to 65% of their outstanding balances in 1931; for the AMB the 
relevant figure was 59%, and for the rest of the banks the percentage arrived to 70%.
TABLE 61
MORTGAGE BANK BONDS 
DOLLAR DEBT 
PERIOD 1926 - 1950
AGRICULTURAL
MORTGAGE
BANK
1926 2887374
1927 10696248
1928 15268122
1929 14761000
1930 14010500
1931 13065500
1932 12204000
1933 10813500
1934 10306500
1935 10288500
1936 9593000
1937 8897500
1938 8202000
1939 7506500
1940 6811000
1941 6115500
1942 5420000
1943 4328375
1944 3236750
1945 2145125
1946 1053500
1947 807500
1948 623500
1949 527500
1950 425000
NON-GUARANTEED 
BANK DEBT
5774276
20136105
20582372
20593498
20058930
18170820
16732115
15293410
13854705
12416000
11430715
10445430
9460145
8474860
7489575
6504290
5519000
4544000
3569000
2594000
1619000
1272500
940000
791000
636000
TOTAL
8661650 
30832353 
43611764 
51671104 
50176263 
47148573 
39938325 
38317176 
38560655 
36531127 
34860996 
32924929 
26395963 
24427388 
22011946 
20184336 
18354627 
16127547 
13817249 
11510911 
9360059 
8473663 
7932044 
6252123 
5833092
SOURCES.
Agricultural Mortgage Bank
1926-1929: The Stock Exchange Yearbook (London), annual issues. 1930-1935: CFB, annual 
reports. 1942: FBPC (1944). 1936-1941 : the difference between the balances in 1935 and 1942 is 
divided into equal amounts along the interim years. 1946-1950: exchanges of bonds originally 
issued by the bank for 1940 3% bonds of the national government. FBPC, annual reports. 1943- 
1945: it is assumed that the difference between 1942 and 1946 corresponded entirely to 
exchanges for new 3% bonds of the national government.
Non-Guaranteed debt.
1926-1931 ; estimates worked out as the difference between total bank loans (South American 
Journal, February 4 1933) and loans floated in New York by the AMB, and by all the banks in
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Europe. 1932-1934 : the difference between the balances in 1931 and 1935 is equally divided 
along the period. 1935: FBPC (1944). 1936-1942: repatriation of US$6,897,000 which is equally 
divided along the period. 1942: FBPC (1944). 1943-1945, and 1946-1950, as for the AMB above.
Finally, the rapidly declining balances in both series are accounted for by the exchanges of 
old mortgage issues by 3% bonds of the national government. As explained before, these 
government bonds were already the outcome of repatriations. In practice, since the national 
government made its 1941 offer regarding its own dollar debt, the AMB started purchasing 
3% national government bonds in U.S. open markets, at prices ranging between 28% and 
40% (Table 51). The bonds so repatriated were those which appeared in the AMB offer of 
1942, in exchange for its own and other mortgage bonds.
Table 62 describes the evolution of mortgage loans sold in London during 1928 and 1929. In 
the case of the AMB, since sinking fund payments were suspended early in 1932, the 
continuous decline of the series up to 1942-1944 when negotiations took place is explained 
by open market purchases. In 1933 the CFB reported an outstanding balance of £1,132,800, 
which suggests that some buybacks occurred during 1933. Later, the Manager of the AMB 
reported to the British negotiator in Bogota that the outstanding balance at the end of 1942 
was £804,900, the difference with the 1933 balance being explained by repatriations. As a 
whole, repatriations between 1932 and 1944 amounted to 30% of the outstanding balance at 
the end of 1932. The declining balances at the end of the series are due to amortizations 
carried out after the settlement of 1944.
The experience of the Mortgage Bank of Bogota is different since as seen before in this 
section, the Sterling debt of the bank was transformed into a Colombian peso debt. In 1938 
(October), the bank offered C$7,304,415 in exchange for the outstanding sterling balance of 
£1,760,000. Amortizations of the peso bonds were agreed to start since 1943. The table 
shows the declining balances of the peso bonds since 1943, but also the equivalent value in 
sterling since bondholders were offered that interest and sinking fund payments would be 
made at the rate of the day. As for repatriations in the early 1930s, the series suggests that
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between the end of 1931 (remittances on account of sinking funds were suspended in 
February 1932, and the coupon dates of the loan were May and November), and the end of 
1934, buybacks amounted to 17% of the outstanding balance on the first date.
TABLE 62
MORTGAGE BANK BONDS
STERLING DEBT
PERIO D 1928 - 1950
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AGRICULTURAL MORTGAGE MORTGAGE TOTAL
MORTGAGE BANK OF BANK OF (1) + (2)
BANK BOGOTA BOGOTA
(COL. PESO S)
1928 — 1595000 1595000
1929 1192500 2166900 3359400
1930 1175200 2137600 3312800
1931 1154700 2120100 3274800
1932 1154700 1985200 3139900
1933 1132800 1762000 2894800
1934 1096367 1760100 2856467
1935 1059934 1760100 2820034
1936 1023501 1760100 2783601
1937 987068 1760100 2747168
1938 950635 1760100 7304415 2710735
1939 914202 1760100 7304415 2674302
1940 877769 1760100 7304415 2637869
1941 841336 1760000 7304415 2601336
1942 804900 1035206 7304415 1840106
1943 804900 995391 7023476 1800291
1944 804900 934926 6596840 1739826
1945 784000 896344 6324600 1680344
1946 763100 896344 6324600 1659444
1947 750400 836117 5899640 1586517
1948 744167 836117 5899640 1580284
1949 737934 1146436 5618685 1884370
1950 731700 1089110 5337730 1820810
SOURCES.
AGRICULTURAL MORTGAGE BANK.
1929: The Stock Exchange Yearbook (1930). 1930-1933: CFB. 
1934-1942: repatriation of £327,900 equally distributed along 
the 9-year period. 1942-1944: a constant balance is assumed 
during the negotiation period. For 1945 CFB reports a balance 
equal to that reported in 1942 by the manager of the AMB. CFB,
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Correspondence files, 311-618, 2-12-42. 1945-1950: CFB, annual 
reports.
MORTGAGE BANK OF BOGOTA.
1928-1937: The Stock Exchange Yearbook, annual reports. 1938: 
Offer of settlement: C$7,304,415 bonds offered in exchange for 
£1,760,000 bonds. The Stock Exchange Yearbook (1939). 1939- 
1950: The Stock Exchange Yearbook, annual reports.
f. External debt of the banking system
Table 63 shows the evolution of total external liabilities of the banking system. The long­
term liabilities are the same mortgage bonds floated abroad. Three periods can be 
distinguished. The borrowing boom of 1926-1930 when bonds were sold in the United States 
and Europe, and domestic banks enjoyed increasing access to short-term funds provided by 
U.S. commercial banks; 40% of the financing obtained during this period was on a short-term 
basis.
A second period which would last over one decade -1931-1942-, corresponded to the 
reduction to minimum levels of short-term foreign lending to banks, and the cut off of long­
term foreign private lending. As seen, external financing to banks declined by 50% between 
1930 and 1934, and while short-term loans continued at very depressed levels, the gradual 
decline of long-term liabilities is explained by repatriations -which for the sake of simplicity 
were evenly distributed over time-. Finally, the exchanges of bonds and amortizations after 
the settlements of 1942-1944 accounted for the ultimate decline of long-term bank debt, 
while short-term lending reemerged with the recovery of international lending after World 
War n.
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TABLE 63
EXTERNAL LIABILITIES OF THE BANKING SYSTEM
1925 - 1950 
(Millions of US$)
SHORT-TERM LONG-TERM TOTAL
L IA B IL IT IE S L IA B IL I T I E S
1925 6.93 6.93
1926 12.19 8.63 20.82
1927 19.06 30.83 49.89
1928 20.84 43.61 64.45
1929 29.88 51 .67 81 .55
1930 31 .69 50.18 81 .87
1931 24.63 47.15 71 .78
1932 13.42 39.94 53.36
1933 9.31 38.32 47.63
1934 4.43 38.56 42.99
1935 2.69 36.53 39.22
1936 3.28 34.86 38.14
1937 5.57 32.92 38.49
1938 2.62 26.40 29.02
1939 2.59 24.42 27.01
1940 8.30 22.01 30.31
1941 9.57 20.18 29.75
1942 10.79 18.35 29.14
1943 3.06 16.12 19.18
1944 2.94 13.81 16.75
1945 2.86 11.51 14.37
1946 8.37 9.36 17.73
1947 1 6.64 8.47 25.11
1948 15.51 7.93 23.44
1949 13.58 6.25 19.83
1950 17.15 5.83 22.98
SOURCES.
For short-term liabilities: Informe del Superintendente 
Bancario. Annual Reports. For long-term liabilities: Tables 61 
and 62.
g. Total external debt
Table 64 is the final summary of our previous series. It divides total debt between public debt 
and bank debt. It is not the same as dividing debt between public and strictly private debt 
since part of it was publicly guaranteed. Additionally, appart from the originally publicly
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guaranteed debt of the AMB, some settlements extended the public guarantee to loans which 
did not get it in the first contract.
As expected from our previous descriptions, the total external debt of the country declined 
gradually since the early 1930s in spite of formal declarations of default in 1932-1933. This 
process was caused by bond repatriations concentrated during the 1930s and early 1940s, and 
by the resumption of payments during the 1940s.
In the aftermath of World War H, a new source of external financing emerged. 
Developmental agencies were created to offer international credits on a concessionary basis. 
Colombia had access to this sort of resources through the Ex-Im Bank since the early 1940s, 
and through the World Bank since 1949. During the 1950s and 1960s, developmental 
agencies were to become the predominant source of foreign financing. By that time, 
progressively dwindling balances were the only remainder of the era of bond finance.
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SECTION III
NOTES
1. The total outstanding dollar debt by the end of 1936 was of US$5.37 billion. Similarly, the 
outstanding amounts for Latin America, Europe, Far East and Africa, and Canada, were 
US$1.54 billion, US$1.66 billion, US$0.53 billion, and US$1.65 billion, respectively.
2. FBPC (1936), p.857
3. Ibid., p.860
4. Quoted by Lewis, Cleona (1938), p.421
5. Wallich, Henry (1943), p.322
6. Although the bankers' loan was originally contracted in 1930 for only one year, it was 
extended from time to time. Interests were fully paid. When the first round started, the 
maturity date of the loan was December 31,1935.
7. The Andian National Corporation and the Frederick Snare Corporation received 
Promissory Notes from the national government for loans destinW to finance Port Works in 
Cartagena.
8. Letter from the Colombian president Alfonso Lopez to Mr. J. Reuben Clark, president of 
the FBPC, September 8,1934. Revista Economia Colombiana, Julio-Agosto 1987, p.93-94.
9. Letter from Mr. J. Reuben Clark to president Lopez, August 22,1934. Revista Economia 
Colombiana, Julio-Agosto 1987, p.92.
10. Letter from president Lopez to Mr. J. Reuben Clark, Ibid., p.93.
11. The Secretary of the Colombian Bondholders Committee of New York -Hoover 
Committee- published a statement praising the attitude of the Colombian government, and 
indicated that he was able to announce -with the authorization of the Colombian president- 
that the external debt question was under consideration and plans existed to initiate 
negotiations with bondholders. The Journal of Commerce (New York), April 5,1935.
12. Circular letter to the holders of external dollar bonds of the Republic of Colombia - 
National, Departmental, Municipal, and Mortgage Bank, and Certificates of Deposit-. June 
15,1935. CFB, Extracts Vol II.
13. Circular letter. Ibid.
14. FBPC (1936), pp.7-8
15. The Financial Times, April 24, 25, and May 22,1935. Extracts Vol II
16. Of a total sum of about US$2.5 million of defaulted bonds, new arrangements involved 
US$1.8 million during 1934-1939, of which temporary settlements coverSl US$1.5 million. 
FBPC (1939), p.7
5 7 4
17. FBPC (1939), p.9
18. Information on repatriations is given in Memoria de Hacienda, 1942, pp.30-35.
19.The Stock Exchange Yearbook (London), 1934, p. 198
20. Letter from CFB to C. Palmer, 26-7-33. CFB Correspondence, File 1.
21. Questioning of James A. Sexton, of Baker, Kellog and Co. by the SEC. The Financial 
Times, December 1935. Extracts, Vol II
22. Questioning of George Merzback, a partner in Hallgarten and Co., fiscal agents for the 
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STATISTICAL APPENDIXES
COLOMBIAN LOANS FLOATED IN GREAT BRITAIN (1900-1929) 
AND THE UNITED STATES (1920-1929)
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FINAL THOUGHTS
Historians of economic analysis argue that unlike the case in natural sciences, the issues 
confronted by economists are permanently changing not only because economies change 
over time, but because new social and political situations challenge the ability of economists 
to offer the explanations the public expect from them. In this work we have argued that 
public debt is one of those areas of interest of the profession in which the influence of 
changes in the economy on the subjects of debate is apparent.
Our scrutiny has traced back six decades of public debt theorizing since the outbreak of the 
great depression in the late 1920s. Our aim has been to place that theorizing into perspective, 
by reviewing the achievements of the debaters with reference to the changing economic 
environments in which they wrote, and the challenges faced by the profession. We tried to 
identify central lines of research and controversy and to highlight individual contributions to 
the theory of public debt. The results of this work were offered to the reader in Part I.
To a great extent the theoretical debates discussed in Part I arose in connection with events 
and political realities in industrialized economies. In the last decade and a half theorists were 
captivated by the resurgence of high debt indicators in developed economies, and the 
outbreak of international debt problems. International economists addressed a variety of 
topics which involved not only the highly contentious issue of repudiation, but also the 
possibility of a global problem of "debt overhang", and the viability of writing down the debt 
principals.
Interestingly, professional economists and historians looked back to experiences of high 
internal debts in advanced economies, and a great deal of research was dedicated to interpret
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former external debt crises, and derive possible lessons for the present. Some researchers 
explored parallels between foreign debt crises in the 19th century and the 1980s, but it was 
the external debt crisis of the 1930s which attracted most attention. In a nutshell, under the 
pressure of events, economists and historians have revitalized the importance of studies in 
historical perspective.
In Part II, Part HI, and Part IV, we looked back to the Colombian experience with public 
debt, as an essay on economics in historical perspective. Based on historical documentation 
(quantitative and qualitative), part of it still unpublished, we defined the elements of a model 
which could guide us in our empirical and historical inquiries. A crucial point in the 
definition of this model is the different role played by the internal and the external debt. The 
documentation suggests that authorities have tended to prefer the external indebtedness to the 
internal debt, and that institutional restrictions on the access of the government to the credit 
of the central bank have been characteristic in the Colombia's case. Only under extreme 
contingencies, such as severe external shocks, the internal public debt should increase on a 
temporary basis so as to cushion the adverse effects of the external shocks on economic 
activity and the stability of the financial sector. Our econometric discussions in Peirt HI 
supported this hypothesis of the shock absorber role of the internal public debt, and our 
historical perusal in Part IV, Section II documented the relevant facts during the world 
depression which affected Colombia during the 1929-34 period.
Regarding the external debt, two central ideas stand out throughout the historical 
documentation, namely, that the access to foreign financing has been largely determined by 
cycles in external lending markets, and that a long-term relationship between Colombia and 
her creditors has existed since the period of Pax Britannica despite collapses of foreign 
lending and episodes of default. The key to the survival of such a long-term relationship has 
been the mechanism of debt recontracting through a variety of forms. The Colombian 
experience during the 1930s and 1940s which was chronicled in Part IV, Section IB, is
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illustrative of a diversity of forms of renegotiating debt contracts, which included 
rescheduling, buybacks, new loans, and reduction of interest rates.
Overall, the common factor of these essays on public debt -the theoretical debates and the 
Colombian experience- is the historical perspective. During the last decade, studies of this 
class have improved the understanding of the political economy of the public debt. To what 
extent our perusal has made its own contribution is a matter for the reader to decide.
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